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  ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the connection between the Peace, Order & Good Government doctrine 
(‘POGG’) and responses to requests for faith-based legal exceptionalism in England, 
Canada, and the United States. By assessing certain aspects of the three nations’ 
imperial/colonial heritage, the study demonstrates that POGG acts as the catalyst for their 
disparate approaches to constitutionalism (i.e., church-state arrangements). The 
connection is significant since the concept of multiculturalism has seemingly become the 
basis for justifying extraordinary accommodation requests that include not only non-
democratic political ideologies but also constitutionally-challenging religious choice of law 
preferences. The prevalence of requests for accommodation has been more recently linked 
to migrants from nations where religion and government are inextricably bound.  As such, 
this study demonstrates the imprudence of relying on multiculturalism when responding to 
constitutional inquiries that necessitate a return to foundational principles. By revisiting 
more recent requests for Islamic law exceptionalism, this study assesses POGG’s 
foundational connection to the national rejoinders of England and Canada. This study then 
advocates for the United States to return to foundational principles to frame a prudent 
rejoinder to similar requests, which will likely prevent an unprecedented enlargement of 
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“An idea is like a virus. Resilient. Highly contagious. 
And even the smallest seed of an idea can grow. It can grow to define or destroy you.”2 
It is generally understood that history is repetitive.  As the axiom goes, “what has been will 
be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.”3   
Notwithstanding the scholarly and/or political rebranding of a circumstance, history has 
shown itself capable of providing archetypical guidance for well-founded resolutions to 
modern societal issues.  As such, it is somewhat perplexing when certain societal issues 
recur, and the least persuasive modern alternative is the one that involves heeding past 
lessons to sidestep certain aspects of repetition.  This is arguably the present situation with 
requests for faith-based legal exceptionalism (i.e., sanctioning faith-based choice of law 
options or ecclesiastical law platforms in place of or as appendages to the national 
judiciary).  In the text, The Great Emergence, Phyllis Tickle suggests that throughout history 
”religion [has been] a social construct as well as an individual or private way of being and 
understanding.”4  Therefore, theories that suggest that one’s soul is inextricably linked to 
the belief system proliferated by a national government or constitution, or the belief that 
one’s religious ideology defies the laws of man—and should therefore be afforded 
extraordinary deference—are certainly not novel.  Even still, the question of whether to 
afford extraordinary deference to those who hold one or both of these viewpoints seemingly 
continues to confound.  
Instead of seeking lessons from history, the concept of multiculturalism has become the 
socio-political prophylactic to justify the Islamization of the social order in England, Canada, 
and the United States.  Islamization as a facet of multiculturalism has resulted in 
expectations for the accommodation of not only non-democratic political ideologies but 
also acceptance of the theory that the religious legal precepts that emanate from Islam’s 
religious text and prophet (i.e., the Quran and Sunnah) are compatible with the democratic 
perspectives and/or the national rule of law in each nation.  Accommodation also appears 
to assume that any encroachments on the religious liberties and/or legal rights of non-
Muslims are reasonable, as they are in furtherance of multicultural inclusion.  As the last 
instance of such expansive expectation of exceptionalism was occasioned by the rise of 
                                                          
2 Nolan, Christopher, et al. Inception. 2010. 
3 Ecclesiastes 1:9 (New International Version). 
4 Phyllis Tickle, The Great Emergence: How Christianity is Changing and Why (Baker Books 2012) 33. 
[2]  
 
the British Empire, this study returns to the common colonial heritage of England, Canada, 
and the United States to seek historical guidance concerning the Islamic law inquiry.  As 
the British Empire employed the doctrine of ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ or POGG 
to effectuate faith-based legal exceptionalism, this study endeavors to reassess the degree 
to which POGG affected constitutional perspectives on religious plurality in each nation.  
Reevaluating these effects also evidences that the most prudent guidance concerning the 
question of faith-based legal exceptionalism is embedded not in modern theories on 
multiculturalism but in that overlapping history.   
In the United States specifically, post-9/11 attitudes toward Muslim immigrants have been 
(and may remain) an enduring socio-political barrier to formulating a judicious legal 
response to what can be properly described as a trajectory-altering constitutional 
conundrum.  Instead, rebranding Islamic law exceptionalism as a facet of multiculturalism 
aids in fostering a theory that utilizing the American judiciary to uphold the legal precepts 
of Islam is supportable as indispensable to multicultural ‘authenticity’.5 This perspective 
also makes requests for Islamic law exceptionalism appear to be a matter of first 
impression, which dissuades making historical comparisons concerning the means by 
which denominations or religious subgroups attempt to secure superior deference on a 
nation or international scale. Therefore, the United States appears to have reached an 
alarming precipice, confronting the issue of allowing the purported demands of 
multiculturalism to justify unprecedented expansions to the 1st Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution for the sake of normalizing the religious guidelines and/or legal precepts 
associated with the Islamic faith. This is the case despite the wide-reaching implications, 
which include the likelihood of curtailing the rights and freedoms of citizens who do not 
espouse Islam.  
With this in mind, the general aim of this study is to demonstrate the aforementioned axiom 
in the socio-legal context, particularly where it pertains the convergence of 
multiculturalism, religious pluralism, and constitutionalism in the three focus nations.  The 
primary aim of this study is to underscore the problematic consequences of late-stage faith-
based legal exceptionalism—particularly as it concerns Islamic law—on denominationalism 
and religious liberty in nations that have already established a constitutional stance on 
religion and government disestablishment as a response to religious plurality.  Where it 
                                                          
5 Matthew Wright and others, ‘Multiculturalism and Muslim Accommodation: Policy and Predisposition 
Across Three Political Contexts’ (2017) 50 Comparative Political Studies 102, 103. 
[3]  
 
pertains the juxtaposition of the three nations, this study concentrates predominantly on 
the foundational history and current circumstances in the United States.  Although the 
nuances of the Islamic law inquiry in each nation will be assessed, the fact that England 
and Canada have already adopted national policies means that their circumstances are 
germane where they aid in informing the U.S. experience, or they provide guidance that 
might be beneficial in light of their common colonial nexus. Particularly relevant is the fact 
that, despite a protracted imperial/colonial relationship, England and Canada have 
adopted divergent policies based on the post-colonial effects of British Imperialism, which 
established the imperatives of POGG as a customary means of colonization.  The benefit 
of returning to the point where the three nations were parts of a larger whole is that it 
affords a more pristine vantage point from which to evaluate the weight of foundational 
history and the importance of constituting ideals when addressing faith-based legal 
exceptionalism.   
With this in mind, Chapter 1 establishes the scope and limitations of the research 
attempted herein by providing a basis for understanding not only the POGG doctrine but 
also the supporting concepts and theories relied upon in subsequent chapters. The 
analyses undertaken in Chapters 2 through 4 are historiographic in nature. They reevaluate 
certain historical occurrences in light of the implications of the POGG doctrine (and where 
relevant, the POgG clause) for England (Chapter 2), the United States (Chapter 3), and 
Canada (Chapter 4).  They also synopsize specific socio-legal issues created by the 
question of sanctioning Islamic law tribunals to highlight correlations between historical 
and modern expectations for faith-based legal exceptionalism. Thereafter, Chapter 5 
analyzes the present stance on Islamic law in the U.S. in light of the viewpoints of the 
Constitutional Framers.  This juxtaposition evidences the benefit of heeding the Framers’ 
assessments on religious liberty where they intersect with the constitutionality of national 
exemptions and/or exceptionalism. Chapter 6 evaluates the potential consequences of the 
U.S. disregarding the implications of the POGG doctrine, and by extension reinforces the 
case against disregarding the Framers’ guidance concerning denominationalism and 
religious equilibrium.  Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this study by considering future 






METHODOLOGY: RELEVANT CONCEPTS & THEORIES 
“The most enduring meaning conveyed by Lady Liberty has nothing to do with immigration,  
and I say let's go back to that. The statue's original name is “Liberty Enlightening the World,” 
 and the tablet the lady holds in her left hand reads “July IV, MDCCLXXVI”  
to commemorate the signing of the Declaration of Independence.”6 
 
For the United States, the inevitability of the accommodation of the ideologies of 
immigrants from non-democratic nations became a more provocative national 
predicament after 1965.7 On 3 October 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson, using the 
Statue of Liberty (Enlightening the World) as the backdrop, signed into law an immigration 
reform bill.8  While Congress wrangled with affording the right to vote to the ancestors of 
the nation’s ‘involuntary’ immigrant population—i.e., former slaves—the Hart-Celler 
Immigration Act of 1965 (‘HCA-65’) moved unassumingly through both Houses.9  Johnson 
down-played the impact of the legislation to get it passed; he opined that the bill was 
neither revolutionary nor bound to affect the lives of the millions of Americans already living 
in the United States.10  According to the former President:  
[i]t will not reshape the structure of our daily lives. ... Yet it is still one 
of the most important acts of this Congress and of this 
administration. For it does repair a very deep and painful flaw in the 
fabric of American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in 
the conduct of the American nation.11   
Kammer clarifies that “[t]he wrong that Johnson and Congress sought to correct was 
codified in legislation passed 41 years earlier, during a post-war era fraught with anxiety 
about mass immigration, the shadow of European radicalism, and theories of racial 
superiority.”12  As such, HCA-65 abolished America’s national origins quota system, which 
had been central to U.S. immigration policy since the 1920s.13  In its place, the U.S. 
                                                          
6 Roberto Suro, ‘The Statue of Liberty’s Real Stand’ Washington Post (Washington DC, 5 July 2009) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/02/AR2009070201737.html> 
accessed 20 November 2018. 
7 See Charles B Keely, ‘Effects of the Immigration Act of 1965 on Selected Population Characteristics of 
Immigrants to the United States’ (1971) 8 Demography 157, 157-61. 
8 Jerry Kammer, ‘The Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965: Political Figures and Historic Circumstances 
Produced Dramatic, Unintended Consequences’ (2015) <https://cis.org/Report/HartCeller-Immigration-
Act-1965> accessed 19 November 2018. 
9 Kammer (n 8). 
10 Kammer (n 8). 
11 Kammer (n 8). 
12 Kammer (n 8). 
13 Kammer (n 8). 
[5]  
 
Government adopted “a preference system that focused on immigrants’ skills and family 
relationships with citizens or residents of the U.S.”14  Although Johnson claimed that HCA-
65 would not effectuate expansive change, Zeitz notes that the policy modification 
“opened the floodgates to new immigrants when it went into effect in 1968.”15  Profiling 
post-Act immigration, Keely illustrates that since becoming law, the Act has substantially 
affected the migration profile in the United States.16  Specifically, it has affected the 
“national origins and professional characteristics of [post-1968] immigrants,” which Keely 
projected would lead to sharper distinctions and fragmentation of the ethnic landscape.17 
His predictions have undoubtedly come to pass. 
Enactment of HCA-65 has also brought about a number of unanticipated consequences. 
These consequences have not only been catalysts for present socio-political divisiveness 
concerning multiculturalism, but they also buttress the growing number of arguments in 
favor of reforming the previously reformed immigration laws in the United States.18  One of 
the unanticipated consequences is that the legislation led to ‘chain immigration 
practices’.19  The chain immigration process starts with the naturalization of new or 
‘principal’ immigrants.20  Thereafter, principal immigrants sponsor as many relatives from 
their home nations as possible, thereby creating “an ever-lengthening migratory 
process.”21  Guild notes that this method “is the most common legal form of immigration 
to the United States.”22  Another unanticipated consequence has been increased illegal 
immigration.23  As there has been much consternation in recent years around the use of 
the term ‘illegal’ immigrant, as an affront to the humanity of those seeking asylum or 
refugee status, it is worth offering a proper legal definition.   Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
‘illegal immigrant’ as the term given to a non-national working or living in the a country 
                                                          
14 Kammer (n 8). 
15 Josh Zeitz, ‘The 1965 Law That Gave the Republican Party Its Race Problem’ [2016] POLITICO Magazine 
<www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/immigration-1965-law-donald-trump-gop-214179>. 
16 Keely (n 7), 160. 
17 Keely (n 7), 157. 
18 Kammer (n 8). 
19 Kammer (n 8). 
20 Bin Yu, ‘The Principal Immigrants: The Initiators of Migration Chains’ in Steven J Gold and Rubén G 
Rumbaut (eds), Chain Migration Explained : The Power of the Immigration Multiplier (LFB Scholarly 
Publishing LLC 2008) 103. 
21 Yu (n 20), 103; See also, Blair Guild, ‘What Is “Chain Migration”?’ CBS News Report (Washington DC, 29 
January 2018) <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-chain-migration-definition-visa-trump-
administration-family-reunification/>. 
22 Guild (n 21). 
23 Kammer (n 8). 
[6]  
 
“with no right to stay who has taken no steps to become a citizen.”24  For the purposes of 
this study, this includes those applicants who take the necessary initial steps to gain entry 
to the U.S.; but once in country, they discontinue pursuing proper citizenship which leads 
to overstaying their visas and/or disregarding the immigration hearing process.25  As a 
result of HCA-65, Kammer explains that illegal immigration has “experienced a decades-
long surge.”26  Illegal immigration flow has resulted in an estimated 12.5 million illegal 
immigrants residing in the U.S. as of October 2017.  As of 2019, the cost of illegal 
immigration associated with the unexpected consequences of HCA-65 is estimated at 
$200 billion American tax dollars annually.27   
1.1 Muslim Immigration & Islamic Law in the Post-9/11 Context 
As Keely also predicted, these unanticipated outcomes have brought about changes in 
ethnic and religious politics in the United States.28  This is especially the case where recent 
increases in immigration from Muslim-majority nations are concerned—via chain 
immigration, refugee/asylum relocation, or illegal migration.  This has placed a spotlight on 
expectations to accommodate the preferences of those espousing Islam, which are 
religious yet couched as cultural, which appears to have become a focal-point in an already 
charged environment of immigration-centric tension.  The circumstances were worsened 
by episodic acts of terror perpetrated by Islamic extremists between 1993 and 2006 in the 
United States, England, and Canada (collectively ‘9/11’).  The 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing in the United States reinvigorated feelings of skepticism concerning Islam and the 
dangers of Muslim immigration.29  This is partly attributable to the fact that the Muslim 
                                                          
24 ‘What Is Illegal Alien or Immigrant?’ (Black’s Law Dictionary Online 2nd Ed., 2018)  <https://thelaw 
dictionary.org/illegal-alien/> accessed 20 November 2018. 
25 ‘What You Need to Know About Catch and Release’ (Statements from the White House, 2018) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/need-know-catch-release/> accessed 2 April 2018. 
See also, Phillip Connor and Jens Manuel Krogstad, ‘The Number of Refugees Admitted to the U.S. Has 
Fallen, Especially among Muslims’ (2018) <https://pewrsr.ch/2IclDLK>; Kelly Sadler, ‘The Real Cost of 
Illegal Immigration, and It’s Not Avocados’ Washington Post (Washington DC, 5 June 2019) 
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/5/the-real-cost-of-illegal-immigration-and-its-not-a/>; 
Michelle Malkin, ‘The Post-9/11 Cycle of Cynicism’ National Review (Washington DC, 12 September 2018) 
<https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/09/visa-overstayer-problem-continues-17-years-after-9-11/>. 
Collectively, these articles distinguish between illegal immigrants and refugees and asylum seekers.  The 
U.S. distinguishes between refugees and asylum seekers. Applications for the former are administered 
overseas, and the applicants later resettle in the U.S., while the latter “claim asylum while in the U.S. or at 
an airport or land border checkpoint.”  The definitional distinction is noteworthy as more recent illegal 
immigration debates focus on migrants at the Mexican border seeking asylum, while the lion’s share of 
those who seek refugee status and/or overstay their temporary visas are from Muslim-majority nations. 
26 Kammer (n 8). 
27 Sadler (n 25). 
28 Keely (n 7), 157. 
29 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 2; See also, Rachel R Steele and others, ‘Emotion Regulation and Prejudice Reduction 
[7]  
 
extremists involved in the 9/11 and Boston Marathon bombings misused international 
goodwill by availing themselves of America’s refugee/asylum relocation process to enter 
the nation.30   
On a broader scale, the events of 9/11—in conjunction with other acts of terror perpetrated 
by Islamic extremists throughout the European continent—brought Islam into the national 
and international spotlight with a new intensity.31  As such, assessments of the world order 
have become marked by two postures, pre- and post-9/11.  In Why the West Fears Islam: 
An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies, Jocelyne Cesari points out that in the 
post-9/11 posture, there has been a primary focus on securitization, which sees Islam “as 
an existential threat to European and American political and security interests and thereby 
justifies extraordinary measures against it.”32  Cesari also observes that “the post-9/11 
era adds concerns on pluralization of societies and security, therefore, exacerbating and 
resurrecting the mentality of an ‘us versus them’ where Muslims are ‘them’.”33 
Consequently, nations in the West appear to have made national security central to any 
decisions concerning immigration and multiculturalism in the post-9/11 posture.  The 
sheer weight of post-9/11 trepidation across national and international landscapes has 
undoubtedly made attempts to evaluate appropriate levels of accommodation of Islamic 
religious proclivities extremely difficult.  However, such an evaluation is necessary to 
achieve ‘reasonable’ accommodation for Muslim migrants without discounting the rule of 
law and/or the rights of those who pre-date them.  This is especially relevant as inadequate 
efforts to scope religious and/or cultural differences appear to be a significant factor in 
multicultural tension that exists in the three focus nations.  The aspects of this excessively-
detailed debate are multi-faceted, to say the least.   
1.2 Distinguishing between Islamic Law Exceptionalism & Multiculturalism  
Seen by some as the proper means to defuse persistent tension between the ‘us versus 
them’ dichotomy and the consequences of HCA-65, policies promoting the concept of 
                                                          
Following Acute Terrorist Events: The Impact of Reflection before and after the Boston Marathon Bombings’ 
(2017) 22 Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 43, 43-4. 
30 Malkin (n 25). 
31 Cesari (n 29), xiv-xv; See also, Chris Weller, ‘Startling Maps Show Every Terrorist Attack Worldwide Over 
the Last 20 Years’ Business Insider (New York, 1 November 2017) <https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
global-terrorist-attacks-past-20-years-in-maps-2017-5?r=UK&IR=T>. 
32 Cesari (n 29), xvii-xviii. 
33 Cesari (n 29), 4. 
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multiculturalism sprang into action like some sort of superhero.34  For the purposes of this 
study, ‘multiculturalism’ is defined as a “feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity, 
encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, 
music and cuisine that exist in multi-ethnic society.”35  Hence, the general aims of 
multiculturalism seem to have been to promote aspects of cultural diversity that are ‘value-
adds’ to host nations.  Kymlicka notes that, “from the 1970s to the mid-1990s there was 
a clear trend across Western democracies toward the increased recognition and 
accommodation of [aspects of] diversity through a range of multiculturalism policies and 
minority rights.”36  Therefore, the solution to the tension would appear to be as unassuming 
as utilizing the concept of multiculturalism to “enable minority group members to live an 
authentic life” within the societal culture of the nation to which they migrate.37  Where it 
pertains Muslim immigration, this unassuming celebration of cultural difference has 
seemingly come to encompass the Islamization of Western culture.38  For the purposes of 
this study, ‘Islamization’ is defined as the “integration of cultural, political, [and/or] 
legal…systems with Islamic doctrines…or their production from an Islamic perspective.”39   
The primary issue created by the theory of Islamization is that the perspective appears to 
inconspicuously expand traditional notions of multiculturalism to include the often-non-
democratic political ideologies and foreign legal systems of Islamic nations.  This outcome 
manifests itself in the expansive scope of requests for accommodation for certain 
immigrants to live an authentic life—i.e., the life they would have if they had never migrated.  
However, the perspective in practice has the effect of infringing on native citizens or those 
who have migrated with a full appreciation of the subjective nature of the concept of 
‘authenticity’.  As such, it appears that the opposing perspectives on reasonable 
accommodation have resulted in “a backlash and retreat from multiculturalism, and a re-
assertion of ideas of nation building, common values and identity, and unitary citizenship—
even a return to assimilation.”40  This would explain more recent analyses, such as those 
of Kymlicka, Wright et al., and Adida et al., which suggest that multiculturalism as an 
                                                          
34 See generally, Will Kymlicka, ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and 
Accommodation in Diverse Societies’ (2010) 61 International Social Science Journal 97; Keith Banting and 
Will Kymlicka, ‘Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the 
Multiculturalism Policy Index’ (2013) 11 Comparative European Politics 577. 
35 Kymlicka (n 34), 97. 
36 Kymlicka (n 34), 97. 
37 Wright and others (n 5), 103. 
38 Gerhard Bowering and others, ‘Islamization’, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought 
(Princeton University Press 2012) 263, 263. 
39 Gerhard Bowering and others (n 38), 263. 
40 Kymlicka (n 34), 97. 
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approach to more recent mass immigration is not only flawed but waning by suspicion of 
over-infringement.41  Thus, leaders as well as native citizens of many nations across Europe 
and North America have begun to signal “a death warrant for multicultural experiments,” 
as said experiments have ‘utterly failed’ to achieve their desired aims.42  
As far as shifts in attitudes are concerned, they appear to be in some remarkable way 
connected with two noteworthy occurrences. The first is the pitting of multiculturalism 
against assimilation instead of establishing the two ideologies as symbiotic approaches to 
immigration, cultural inclusion, and individual accountability.  Multiculturalism tends to be 
viewed as the antithesis to the concept of assimilation.43   Where it relates to Muslim 
migration, Adida et al. synopsize the ‘multiculturalist’ versus ‘assimilationist’ debate in Why 
Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies.  The debate has become integral 
to approaching the ethnic, cultural, and political differences between “Muslim immigrants 
and host population[s].”44  Building on the contributions of multiple scholars, Adida et al. 
explain that, “[t]he assimilationist model is reinforced by a theory in which assimilation is 
achieved when immigrants “adhere to the common set of values and norms…to guarantee 
the moral order and coherence of…society.”45 The assimilationist model is perceived to 
benefit both the ‘native majority’ and more recent immigrants.  This model has its genesis 
in “the idea of cultural incompatibility that recalls Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ theory’.”46 Alternatively, the multiculturalist model is predicated on the 
rejection of the theory of cultural incompatibility in favor of “cultural pluralism based on the 
coexistence of different cultures and values.”47  Moreover, this perspective stresses the 
theory that “successful integration of immigrants is best realized if governments celebrate 
the cultural diversity that is entailed by recent immigration and acknowledge the culture of 
                                                          
41 Kymlicka (n 34), 97; Wright and others (n 5), 104; Claire L Adida, David D Laitin and Marie-Anne Valefort, 
Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies (Harvard University Press 2016) 4-11. 
42 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13; See also, Kymlicka (n 34), 97. Adida and others citing Kymlicka and 
statements made by former-Prime Minister David Cameron of the U.K. and Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany. 
43 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13. 
44 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13. 
45 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13. 
46 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13; See also, Samuel P Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ [1993] 
Foreign Affairs <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>. 
According to Huntington, “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of 
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal 
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of 
civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the 
future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern 
world.”  
47 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13. 
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minority groups as having equal value to the mainstream culture.”48  While England, 
Canada, and the United States have to varying degrees shifted from the assimilation 
approach to the multicultural approach, the most probative aspects of these national shifts 
is that reports have continued to evidence that national policies “oriented toward 
assimilation [have] better returns for integration than do policies that emphasize 
multiculturalism.”49 
The pitting of the two approaches also appears to be the basis for more recent 
disillusionment with multicultural practices and immigration policies in Western nations 
generally.  Cesari alludes to the fact that, instead of moving toward integration, this way of 
thinking feeds into the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy, which in turn continues to create 
concerns about mass Muslim immigration.50  When the concerns of citizens who pre-date 
‘them’ have been labeled irrational and seemingly ignored—despite continued radicalized 
Muslim attacks—concern appears to have been replaced by disdain and/or 
disinterestedness in the promotion of multiculturalism in general.  Along the same lines, 
Adida et al. demonstrate that this way of thinking produces ‘a discriminatory equilibrium’.51  
This is where “host populations discriminate against Muslims even when it does not expect 
any particular hostility from them,” which carries over into perceptions concerning 
demands for expansive levels of accommodation associated with Islam.52   
At the same time, “Muslims behave in ways that feed rational Islamophobia” by promoting 
Islam as an all-encompassing organism that negates immigrants’ need to even try to 
integrate.53  In both of these circumstances, the promoted and perceived mutual exclusivity 
of the two approaches prevents any opportunity to endorse the benefits of multiculturalism 
while simultaneously reinforcing the need for assimilation in some areas.  This is especially 
the case when the practical reality is that there are certain aspects of multiculturalism that 
cannot supplant societal assimilation and vice versa.  Although beyond the scope of this 
study, recent studies suggest that failing to foster proper integration between immigrant 
minority groups and the national majority; focusing too heavily on multicultural identity; and 
undervaluing the importance of core nationalism created the groundswell that has come 
                                                          
48 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 13. 
49 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 14. 
50 Cesari (n 29), 4. 
51 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 14. 
52 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 14. 
53 Adida, Laitin and Valefort (n 41), 14. 
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to be labelled as the ‘retreat from multiculturalism’.54  Moreover, incongruity in areas of 
language and literacy, education and employment opportunities, and political engagement 
have been highlighted as consequences of pitting the benefits of multiculturalism against 
the inherent need for societal integration.55 
The second perspective involves apparent attempts to take a ‘kitchen-sink’ approach to 
multiculturalism.  That is, the celebration of multicultural identity and accommodation 
demands societal acceptance of everything but the kitchen sink.  In the text, Culture and 
Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Barry observes, “[m]ulti-culturalists 
tend to be intellectual magpies, picking up attractive ideas and incorporating them into 
their theories without worrying too much about how they might fit together.”56  As long as 
a practice is even loosely linked as “an element in the culture of the group whose practice 
it is,” it deserves to be placed under the umbrella of multiculturalism while receiving broad 
promotion and/or protection.57  Evaluating multiculturalism in this way results in creating 
claims that justify a practice without the need to “demonstrate that it satisfies some 
universalistic criterion of value.”58  According to Barry, “[a]ll we need say-and, indeed, all 
we can say-is that, simply [by] virtue of forming part of a group’s culture, it is essential to 
its well-being.”59  This lends to a problem that, according to Barry, can be defined as the 
“inconsistency between cultural incommensurability and cultural equality.”60  Specifically, 
an inconsistency is established by “the notion that there is no common standard by which 
cultures, and the practices embedded in them, can be evaluated…but at the same time 
[the perspective demands that cultures are]…presumed or affirmed to be of equal value.”61  
Put another way, there are incommensurable aspects of every ethnic group’s culture that 
                                                          
54 See generally, Elke Winter, ‘Rethinking Multiculturalism After Its “Retreat”: Lessons From Canada’ (2015) 
59 American Behavioral Scientist 637, 637-39; See also, Víctor M Muñiz-Fraticelli, ‘The Inadequacy of 
Multiculturalism’, The Structure of Pluralism (Oxford Scholarship Online 2014); Nasar Meer and others, 
‘Examining “Postmulticultural” and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark’ (2015) 
59 American Behavioral Scientist 702; Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, ‘The New Integrationism, the 
State and Islamophobia: Retreat from Multiculturalism in Australia’ (2008) 36 International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice 230; Siobhán Mullally, ‘Retreat from Multiculturalism: Community Cohesion, Civic 
Integration and the Disciplinary Politics of Gender’ (2013) 9 International Journal of Law in Context 411; 
Laura Reidel, ‘Beyond a State-Centric Perspective on Norm Change: A Multilevel Governance Analysis of the 
Retreat from Multiculturalism’ (2015) 21 Global Governance 317; Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ‘Is 
There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index’ 
(2013) 11 Comparative European Politics 577. 
55 Kymlicka (n 34), 97-9. 
56 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity Press 2007) 252. 
57 Barry (n 56), 252. 
58 Barry (n 56), 252. 
59 Barry (n 56), 253.  See also, [3], 264-71. 
60 Barry (n 56), 252. 
61 Barry (n 56), 253. 
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by adoption also allows a nation to become a better version of itself; however, there are 
undoubtedly some aspects that may not. The point however seems to be that those who 
promote a kitchen-sink approach to multiculturalism make no attempt to discern those 
aspects that do or do not foster the specific society’s betterment.   
It is within this context that multiculturalism will be evaluated for the purpose of 
determining how England and Canada returned to foundational principles to address the 
question of statutorily affording faith-based legal exceptionalism to Islam’s religious edicts 
under alternative dispute resolution schemes (‘ADR’) and/or by deference within the 
national judiciary.  For the purposes of this study, ‘faith-based legal exceptionalism’ aims 
to afford extraordinary treatment to religious subgroups or denominations by furthering one 
of two outcomes.  It results adopting extra-constitutional measures that employ contract 
law as the conduit for the jurisprudential application of religious texts and/or traditions in 
circumvention of the national juridical framework.  Alternatively, it results in national courts’ 
reliance on or affording deference to religious texts and/or traditions, which are invariably 
the laws of foreign Muslim-majority nations, to guide judicial decisions instead of or in 
conjunction with the national rule of law.   
Assessing the outcomes in England and Canada will also exemplify why it might be prudent 
for the United States to return to foundational ideals and principles in addressing 
analogous requests for Islamic law exceptionalism.  In other words, the issues produced by 
post-9/11 perspectives and shielding certain facets of Islamization under the umbrella of 
multiculturalism make prudent the return to foundational principles to offer a 
constitutionally sustainable rejoinder to the question of faith-based legal exceptionalism.  
By returning to foundational principles, national policies avoid claims of Islamophobia as 
well as possible by-blows of the ebb and flow of multiculturalism, which may come to 
uniformly affect Western attitudes toward the plethora of idiosyncratic proclivities that have 
come to be indiscriminately linked with its expanding definition. 
1.3 Contextualizing the Question of Islamic Law Exceptionalism 
Despite the contentious debates concerning Muslim accommodation, recent legislative 
and/or Constitutional evaluations concerning Islamic law exceptionalism will figure 
tangentially in the analyses attempted herein.  However, there are several areas that will 
remain beyond the scope of this study. One such area is the debate over whether ‘political-
Islam’ creates the need for modification to national or international immigration 
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practices.62  Instead, this study accepts that it is generally understood that perceptions of 
threat hamper the ability to address multicultural cohesion for those who are attempting 
to live as an inclusive democratic community in the aforementioned nations.  This is 
especially the case where multi-lateral xenophobia and religious prejudice continuously 
resurface as Islamic terrorist activity continues on a national and international scale.  
Repetition of these instances ostensibly continues to feed the perception of present and 
future danger.  
Another area that is beyond the scope of this study is the intensely fragmented quagmire 
that encompasses socio-political debates focused on legislative or judicial determinations 
as to ‘public-space’ accommodations, such as ‘veiling’.63  This study will focus on clarifying 
relevant colonial and post-colonial occurrences that buttress constitutional policies, 
thereby establishing a cogent foundation for divergent approaches to accommodating or 
not accommodating specific cultural preferences.  Although inferences might be possible 
where it pertains other areas of religious accommodation, they are not the aim of this study.  
It might seem natural to consider veiling in public spaces and legally sanctioning Islamic 
law exceptionalism as mutually-inclusive preferences.  However, this study distinguishes 
between them.  As similar legal distinctions have been drawn concerning other religious 
denominations and subgroups co-existing in the aforementioned nations, this study revisits 
those demarcating lines, especially as they inform national approaches to religion and 
                                                          
62 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Islam and Human Rights’ in John Witte and M Christian Green (eds), Religion 
and Human Rights: An Introduction (Oxford University Press 2011) 63; See also, John M Owen IV, 
Confronting Political Islam: Six Lessons from the West’s Past (Princeton University Press 2015). In 
addressing what is meant by the concept of ‘political-Islam’, An-Na’im notes that since the 1970s there 
have been mounting demands for the enforcement of certain principles of Sharia as the official law of the 
ummah, commonly known as the rise of ‘political Islam’.”  Along the same lines, Owen’s text considers 
specifically the question of how more liberal Western nations should respond to the challenges of political-
Islam, which includes questions of immigration and to some degree accommodation of the politics and 
laws emanating from the politicization of Islam. 
63 See e.g., Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion (Oxford University 
Press 2012). The entirety of Elver’s text is dedicated to comparative legal analysis of the ongoing brouhaha 
over of Muslim women’s headscarf in Western nations from sociological and legal perspectives. Moreover, 
there are many others, and they seem to be long on discussion but short on conclusions beyond legally 
enforced ‘accommodation’.  As such, it is fair to say that a consensus on hijabs (and nicabs) in public space 
is nowhere in sight.  However, the articles, dissertations, and books continue to be published by Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike in an effort to change the trajectory of general perspectives on women of Islam 
and/or Islam as a religious dogma…or to maintain the status quo. As it relates to this study, whether 
wearing either or both items proclaims freedom or suppression is less consequential, unless they are used 
as a means to suppress the legal and/or religious liberties of non-Muslims. Said another way, unless these 
items afford Muslim women undue advantage or exceptional treatment under the law or hinder the rights of 




government entanglement or ‘church-state arrangements’.64  As this study will consider 
sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism exclusively, becoming more engaged in the ‘public 
space’ debate in this setting would be an exercise in futility in light of the primary aims of 
this study.  
Finally, this study will not attempt to contribute to academic scholarship that has as its 
objective endorsing the application of Islamic law in Western nations.  Much of that 
scholarship follows the line of reasoning that the ability to further legal claims by nationally 
sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism is the appropriate response because it 
promotes ‘multiculturalism’ or demonstrates ‘religious tolerance’.   However, there appears 
to be a scarcity of demonstrative evidence that either condition is furthered by the 
sanctioning of any faith-based legal platform, including those dispensing Islamic law.  
Moreover, pro-Islamic law scholarship often overlooks ever-growing discourse—including 
that of female Muslim scholars and activists like Manea, Ali, Murabit, and Bennoune—that 
not only refutes the aforementioned claims but also demonstrates specific instances of 
gender disproportionality in Islam generally, which is legally memorialized when Islamic law 
is applied substantively or procedurally.65  One might conclude that where it pertains 
Muslims who make the conscious choice to be treated disproportionately, it is the 
Government’s responsibility to sanction the platform for said treatment.  Although this 
specific supposition will be addressed in the final two substantive chapters of this study, it 
will not extend beyond analyzing the effects of post-imperial/colonial constitutionalism in 
England, Canada, and the United States.  
Additionally, pro-Islamic law scholarship often fails to address substantive and/or 
procedural legal issues that are prevalent in liberal democratic nations when claims 
invoking religious law do not remain confined to the sphere of specific religious law 
tribunals.66 In some instances, the tribunals attempt to extend their jurisdictional 
                                                          
64 WC Durham, Jr., ‘Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework’ in Vicki C Jackson and 
Mark Tushnet (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law (3rd edn, Foundation Press 2014) 1412-21. 
65 See e.g., Elham Manea, Women and Shari’a Law: The Impact of Legal Pluralism in the UK (IB Tauris & Co 
Ltd 2016); Shaheen Sardar Ali, Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2016); 
Samina Ali, ‘TEDx Talks: What Does the Quran Really Say About a Muslim Woman’s Hijab?’ <https://youtu. 
be/_ J5bDhMP9lQ>; Karima Bennoune, Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here: Untold Stories from the Fight 
Against Muslim Fundamentalism (2014); Alaa Murabit, ‘What My Religion Really Says About Women’ 
<https://www.ted.com/talks/alaa_murabit_what_my_religion_really_says_about_women?utm_campaign=t
edspread&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=tedcomshare>; Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ‘Setting the 
Scene’, Muslim Women in America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today (Oxford University Press 2006).  
See also, Footnote 198, which address the research findings of Yüksel Sezgin, which provide yet another 
example of the issues presented by faith-based legal exceptionalism. 
66 See e.g., Bernard Jackson, ‘“Transformative Accommodation” and Religious Law’ (2009) 11 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 131; Zaleha Kamaruddin, Umar A Oseni and Syed Khalid Rashid, 
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boundaries (i.e., ‘jurisdictional creep’).67  In others, litigants either attempt to forum shop 
or move their religion-centric claims from religious tribunals to the national court systems.68   
This is the case even though they are aware that forfeiture of national court access is the 
condition of seeking redress from the religious tribunal.69  These attempts raise questions 
about the problematic implications that overstepping these boundaries has on the national 
juridical framework as well as the repercussions of infringing on the religious and legal 
rights of non-Muslim citizenry by state-wide or national imposition of Islamic law precepts.  
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, these are current prevailing issues in 
England as a result of her ‘post-Imperial’ attempts at exceptionalism.  
Instead of venturing into the fray of any of the aforementioned scholarly debates, this study 
will focus on Islamic law platforms as the most recent tri-national circumstance of requests 
to sanction faith-based legal exceptionalism.  The circumstances surrounding these 
requests highlight the question of whether faith-based legal choice of law is a 
constitutionally recognized aspect of ‘religious liberty’. Moreover, the circumstances beg 
the question of whether sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism is indispensable to 
the promotion of multiculturalism or religious tolerance when evaluated in light of 
furthering post-colonial liberal democratic ideals.  To achieve these ends, this study will 
juxtapose the central points raised in deliberations about Islamic law exceptionalism in the 
aforementioned nations at varying points between 2005 and 2016. This is done for the 
purpose of demonstrating how three nations that possess a common colonial heritage 
could highlight similar themes and raise parallel concerns about a prevalent socio-legal 
conundrum while yielding dissimilar outcomes.  More to the point, this juxtaposition will 
illustrate how British Imperialism and integration of the concept of Peace, Order & Good 
Government (‘POGG’) or the Peace, Order & good Government clause (‘POgG’) resulted in 
differing constitutional frameworks (i.e., approaches to liberal democracy); divergent 
                                                          
‘“Transformative Accommodation”: Towards the Convergence of Sharīah and Common Law in Muslim 
Minority Jurisdictions’ (2016) 30 Arab Law Quarterly 245.  Although both articles find ‘transformative 
accommodation’ compelling, neither is able to find a definitive means by which to make the theory useful 
where it pertains to differing religious approaches to judicial proceedings.  Where Jackson’s analysis is 
concerned, his conclusions focus specifically on the distinctions between religious and secular marriages, 
which yields very different outcomes in how transformative accommodation could be uniformly applied to 
Muslims, Jews, Christians, and the non-religious alike.   
67 Baroness Caroline Cox, ‘Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill [HL] 2014-15’ (UK Parliament 
Website) <https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/arbitrationandmediationservicesequality.html>. 
68 Cox (n 67). 
69 Cox (n 67). 
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contemporary church-state arrangements; and disparate rationales for their approaches to 
faith-based legal exceptionalism.  
1.4 The Imperativeness of Constitutionalism in an Era of Human Rights Debate 
Although this study will consider the ‘international’ reach of the POGG doctrine as it informs 
the constitutional approaches to religious liberty espoused by the three focus nations, it is 
useful to clarify that this study will sidestep the fray of scholarly discourse focused on 
international human rights law.  It may seem intuitive to evaluate the concept of faith-based 
legal exceptionalism by the mandates of human rights treaties and/or within the scope of 
international judicial decisions.  This perspective can be attributed to the fact that the topic 
of human rights has grown in popularity by attracting a following of scholarly researchers 
whilst also focusing or redirecting the careers of myriad legal practitioners from different 
parts of the world.70  This trend notwithstanding, scholarly discourse focused on scoping 
certain rights or freedoms outside the realm of international human rights law remains 
quite robust.  This is especially the case where it pertains historical and/or constitutional 
analyses.  Moreover, constitutional histories are particularly probative where multi-national 
perspectives appear to have notable similarities, yet ratification of specific international 
treaties does not yield corresponding interpretation/implementation.  In some instances, 
the bases for divergent national policies are made explicit by the reservations, 
understandings, and/or declarations (‘RUDs’) upon which certain nations condition their 
ratification.  In other instances, it becomes apparent when, despite support for or even 
ratification of particular treaties, certain articles are simply not adopted nationally, even 
when the preferred meaning of those articles are reinforced by international judicial 
decisions.71   
In either case, the history of a nation’s constitutional development is imperative to any 
evaluation of a nation’s response or approach to the preservation of certain rights or 
freedoms, even those that have come to fit within the purview of international human rights 
advocacy.  In the text Comparative Human Rights Law, Sandra Fredman frames this 
perspective as follows: 
On the one hand, there is a broadly similar common core of human 
rights both internationally and domestically, and human rights 
                                                          
70 Sandra Fredman, Comparative Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2018), 30. 
71 For example, the United States has not ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’); 
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guarantees in different jurisdictions have important central affinities, 
often through conscious adoption or adaption.72 
… 
On the other hand, human rights are inevitably formulated in open-text 
terms, requiring interpretation and application in specific contexts.  
The differences in text, culture, history, and institutions might be [more 
important] than the similarities.73 
Thus, this study will not explore international treaties or judicial decisions focused on 
human rights beyond offering this introductory clarification.  This study will instead 
demonstrate by comparative analyses that constitutionalism through a foundational lens 
provides a more appropriate and compelling basis for analyzing how England and Canada 
have evaluated and how the United States should evaluate the accommodation of faith-
based legal exceptionalism, which has accompanied more recent immigration from non-
democratic nations or from nations where religion and government are indistinguishably 
entangled.   
Despite the importance of constitutional history to this study, offering specific justification 
for sidestepping international human rights discourse is warranted to allow this study to be 
evaluated in the proper context.  Primarily, this study will remain within the sphere of 
comparative constitutionalism because the landscape where international human rights 
and religious liberty intersect is notably fragmented.  In the text, Religion, Human Rights, 
Equality and the Public Sphere, Christopher McCrudden opines, “[t]he architecture of 
human rights and its relationship to religion is in the course of being constructed.”74  
Although the concept of human rights is often grounded in principles of human dignity and 
personal autonomy, neither human rights scholars nor practitioners have reached 
consensus concerning how to appropriately scope certain public manifestations of 
religion—e.g., the establishment of faith-based legal tribunals—which may be perceived by 
some but not others as facets of religious liberty.75   
The incongruity of meaning appears to be attributable to the fact that the phrase ‘human 
rights’ has come to be employed to reference a plethora of perceived rights or freedoms, 
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74 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Religion, Human Rights, Equality, and the Public Sphere’ (2011) 13 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 23, 38. 
75 See generally, Fredman (n 70), 29-58.  See also, Section 1.4 of this chapter, which distinguishes this 
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and by extension certain societal proclivities, practices and/or preferences.76  Fredman, 
McCrudden, and other scholars acknowledge that, as a consequence of the myriad vantage 
points from which human rights are evaluated, there is much disagreement around the 
meanings attached to the concept.77   Fredman explains further that, “[] while the notion 
of fundamental human rights attracts general respect, there is little agreement on how we 
identify them.  This is true for both the general question of what constitutes a fundamental 
human right, and the more specific question of its substantive content and application.”78  
Likewise, McCrudden suggests that the meaning and scope of human rights is ‘anything 
but settled’; therefore, those with a vested interest have an opportunity to shape how 
religion and human rights engage not only in each nation’s public sphere but also their 
respective juridical spheres.79  It can therefore be inferred that the debate over what is 
actually meant by ‘human rights’ will remain in a state of flux for the foreseeable future.  
The lack of clarity inherent in the debate makes it prudent for democratic nations to return 
to their foundational histories and constitutional documents to reinforce and reassert 
domestic ideologies, and by extension international perspectives, on the engagement of 
religion and human rights within their sovereign borders. 
Along similar lines, human rights scholars and practitioners have yet to conclusively 
connect the practice of circumventing a national judicial system and the laws thereof, in 
favor of legal tribunals that dispense a religious subgroup’s preferred legal doctrine, with 
that ‘common core of human rights’ that all nations espouse.  This is the case 
notwithstanding whether the preference is defined as faith-based legal exceptionalism (as 
is adopted herein), faith-based legal pluralism, or faith-based legal forum shopping.   As 
will be demonstrated more fully in subsequent chapters, much of the scholarship that 
supports faith-based legal exceptionalism acknowledges that this type of accommodation 
often requires ‘extra-constitutional’ measures to achieve.  In other words, certain citizens 
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perspectives on the meaning of human rights when she poses the question “[i]s there a human right to 
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are given the right to ignore valid law because their immigration narrative implicates the 
laws of other nations, which may also be inextricably connected with their specific religious 
proclivities.  Evaluation of the issues inherent in this type of accommodation has led a 
significant number of legal scholars to promote exercising caution in the accommodation 
of faith-based legal exceptionalism.  Therefore, it cannot be assumed that this kind of 
exceptionalism should or will become an internationally-accepted extension of the 
architecture to which McCrudden refers or foster a consensus as it relates to the scope of 
religion in the public sphere.   
It is however well established that the aforementioned ‘architecture’ and/or ‘common core’ 
will continue to be scoped by national interpretations of religious liberty that are embedded 
in constitutional histories and enshrined in national constitutions.  Of the three nations that 
are the subjects of this study, England is the only nation that has accommodated faith-
based legal exceptionalism as part of its national ADR scheme.   As will be borne out in 
subsequent chapters, the bases for England’s decision appear to have more to do with the 
nation’s legacy of Imperialism, and the constitutional adoption of an established church 
and religious denomination, than it does to do with adhering to the terms of a specific 
international treaty.  Therefore, sidestepping the fray of human rights discourse allows for 
a more focused analysis of relevant aspects of the constitutional histories of the three 
nations.  Although not a primary goal of this study, it may also offer necessary insight into 
readjusting certain expectations concerning not only accommodating exceptionalism but 
also respecting the disparate polices adopted by sovereign nations where it pertains the 
engagement between religion and government. 
This leads to the final reason for addressing faith-based legal exceptionalism without 
implicating international human rights treaties or judicial decisions.  As will be addressed 
more fully in Section 1.7 of this chapter, England, Canada, and the United States have 
demonstratively different church-state arrangements, which are illustrative of Fredman’s 
assertion concerning the significance of national distinctions.80  Consequently, evaluation 
of the three nations’ divergent post-colonial histories, cultures, and national institutions in 
light of their common colonial heritage is arguably more probative when seeking a prudent 
response to faith-based legal exceptionalism than is the fact that each nation has ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).81  Put another way, 
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although the specific articles of the ICCPR have come to be perceived by human rights 
scholars as part of the international baseline for current assessments pertaining religious 
liberty, each nation maintains a different constitutional perspective toward religion and 
governmental entanglement.82  The divergent constitutional relationships have yielded 
disparate national responses to requests to accommodate faith-based legal 
exceptionalism.  Moreover, the foundational basis that forms each nation’s constitutional 
attitude toward the entanglement of religion and government appears to serve as the lens 
through which ratification of the ICCPR and other international treaties has been evaluated.   
In light of these points, the aim of this study is to contribute to scholarly discourse that 
promotes the reliance on a nation’s constitution—and where possible, a nation’s 
foundational history—to address certain contemporary legal issues or phenomena.  This is 
especially the case where the question is historically repetitive, so relevant constituting 
documents provide guidance for addressing the issue or phenomenon.  As subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate, issues that stem from faith-based legal exceptionalism were 
central to not only British Imperialism and the foundation of the Province of Canada but 
also the independence of the British-American colonies.  This suggests that 
accommodation of this kind is not a question of first impression.  Moreover, the prudence 
of sanctioning more recent requests for accommodation can be assessed by evaluating 
constituting documents in light of foundational histories.   
1.5 Differentiating Constitutionalism in England, Canada & the United States 
It is well understood that England, Canada, and the United States possess a common 
nucleus of interconnected persons and cultures that came to define three disparate 
national perspectives.  To contextualize the perspectives on constitutionalism that have 
impacted progression in the three nations, it cannot be concluded that these principles 
simply facilitate stylistic rules of construction that lead practitioners and legislators to 
achieve more concise lawmaking.83  Instead they are engrained philosophies that create 
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83 See generally, Bora Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law (Stevens & Sons 1969). Laskin 
discusses the stylistic rules of construction that were relinquished as Canada attempted to define a 
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the foundation upon which rules of law are constructed.  Preuss observes that, 
“constitutionalism includes the key tenets of a polity which is based on the idea that the 
ruled are not merely passive objects of the ruler’s willpower but have the status of active 
members of the political community.”84  As a practical consequence of the dynamic 
relationship between those who govern and those who accept being governed, Bellamy 
goes on to deduce that, “constitutionalism encompasses institutional devises and 
procedures which determine the formation, structure and orderly functioning of 
government, and it embodies the basic ideas, principles and values of a polity which 
aspires to give its members a share in the government.”85  
Therefore, it is necessary to understand methods of constitutionalism as more than 
theoretical terms. Through continual exploration and assessment, they appear to have 
come to define the historical experiences that led to specific perspectives on the “bonds 
of mutuality between the rulers and the ruled.”86  When speaking about constitutionalism 
in England, Canada, and the United States, comparative constitutional scholars denote two 
notable concepts: political and legal constitutionalism.87  These concepts have also been 
labeled capital-C versus lower case-c constitutionalism or traditional versus modern 
constitutionalism.88  In the text, The Place Of Constitutional Law in the Legal System, 
Stephen Gardbaum posits that when distinguishing between legal and political 
constitutionalism, constitutional scholars can agree on several characteristics that speak 
to the fundamental distinctions between the two philosophies.89  The following diagram 
illustrates Gardbaum’s analyses: 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the most striking difference is that under legal constitutionalism, 
constitutional supremacy is realized in a cohesive written constitutional documentation.90  
The written constitution not only acts as an understanding between government and 
citizens, but also serves as the supreme law of the sovereign nation.91  It is the four corners 
of the constitutional document that establishes the breadth and scope of the rule of law.  
Under political constitutionalism by contrast, supremacy is not realized by any one cohesive 
written document.92  Instead, it rests with the political/legislative branch of government, 
which is in this case Parliament.93  It is parliamentary supremacy that buttresses the rule 
of law.94  In essence, these two principles represent a shift in the balance of rulemaking 
power from the politicians to the document and the branch of government responsible for 
adjudicating its interpretation.  Inherent in the distinction between political and legal 
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91 Gardbaum (n 87), 170-75. 
92 Gardbaum (n 87), 170-75. 
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Political Constitutionalism 
Verb (small c constitution)
The act of securing certain 
characteristics.
The laws adopted by the unitary 
legislative body establish the political 
body as supreme. 
ENGLAND: Parliamentary supremacy = 
sovereignty
Legal Constitutionalism 
Noun (capital C constitution)
Representative of the act of securing 
certain characteristics.
The document acts as a compact 
establishing the supreme rule of law 
that is contained in the document.
UNITED STATES: Constitutional 
supremacy = sovereignty
Figure 1: Diagram Contrasting Political & Legal Constitutionalism 
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constitutionalism appears to be the idea that governance is not a political mechanism, but 
an outcome of upholding the rule law by remaining true to the document that creates it.   
Where Canadian constitutionalism is concerned, her prolonged ‘colonial/quasi-colonial’ 
status coupled with her late stage ‘patriation’ taken in tandem with her proximity to the 
United States has resulted in what has been labeled, ‘49th Parallel Constitutionalism’.95  
According to Justice Barry L. Strayer, a key contributor to Canada’s patriation process, 
Canada’s attempt to step beyond the shadows of British constitutionalism can be 
legitimately called her “profound and innovative…constitutional revolution.”96 Some 
scholars see Canadian constitutionalism as the adoption of the best aspects of not only 
the British Empire but also her rebellious southern neighbor.97  Others have argued that 
Canadian constitutionalism is in fact a reaction against one or both constitutional 
frameworks.98  As will be fully explored in Chapter 4, the legacy of POGG on Canadian 
constitutionalism is well-established.  It is discernible not only in Canada’s constitutional 
documents, but also her legislative infrastructure and continued ties to the British 
monarchy.   
However, there is also support for the proposition that Canada’s approach to 
constitutionalism can be attributed to bellicose relations fostered by the British Empire to 
keep the Canadian and American colonies at odds.99  In the Harvard Law Review article, 
Forty-Ninth Parallel Constitutionalism: How Canadians Invoke American Constitutional 
Traditions, the author considers America’s influence on Canadian constitutionalism from 
three perspectives: (1) America as the model; (2) America as the anti-model; and (3) 
America as dialogical resource—the independence model.100  Although the intricacies of 
the three models are beyond the scope of this study, what is essential is the fact that 
Canada sought and gained patriation in 1982, which included the effectuation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  According to Harvard Law Review, Canada also 
“grapple[d] with the impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian political 
and legal culture—including the increase in active judicial review and individual rights-
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based litigation.”101  As such, Canada’s Charter—akin to the U.S. Constitution—seemingly 
took on the role of a compact between the people and the Government, which establishes 
the rule of law contained in the document as supreme.102  In this way, it appears that 
Canada veered toward legal constitutionalism, as it became more evident with full 
Canadian independence that constitutional supremacy would emanate primarily from the 
compact document(s) instead of from Canadian Parliament.  
1.6 Contextualizing the Concept of Peace, Order & Good Government 
To properly juxtapose POGG’s influence on England, Canada, and the United States, it is 
necessary to understand that, beyond an exclusive cluster of Commonwealth scholars, the 
concept of Peace, Order and Good Government “remains relatively under-theorised and 
under-researched.”103  Those who have contributed to the discourse have focused mainly 
on the inclusion of the POgG clause in constituting documents and its effect on legal 
analyses and judicial outcomes in specific Commonwealth nations.104  In the text, Colonial 
and Post-Colonial Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth: Peace, Order and Good 
Government, Hakeem Yusuf expands the discourse by analyzing the comparative effects 
of the POgG clause not only on post-colonial constitutionalism but also on specific colonial 
implications in five nations of the Commonwealth, including England and Canada.  Hence, 
Yusuf’s comparative assessment represents an amalgamation of the work of that cluster 
of scholars and provides the most expansive scholarly research on the concept of POGG.  
This study relies on and endeavors to expand Yusuf’s contributions where it pertains 
England, Canada, and the United States (although it is well understood that the United 
States is not a Commonwealth nation).  Within the Commonwealth context, Yusuf explains 
that POGG “has played an important role in colonial and post-colonial constitutionalism as 
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it has had not only legal but also [political and historical] significance in various 
jurisdictions in the Commonwealth.”105  
Although Yusuf’s work in some instances criticizes POGG’s application, the analyses 
undertaken by this study does not attempt to condemn the imperial policies of the former 
British Empire.  Historian Frank Luttmer advises that “the past must be understood on its 
own terms; any historical phenomenon -- an event, an idea, a law, or a dogma…must first 
be understood in its context, as part of a web of interrelated institutions, values, and beliefs 
that define a particular culture and era.”106  Thus, it is not the objective of this study to 
argue the injustices of Imperialism, as it is well understood that Imperialism is a worldwide 
phenomenon that implicates more than the national ideologies of the three focus nations.  
Instead, this study attempts to approach the rise and decline of the British Empire from a 
more pragmatic perspective.  Specifically, this study considers the British Empire’s 
implementation of POGG by attempting to demonstrate that it is not simply an unexplained 
constitutional ‘clause’ that “denote[s] the delegation of large but undefined powers to a 
nominated rule-maker.”107  Specifically, this study attempts to show that the POGG doctrine 
was first a set of medieval policies used as a mode of societal ordering for the sake of 
kingdom building.  POGG then became the doctrinal conduit between British Imperialism 
and post-colonial constitutionalism in England, Canada, and the United States.  In other 
words, POGG will be analyzed not only as the effect of British Imperialism—as Yusuf 
highlights—but also as the ideological template or doctrine, which implicated specific 
imperatives that made the rise of the British Empire possible.108  Taken in tandem, the 
societal imperatives, and the constituting documents that memorialized them, 
substantiate each nation’s perspective on the entanglement and/or disentanglement of 
religion and government in their respective constitutional frameworks.   
Although it is well understood throughout the Commonwealth that the phrase ‘peace, order 
and good government’ has distinguished the relationship of the Crown and the citizenry for 
countless centuries, the phrase is inherently ambiguous.109  Therefore, it is important to 
understand the scope of its historical and modern application.  In modern parlance, the 
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POgG clause—included in constitutional documents of the Commonwealth—has come to 
stand for the following proposition: 
[t]he federal government [should possess] comprehensive authority 
over any matters not immediately pertaining to [colonies, dominions, 
or provinces]. In practice, federal authority has been interpreted by 
the courts as pertaining to matters concerning four branches outside 
of federal and provincial jurisdiction: residual, emergency, national 
concern and federal paramountcy.110 
Before the implementation of modern conceptions of a confederation or a national ‘federal 
government’, POGG was an imperial reference that characterized the means by which the 
British Empire conferred rule making authority to its overseas colonial possessions to allow 
for the development of colonial laws without granting comprehensive autonomy.111  
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the ideology behind the doctrine 
symbolized a specific philosophical perspective on socio-political and legal ordering in 
Medieval England before the British ever left the British Isles.  Once the British set their 
sights on ‘empire’, the doctrine came to also further Great Britain’s overseas expansion, 
which then ultimately led to it becoming a residuary clause of the constitutions of British 
Commonwealth nations.112  According to Yusuf: 
POGG has been used the dual purpose of furthering British 
imperialism (to facilitate direct or indirect control and governance of 
its overseas territories) as well as to grant powers of self-rule (and 
later independence) at some point, to various parts of the British 
Empire.113   
In the exploration of this claim, much of the research that has been undertaken by 
Commonwealth historians and scholars has focused on different facets of British 
Imperialism and Commonwealth constitutionalism.  Taken in aggregate, these scholars 
demonstrate that political and legal control—whether direct or indirect—was predicated on 
several key imperatives that appear to mark the realization of the aims of POGG.114  The 
implementation of Great Britain’s political infrastructure—i.e., a hereditary monarch and 
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parliamentary form of governance—were fundamental to the Empire’s colonial 
establishment.115  Additionally, law making power was controlled by the British Empire 
through the incorporation of English colonial law as the legislative and juridical substrates 
in overseas territories.  Incorporation of English colonial law forced colonial assemblies to 
bend to the legislative and judicial will of the Empire.116  Last but not least, the proliferation 
of the Church of England and Anglicanism served as the foremost imperative to 
colonization under the POGG doctrine.  This is the case despite the fact that national 
indoctrination of religion often receives much less legal or constitutional consideration than 
the other imperatives.  For this reason, subsequent chapters will demonstrate that 
constitutionally installing Anglicanism as the superior perspective on Christianity in the 
Canadian and American colonies—as well as other colonies—was central to British 
colonization.117  The imperatives resulted in the POGG doctrine functioning as an imperial 
‘claw-back’ option, which was often achieved by the act of ‘disallowance,’ to revert or retain 
control under the auspices of the royal prerogative.118  Swinfen notes that “the right of 
disallowance had been exercised from the earliest years of the British colonial system.”119  
Therefore, POGG as a manifesto for Imperialism was successful—for a while—in furthering 
what the British Empire understood as ‘the Peaceable Kingdom’.120   
1.7 Distinguishing ‘Originalism’ & its Connection to Foundational History 
It is also useful to justify the reliance on Originalism as the constitutional baseline for the 
historical analyses attempted in subsequent chapters.  In the white paper, On Originalism 
in Constitutional Interpretation, Steve Calabresi defines Originalism as follows: 
A theory of the interpretation of legal texts, including the text of the 
Constitution. Originalists believe that the constitutional text ought to 
be given the original public meaning that it would have had at the 
time that it became law. The original meaning of constitutional texts 
can be discerned from dictionaries, grammar books, and from other 
legal documents from which the text might be borrowed. [It can also 
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be inferred from the background legal events and public debate that 
gave rise to a constitutional provision].121 
It is generally accepted that Originalism is an essential feature of constitutional theory.  One 
could argue that notwithstanding how many other interpretative modalities exist, every 
nation with a constitution—written or otherwise—has an ‘originalist’ perspective on the 
nation’s constitutional development.  This is the case notwithstanding the historical, socio-
legal, and/or socio-political catalysts for that perspective—e.g., the rise and/or fall of an 
empire, a declaration of independence, political and legal unification or division, provincial 
colonialism, or even the devolution of national legislative and/or judicial powers.   
Where the numerous modes of constitutional interpretation are concerned, they have 
subsequently emerged to resolve differences of perspective on the meaning and/or 
application of certain constitutional provisions.  As such, modes of interpreting 
constitutional documents have continued to expand to include terms like ‘contextualism’, 
‘strict/loose constructionism’, ‘textualism’, ‘structuralism’, ‘living tree doctrinalism’, as well 
as others.  This is especially the case in Canada and the United States.  The existence of 
so many interpretations however has also resulted in considerable debate over which is 
the proper one to follow; which is more intellectually compelling; and/or which has become 
more legally influential.122  Although an analysis of the merits and shortcomings of the 
many modes of constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth 
acknowledging their existence, if only to distinguish them from Originalism.   
In the article, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, Andrei Marmor simplifies 
the distinction between those who promote one of many ‘dynamic’ constitutional 
interpretations and those who champion Originalism.123  He frames the perspectives as 
follows: 
Proponents of a dynamic reading []—espousing interpretation of 
constitutional concepts according to [] contemporary 
understandings—typically rely on the idea that the Constitution 
entrenches only the general concepts it deploys,…without favoring the 
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articular conception of the relevant concept that the framers of the 
Constitution may have had in mind.124  
Originalists argue, to the contrary, that fidelity to the Constitution 
requires an understanding of its provisions according to the particular 
conception of the abstract concepts prevalent at the time of 
enactment, and not those we may now favor.125 
Where it pertains the modalities referenced above (as well as others not mentioned), they 
can be loosely labeled as ‘dynamic’, as they appear to fit within the aforementioned 
definition.  Specifically, they might encompass contemporary interpretations of past 
interpretations; interpretations that represent the bifurcation or splintering of broader 
perspectives on constitutionalism; or interpretations that result from the amalgamation of 
several overlapping perspectives.  To illustrate, William Fisher III contends that 
contextualism, textualism, structuralism, and new historicism have each evolved into a 
‘reasonably distinct’ method of constitutional interpretation as a result of being debated 
by intellectual historians since the 1970s.126  As such, each has had its turn at 
“influenc[ing] the study of the development of American legal doctrine and legal 
thought.”127  Similarly, Justice Grant Huscroft and Jeffrey Goldsworthy note that the living 
tree doctrine has become Canada’s preferred approach to constitutionalism, not because 
it is the only or most persuasive mode of interpretation, but because it is a progressive 
rejection of America’s more conservative standpoint on constitutionalism.128 
While the influence of the many modes of interpretation has ebbed and flowed, the 
consistency of Originalism as a means of extrapolating the meaning of American and 
Canadian constitutional documents does not appear to have waivered in relevance.  Justice 
Huscroft and Bradley Miller have compiled an entire text dedicated to the endurance of 
Originalism as a preferred mode of constitutional interpretation in the United States.129  
These scholars acknowledge at the outset that “Originalism is a force to be reckoned with 
in American constitutional theory.”130  Likewise, Richard Albert and David R. Cameron 
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promote similar assertions in the recently compiled text focused on comparative 
perspectives on Canadian constitutionalism.131  Notwithstanding references to Canadian 
constitutional documents as a collective non-fixed ‘living tree’, the unmistakable theme 
that binds the chapters of the text is the significance of Canada’s foundational and post-
colonial history and their effects on modern evaluations of Canadian constitutionalism.132  
In the chapter, Originalism in Australia and Canada: Why the Difference?, Huscroft and 
Goldsworthy note that, “a moderate version of [O]riginalism was inherent in British 
principles of statutory interpretation used to interpret [the two constitutions] for many 
decades following their enactment.”133  Despite Canada’s perceived shift to a more 
progressive perspective, Huscroft and Goldsworthy also observe that Canada’s national 
judiciary continues to rely on Originalism in many cases today.134  Therefore, it appears that 
where it pertains the U.S. and Canada, constitutional scholars, practitioners, and judiciaries 
continue to revert to Originalism as the benchmark.   
Returning to Calabresi’s definition of Originalism as the baseline for seeking a prudent 
response for the U.S. concerning faith-based legal exceptionalism, it would appear that 
Originalism finds its merit in the ‘paper-trail’ of foundational documents that create and 
maintain a historical record of the establishment of national sovereignty.  Central thereto 
is the U.S. Constitution itself, which is an articulation of specific rights and freedoms that 
exist in tandem with national sovereignty.  Therefore, it is safe to suggest that Originalism 
is more than a mode of constitutional interpretation and thus not analogous to those 
interpretations that have ebbed and flowed over time.  In the recent article Originalism as 
a Theory of Legal Change, Stephen Sachs asserts a similar claim.135  Making distinction 
between constitutional interpretations and Originalism, he suggests that, “what makes 
debates over ‘constitutional interpretation’ so frustrating is that the participants often 
seem to have different concepts in mind.”136  For some theorists, constitutional 
interpretation entails considering subsequent extra-textual sources, such as precedent, 
longstanding traditions, the American ethos, etcetera.137  For others however, there is little 
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to no extra-textual deference afforded when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.138  In other 
words, ongoing philosophical debates over what has been or should be factored into 
constitutional interpretations—like those highlighted by Fisher, Huscroft, and Goldsworthy—
contribute to the ebb and flow of the different modalities.   
However, philosophical debates cannot and do not claim an authoritative role for the 
United States as does Originalism and/or the Constitution.139  Sachs acknowledges that 
the U.S. Constitution “serves as the ultimate source of our supreme law.  And in defense 
of this premise, the philosophy of language has nothing to say.”140  Where it pertains the 
importance of returning to Originalism to extrapolate the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 
he further clarifies: 
Relying on past law is hardly unusual.  What’s distinctive about 
American practice, though, is that it relies on the law of the Founding.  
We date our legal system…. The salient claim, for present purposes, is 
that the Constitution represents a boundary in time, separating our 
present legal system from older systems that we've discarded.141 
 
Thus, “[e]ven after two hundred years, [Americans share] what some scholars have called 
‘constitutional continuity’ with the Founding.”142  Moreover, the relationship between 
Americans and ‘the Founding’ affords the law of the Founders a “certain sort of prima facie 
validity.”143  Therefore, reliance on Originalism, instead of other ‘dynamic’ interpretations, 
when addressing whether it is constitutionally prudent to return to a colonial practice that 
the Framers had already discarded (i.e., faith-based legal exceptionalism) is not only 
reasonable but is arguably a preservation of ‘constitutional continuity’.   
As will be more fully assessed in Chapter 5 of this study, Professor Ellis West makes a 
similar observation while evaluating the merits of Originalism as a means of assessing the 
imprudence of religion-based exemptions under the 1st Amendment.  In his case against 
the post-colonial right to religion-based exemptions, West acknowledges the unmistakable 
significance and persuasiveness of Originalism.  Moreover, he opines that historical 
context—which is evidenced by the documented occurrences leading up to the drafting of 
the U.S. Constitution—is essential to add precision to the circumstances that lead British-
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Americans to not only declare independence but also construct the U.S. Constitution.144  
As the historical analyses attempted in subsequent chapters focus extensively on the 
founding of England, Canada, and the United States, this study adopts the reference to 
‘foundational’ perspectives, commitments, and/or ideals as a more precise descriptor for 
clarifying the documented historical circumstances surrounding the constituting paper-
trail that buttresses the historical analyses attempted by this study.  This allows for the 
question of faith-based legal exceptionalism to be properly linked to the most authentic 
point of rationally-balanced inquiry for the three nations: where Imperialism, Colonialism, 
and Constitutionalism converge.  
1.8 A Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Religious Plurality & Secularism 
Likewise, it is important to make the connection between constitutionalism and each 
nation’s approach to the relationship between religion and government in the furtherance 
of their respective approaches to liberal democracy.  As such, this study will adopt the 
terminology fashioned by W. Cole Durham Jr. in his analytical framework, which provides a 
taxonomy for methods in which constitutions address religious plurality in democratic as 
well as other societies.145  In the text, Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative 
Framework, Durham integrates the work of G.R. Ryskamp to establish a basis for 
conceptualizing the “church-state identification continuum.”146 The continuum is 
predicated on the existence of four foundational or ‘threshold’ conditions necessary for 
religious liberty to exist and flourish.  These conditions include: (1) plurality; (2) economic 
stability; (3) political legitimacy within the society in question; and (4) some willingness on 
the part of differing religious denominations and/or subgroups and their devotees to live 
with each other.147  As each focus nation assessed in this study is specifically highlighted 
in Durham’s taxonomy, it can be inferred that the threshold conditions are met without the 
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need to make a case for their inclusion in subsequent analyses. With the existence of these 
conditions, various divergent approaches to religious liberty—vis-à-vis church-state 
arrangements or regimes—have emerged transnationally.148  Although this study will focus 
on three arrangements, there is benefit in highlighting Durham’s complete taxonomy.  It 
encompasses absolute theocracies; established-church regimes; endorsed church 
regimes; cooperative church-state regimes; accommodationist regimes; separationist 
regimes; inadvertently insensitive regimes; and regimes that exhibit hostility toward 
religious liberty.149   
Where it pertains absolute theocracies, Durham explains that these are “of the type one 
associates with stereotypical views of Islamic fundamentalism.”150  For further clarification, 
“Islamic fundamentalism was basically home-grown in Arab societies, where the masses 
turned to it as a panacea for society’s failings and economic ills.”151  Although not denoted 
in the continuum, the Holy See seems to take on the characteristics of an absolute 
theocracy, as it has an ecclesiastical form of government and a purely “religious legal 
system based entirely on canon (religious) law.”152  Next are the established-church 
regimes, which Durham contends, “can cover a range of possible church-state 
configurations.”153  At one end of this pendulum are “regime[s] with an established church 
that is granted a strictly enforced monopoly in religious affairs….”154 Italy and Spain are 
highlighted as the archetypes thereof.155  The opposite end of the same pendulum 
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encompasses “countr[ies] that maintain an established church, but guarantee[] equal 
treatment for other religious believes.”156  Durham identifies Great Britain as the 
standard.157  Cooperative regimes “grant[] no special status to dominant churches, but the 
state continues to cooperate closely with churches in a variety of ways.”158  According to 
Durham, Germany “provides the prototypical example,” although there are others.159   
Where it pertains accommodationist and separationist church-state arrangements, the two 
most noteworthy archetypes are Canada and the United States, respectively. Durham 
explains that accommodationist regimes “insist on separation of church and state, yet 
retain a posture of benevolent neutrality toward religion;” whilst separationist regimes, 
“insist on more rigid separation of church and state,” and any religion support by the 
Government is “deemed inappropriate.”160 According to Hirschl’s parallel church-state 
categorization, Canada takes an accommodationist perspective to church-state 
interaction, which is manifested as “separation alongside multicultural 
accommodation.”161  The United States by contrast views disestablishment “as state 
neutrality toward religion.”162  As it concerns the United States’ separationist approach, 
Durham notes that some U.S. scholars contend that interpretations of the religious clause 
of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution should be skewed more toward the 
accommodationist perspective.163  Debate over the U.S. perspective notwithstanding, 
three church-state arrangements will be analyzed in relationship to colonial and post-
colonial catalysts for their implementation: (1) established-church (England); (2) 
accommodationist (Canada); and (3) separationist (the United States).  Moreover, they will 
be analyzed from the perspective that the first national arrangement symbolizes the 
creation of the POGG doctrine, while the latter two represent the adoption and rejection of 
that doctrine.  
This leads to an additional means of limiting the scope of the analysis to be had herein.  
The analysis concerning religious plurality does not assume that every facet of religiosity is 
‘inalienable’ or that a nation lacks religious liberty when it determines that certain 
manifestations of religious belief fall outside its constitutional and/or democratic 
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parameters.164  Gill points out that “constitutional declarations pronouncing a ‘right of 
conscience’ enhance the perception that religious freedom is an ‘either/or’ concept.”165 
Relying on this general misconception—especially where a nation espouses democracy—
there appears to be a trend toward mistakenly falling back on the premise that all things 
even remotely alluding to religious freedom should fit in the inalienable category.  To the 
contrary, it has long been recognized that the ‘right of conscience or belief’ is that which is 
sacrosanct.166 The theory that every manifestation associated therewith is an 
indistinguishable extension of the inalienable right of belief remains provocative and 
under-supported because the practical outcomes do not support the theoretical assertion.  
As a natural extension of considering religion and government, this study is also predicated 
on the theory that individual or moral secularism and national liberalism are 
distinguishable concepts.  The former is evaluated as a ‘form of religion’ and the latter is a 
means to aspire toward ‘equilibrium’ when furthering religious freedom for all religious 
denominations and subgroups.167 Such distinction offers a means to rebut the false 
assertion that secularists are ‘irreligious-religious zealots’ who are often the victors when 
national governments adopt disestablishment.168 This study approaches this topic from 
the perspective that where nations have espoused disestablishment as a facet of 
constitutionalism, the motives for such adoption stand independent of the number of 
citizens who then find merit or prudence in the adoption.  This is especially the case when 
a nation’s adoption of disestablishment predates traditional notions of secularism.  Where 
citizens gravitate toward or see the merit in disentangling religion and government, it does 
not logically follow that they are indoctrinated into a competing ideology for the sake of 
bolstering the argument in favor of faith-based legal exceptionalism for certain religious 
subgroups.169  
To illustrate, ‘irreligion’ (or secularism) as a form of individual belief is usually defined as 
the antithesis to religiosity (or religion).170 In his text, Pluralism, Religion, and Secularism, 
J. Milton Yinger combines several perspectives to offer a composite of what is meant when 
secularism is claimed as an individual response to religion: 
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[i]t is “a view of life…based on the premise that religion and religious 
considerations, as of God and a future life, should be ignored or 
excluded’.”…171  
 
“Secularism…is the name for an ideology, a new closed world-view 
which functions very much like a new religion.” Herberg notes that 
when secularism is used in this way, it becomes “something very like 
a religion.” It is not truly, then, the antithesis of religion; it is a form 
of religion.172  
Rooted in this theory is also the understanding that some governments are not attempting 
to engage in the question of ‘ultimate truth’ or aspiring toward the proverbial ‘afterlife’, 
even when many of their citizens are.  This is the case whether that afterlife is heaven, 
paradise, hell, the inferno, transformation, transfiguration, a hole in the ground, or an urn 
on a fireplace mantle.  Moreover, it makes a distinction between nations that include a 
religious stance in their national constitutions, as is the case in most Muslim-majority 
nations, and nations whose citizens reinforce the discrete nuances of denominationalism 
without the nation making any specific national proclamation of one interpretation or 
another in constitutional documents.  
The basis for establishing this point is to highlight the distinction between an individual 
preference of not being infringed upon by another person’s religious views and a national 
objective that moves toward equilibrium amongst expansive plurality.  Where it pertains 
faith-based legal plurality, this study attempts to further the theory that there should be 
consideration and concern when plural legal platforms encompass sanctioning religious 
ideologies that move in the opposite direction of the democratic ideals of a particular 
nation.  Moreover, the national objective should be promoting shared values and protecting 
the national rule of law in the process of becoming the best democratic version of itself.  
This does not appear to mean that the nation is devoid of religion or irreligious.  Instead, it 
demands that the Government act as an instrument of democratic progression within the 
scope of its sovereign reach, notwithstanding how many religious subgroups and 
denominations take part in the never-ending comparative/superlative fight for religious 
space or supremacy.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CONCEPTION OF POGG: 
ENGLAND’S ESTABLISHED CHURCH REGIME 
 “National self-esteem and self-assertion grew stronger, as did that already deep-rooted sense 
that Britain was specifically favored by Providence. It was a nation which was moving forwards 
and the inexorable expansion of trade and empire was striking evidence of this progress.”173 
 
This chapter provides a historiographic analysis of British Imperialism as the catalyst for 
the POGG doctrine and England’s present constitutional relationship between the Church 
of England, branches of government, and non-Anglican religious subgroups and 
denominations. Specifically, this chapter explains the amalgamation of the discrete 
imperatives that became the constitutional roadmap for British imperial expansion. 
Moreover, this chapter demonstrates that England’s longstanding established church-state 
arrangement compels the accommodation of certain requests for exceptionalism, which 
are associated with the religious dogmas that prevailed in former British colonies.  In recent 
years, accommodation has come to encompass the legalization of Islamic law tribunals, 
notwithstanding the legislative and judicial challenges created thereby. This chapter also 
highlights more recent national efforts to demonstrate a set of values exclusive to the 
British in promotion of cosmopolitanism.  Despite these modern efforts, this chapter 
illustrates that, akin to colonial practices, the imperial legacy of the POGG doctrine 
continues to dictate England’s approach to religious plurality.  Finally, this chapter sets the 
foundation for subsequent chapters which seek to consider periods during the rise of the 
British Empire that are germane to the overlapping foundational and post-colonial 
experiences in the United States and Canada.  The juxtaposition of imperial and colonial 
perspectives will further clarify the divergent church-state arrangements that have 
developed in each nation as a result of disparate responses to POGG. 
2.1 ‘The Mea Culpa’: Obligatory Accommodation of Faith-Based Legal 
 Exceptionalism? 
It is well understood that the Church of England and Anglicanism have been interwoven 
fixtures attached to England’s hereditary monarchial/parliamentary infrastructure since 
the time of Henry VIII.  In the age of liberal democracy however, the regime appears to 
wrestle with two distinct but overlapping issues.  The first issue is centered on the ‘optics’ 
of the infrastructure itself. Unless one hails from a nation with a similarly-situated or more 
tightly intertwined infrastructure, there is the sense of a carefully orchestrated national 
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paradox.  Moreover, it seems as if the entire nation is taking part by attaching secular labels 
to all things religious, including the Government’s intimate affiliation with the Anglican 
Church.   This is the case despite the obvious contradictions.  This situation is made more 
puzzling because the trend in England is to contend that the nation is ‘post-Christianity’, 
although the quintessential constitutional debate over the last decade or so has been how 
the non-religious, the religious, and hyper-religious should peaceably co-exist.174  
Additionally, the backdrop of this debate encompasses a modern nation that continues to 
epitomize the concept of government “deriving its title-to-rule from a monarchy linked to 
church establishment.”175  Therefore, the lack of clarity concerning the necessity and 
function of the monarchial aspect of England’s infrastructure (including the Anglican 
Church) makes it exceedingly challenging to discern the aims of certain national policies.  
This is especially the case when the policies appear counterintuitive to the nation’s 
declared values.  
Where the details of the paradox are concerned, Abell and Stevenson observe that 
“[c]onstitutionally…the Head of State [is the] head of the Church of England.  Within 
England the reigning sovereign also has the title and role of Defender of the [Anglican] 
Faith.”176  Moreover, the broad reach of the British monarch’s political and religious powers 
is supposed to naturally bifurcate to not only champion the liturgical interests of the Church 
of England but also defend the interests of those who espouse denominations of 
Christianity that effectively compete with Anglicanism.  Moreover, the British monarchy’s 
ecclesiastical reach includes even the secular interests of all British subjects.177  Adding 
another layer to the situation is the fact that, unlike other religious denominations or 
subgroups, the Church of England has an exceptional place in society that includes a 
parliamentary presence.  Specifically, the two highest-ranking members of the Church hold 
seats in perpetuity within British Parliament.178  As England’s national church signifies that 
its chief aim is safeguarding the souls of its parishioners, said protection has come to 
include marketing a democratically expedient endorsement of faith-based legal 
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exceptionalism.179  Thus, the contradiction is derived from the fact that no one satisfactorily 
confronts the central issue. That is, the Church as a religious organization furthering a 
specific denominational perspective, and the national government, are not typically 
endeavoring to achieve the same ends.180 Nevertheless, these confounding nuances 
buttress England’s approach to religion and governmental interaction—vis-à-vis—her 
‘established church-state arrangement’.181   
The second issue is associated with ‘adaptability’, or the perceived lack thereof. The 
ostensible shift from royal to parliamentary supremacy led to the adoption of more liberal 
ideals, which has occurred over the past few centuries.  This evolution has apparently made 
the paradoxical relationship between the Crown, the Church, and Parliament more 
unexplainable.  This is especially the case because the British monarchy no longer actually 
‘rules’ the nation, but still retains a symbolic crown that encompasses an expansive 
breadth of discretionary powers under the royal prerogative.182  According to Bartlett and 
Everett, “[t]he concept of prerogative powers stems from the medieval King acting as head 
of the kingdom, but it is by no means a medieval device.”183  Modernity has seen the power 
reined in considerably, but it still affords Elizabeth II a wealth of latitude concerning 
national religiosity as well as a plethora of foreign policy responsibilities.184  These include 
the ability to “enable[] Ministers,…deploy the armed forces, make and unmake 
international treaties and to grant honours [amongst many other things].”185  
Instead of responding to modernity by returning religion to the Church; allowing Parliament 
to govern the nation; and letting the symbolic rulers find other occupations or retire 
altogether, England holds steadfast to this imperialistic regime.  Thus, the present church-
state arrangement retains the essential pillars of colonial-era policies under the POGG 
doctrine.  Recall that in the colonial context, POGG entailed the proliferation of the Church 
of England and Anglicanism, which was tethered to a ruling hereditary monarchy, while 
                                                          
179 See generally, Rowan Williams, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective’, Islam and 
English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
180 Augur Pearce, ‘Religious Denomination or Public Religion? The Legal Status of the Church of England’ in 
Richard O’Dair and Andrew Lewis (eds), Law and Religion (4th edn, Oxford Scholarship Online 2012) 457, 
458-90. 
181 Durham, Jr. (n 64), 1417. 
182 Gail Bartlett and Michael Everett, ‘The Royal Prerogative’ 03861 <https://researchbriefings.parliament. 
uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03861> accessed 16 November 2018. 
183 Bartlett and Everett (n 182). 
184 Bartlett and Everett (n 182). 
185 Bartlett and Everett (n 182); See also, Abell and Stevenson (n 176), 487. Abell and Stevenson clarify 
that it is within the prerogative of the reigning monarch to completely dissolve Parliament and take a more 
active role in promoting Anglicanism nationwide, if he/she so desires. 
[40]  
 
Parliament and the English judiciary cooperatively ensured that the laws of British colonies 
remained as near as possible to the laws of England.  In the modern context, POGG appears 
to be the basis for maintaining the preeminence of the Church of England, which remains 
tethered to a symbolic hereditary monarchy, while Parliament and the English judiciary 
work to foster political constitutionalism for the sake of furthering the democratically-bent 
social order. 
In an effort to promote multiculturalism, England also adopted national social standards, 
which have been branded Fundamental Shared Values (‘FSVs’).186  These values include 
embracing: (1) democracy—i.e., a culture built on freedom and equality; (2) the rule of law; 
(3) individual liberty; and (4) respect and tolerance—i.e., a bi-lateral respect for values, 
ideas and beliefs of others without imposition.187 The national advancement of said values 
seems to be meant to promote the United Kingdom as a beacon of cosmopolitanism.  
These fundamental values are purported to be non-negotiable; that is, they set the floor for 
immigration and citizenship in the nation as well as establish a threshold for participation 
in British society.188  Fundamental values notwithstanding, it appears that certain 
immigrants have been afforded a remarkable degree of latitude in negotiating their 
commitment to these shared values. In fact, some have argued that certain immigrants 
from non-democratic nations have been afforded the choice of simply opting-out of the 
values all together in favor of the religiously political ideologies and legal precepts 
entrenched in the nations from which they hail.189  
The disparity produced by the ability to opt-out becomes more remarkable when the 
common denominator between England’s imperial legacy and sanctioning certain opt-outs 
is fully appraised.  Specifically, the common denominator appears to be associated with 
the effects of the POGG doctrine as it was applied during the rise and fall of the British 
Empire. National decisions like sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism in England 
take on new meaning when one considers that most of the migrants afforded the 
bandwidth to negotiate or opt-out are from former colonial possessions of the British 
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Empire.190  This is the case despite the free movement of people occasioned by EU 
membership.191  As such, the imperial/colonial correlation appears to buttress expansive 
degrees of accommodation of non-Christian religious ideologies.  Although this outcome 
might appear to be in keeping with England’s imperial history, it is questionable whether 
the situation furthers the nation’s shared values. As England’s history includes subjugating 
divergent non-Anglican Christian denominations, it is also reasonable to question whether 
those colonial-era commitments to non-Christian dogmas have created a national 
condition that infringes on the legal rights of adherents of Christian denominations not 
associated with Anglicanism.  
Undervaluing the significance of the infringement seemingly results from the presumption 
that all Christian denominations are indistinguishable, and the Anglican Church—as the 
national church—expresses the collective views of them all.  As this study will demonstrate, 
this is the fallacy that buttressed American colonial rebellion as well as constitutional 
disestablishment in Canada and the United States. Therefore, England’s decision to 
‘accommodate’ faith-based legal exceptionalism seems to have all the trappings of an 
obligation—i.e., a mea culpa—instead of the appearance of the promotion of the 
aforementioned values. For the sake of illustration, British Parliament most recently 
decided to sanction the creation of Islamic law tribunals—i.e., faith-based legal 
exceptionalism—and afford legal effect to the judgments of those tribunals, even though 
the decision raises significant questions concerning the partiality and general application 
of Islam’s religion-centric legal precepts.192  It is well understood that England has a history 
of maintaining religious law courts that is as long as the existence of her present church-
state arrangement.  The first official Ecclesiastical court in England was established in 
tandem with the Church of England for the express purpose of annulling Henry VIII’s 
marriage to Catherine of Aragon.  When its jurisdictional reach was at its broadest, 
England’s Ecclesiastical judiciary dispensed with legal matters concerning probate, 
marriage, divorce, child legitimacy, distribution of personal property, defamation, certain 
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torts that were considered a breach of the King’s peace, as well as issues associated with 
the conduct of the clergy.193   
Modernity and religious plurality resulted in Parliament curtailing the jurisdiction of 
England’s religious courts such that they could only adjudicate legal issues concerning the 
Anglican clergy and other matters associated with the national church.194  In the text, The 
Ecclesiastical Courts, John Baker observes that by the 19th century, “what still remained of 
the Church’s [adjudicative] jurisdiction was becoming indefensible.”195  He further explains 
that it had come to be considered ‘absurd’ in a plural society that non-Anglicans (i.e., 
Dissenters, Catholics, Jews, etc.) should be subject to the Ecclesiastical laws of 
Anglicanism instead of the laws of an impartial Common Council.196  Therefore, England’s 
recent recognition of Islamic law courts as a feasible alternative for the settlement of the 
same kinds of legal disputes that were formerly covered by England’s Ecclesiastical 
courts—in addition to matters that ‘creep’ in, like certain domestic torts, crimes or 
contracts—appears to be a societal and juridical relapse.197  Moreover, it seems 
implausible to suggest that returning to faith-based legal exceptionalism is a natural 
extension of the fundamental values shared by the entire nation.  This claim becomes more 
compelling when one considers that Parliament has also attempted to erect the same 
jurisdictional limitations around Islamic law tribunals that modernity and religious plurality 
placed on Anglican Ecclesiastical courts.  That is, Parliament has attempted to curtail the 
encroachment of Islamic law by precluding tribunal decisions from being carried over into 
the national judicial system.198  
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Parliament’s attempts at curtailment suggest that there is an acute awareness of the 
likelihood of burdening religious liberty for non-Muslims and other legal rights associated 
with imposing the religious laws of one religious subgroup or denomination upon the whole 
of society.  This is the case notwithstanding whether the laws are designated religious 
guidelines or foreign precepts imported from other nations…or whether they are imposed 
from the bottom up instead of from the top down.  In the text, The Reconstruction of the 
English Church, Roland Usher clarifies that historically Anglican Ecclesiastical courts 
utilized the Corpus Juris Canonici, which was supplemented by certain regional 
ecclesiastical canons, to address the aforementioned types of legal matters.199  After 
Elizabeth I assumed the throne (and Imperialism became a domestic probability), the 
British Empire was eventually forced to confront the fact that its religion-centric sources of 
law and faith-based legal infrastructure was no longer appropriate to address the 
aforementioned types of legal matters.200  Although the jurisdictional shift away from 
Anglican religious law was not complete until the Victorian era, recognition of issue was the 
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catalyst for moving beyond the “ancient system of [E]cclesiastical courts,” that existed 
before the split with Rome.201  Instead, impartial national councils or judiciaries usurped 
the legal landscape thereby precluding the continuation of faith-based legal platforms as 
appendages to the countrywide infrastructure.  It also prevented the reversion to Catholic 
or Anglican religious law and/or canon to create or expand the national rule of law.202 
Moreover, jurisdictional conflicts resulting from Anglican Ecclesiastical courts’ attempts to 
retain their preeminence (akin to the manner in which the Empire attempted to retain 
preeminence of Anglicanism) played a significant role in the expansion of English Common 
law as the codex for legal decision-making for the whole of society.203  
As such, the recognition of a rule of law that is common to all made the imposition of 
religious law not only problematic but legally impermissible.204  Whether recognition was 
furthered by enlightenment or reformation; unresolvable conflicts in judicial jurisdiction; or 
the loss of the colonial possessions that rebelled against it, the British Empire seemed to 
eventually comprehend that it is insupportable to enforce Anglican exceptionalism through 
a faith-based juridical model.205  As the renewed attempt at faith-based legal 
exceptionalism implicates Islamic law, it is unlikely that the modern British Government 
has failed to realize that it is just as insupportable to enforce Islamic law exceptionalism 
on the whole of society.  This is the case notwithstanding whether it is initiated at one 
degree of separation from the national judiciary and purported to be a policy in promotion 
of multiculturalism.  Therefore, sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism in England may 
create a socio-legal quagmire by reinstituting a legal alternative that had already been 
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tested and found wanting in a society with expansive religious plurality.  This reality affords 
more weight to the suggestion that England’s approach to Islamic law exceptionalism 
contains a perceived obligatory element that is a byproduct of her imperial legacy under 
the POGG doctrine, instead of being motivated by furthering England’s more modern 
shared values.  
2.2 The King’s Peace & the Genesis of the POGG Doctrine 
To fully understand how a ‘mea culpa’ might manifest itself in the accommodation of 
Islamic law exceptionalism, it is necessary to recall how POGG was created, adapted, and 
integrated for the purpose of societal and religious ‘Anglicization’.  It is also necessary to 
correct the misconception that POGG is not applicable in the United Kingdom and/or the 
Commonwealth of Nations. According to Yusuf: 
[t]he common supposition is that peace, order and good government 
(POGG) does not apply in the United Kingdom, at least not in this most 
common phrasing of it.  [However,]…POGG has its origins in the British 
Isles and at least historical application through the Justices Act 1489 
[as well as] very important Tudor era legislation made for facilitating 
better governance in England (and Wales from 1543).206 
Notwithstanding theories to the contrary, the POGG doctrine appears to be alive and well 
in the United Kingdom.  It is well understood that the United Kingdom is a constitutional 
continuation of the former British Empire, the former Great Britain, as well as the former 
Britannia.  Thus, it is implausible to suggest that the imperatives of POGG, which were 
legally imposed during the United Kingdom’s imperial rise, are not applicable to the United 
Kingdom.  To do so is to suggest that the concept of POGG is not applicable in the nation 
where it was created, adapted, and integrated as a conduit for colonizing territories that 
were not Anglicized and thus not adequately civilized. 
A more accurate supposition might be that the POgG clause is not implicated in the 
Commonwealth-era devolution of powers in Wales and Scotland, which were territorially 
usurped and legislatively subjugated by England but not ‘officially’ colonized.  However, it 
is integral to the constitutional nature of Northern Ireland and other British colonial 
holdings that subsequently became members of the British Commonwealth.207  As has 
been previously noted, evaluating POGG as a vague legal clause suggests that there is no 
history, basis, or impetus for its existence, which also fosters a misconception about the 
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constitutional nature of the United Kingdom.  However, if the POgG clause is appropriately 
linked with the discrete set of imperatives that sustained its centuries-long employment, 
then it becomes clear that POGG was not just an ideology established on the British Isles.  
Its continued employment established a template or doctrine that offers an explanation for 
how the United Kingdom might be obliged in a more modern era to accommodate the 
religious legal precepts of the previously ‘distant’ inhabitants of former colonial holdings, 
notwithstanding how illiberal the application of those precepts might be. 
Where England’s legacy of Anglicization is concerned, it is generally understood that 
Roman occupation and Constantine I brought Christianity to the British Isles.  However, it 
is what occurred after the Romans left which set the British Isles on the course toward 
constituting the imperatives of POGG as a means of colonial societal management.  By the 
7th century, Christianity had eclipsed paganism as the domestic religion of the kingdoms of 
post-Roman Britain.208  Scagg observes that, “[o]ne by one, these kingdoms were 
converted to Christianity, initially by missionaries sent by Pope Gregory the Great to Kent 
at the end of the sixth century and by Irish monks from Iona in western Scotland during the 
early seventh.”209  As Constantine I protected Christianity during the Roman Era, Alfred the 
Great is credited with forming the archetype for the Christian English kingdom that exists 
today.  Abbott observes that Alfred the Great “spent his life…laying broad and deep the 
foundations on which the enormous superstructure of the British [E]mpire has since been 
reared.”210  In his self-proclaimed role of ‘defender of the Christian faith,’ Alfred the Great 
promoted education, the rule of law, and a more sophisticated model of government in 
England by mingling religion with all three areas.211 He also made the church the hub for 
literacy, which took on a fundamental role in the education of English society.212  As a result 
of Alfred’s promotion of the Christian faith, it became the religious substrate for the new 
social order of ‘English’ citizenry.  Like polytheism’s role in the Roman Empire, Christianity 
became the religious, linguistic, legal, and political bonding agent in the single unified 
Christian nation.   
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These circumstances offer a historical basis for the inference that Alfred the Great was also 
responsible for promulgating the earliest iteration of the POGG doctrine.  That is, he laid 
the groundwork for the amalgamation of the imperatives that came to underpin England’s 
particular approach to colonial societal management.  Recall from the previous chapter 
that POGG is more than a legal clause that resides in the constitutional documents of 
Commonwealth nations. In fact, the concept of ‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ 
represents an ideology that is not exclusively associated with colonialism.  In Great Britain’s 
case, desires for territorial expansion resulted in POGG becoming the conduit for 
colonization, which accounts for its modern parlance.213  However, the amalgamation of 
the imperatives as an approach to social ordering can be found in Medieval England before 
the English ever left the British Isles.  
In the text, The Empire of the Bretaignes—The Foundations of a Colonial System of 
Government, Frederick Madden and David Fieldhouse theorize that the English medieval 
empire was the ‘seedbed’ of British constitutional forms later implemented by the British 
Government.214  Yusuf builds on this theory by suggesting that the seedbed of POGG can 
be found “somewhere in English constitutional history or at least in its socio-political 
ordering.”215  Yusuf explains that archivists date “the earliest references to what came to 
be recast as ‘peace, welfare, and good government,’ and then ‘peace, order and good 
government’ to the Justices Act of 1489.”216  As it relates to both the constitutional history 
and the socio-political ordering, POGG seems to predate the Justices Act of 1489 since the 
imperatives are collectively prevalent in Alfred the Great’s earlier Law-Code.  According to 
Dammery and Pratt, Alfred took great effort to construct his legal codex, which came to be 
known as sea domboc (i.e., the law or judgment book).217  Pratt also acknowledges that 
the domboc is an often overlooked aspect “within the broader structures of royal 
thought[;]…[although] in scale and structure…[it] had high ambitions.”218  This would 
explain why the Law-Code was relied upon by Alfred's successors from the tenth-century 
onward, yet it has not been definitively linked with the imperatives or genesis of the POGG 
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doctrine.219  The Law-Code was divided into four distinct sections, the most notable are the 
Biblical introduction, which set out moral responsibilities of English subjects, and the 
separate collection of written legislation or the rule of law.220  The rule of law established 
not only the rules of court but also statutory provisions, which were relied upon by the Court 
to pronounce judgments.221   
During this time in British history, establishing and maintaining civil order and the rule of 
law meant balancing the actions of Anglo-Saxons seeking private vengeance and/or public 
retribution amongst warring factions for the commission of major crimes.222  In the article, 
The King’s Peace in the Middle Ages, Frederick Pollock suggests that during this period, it 
was impossible to discern “where private vengeance ended and public retribution for 
offences began.”223  After the Peace treaty of Wedmore, the Law-Code was a response to 
the civil disobedience that had been widespread throughout the territory.224  Most notably, 
the Law-Code established the doctrine of the ‘King’s Peace’, which came to be understood 
as a common right of protection by the law administered by the authority of the British 
monarch.225  According to the Law-Code: 
[t]his is the peace that king Alfred and king Guthrum and the witan of 
all the English nation and all the people that are in East Anglia have 
all ordained and with oaths confirmed for themselves and for their 
descendants as well for born as for unborn who reck of God's mercy 
or of our's.226 
There is limited historical and legal scholarship devoted to the doctrine of the King’s Peace; 
however, the work that does exist clarifies that the King’s Peace signified the social and 
political peace of the country, in perpetuity, under God.227  Specifically, the King’s Peace 
extended protection to persons and property within the British monarch’s jurisdiction, 
which encompassed not only protection against criminal acts but also the promotion of 
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morality and civil order.228  Sayles explains that in Anglo-Saxon England, “when kings refer 
to trespasses against their peace (frith), it denotes a political conception of public order, a 
general state of peacefulness,...”229  Therefore, it is unlikely that references to the King’s 
Peace were limited to protection against delinquency; it undoubtedly implicated the 
individual wellbeing that a lack of crime evokes.  By the very nature of the king’s rule, the 
King’s Peace signaled the establishment of civil order, around which Alfred and his 
successors constructed a juridical infrastructure to maintain that establishment.  In 
addition to ‘protecting the peace’ or ‘promoting civil order’, Feldman alludes to the 
existence of a symbiotic relationship between the King’s Peace and his ‘royal 
prerogative’.230  That is, employment of the royal prerogative and royal writs were the 
means by which the King’s Peace was bestowed.231  Both undoubtedly emanate from the 
Law-Code to promote peace and civil order for public wellbeing, for which the king—by the 
nature of his role as ‘ruler’—was morally and constitutionally responsible.  
After the Norman era, the King’s Peace was employed to “consciously extend[] the 
jurisdiction of royal law.”232  As such, knights were “assigned in each county to take an 
oath…for the maintenance of the King’s Peace and the effectual pursuit of evil-doers.”233 
These were the “predecessors of the conservators of the peace first appointed under the 
authority of Parliament in 1327, and known as justices of [the] peace from that time.”234 
Therefore, it would appear that societal circumstances dictated the political and legal 
responsibilities related to the King’s Peace, which ultimately gave way to references to 
‘peace, welfare, and good government’ under the Justices Act of 1489.  Pollock, Feldman, 
and Yusuf suggest that it was the 1489 Act that conferred on the conservators of peace—
or justices of the peace—their distinct judicial functions and specific territorial 
jurisdictions.235  By accepting the 1489 Act as an early iteration of POGG, the ‘seedbed’ to 
which Madden, Fieldhouse, and Yusuf refer becomes historically and linguistically 
connected to the imperatives of the King’s Peace and his use of the royal prerogative to 
effectuate those imperatives.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that ideological 
remnants of the King’s Peace are synonymous with the genesis of the POGG doctrine.   
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The collection of imperatives subsequently became the constitutional ideology by which 
the British Empire attempted to ascribe its understanding of social ordering beyond the 
British Isles to its overseas territories.  Analogous to its modern parlance in relation to 
federalism, POGG initially established the Crown (and later Parliament) as the 
constitutional ‘provider of last resort’ or residual guarantor of peace and civil order 
throughout the kingdom.  As an ideology for overseas colonization however, Great Britain’s 
imperial aspirations seemingly frustrated the spirit of POGG’s medieval predecessor.  
James notes that “Britain’s colonies and the new transatlantic commerce they were 
generating were a vital national asset to be coveted, protected and extended, if necessary 
by aggression.”236  Historians and legal scholars suggest that this is where, for the 
American and Canadian colonies specifically, colonial ‘welfare’ was exchanged with 
colonial ‘order’, resulting in conquest, dominance, and subjugation.237  This also seems to 
be where the fundamental aims of the King’s Peace and the aims of POGG officially deviate.  
After Alfred the Great, the idea that the reigning monarch commandeered the royal 
prerogative to ensure peace and civil order, while possessing the moral authority as the 
defender of the Christian faith on earth under God, remained a strong lasting perspective 
on effective leadership in England.  As is demonstrated in the next section, Henry VIII 
expanded the role to establish the sovereign as the ‘supreme head’ of the Church of 
England. The only notable alteration to this designation occurred during the reign of 
Elizabeth I.  Ephesians 5:23 of the Holy Bible establishes that, “the husband is the head of 
the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which he is the Savior.”238 To 
acknowledge Christ’s role as the Head of the Church, the Act of Supremacy of 1559 was 
modified to avoid the perception that any monarch was elevated to the same level as 
Christ.239  Hence, Elizabeth I discontinued the title of ‘Defender of the Faith and Supreme 
Head of the Church of England’.  Instead, she (as well as subsequent sovereigns in 
England) adopted the title of ‘Defender of the Faith and Supreme Governor of the Church 
of England’.240  
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Despite the rise of democracy in England, the nation’s established-church regime has 
remained essentially as it has been since the 7th century. The established religion that 
emerged is a variation on Roman Catholicism, but at the same time claims a liturgical 
connection with the schism that brought about the Protestant Reformation.241 Thus, the 
Anglican Church claims to be “an ancient Church, catholic and reformed” with “roots [that] 
go back to the time of the Roman Empire when Christianity entered the Roman province of 
Britain.”242  The Church further clarifies: 
… [it] developed, acknowledging the authority of the Pope until the 
Reformation in the 16th century. The religious settlement that 
eventually emerged in the reign of Elizabeth I gave the Church of 
England the distinctive identity that it has retained to this day. It 
resulted in a Church that consciously retained a large amount of 
continuity with the Church of the Patristic and Medieval periods in 
terms of its use of the catholic creeds, its pattern of ministry, its 
buildings and aspects of its liturgy, but which also embodied 
Protestant insights in its theology and in the overall shape of its 
liturgical practice….243 
This means that Elizabeth II as the present sovereign—and her offspring as future 
sovereigns—not only personally embody the tenets of Anglicanism, but she is the ‘Supreme 
Governor’ of the Anglican Church and assumes responsibility for preserving the tenets of 
that faith.244  Therefore, England’s present church-state arrangement has been firmly 
engrained in the nation’s psyche for the entirety of her existence as a unified national 
presence.  Although unforeseeable at the time, buttressing the supremacy of this national 
image serves as the basis for the somewhat problematic perception of fluidity and lack of 
transparency between church and government that exists in England today.245  
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2.3  The ‘Henrician’ Reformation: Framing England’s Approach to Establishment 
In the text, Dissolving Royal Marriages: A Documentary History, D.L. D’Avray observes that 
marriage historically played a significant role in kingdom building, which included 
monarchial foreign affairs. 246  As such, the link between Henry VIII’s marital affairs mark a 
turning point for the imperatives of POGG as well as England’s modern established church-
state arrangement. In the modern sense, England’s church-state arrangement is structured 
such that democracy is furthered within the context of a constitutional monarchy 
buttressing a national or preferred church.247 The following diagram attempts to illustrate 
Matthew Purvis’s detailed analysis of the structure of religious and governmental 
responsibilities occupied by the sovereign as well as the highest positions of the Church:248 
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of England’s Present Church-State Arrangement  
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In practice, this means that the reigning monarch with the advice of the leader of his/her 
government (i.e., the Prime Minister) seats the highest positions of the Church.249  Those 
positions in turn control the operations and maintenance of the collective Anglican 
congregations, including to some degree managing the subordinate roles within.250  As a 
facet of the Crown’s prerogative as executive, the Church is directly controlled by the 
executive branch.  For all intents and purposes, the Church of England has all the trappings 
of being an integral part of the English government.  Some legal scholars have argued that 
where religion and politics are concerned in England, it is difficult to distinguish the end of 
one from the beginning of the other.251  Therefore, it appears that the Church is not only 
answerable to God but also subject to the interpretations of democracy that are inherent 
in England’s constitutional documents, even when these two responsibilities are not 
aligned.  This appears to be the case even though those who contribute to the complexity 
make a concerted effort to rebut the presumption by claiming something less convoluted.  
This also appears to explain why political and legal scholars continue to question whether 
there can be true separation between church and government in England.252  As is 
demonstrated in the next section, even the English courts struggle with demarcation.  
During the reign of Henry VIII, the church-state arrangement was equally convoluted.  
Although Rome had discontinued occupation of Britain in 410 A.D., the Catholic Church 
continued to have a role as religious arbiter for the souls of English citizenry.253  Unlike 
today however, the Church in England was an extension of the Church in Rome.  Church 
hierarchy was solely a religious one based on Canon law that developed in Western 
churches after the Schism of 1054.254   Secular monarchs protected the country and ruled 
the populace, but the spiritual wellbeing of the English fell within the purview of the 
Church.255  When corruption became rampant throughout the catholic or universal Church, 
parishioners began to question its ability to secure their spiritual welfare.  Wooding notes 
that church bishops had “exalted their status to the point of declaring themselves the 
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Vicars of Christ, the representatives of God on earth.”256 Antipapal sentiment resulted in 
religious viewpoints becoming more divergent as countless political, legal, and social 
issues simultaneously emerged.257  Since the three were integrally connected, an issue 
affecting one area of English life unavoidably became an issue in the other two.  By the 
time the Catholic priest Martin Luther took the first overt step to dispute church practices 
in 1517—i.e., publicly posting of his 95 Theses at Wittenberg Castle church—Catholic 
discontent had become a festering abscess affecting all of England.258  This led to the 
emergence of Christian factions or denominations demanding a reevaluation and 
modification of church liturgy.259   
The pivotal event that altered the status of England’s church-state arrangement was 
branded ‘the King’s Great Matter’.260  Henry’s petition for annulment from Catherine of 
Aragon, instead of divorce, required the Church in Rome to avoid a 21-year marriage and 
bastardize the daughter born to it for the sake of kingdom building.  When the Church 
refused, Henry publicly challenged the Church’s legitimacy to control his decisions as royal 
sovereign. The schism that resulted officially constituted the established church-state 
arrangement in England.261  The subsequent restructuring between ‘church and state’—
i.e., the Henrician Reformation—nullified any political or religious power that the Church in 
Rome retained over England.262  Henry’s new role gave him—and every monarch that has 
succeeded him—the statutory wherewithal to exert power over religious conviction.263  From 
a functional perspective, the English Crown—i.e., the executive—came to control the reins 
of the Church of England and the ecclesiastical legal framework associated therewith.  By 
establishing himself as the Supreme Head of the Church however, Henry’s intent was to 
elevate himself over the belief system within his realm—and theoretically any additional 
belief systems that have since been established within the nation.264  According to Elton, 
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the Henrician Reformation had several significant political and religious outcomes: “[T]he 
break with Rome—the withdrawal from the papal obedience—the creation of a schismatic 
English church—the setting up of the royal supremacy.  All of these are different, and in part 
tendentious, descriptions of one thing: the definition of independent national sovereignty 
achieved by the destruction of the papal jurisdiction in England.”265  The schism is a 
watershed event in England’s history because Henry effectively established secular 
oversight for the management of religious affairs.  As will be demonstrated in subsequent 
chapters, this audacious ‘power-grab’ opened the door for the monarchy and later 
Parliament to use the societal manifestations of religious conviction as negotiable 
instruments during the rise of the British Empire, which was a maneuver with effects that 
are still resonating in England today.  Specifically, the effects of the shift in church oversight 
from religious to secular leadership continues to be evidenced by the interaction between 
Elizabeth II and the national government based on Constitutional law in England.266  
When considered prospectively, the magnitude of Henry’s marital and political 
transgressions might have germinated the ideal national crisis to facilitate a 
discontinuation of the church-state arrangement of 16th century England.  Alternatively, it 
could have served as the impetus to shift the religious tides toward the development of a 
more significantly defined veil of separation.  This is especially the case when the basis for 
restructuring the church-state arrangement was to further nonreligious ends. However, 
Henry’s behavior was not fueled by a distaste for Catholicism.267  He continued to espouse 
‘Henrician-era Catholicism’ after he issued England’s antipapal statutes.268  It was fueled 
by a desire to discontinue the control that the Church had on how he attempted to exert 
power over the people of England.269  It seemingly had little effect on severing religious and 
monarchial ties, despite the difficulties caused by the union.  Although the break itself was 
a turning point, it did not lead to the establishment of a reformed, ‘independent’ Church in 
England.  However, an independent Church of England during the 16th century may have 
separated Christianity from the Crown. Henry’s schism more fully highlighted the 
implications of the Protestant Reformation, which was literally the making of Anglicanism.  
If viewed providentially, it also benefited Christianity as a belief system.  It would come to 
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allow individuals to follow their consciences without fear of being labeled apostates and/or 
being charged with treason.  However, the same may not have been the outcome for 
England as a kingdom.  An independent Church may have altered Britain’s imperial 
trajectory.  Therefore, England needed Christianity, as its interpretation of the belief system 
became a part of the basis for its existence.  That necessity would subsequently manifest 
itself as the first legally-enforceable imperative of the POGG doctrine—i.e., the proliferation 
of Anglicanism—when Great Britain extended her footprint beyond the British Isles. 
2.4 The Crown & the Anglican Church in ‘Post-Christian’ England 
Although England claims that Christianity is no longer essential to the lives of Britons, the 
accoutrements associated with constituting a nation on Anglican exceptionalism appears 
to remain a substantial facet of England’s enduring legacy, economic viability, and modern 
reputation on the world stage.  The British Council described the situation in the United 
Kingdom’s 2015 Religion and Belief Equality Guide.  Specifically, “[t]he UK has a complex 
relationship with religion. There is still a link between the Head of State and the established 
Church. The Queen is Head of Church and State and this can lead to confusion about the 
extent to which the UK is ‘a Christian country’ whilst some hold that the UK is in fact a ‘post-
Christian’ country.”270  Despite the cross-functional roles that are clarified by the previous 
diagram, the English Government continues to dispute the Church of England’s 
involvement in politics or non-religious legal matters.  Instead the Government contends 
that the Church performs several official regulatory functions that are within its own sphere 
of activity.271  However, it is not considered to be a part of government.  This precise issue 
continues to be the focus of the aforementioned political and legal debate, which is likely 
attributable to the fact that the relationship does not appear to be what it is purported to 
be.  When the Church was implicated as an emanation of the state in a 2003 lawsuit, the 
precedent for England’s confounding church-state arrangement was continued as 
Parliament struggled in its attempt to address the nature of England’s church-state 
arrangement. 
Specifically, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords attempted to clarify the limits 
of the intersection between the Church and Parliament when dispensing judgments in the 
series of cases known as Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church 
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Council v Wallbank.272  Specifically, the Wallbanks inherited glebe land at Aston Cantlow in 
1970, which they sublet.273  In 1994, the couple was billed in excess of £95,000 by the 
Parochial Church Council (PCC) of Aston Cantlow for repairs made to the chancel of the 
appurtenant parish church.274  The central issue was whether the Wallbanks were 
responsible for the repairs.  The statute in question, The Chancel Repairs Act of 1932, 
imposes liability upon lay rectors or impropriators for repairs made to the chancel of the 
church.275  While the PCC sought compensatory relief, the Wallbanks attempted to shift the 
burden back to the PCC and possibly the Church of England.  The Wallbanks claimed that 
the ‘overt act’ by PCC of imposing liability on glebe land holders is an official role of a public 
authority and a violation of the Human Rights Act of 1998.276  In its opinion, the Committee 
attempted to deal with the relationship between the Church and the English Government 
based on English Constitutional law. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explains: 
As the established church the [Church of England] still has special 
links with central government. But the Church of England remains 
essentially a religious organisation. This is so even though some of 
the emanations of the church discharge functions which may qualify 
as governmental. Church schools and the conduct of marriage 
services are two instances. The legislative powers of the General 
Synod of the Church of England are another. This should not be 
regarded as infecting the Church of England as a whole, or its 
emanations in general, with the character of a governmental 
organisation.277 
In a previous case, Lord Hope of Craighead has also made clear that, “the Church of 
England as a whole has no legal status or personality;” instead, “[t]he relationship which 
the state has with the Church of England is one of recognition, not of the devolution to it of 
any of the powers or functions of government.”278  These distinctions notwithstanding, the 
longstanding preservation of a national church has admittedly resulted in convolution.  
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry refers to the situation as the ‘notoriously amorphous’ juridical 
nature of the Church of England.279  Therefore, it is fair to say that it is so engrained that 
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to suggest that it no longer exists makes it even more paradoxical when questioning how 
the Government can continue to support a national church and/or faith or the monarchy 
that personifies it.  
If dismantling England’s church-state arrangement is not the answer—and it appears that 
it is not—then the other end of the pendulum seemingly requires affording the Crown, with 
the advice of the Prime Minister, control over the highest religious leaders in mosques, 
synagogues, and temples in England.  Then any future monarch could accurately style 
himself or herself as ‘defender of faiths’ in England.280  At first blush, this may appear 
somewhat incomprehensible.  However, the prospect of the British Crown exerting control 
over the religious beliefs of non-Anglican and/or non-Christian subjects is not without 
precedent.  As will be analyzed more fully in subsequent chapters, this is precisely how the 
British Empire used POGG to ensure the proliferation of the Church of England as the 
national church of the North American colonies.  This was the case even though migration 
to those colonies was an effort for non-Anglican denominations to liberate themselves from 
the Anglican Church, the imperial regime, and the regime’s vendetta against Catholicism.  
Although some might find the monarchial relationship incomprehensible, this was the 
practical reality for non-Christian religious subgroups during the reign of Victoria once her 
royal title was augmented to include her role as Empress of India.281 Cohn notes that “in 
conceptual terms, the British, who started their rule as ‘outsiders’, became ‘insiders’ by 
vesting in their monarch the sovereignty of India through the Government of India Act of 2 
August 1858.”282  Despite the prospect of being labeled an absolutist government, Victoria 
not only assumed the role, but also proclaimed for Britain’s Indian subjects “the same 
obligations of duty” afforded all British subjects.283  Both Cohn and Yusuf submit that the 
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means by which to achieve the obligation was through some of the imperatives of POGG.284  
Cohn goes on to note that Victoria’s proclamation was based on two main assumptions.  
As it pertained to ‘peace and order’, “there was an indigenous diversity in culture, society, 
and religion in India.”285 In order to maintain the balance thereof, the indigenous social 
order could not be dismantled or discarded as had been attempted in earlier British 
colonies.  Where it concerned ‘order and good government’, the British Crown believed that 
“foreign rulers had a responsibility for the maintenance of an equitable form of government 
which would be directed not only to protecting the integrity inherent in this diversity, but 
also to social and material progress which would benefit the ruled.”286  In essence, 
Victoria’s proclamation appears to have constituted a church-state arrangement between 
the British/Indian Crown and the national government to be established in India under 
British rule, which also implicated the religious subgroups co-existing in the region.  The 
Crown recognized the practical realities inherent in the religious diversity of the indigenous 
inhabitants, but also anticipated a future India that adapted to the progressive national 
image of the British Commonwealth.287  This gamble in furtherance of progression also 
included the expansion of Anglicanism in the region.  If the church-state arrangement on 
the British mainland entailed defending the Anglican faith and governing the national 
church, why would the arrangement signify an alternative relationship in India?  
The answer to this question can be found in the proclamation itself.  If Victoria had meant 
to establish a different arrangement, it would not have been necessary to make assurances 
that “her Indian subjects were to be secure in the practice of their religions.”288  If Victoria 
had not believed religion fell within her purview as the sovereign of Britain and India, such 
assurances would have been superfluous.  Likewise, it would not have been necessary to 
ensure “equal and impartial protection of the law, and in the framing and administration 
of this law: ‘due regard…to the ancient rights, usage and customs of India’.”289  The 
detailed evolution of India and Pakistan in conjunction with British Imperialism is beyond 
the scope of this study; however, British occupation of the territory seems to have 
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established in theory a church-state arrangement that implicated the largest religious 
belief systems in the region, including Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism.290   
Therefore, the idea that equal religious treatment in England might also encompass a 
theoretical extension of the relationship that exists between the Crown and the Church of 
England when similarly applied to other religious subgroups based on commitments of 
former monarchs may not be so incomprehensible after all.   If the goal is to promote 
equilibrium, then there appears to be historical basis for suggesting that the relationships 
between the Crown and the disparate faiths must be indistinguishable, although the 
aforementioned arrangement means for achieving this outcome may not be what non-
Christian religious subgroups envisioned.   Considering these circumstances, it is 
conceivable that the nuances of England’s imperial history and the deeply entrenched 
established church-state arrangement was central to the decision to sanction faith-based 
legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam.  Put another way, England’s inability to rectify 
the optics and adaptability of her own national church-state arrangement coupled with 
colonial commitments made by past monarchs in the preservation of POGG support the 
inference that sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism is England’s modern approach 
to promoting religious equilibrium in light of her past treatment of ‘non-conformists’.  This 
is the case notwithstanding how many societal, legislative, and judicial issues are a 
consequence of the policy decision.  
2.5 A Theory on the Illusion of Religious Equilibrium in England 
Those who make the decision to migrate to England, or nations with similarly-situated 
church-state regimes, do so fully aware of the prominent place that the established church 
has in the social order.  This is the case regardless of whether immigration occurs for the 
purposes of education, employment, marriage, sanctuary, or simply a different quality of 
life. This enduring reality demonstrates that not only is England not post-Christianity, but it 
appears to be just as committed to Anglicanism as it was during the rise of the British 
Empire.  Jonathan Fox observes that, where nations have official religions, it is understood 
that “religions do not compete on a level playing field, [as] one or more religions receiv[e] 
benefits that are not shared by all.”291  Those advantages can include funding, other forms 
of governmental support, enforcement of elements of the religion, and even government 
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restrictions on competing religions.”292  Scholars who challenge the appropriateness of an 
established church in England generally come to similar conclusions, even as they rebuke 
the nation’s imperial past while contending that the nation’s church-state arrangement 
must be amended to provide equal treatment for all other religious dogmas.293  As is the 
case with every nation with a constitutionally mandated religion, the intricacies associated 
with England’s monarchial history and church-state arrangement seem to make scholarly 
discourse focused on achieving equilibrium a futile debate, that is, without changing the 
course of history. England’s foundational history and imperial era demonstrate that 
religious equilibrium has never been a facet of the nation’s political, legal, or religious 
agenda.  Likewise, more recent efforts to promote equilibrium may become a substantial 
stumbling block moving forward. 
Specifically, the British Government seems to be proactively extending a wide berth in the 
accommodation of certain religious subgroups.  On closer inspection however, one gets the 
impression that the Government realizes that the maneuver will not actually establish 
equilibrium.  However, it seems necessary to take some action, short of dismantling 
England’s church-state arrangement, to give the impression of attempting to level the 
playing field.  That being said, it does not appear that the Government has fully assessed 
accommodating religious accommodation that includes the political ideologies and choice 
of law preferences associated with migration from non-democratic nations.  Instead of 
proactively and consistently promoting the shared values that collectively act as a national 
leveling agent for all who immigrate to England—not just those from former colonies—the 
Government appears to have reverted to the colonial-era practice of demonstrating 
tolerance by sanctioning exceptionalism for specific groups with the expectation that in 
time integration will eventually rectify the issues of incompatibility.  In so doing, 
exceptionalism gives the appearance that religious plurality can reach a point of 
equilibrium in a democratic nation that has a national church, even if in actuality it cannot.  
Considering these circumstances, there appears to be a fallacy in the theory of 
exceptionalism as a means to establish equilibrium or impartiality in nations that declare 
an official religion—or in the case of the United Kingdom, two related religions (Catholicism 
and Anglicanism).294  In England’s case, there appears to be an added layer to the fallacy.  
Specifically, requests for exceptional treatment within a national infrastructure that has as 
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a matter of course commandeered exceptional treatment throughout her imperial history 
seems to exacerbate the fallacy. In the case of Islamic law exceptionalism, the 
circumstances that have unfolded seem to create a dichotomy between ‘Imperial Privilege’ 
and ‘Exceptionalism’.  As has been demonstrated herein and will be discussed more fully 
in subsequent chapters, England’s imperial history has been predicated on a comparative/ 
superlative relationship between the national church and other religious subgroups and 
denominations. However, the extraordinary deference afforded Islam does not appear to 
yield the customary outcome where religious equilibrium is attempted by other religious 
subgroups and/or denominations, while Anglicanism retains exceptional or privileged 
status as the national church.  
Instead, the practical effect of the British Government affording Islam such expansive 
religious accommodation has seemingly resulted in the Islamization of English society 
being imposed upon other religious subgroups and/or denominations.  That is, instead of 
being subject to the circumstances associated with an established-church regime, the 
remaining subgroups and/or denominations are sandwiched between the historical and 
modern implications of imperial-Anglicanism attempting to accommodate political-Islam.  
Meanwhile, the Church of England has become the advocate for Islamic law exceptionalism 
by acting as a benevolent bully pulpit to coax Britons into being at ease with the political 
ideologies and religious laws espoused by Muslim transplants.295 According to former-
Archbishop Williams, such acceptance is the proper ‘Christian’ response to 
multiculturalism and religious plurality.296 Therefore, the ‘Imperial Privilege/ 
Exceptionalism’ dichotomy between England’s imperial past and her present responses to 
the demands of Islam are seemingly inescapable, even if one does not espouse either 
religious ideology.   
Long before Fox and others analyzed the disproportionate treatment of religious subgroups 
throughout the world, Adam Smith discussed the futility in attempting to artificially impose 
equilibrium as England appears to be doing.  In his seminal work in economic theory Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he alludes to this situation when he 
juxtaposes religious denominationalism—as it existed at the point of America’s declaration 
                                                          
295 Rowan Williams, ‘The Archbishop of Canterbury and Shari’a Law’ in Robin Griffith-Jones (ed), Islam and 
English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a (Cambridge University Press 2013) 7; See 
also, Mark D Chapman, ‘Rowan Williams’s Political Theology: Multiculturalism and Interactive Pluralism’ 
(2010) 9 Journal of Anglican Studies 61. 
296 Williams (n 295), 7; See also, Robin Griffith-Jones and Rowan Williams, ‘The “unavoidable” Adoption of 
Sharia Law – the Generation of a Media Storm’, Islam and English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the 
Place of Shari’a (2013). 
[63]  
 
of independence—with the laws of supply and demand to evaluate the societal benefits of 
religious plurality.297 Smith contends that there is an insurmountable incongruence 
between more and less dominant religious subgroups in a society.  In Book V, Chapter 1 
paragraph 197, Smith summarizes: 
…if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering 
party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of 
another when it had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt 
equally and impartially with all the different [religious] sects, and have 
allowed every man to choose his own priest and his own religion as 
he thought proper.298  
When Smith describes the possibility of achieving a state of equilibrium, he offers a 
universally demonstrative caveat: “…had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of 
one sect more than those of another when it had gained the victory.”299  This level of 
inequality is inherent because the victor determines the religious direction.300 As a 
precursor to Fox’s contention, Smith’s ‘if/then’ proposition demonstrates the fundamental 
obstruction to the ability to achieve equilibrium.  In other words, the adoption of a religious 
denomination to serve as the constitutional figurehead for the national government 
fundamentally obstructs equilibrium and renders attempts to artificially impose it little 
more than the exacerbation of the incongruence.  
Along the same lines, religious and legal theorists alike have come to acknowledge that 
religious leveling in religiously plural societies is challenging enough when a nations’ 
church-state arrangement is by design focused on ‘not’ espousing a particular religious 
dogma as the basis for constitutionalism.301  It is fair to say then that equilibrium is 
unachievable when a nation has and continues to promote an established church while 
also affording extraordinary accommodation to one religious dogma over the others that 
remain.  Consequently, there appears to be an absence of research in England that gauges 
how the Imperial Privilege/Exceptionalism dichotomy affects non-Anglican Christians.  
Instead, the Anglican Church seems to continue to speak for the whole of Christendom.  
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Therefore, a reasonable question is whether England’s decision to sanction faith-based 
legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam is the most judicious alternative for achieving 
religious equilibrium amongst the many religious subgroups and/or denominations co-
existing throughout the nation. 
The indictment that nations embracing more liberal democratic ideals are obliged to turn 
the nation inside out to defuse their historical legacies for the sake of accommodating 
newcomers appears to create a need to foster the fallacy in the first instance.  
Exceptionalism then becomes an acceptable measure for curing the imbalance created by 
the sheer weight of history.  To contextualize this assertion, one need only ask whether 
England is amenable to the legalization of faith-based legal tribunals for every subgroup 
and/or denomination co-existing in the nation.  This might implicate not only returning to 
Ecclesiastical courts for the integration of interpretations of the Holy Bible, but also the 
Hebrew Bible (which contains additional books), the Book of Mormons, the Book of the 
Maccabees, the Guru Granth Sahib, the Vedas, etc.  It might also come to include legalizing 
tribunals for religious outliers like Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of Scientology (and the 
wealth of literature published by its prophet, L. Ron Hubbard), or even LaVey’s Satanic 
Bible, which is the religious text for the Church of Satan.  Along the same lines, could the 
200,000 or so members of the Temple of the Jedi Order living in England request the same 
treatment as the 4% percent of the population that espouses Islam?  At present, the Jedi 
are denied religious protection in the United Kingdom.302  If this particular belief system 
was to be recognized however (as it is in Canada and the U.S.), are the adherents of it—or 
any of the others listed herein—free to rely on the 1996 Arbitration Act to integrate the laws 
of the Jedi Order under ADR and fully expect the English judiciary to afford legal deference 
to those judgments?  If not, then it is highly unlikely that the promotion of religious equality 
is the motivation behind Islamic law exceptionalism in England.   
Somewhat like the ramifications in Canada or the United States (if either were to legalize 
faith-based legal exceptionalism), the repercussions of affording deference to 
interpretations of religious legal precepts—whether of smaller denominations, outliers, or 
former colonial holdings—has the propensity to subject Britons to more than the 
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idiosyncrasies associated with those religions.  In the case of Islam, this includes not only 
sharia guidelines, but also legally binding opinions on Islamic law transplanted from 
Muslim-majority nations.  The practical outcome of the latter is the imposition of foreign 
legal judgments upon British subjects.  The implications of these probabilities appear to be 
the rationale for large scale scholarly efforts to inquire into Islamic law’s compatibility with 
liberal democracy and/or promote its ability to be harmonized with traditional codified rules 
of law for the purpose of dispensing judgment.303   One such example is the text, Islam and 
English Law, in which the works of Baderin, Edge, McGoldrick, and others attempt to 
address the question of whether there is a future where Islamic law supplements English 
law; and if so, what conditions should be placed on the areas and degrees of integration.304 
These specific questions of compatibility however appear to promote a response to a 
misallocated legal inquiry. That is, they seem to be more appropriate for Muslim-majority 
nations seeking to move to more secular, democratically-inclined legislative/juridical 
infrastructures. Therefore, the questions appear to fit more effectively in the analyses 
proffered by Islamic scholars like An-Na’im and Manea, who promote the transition to 
secular legal frameworks to disentangle religion and law within Islam.305  
Where it pertains nations that already possess neutral or even quasi-neutral juridical 
infrastructures—like the three considered herein—the more relevant question appears to 
be whether engaging with Islamic law results in imputing the legal precepts of the Quran 
and the Sunnah—i.e., the law’s primary sources—to non-Muslims in violation of their 
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religious liberties and/or frustrating their equal access to an impartial judiciary. Although 
the discussion of primary source material will be more fully explicated in subsequent 
chapters, it is worth clarifying at this point that the Quran is generally believed by Muslims 
to be the exact words of God revealed by Muhammad, while the Sunnah is believed by 
Muslims to be their prophet Muhammad’s lifetime sayings, deeds and tacit approvals on 
different aspects of life.306  In light of the religious nature of the sources, England’s imperial 
legacy, which includes Anglican Ecclesiastical courts and faith-based legal exceptionalism, 
offers relevant context for not only contemplating these inquiries in relation to Muslims and 
non-Muslims but having definitive answers thereto before affording nationwide legal 
deference to Islamic law judgments.  Therefore, it seems inconceivable that England would 
sanction the creation of a body of religious law—without being compelled by obligation or 
by social contract—even if it is expected to simply remain in the adjudicatory realm of ADR. 
These issues notwithstanding, England established a separate legal jurisdiction for the 
purpose of dispensing religious law for those who espouse Islam, with a notable caveat.  
Ironically enough, the caveat is that the judgments remain in the adjudicatory realm of 
ADR.307  That is, pursuing redress under religious law results in claimants forfeiting their 
right to have their issues addressed by the national judiciary.  However, the limitations 
placed on Islamic law tribunals have not prevented Muslim claimants from attempting to 
transfer matters into the national court system when they are dissatisfied with the 
outcomes under Islamic law.308 Therefore, it might become necessary for England to 
reevaluate the theory of sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism before decisions come to 
affect the legal rights of those who may become bound by the rules of the Quran and/or 
Sunnah without their consent.  For the time being, the English judiciary has taken the 
position that it will not adjudicate ‘religious matters’.309  Specifically, Lord Justice Mummery 
proclaims in the 2012 case, Khaira & Ors v Shergill & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 983: 
A secular court will not adjudicate on the truth of disputed tenets of 
religious belief and faith, or on the correctness of religious practices: 
those questions are non-justiciable, because they are neither 
questions of law nor are they factual issues capable of proof in court 
by admissible evidence. Judicial method is equipped to deal in hard 
facts objectively ascertainable, directly or by inference, from 
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probative evidence: it is not equipped to determine the truth, 
accuracy or sincerity of subjective religious beliefs about doctrine and 
practice.310 
Proclamation notwithstanding, the promotion of Islamic law as a ‘cultural’ component of 
societal interaction has seemingly encouraged encompassing Islamic law exceptionalism 
as necessary to the furtherance of multiculturalism without evaluating whether this 
perspective sidesteps the ‘religious matters’ stance.  To put this another way, if 
Islamization means the imposition of religion, and religion and law are inseparable within 
Islamic culture, then a reasonable question is whether there is anything concerning Islam 
(when further shielded by a broad interpretation of multiculturalism) that isn’t a religious 
matter?  
There is apparent expediency in not focusing on the fact that Islamic law is the reiteration 
of foreign interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah.  Specifically, it facilitates directing 
national attention toward the preservation of culture, instead of minding the effects of how 
integrating Islamic law at any level might restrain the rights of those who do not espouse 
the religion. For the sake of illustration, there appears to be a dearth of evidence 
demonstrating that the national judiciary in England has purposefully relied upon and/or 
cited to the judgments of the courts of Muslim-majority nations when addressing legal 
claims of British citizens, even those who espouse Islam.  This is the case even when said 
claimants are immigrants from one of those nations.  Thus, Lord Justice Mummery’s 
assertion that England’s national courts will not rely on Islamic law to adjudicate cases 
involving Muslim claimants suggests that individuals who live in or are citizens of the United 
Kingdom should expect to be bound by national law.  At the same time, it has been 
established that the national courts “will give effect to the decisions of a religious tribunal 
where the parties have appointed it as arbitrator under the terms of the Arbitration Act.”311  
Arbitrators can be Islamic religious leaders who may not be licensed to practice law in 
England or anywhere else.312  Does that not mean that the national court is relying on 
religious arbitrators’ interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah, which then have the force 
and effect of national law?  Once it becomes national law, it is binding on Muslims and non-
Muslims alike.  Therefore, it appears that the practical outcome is Islamic law becomes a 
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part of England’s impartial rule of law, even if one does not believe in the authenticity of 
the Islamic text or espouse the views of the prophetic figure. 
2.6 The Islamic Law Inquiry & Recurring Imperial Commitments  
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the rise and decline of the British Empire has not been without 
consequences. At its height, POGG was the instrument for colonizing and propagating 
Anglicanism to more than half the world.  As the post-imperial era has forced the United 
Kingdom to relinquish her many holdings, it appears that residual imperial responsibilities 
have remained. England’s migration profile, despite membership in the European Union, 
mostly encompasses transplants from her former colonies.313  As such, it is reasonable to 
believe that England’s perception of herself continues to be through the lens of 
Imperialism.  How could it not?  This is especially the case as it appears that the 
relationships did not really come to an end; they simply moved from colonial soil to 
mainland Britain. 
 
Figure 2.2: British Commonwealth Independence by Year 
© TheCommonwealth.org  
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Returning to the Imperial Privilege/Exceptionalism dichotomy, it is worth evaluating where 
Great Britain’s imperial legacy leaves England as it relates to its church-state arrangement 
and Muslims’ request for faith-based legal exceptionalism.  Maret explains, “the United 
Kingdom (UK) has experienced a steady growth of Muslim communities within its borders, 
and with it, a surge of faith-based arbitration services for Muslims.”314 As such, 
accommodating the political ideologies and religion-centric legal preferences of immigrants 
from Muslim-majority nations has not been without controversy, especially over the past 
decade.315 The former Archbishop of Canterbury’s lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice in 
February 2008 entitled, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England,’ exemplifies the continuing 
controversy.316   
The lecture attempted to promote exceptionalism as the democratically expedient solution 
to Islamic law in English courts from the perspective of the national church.  When the 
Archbishop was presented with the question of whether the application of sharia is 
‘unavoidable’ in certain circumstances, especially if England seeks to achieve cohesion 
and take Muslim’s religion seriously, he responded affirmatively.317  Many British citizens 
were incensed as they interpreted his words to suggest that it is just a matter of time before 
Islamic law would be a recognized phenomenon in England.318 Williams later addressed 
the societal discontent raised by his statement.  He explained that, “even when some of 
the more dramatic fears are set aside, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what 
degree of accommodation the law of the land can and should give to minority communities 
with their own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes.”319  He also acknowledged that 
the issue “spills over into…questions about the right of religious believers in general to opt 
out of certain legal provisions…”320 Williams seemed to at least tacitly embrace the reality 
that although the right of conscience is sacrosanct, the judicial system may not uphold 
every manifestation of faith that religious subgroups deem compulsory.  He also seemed 
to recognize that the obvious answer may not be creating bifurcated legal systems to 
appease religious subgroups and/or denominations.   
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Societal responses to the Archbishop’s comments also contributed to the afore-mentioned 
scholarly assessments of the prudence of Islamic law exceptionalism in England.  In 
aggregate, these legal scholars suggest that before affirmative steps are taken, it is 
essential to understand whether Islamic law can or will evolve to meet liberal democracy.  
As is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, Wright et al. observe that the question of 
Islamic law in Western nations is rarely assessed from the perspective of non-Muslims.321 
Although some address possible human rights violations associated with imposing Islamic 
law, none of the scholars who contributed to this text address the question of whether the 
primary sources of Islamic law make the judgments of Islamic law tribunals unenforceable 
in creating legal precedent without infringing on the legal rights of non-Muslims. Therefore, 
how will Parliament and/or the English judiciary ensure that the religious laws of Muslims 
do not unwittingly bind non-Muslims when they petition for redress before the court?  When 
this same question applied to the Anglican Ecclesiastical courts, history evidences that the 
jurisdictional reach of the courts was curtailed to ensure that Anglican religious law was 
not enforced upon the growing number of adherents of other denominations and/or belief 
systems.  Thus, a reasonable question is to what degree will history have to repeat itself 
before the same conclusion is reached concerning Islamic law? Based on England’s 
approach to curtailing Islamic jurisprudence, it would appear that this conclusion has 
already been reached, and the only remaining question is what needs to happen now?  
Notwithstanding the availability of historically demonstrative guidance centered in her own 
imperial rise and fall, it appears that England based the adoption of faith-based legal 
platforms on one of myriad theories associated with legal pluralism as an accommodated 
appendage to the national judiciary.322  One such theory is that branded by legal theorist, 
Ayelet Shachar, as the concept of ‘transformative accommodation’.  According to Shachar, 
is a “scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to choose the jurisdiction under which 
they will seek to resolve certain carefully specified matters, so that power-holders are 
forced to compete for the loyalty of their shared constituents.”323  Those who point to extra-
constitutional measures like transformative accommodation as a solution for requests to 
accommodate Islamic law propose restructuring the rule of law in Muslim-minority 
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countries to allow Muslims to establish a legal system that is exclusive and separate from 
the national framework.324  This alternative is proposed as a means of ‘foster[ing] peaceful 
co-existence based on tolerance’.325  From a practical perspective, this undertaking seems 
to provide a means to forum shop for advantageous legal judgments depending on secular 
or religious partiality.   
In the commoditization of not only religion but also the rule of law, the description conjures 
images of shopping for favorable mortgage or credit card rates instead of exercising one’s 
religious liberty.  Even Williams acknowledges that there is a ‘market’ element to Shachar’s 
definition, which is uncomfortable to consider.326   Although not fully confident of the 
correct answer for England, Williams noted that “if what [the British] want socially is a 
pattern of relations in which a plurality of diverse and overlapping affiliations work for a 
common good, and in which groups of serious and profound conviction are not 
systematically faced with the stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty, it seems 
unavoidable.”327  Moreover, Williams suggests that this level of accommodation emanates 
from Christians obligation to love their Muslim neighbors.328  He noted that this obligation 
does not mean lessening the furtherance of their own Christian faith, but instead working 
to “live together constructively” in a plural society instead of coexisting “tensely or 
suspiciously.”329  However, Williams failed to address how legally curtailing one’s own right 
to pursue one’s faith by giving legal deference to the religious guidelines and legal precepts 
of someone else’s faith actually achieves that objective.  
2.7 The Socio-Legal Consequences of Attempting to Regulate Exceptionalism  
Returning to the employment of ADR to achieve faith-based legal exceptionalism, 
arbitration affords claimants the ability to settle their legal disputes without having to 
endure the litigatory process. English courts have determined that the primary aim of 
arbitration in the U.K. “is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense [when]…the parties [are] free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest.”330  Therefore, the 1996 Arbitration Act is the statutory means that allows parties 
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to agree to have legal issues determined by arbitration rather than by the national 
judiciary.331 England began accommodating faith-based legal exceptionalism in August 
2007, which allowed Islamic law tribunals to begin settling disputes under the Act.332  
Analogous to Canada and the U.S., there are several preliminary requirements in England 
that accompany arbitration agreements and/or the tribunals that adjudicate them. 
Specifically, there is the preliminary requirement that the parties who agree to arbitration 
are of equal bargaining power—i.e., it is evident that there is a lack of pressure, coercion, 
or undue influence.  As it concerns those who serve as arbitrators in England, there are no 
specifically required qualifications or characteristics.333  However, they must be able to 
show objectivity or impartiality where it pertains the parties and disputes being 
arbitrated.334  Lastly, it appears to be presumed that arbitrators will be licensed to practice 
law, although they do not have to be British citizens/subjects or even licensed to practice 
in England. With this in mind, Islamic law tribunals were afforded the bandwidth to address 
certain familial disputes between claimants on a voluntary non-binding basis.335 Although 
judgments of Islamic law tribunals were granted binding legal effect in September 2008, 
they have not been designated as fully integrated aspects of the English judicial system.336 
As it presently stands, Islamic law tribunals continue to make enforceable rulings under 
the Arbitration Act with little regulatory oversight to ensure that the preliminary 
requirements of English arbitration are upheld.337   
England’s history with religious courts notwithstanding, the question of the constitutionality 
of Islamic law exceptionalism and where religious decisions might fit within the English 
judicial system have also created considerable debate.338  Specifically, there was also very 
little examination of how the tribunals actually furthered multiculturalism in England.  As 
such, the tribunals began to be scrutinized because of the lack of governmental oversight 
almost immediately after implementation. A crucial question that continues to challenge 
the appropriateness of Islamic law exceptionalism in England is whether it is possible for 
them to overcome the obvious incongruence between legal protections afforded under 
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Islamic law versus under English law.339 This speaks to the ability or willingness of tribunal 
adjudicators to assure equal bargaining power between the parties when the primary and 
secondary sources of law relied upon do not have gender equality as a principal objective.  
There has also been concern about particular tribunals inconspicuously addressing 
disputes that extend beyond the types of legal matters they purport to address—vis-à-vis 
jurisdictional creep.340 Advocates for the establishment of the tribunals originally claimed 
that they would adjudicate familial matters only.341 However, they have been found to 
address non-familial contract disputes and criminal matters, including those dealing with 
domestic violence.342  As there are no stipulations on who the arbitrators are and general 
views on physical contact between spouses differ under Islamic law and English law, 
advocacy groups have suggested that Islamic law tribunals might condone spousal 
interaction that is illegal under English law.343 As will be demonstrated more fully in 
subsequent chapters, these concerns are not without merit. Moreover, there have been 
concerns about conscious attempts to impede Muslim communities’ reliance on English 
law, in that the tribunals discourage clients from seeking other viable legal alternatives.344  
This has resulted in the English legislature attempting to address the questions that appear 
to have been overlooked when Islamic law exceptionalism was being considered and 
sanctioned.345  
To illustrate, the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill was introduced in the 
House of Lords by Baroness Caroline Cox in 2012.346  The Baroness argued that “some 
sharia tribunals operated in ways that were unproblematic but…others gave cause for 
concern.”347  To mitigate concerns, the Equality Bill requires Islamic law tribunals to 
acknowledge the primacy of English law to all clients that they serve. Cox claimed that this 
acknowledgement would achieve two objectives.  First, the acknowledgement of the 
primacy of English law would effectively prevent jurisdictional creep by Islamic law 
tribunals.348  By forcing Islamic law tribunals to make clear where their jurisdiction ends, 
and English courts begin, it would ensure that claimants were advised on the full extent of 
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their legal rights.  It would also combat “unequal treatment of women by tribunals operating 
under sharia.”349 When the bill was challenged as an interference with Muslims’ religious 
liberty, Cox noted that if after being informed of the full breadth of rights available, an 
individual desires to voluntary submit to the “rulings of any body, religious or otherwise, 
even if that means surrendering their rights under English law, they were free to do so.”350 
The Equality Bill also established an offense that would carry a five-year jail sentence for 
anyone involved in misleading claimants to believe that Islamic law tribunals have legal 
jurisdiction over family or criminal law.351  Although the Bill was unsuccessful, the 
legislative objectives outlined therein illustrate the problems inherent in promoting faith-
based legal exceptionalism in general, and Islamic law tribunals in particular.   
England’s inheritance of the British Empire’s church-state arrangement is also at the center 
of both concerns that Cox’s legislation was drafted to mitigate.  This lends more support to 
the inference that England’s decision to sanction exceptionalism springs from the nation’s 
perception of imperial responsibility.  The British Council suggests that a significant trend 
in England is that there is “an increase in faiths associated with post-war and postcolonial 
immigration, especially Islam.”352 Although this study is not in itself a feminist critique of 
Islamic law or the associated tribunals, an ancillary facet of the Islamic law inquiry is 
focused on how integration of Islamic law in Muslim-minority nations affects Muslim 
women.  Ali, Bennoune, Manea, and others have each to varying degrees considered the 
effect of Islamic law on the privileges and responsibilities of Muslim women as members 
of religious subgroups in Western nations.353  Central to their discourse is the problem that 
results when some attempts to promote multiculturalism—vis-à-vis Islamic law 
exceptionalism—has the practical effect of fostering gender inequality.   
In the text, Women and Shari’a Law, Elham Manea alludes to the fact that not only does 
England assume an obligation of its imperial history, but misguided approaches to that 
obligation facilitate gender inequality by sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism.354  In her 
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effort to oppose accommodating Islamic law in Britain, Manea revisits the concept of the 
‘the white man’s burden’ as the impetus for England’s continued perception of imperial 
supremacy, which manifests itself in the legalization of Islamic law tribunals.355  Manea 
contends: 
[t]he desire to protect the rights of minorities or people in former 
colonies, and the strong sense of shame and guilt over the Western 
colonial and imperial past and its conduct of politics—yields an 
assumption that…human rights is a Western enterprise and an 
imposition of the powerful.356   
She continues by arguing that this assumption leads to efforts to repair past damage by 
taking heavy-handed steps to protect multiculturalism, especially where minority groups 
are concerned.357 She also contends that integration of Islamic law without determining 
whether it’s what Muslims—women in particular—desire or need is illustrative of England’s 
heavy-handedness.358  
Based on the vastness of Great Britain’s reach under POGG—as is illustrated at Figure 2.2—
and the criticisms levelled at the nation—as are discussed herein—it is plausible that 
England deems it appropriate to continue treating immigrants as if they were still colonial 
subjects.  According to Manea, this might include arbitrary attempts to promote the 
perception of equality amongst divergent religious denominations and subgroups by 
affording some of them extraordinary exception.359  In the case of Islamic law however, the 
outcome may result in England weakening the shared values that the nation purports to 
embrace by affording exception to political ideologies and religious tribunals that do not 
actively seek to promote those shared values, especially as it relates to democracy and 
gender equality.  Likewise, the continued attempt by claimants to move claims from Islamic 
law tribunals to national courts could possibly set the stage for nationwide if the move 
results in the specific religious edicts being used to dispense decisions for those outside 
that specific religious subgroup.  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter establishes a chain of cause-and-effect that explains how England’s 
accommodation of Islamic law exceptionalism carries the weight of historically comingling 
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religion and government in the spreading of Anglicanism in expansion of ‘Peace, Order and 
Good Government’.  As POGG has a history that extends back to the Law-Code of Alfred the 
Great and the creation of the English kingdom, the imperatives that buttress the doctrine 
became the archetype for colonial societal management during the rise of the British 
Empire.  Consequently, commitments were made to preserve the religious beliefs and 
societal norms of the territories that the Empire colonized, which has come to include the 
political ideologies and religion-centric laws associated with Islam.  This is the case even 
though issues created by religious law exceptionalism appear to far outweigh the benefits 
gained.  Specifically, the decision to encroach upon the legal rights of adherents of other 
religious dogmas and the non-religious will likely weaken England’s FSVs.  Because of 
migration from former British colonies to mainland Britain however, the preservation of 
POGG—which includes England’s established church-state arrangement—has seemingly 
become the catalyst for expansive degrees of latitude concerning not only worship but also 
the entire mode of societal interaction.  As this chapter has demonstrated, Muslim 
claimants have already taken steps to breach the wall that the British Government has 
seemingly erected around Islamic law tribunals.  Specifically, they have begun attempting 
to move their claims from Islamic law tribunals to English courts, all the while relying on the 
religious texts and prophetic perspectives of the Islamic belief system.  Hence, there may 
be something to the former archbishop’s assertion after all.360  It may become 
‘unavoidable’ that the legacy of the POGG doctrine, which includes a history of Anglican 
exceptionalism, results in the national judiciary imposing Islamic law on non-Muslim 
claimants.  In other words, it may be only a matter of time before non-Muslim claimants 
become bound by Islamic law as a result of comingling claims decided by imams or other 
arbitrators originating in Islamic law tribunals, where Islamic law is applied, with those 
decided by non-religious arbitration panels or the national judiciary, where the national rule 
of law is supposed to prevail.    
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THE REJECTION OF POGG: 
AMERICA’S APPROACH TO DISESTABLISHMENT 
 “Great Britain lost the military struggle for the thirteen rebellious colonies in 1781… 
[t]he combination of the Treaty of Paris and [British] Loyalist resettlement  
[in Canada]…completely transformed British America.”361 
This next two chapters provide historiographic analyses of British Imperialism as the 
provocation for constitutional responses to the POGG doctrine in the United States and 
Canada. By first expanding the scope of POGG as not only a Canadian constitutional 
mainstay, but also a facet of the American colonial experience, the chapters demonstrate 
how the doctrine shaped the relationship between the British Empire and her North 
American colonies. These chapters then examine how the implementation of POGG incited 
divergent and sometimes oppositional perspectives between the American and Canadian 
colonies. The difference in perspectives contributed to the colonies’ divergent reactions to 
Great Britain’s approach to colonial societal management, which included the imposition 
of the Church of England, the monarchial/parliamentary governmental framework, and 
English colonial law.  As such, POGG prompted the adoption of the disparate constitutional 
approaches and governmental frameworks that have emerged in each nation, including 
each nation’s church-state arrangement.  
This chapter focuses on aspects of the American colonial experience that demonstrate that 
POGG was not only instrumental to Canadian constitutionalism but also an American 
colonial paradigm. Although Canada adopted POGG as an ideology that has been 
integrated into her constitutional documents, the doctrinal imperatives were also catalysts 
for steering the British-American colonies toward independence.  Therefore, this chapter 
demonstrates the significance of the POGG doctrine in the history of American 
constitutionalism and why the United States should not discard the effects of POGG when 
drawing upon foundational ideals and perspectives to address modern constitutional 
issues, such as faith-based legal exceptionalism. 
3.1 Mainland Britain: Foreshadowing the Effects of POGG in North America 
Recall from the previous chapter that POGG’s constitutional reach encompasses what is 
present-day Northern Ireland—vis-à-vis the former Province of Ulster.  Specifically, POGG 
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was essential to Northern Ireland’s transition from plantation colonies to semi-autonomous 
nation of the United Kingdom.  Likewise, the occurrences that transpired on the British 
Isles between Great Britain’s establishment of the Ulster plantation in 1609 and the 
issuance of the 1689 British Act of Toleration are significant as they offer insight into the 
role that POGG played in refining Great Britain’s imperial ideology.  The occurrences not 
only illustrate a prior imposition of the imperatives associated with POGG, but they also 
foreshadow the conflicts that were on the horizon in the North American colonies between 
the 17th and 18th centuries.  During those crucial years, the British kingdoms were in a 
continual state of civil war caused in large part by religious conflicts that emerged after the 
Protestant Reformation.   
As a result of the Reformation, Scotland emerged as a faction of Protestantism while 
Catholicism remained entrenched in Ireland.  England emerged as a ‘reformed’ variation 
of Catholicism—i.e., Anglicanism.362  The notable exception was the plantation of Ulster, 
which was established by the British in an effort to colonize the more rural northerly parts 
of Ireland.  This once recalcitrant Gaelic-speaking society of Catholics was subjugated by a 
society of British loyalists committed to Anglican supremacy.363  An assessment of the 
many moving parts that contributed to Great Britain’s plans to colonize Ulster is beyond the 
scope of this study.  What is relevant is the fact that the imperatives of POGG were integral 
to the transformation of Ireland’s “demographic, socio-economic, political,…religious, and 
cultural landscapes.”364  Moreover, the precedent setting imposition of POGG in Ulster 
provided Great Britain with an imperial template or doctrine to be replicated in “future 
colonial expansion in the Americas, the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent.”365  The 
imposition of POGG in Ulster also establishes support for the supposition that POGG was 
not just a Canadian right of constitutional passage but also an American colonial 
phenomenon.   
According to Jonathan Bardon, the colonization of Ulster was a grandiose scheme focused 
on isolating, civilizing and Anglicizing one of the most ‘remote and benighted’ Catholic 
regions under British rule.366  Long before Henry VIII established the Church of England, 
                                                          
362 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (Yale University Press 2009) 11-2. 
363 Sean Connolly, ‘Religion and Society, 1600-1914’ in Liam Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds), Ulster 
Since 1600: Politics, Economy, and Society (Oxford University Press (Online) 2013) 74-8. 
364 Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Micheál Ó Siochrú, ‘Introduction’ in Éamonn Ó Ciardha and Micheál Ó Siochrú 
(eds), The Plantation of Ulster: Ideology and Practice (Manchester University Press 2012) 1. 
365 Ciardha and Siochrú (n 364), 1. 
366 Jonathan Bardon, The Plantation of Ulster: The British Colonization of the North of Ireland in the 17th 
Century (Gill Books 2013) 214. 
[79]  
 
Catholicism was fully entrenched amongst the inhabitants of the Ulster counties.367  
Furthermore, the remoteness of the counties made them somewhat impervious to British 
rule and the imperatives that were meant to ensure peace, order, and good government in 
the territories within Great Britain’s locus of control.368  English-speaking British planters 
were incentivized to establish plantations to exert dominion and ensure the civilization of 
the Irish natives.369  Padraig Lenihan acknowledges that the aim of Ulster’s colonization 
was to “separate the Irish by themselves [to ensure they would]…in heart, in tongue and 
every way else become English.”370  As would be the case in the North American colonies, 
an important precondition was that Anglicanism expunged or at least subjugated any other 
religious dogmas that prevailed.  In Ulster’s case, this translated into “preventing the 
further growth of popery.”371  Civilizing Ulster also encompassed the other imperatives of 
POGG, which included supplanting the Irish governmental infrastructure with that of the 
British and replacing prevailing Irish (Brehon) law with English colonial/penal law.372  By 
1641 when the Irish finally rebelled against the British, the imperatives of POGG had 
shifted the balance of political, legal, and economic power.  According Jim Smyth and Emrys 
Jones, “the native Irish were disadvantaged and displaced [and became] tenants of the 
new [British] owners.”373  Similarly, G.A. Hayes-Mccoy observes that life in Ireland was 
effectively “ ‘dismembered on account of religion’ and further upset by the political, 
administrative, and social changes that culminated in the overthrow of local authority in 
Ulster… .”374  Consequently, the colonization of Ulster territory—and the rebellion and war 
that followed—made the colonization of the North American territories a relevant exercise 
in reiteration and repetition, which would also culminate in rebellion and war.   
Another noteworthy indication of future expectations in the North American colonies 
centered on the exacerbation of political conflicts that had existed between the Crown and 
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Parliament.  From approximately 1630 to 1689, attempts to suppress religious 
denominationalism coupled with the governmental power struggle between the reigning 
monarch and Parliament seemingly assured another civil war on the British Isles.375  In 
response to Parliament’s attempts to assert power, Charles I dissolved Parliament and 
instituted England’s period of Personal Rule.376  Circumstances were worsened by Charles’ 
attempts to exert further control over Scotland and Ireland’s religious and political 
practices.377  Thus, civil war again engulfed the British Isles from 1642 to 1651.  By 1678, 
the British kingdoms were consumed by the fear of an international adversary, the French, 
and the possibility of a Catholic monarch.378  Colley observes that, “England, Wales and 
Scotland had been caught up in a succession of major wars with the foremost Catholic 
power in Europe, France.”379  This common adversary “made it possible for the different 
countries, social classes, and ethnic groups…to have something in common—whether it be 
fear, or aggression, or a powerful sense of embattled Protestantism.”380  After spending 
1688 through 1689 circumventing the return of a Catholic king to the thrones in England 
and Scotland, a political union appeared to be the solution to fortify each kingdom against 
France and the possibility of alignment between France and another Catholic pretender.381  
Scotland and England (and Wales) opted for official unification despite the extreme divides 
attributed to denominationalism and territorial autonomy.382   
To aid in achieving the union, the British Act of Toleration was issued in 1689 to make 
official the practical realities of the religious schisms in Great Britain (and the North 
American colonies).383  The Act essentially assured that Anglicanism emerged as the 
superlative ‘established’ religion, but freedom of religious worship was officially afforded 
to any Protestant religious subgroup that did not follow the doctrines and practices of the 
Church of England.384  The Act afforded religious deference to Scotland, which was 
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Protestant but not Anglican, as well as other non-Anglican denominations that were folded 
into Great Britain as a result of unification.385  The Act also allowed non-Catholics to build 
their own houses of worship but required them to pledge allegiance to England and to the 
supremacy of the reigning monarch.386 The purported aims of the Act were three-fold: (1) 
to create a climate of tolerance for religious plurality; (2) to eliminate obligatory religious 
conformity; and (3) to safeguard against religious plurality being the justification for 
disloyalty to the supremacy of the monarchy and national sovereignty.387  Although the 
British Empire did more to frustrate than promote the spirit of the Act, affording religious 
tolerance during this time of territorial discord and upheaval was nothing short of an 
effective stratagem.  It lessened the likelihood of rebellion while the nation faced 
international opposition. Likewise, the ends achieved by the Act appear to demonstrate 
Great Britain’s establishment of a political policy concerning the recognition of religious 
plurality without frustrating the continuity and supremacy of the ‘established’ church. 
The Acts of Union of 1707 officially united the Kingdoms of England (and Wales) and 
Scotland to form the Kingdom of Great Britain.388  Eventually, the kingdoms of Great Britain 
and Ireland would achieve political unification in 1800.  However, obstruction of religious 
denominational growth became the largest contributing factor to Great Britain’s 
subsequent loss of Ireland (except the province of Ulster) after 1916.389  England’s 
deliberate attempts to prevent Catholics from holding parliamentary seats in Ireland 
coupled with attempts to proliferate the Church of England throughout the region are 
illustrative of the incongruence between the promulgation of legislation furthering religious 
tolerance and competing efforts to ensure supremacy of the Church of England, the British 
monarchy, Parliament, and the English rule of law.  Comparable to the breach that 
established the Republic of Ireland, the breach that resulted in the creation of the United 
States is indicative of how POGG, as an often-repeated colonial doctrine, continued to 
facilitate Great Britain’s political and religious objectives.  
As early as 1620, those most disenchanted with the religious and political discord on the 
British Isles—including those who opted to exit or forego settling in Ulster—could leave 
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altogether in favor of the American colonies.390  Whether labeled Puritans, Pilgrims, 
Protestants, or Separatists, these groups dissented against the Church of England and the 
Government and were subsequently branded non-Anglican dissenters.391 They believed 
their interests were better served away from the national Church, so they sought religious 
autonomy in the British-American colonies.  Religious labels notwithstanding, those who 
emigrated from the British Isles to the American colonies were originally from the same 
nucleus of common demography and intersecting ancestry.  Since the largest numbers of 
migrants to the American colonies were of English, Welsh, Scotch-Irish, and Scottish 
descent, they saw themselves as equals in ethnicity, character, and religiosity to those who 
remained on the mainland.392  Despite the diversity, the imperial politics of establishing 
the Church of England and Anglicanism as superlative found its way to the American 
colonies. 
Although the persistent conflict on the mainland ultimately led to legislation concerning 
religious tolerance, England’s commitment to the Church of England demonstrates that the 
conflict neither demoted Anglicanism nor attempted to establish denominational 
equilibrium.  Moreover, the practical implications of the legislation resulted in the national 
government supporting the suppression of every denomination or religious subgroup that 
was not Anglican.  Therefore, it is unlikely that denominational equilibrium was plausible 
on the British Isles, even when every denomination was under the Christian banner.  If 
religious equilibrium was unachievable amongst denominations of Christians where one 
takes a superlative stance over the others, then how much less feasible is equilibrium 
where non-Christian subgroups are added to the equation?  This is especially the case 
where one is afforded exceptional societal and legal deference based on its superlative 
stance that is akin to that which resulted in the fracturing of the British religious landscape.     
As it relates to colonialism in America and Canada however, the conflict on mainland Britain 
ultimately aided in the North American colonies becoming some of the most religiously 
diverse territories of the era.393  This was the case despite the episodic rise of the Church 
of England as the established church.  Some might conclude that the denominations were 
not as robust as religious plurality today, especially since most were outgrowths of 
Christianity.  Therefore, it might seem that little can be gleaned from them to address the 
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sheer breadth of religious diversity of modern multicultural societies.  To the contrary, this 
assumption is often predicated on labeling as indistinguishable every Christian 
denomination because they believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ.  This is no more 
compelling than suggesting that the denominations of Islam are the same because they 
may all espouse the notion that Muhammad was the last Abrahamic prophet. Belief in 
Muhammad’s prophetic claims has not prevented notable distinctions between Sunnis, 
Shiites, and Sufis (not to mention the subgroups within the denominations).  Where the 
experiences of the American colonies are concerned, the central issues of religion and 
government entanglement have gone unchanged.  Moreover, the insight of circumspection 
as to alternative forms of government and approaches to religious plurality was trajectory-
altering and is a necessary starting point for any contemporary assessment of how to 
respond appropriately to religious requests for exceptionalism in England, Canada, or the 
United States.   
3.2 POGG in British-America: The Impetus for Disestablishment in the U.S. 
The theory that the POGG doctrine played a role in the establishment of the United States 
has not only been under-evaluated, it has hardly been given worthwhile consideration. 
Yusuf alludes to the probability of POGG’s influence in the U.S.  He even suggests that there 
are one or two scholars who have espoused a similar viewpoint; nevertheless, he goes no 
further than allusion.394  As has been established in the previous section, there is 
precedent for the POGG doctrine’s imposition in America.  There is also demonstrative 
evidence that supports a connection between the imperatives associated with POGG and 
the establishment of the British-American colonies as well as a legacy that buttresses the 
evolution of colonial America and the approach to constitutionalism adopted by the United 
States.  This is particularly noteworthy as it pertains perspectives on the 1st Amendment.  
Anthony Gill appropriately frames the analysis in the text, The Political Origins of Religious 
Liberty, when he asks: “[i]f religious freedom was hard to come by and a lack of religious 
tolerance common, what factors eventually led the United States to be the first modern 
nation to firmly enshrine liberty of conscience in its principle document of governance?”395  
As if attempting a syllogism, he also notes that in the U.S., “restrictions on various 
denominations and outright persecution existed for nearly two centuries prior to the 
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drafting of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.”396  To address the question 
categorically, it is necessary to consider not only the American colonial and post-colonial 
experiences but also the more modern American quandary created by myriad theories on 
the meaning of the phrase ‘separation of church and state’.   
Where it pertains the colonial and post-colonial eras, the establishment of the United 
States cannot be evaluated as a single uninterrupted narrative.  Instead, it should be 
evaluated as an analysis of cause and effect.  Specifically, generations of American 
colonists co-existed for nearly two centuries under a certain set of conditions that became 
progressively more undesirable before their descendants opted for a different course.  This 
suggests the presence of a catalyst or change agent.  As will be borne out in the remainder 
of this chapter, the terms of America’s colonial charters evidence that the POGG doctrine 
served as that change agent.  The specific imperatives of the doctrine were not only present 
but essential to the regulation of the American colonial infrastructure from 1603 to 1775.  
Moreover, the effects thereof established the foundational perspective upon which 
disestablishment in the United States is predicated. 
During most of this colonial period, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States 
were a single domain that encompassed a mother country and two colonial regions.  At the 
beginning of the period, what was then a loose interpretation of the Kingdom of Great 
Britain successfully established its first colony on North American soil on its way to 
becoming an imperial power.  By the end of it, Great Britain had achieved ‘Empire’ status, 
while the 1783 Treaty of Paris relegated British-Canada to perpetual colonial status within 
that empire.397  Alternatively, the treaty memorialized the sovereignty of the American 
states and prompted the Constitutional Framers’ toward articulating the meaning of ‘life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ (‘LLPH’) in the 1789 U.S. Constitution.398  Between 
those years however, Great Britain employed the POgG clause to sustain her imperial hold 
over her territories on the North American continent.  In the American colonies however, 
references were linguistic derivatives of those to which Yusuf alludes.  Instead of being 
designated, ‘peace, welfare, and good government’ or ‘peace, order, and good 
government,’ the terms implicating the doctrine in the American colonies were, ‘civil order’ 
and ‘settled & quiet government’.  Terminology notwithstanding, the imperatives and 
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application were analogous to those in the Ulster colonies, British-Canada, and later-
acquired British colonial holdings.   
Where America’s modern 1st Amendment quandary is concerned, it is necessary to 
comprehend the degree to which the principle of disestablishment or separation of church 
and state has become a constitutional wall of pride and/or censure, depending on who’s 
commenting about it.  Disestablishment has arguably been blamed for almost every ill that 
plagues any part of American life where religion and/or government are required to 
interact.399  Criticisms encompass everything from education, employment, corporate 
practices, voting rights, to whether individuals can smoke plant-based hallucinogens while 
‘worshiping’ and remain employed.400  It seems as if disestablishment can’t catch a break! 
When religion remained in public schools, the 1st Amendment was the basis for claiming 
the disenfranchisement of those who do not believe, or those whose beliefs reflect one of 
many insular denominations that may or may not claim a connection with Christianity.401  
Once religion was removed, the 1st Amendment was responsible for not only the removal 
but the demoralization of American youth and the creation of an unprincipled American 
society.402  With more recent efforts to include foreign political ideologies and religious laws 
within the meaning of multiculturalism, these kinds of circumstances have systematically 
become constitutional challenges that seem to be topically repeated every decade, 
especially since the U.S. modified its immigration practices under HCA-65.403   
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A more expansive description of multiculturalism appears to have brought with it the 
propensity to claim that one’s specific immigration narrative warrants a reassessment of 
the 1st Amendment.  This is especially true if the governmental framework of the nation 
from which an immigrant hails does not espouse liberal democracy and/or has not 
disentangled religion and government.  This circumstance also appears to result in a failure 
to understand that repeatedly raising faith-based constitutional challenges, expecting a 
different judgment than the one afforded the previous challenger, has the unintentional—
or intentional—consequence of signifying that there is something superlative about one 
denomination or religious subgroup that warrants extraordinary deference.  This has 
arguably become the perspective buttressing requests for Islamic law exceptionalism.  
Despite the many criticisms of the United States’ present separationist church-state 
arrangement, subsequent chapters will evidence that the Islamic law inquiry is one of the 
conundrums that the separation of church and state was intended to overcome.  Thus, 
disestablishment was an appropriate and effective response to colonization and the 
imposition of the POGG doctrine in the American colonies. If the post-colonial 
considerations that buttressed the Constitutional Framers’ reasoning for promoting the 
separation can be continuously regarded and sustained, then disestablishment can also 
endure as the appropriate and effective response to multiculturalism’s insulation of the 
political ideologies and religious precepts often associated with those who espouse Islam. 
Where it pertains the Constitutional Framers’ reasoning, the important fact to remember 
is that politicizing religion by attempting to bind the souls of citizens to a governmental 
infrastructure is not unfamiliar to the American experience.  The history of colonial 
America’s ‘established church-state arrangement’ is simply a reality that is often 
selectively overlooked.  For many if not all the British Empire’s overseas possessions, 
religious establishment in some way affected the national identities that emerged on the 
post-colonial side of those experiences.  The United States is no exception.  Therefore, it 
cannot be discounted that America’s present wall of separation has its origins in the 
American colonies’ individual and collective responses to colonialism and Great Britain’s 
implementation of the POGG doctrine. To recall why separation of church and state 
became the appropriate constitutional response, it is necessary to refresh one’s 
recollection concerning the years between the issuance of constituting documents to 
establish British-America and the signing of the constituting document to establish the 
United States of America.  During this time, non-Anglican denominations generally believed 
the Church of England to be little more than an imperially-sponsored reiteration of the 
[87]  
 
Catholic Church. 404  Likewise, there was little trust for those attempting to proliferate either 
dogma as exceptional.405 Notwithstanding this reality, the British Empire predicated 
colonization on the proliferation of the Church of England, which contrary to the British 
Empire’s political viewpoint was not the full breadth and scope of Christendom. 
3.3 The Principal Imperative: Religiosity Clauses in American Colonial Charters  
In 1584, writer and cleric Richard Hakluyt addressed Elizabeth I concerning the 
“propagation of the Church of England in new territories across the ocean.”406  His petition 
was in response to France and Spain’s efforts to “propagat[e] the Catholic Church 
anywhere they planted their respective flags.”407  Hakluyt’s appeal entitled Discourse on 
Western Planting, made a case for colonizing territories across the Atlantic Ocean “for the 
enlargement of the gospel of Christ whereunto the Princes of the reformed religion are 
chiefly bound amongst whom her Majesty is principal.”408  Hakluyt went on to author 
additional publications “advocating English colonization for the propagation of England’s 
church and for the glory of England on the global stage.”409  Consequently, Elizabeth I 
issued a colonial charter affording Walter Raleigh approximately six years to colonize an 
area of North America not claimed by other Christian empires.  In relevant part, the charter 
permitted Raleigh to: 
‘discover, search, finde out, and view such remote, heathen and 
barbarous lands, countries, and territories, not actually possessed of 
any Christian Prince, nor inhabited by Christian people,…to inhabite 
or remaine, there to build and fortifie, at [Ralegh’s] discretion,’ on 
behalf of the English Realm.410 
In other words, the charter contained a ‘Religiosity clause’.  Raleigh settled England’s first 
North American colony in 1587; however, it and the settlers had vanished by 1590.411  The 
lost colony of Virginia (as it is known) was wholly unsuccessful.  Even still, the language of 
the charter demonstrates the most significant precondition to the establishment of the 
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POGG doctrine in the North American colonies: the expansion of Great Britain’s Anglican 
footprint.   
There are some historians who have analyzed the proliferation of England’s preferred 
denomination as a tangential facet of British Imperialism. They suggest that the 
comprehensive goal of Great Britain’s imperialist overtures was always territorial 
dominance.  For example, Andrews and Canny contend that the proliferation of the Church 
of England was secondary or even tertiary to expectations of plunder, trade, and territorial 
dominance.412  Along the same lines, Strong notes that the British Government did not link 
colonialism and the proliferation of Anglicanism until the seventeenth century.413  David 
Armitage suggests that where Great Britain’s imperialist ideals surround religious 
proliferation are concerned: 
[n]o particular pan-Protestant theory or support for empire emerged in 
either England or Scotland during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries because of the fractured nature of British Protestantism 
between the episcopalian Church of England and the presbyterian 
Church of Scotland. Consequently, religious conceptions of empire 
played little part in imperial identity and justification until the eighteenth 
century.414   
In responding to Armitage’s claim however, Strong points out that, “while religion may not 
have prompted large-scale concern for colonization, that did not mean it was thought to be 
unimportant….”415  Other historians and legal theorists, such as Falola, Heaton, and even 
Yusuf suggest that the proliferation of the Church of England was somewhat of a red 
herring employed to divert attention away from Britain’s primary motives.416  Specifically, 
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these scholars claim that while missions brought Anglicanism in the form of church 
congregations and Western education, the real aims were the subjugation of natives and 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the colonies.417  This particular line of reasoning 
is especially prolific where it pertains the activities of Anglican missions in the British 
Empire’s later overseas acquisitions like India and Nigeria.418   
With all due respect to the aforementioned perspectives, the British Empire’s promotion of 
Anglicanism reflects neither a lack of ideological perspective nor the characteristics of a 
red herring.  Besides Strong’s recognition of the importance of religion to the English who 
migrated overseas from mainland Britain, the legal documents associated with Great 
Britain’s expeditionary efforts evidence that the proliferation of either Catholicism or 
Anglicanism was a distinct precondition that dates back to at least the later part of the 
fifteen century. 419   Although not a stipulation in the expeditionary charter for Christopher 
Columbus in 1492, Henry VII’s issuance of the Letters Patents to John Cabot and his sons 
in 1498 illustrates the scope of the religious precondition.420  Specifically, the Charter 
provides for the Cabots to “seeke out, discouer, and finde whatsoever isles, countreys, 
regions or prouinces of the heathen and infidels whatsoeuer they be, and in what part of 
the world soeuer they be, which before this time haue bene vnknowen to all 
Christians…”421  Once located, the Cabots were authorized to “subdue, occupy and 
possesse, as [the Crown’s] vassals, and lieutenants,” for the purpose of settling the 
territory on behalf of England.422  This and subsequent charters evidence that carrying 
forward her preferred religion was integral to England’s (and subsequently Great Britain’s) 
overseas expansion plans.  As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the ‘royal’ 
religious ideology shifted from Catholicism to Anglicanism between the issuance of the 
1498 Charter and Hakluyt’s petition to Elizabeth I.  As such, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the proliferation of Anglicanism became much more significant because Anglicanism 
was England, and to be truly English was to be a part of the Church of England.  Therefore, 
the presence or absence of a pan-Protestant agenda was arguably irrelevant to England’s 
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overseas expansion plans.  If Anglicanism was the ‘true’ religion, then why would there 
need to be concern about the importance of other religions in the American colonies or a 
unified plan that encompassed the divergent religious views of the whole of the British 
Isles?  Put another way, if Anglicanism was to be the official religion, what non-Anglicans 
believed would become a matter of political expediency instead of policy based on genuine 
concern for individual conscience or belief. 
Returning to Hakluyt’s petition to Elizabeth I, a salient feature of his promotion of overseas 
colonization was the acknowledgement of Elizabeth I as the ‘principal’ of the ‘reformed 
religion’ to be propagated.423  Therefore, it can be inferred that the objective of the 
Religiosity clause was not to spread Christianity, per se.  It was to spread Anglicanism as 
the superior interpretation of Christianity.  Recall that by the end of Henry VIII’s reign in 
1547, schisms caused by conflicting doctrinal and liturgical perspectives within the 
‘catholic’ or ‘universal’ Church changed the outlook on the continuation of an undivided 
Christian belief system.  As Armitage points out, the religious landscape had become 
fractured.424  The breach prevailed throughout the British Isles well before the plantation 
of Ulster and before the first ‘viable’ territory across the Atlantic presented itself.  
Therefore, the divergent perspectives, which resulted in anti-Catholic or Protestant 
denominations, made the establishment of a homogenous religious landscape within the 
North American colonies fundamentally unachievable from the outset.425 This reality 
notwithstanding, the proliferation of Catholicism and then Anglicanism remained integral 
to, and a legal stipulation of, England’s imperial aspirations from the 15th century 
onward.426  
It is worth clarifying that, as it relates to the British Empire’s later colonial pursuits, these 
acquisitions came at the end of or even well after the American colonial experience. By 
that time, D.B. Swinfen suggests that the British had begun moving toward a more 
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stratified, less stringent approach to colonization.427  Similar to the customary practices of 
the French and the Spanish in spreading Catholicism, the British also began chartering 
Anglican missions like the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (‘SPCK’) and the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (‘SPG’) at the start of the 18th 
century.428  These organizations were Anglican enterprises that assumed the role of 
proselytizing to bring the Church of England to the indigenous inhabitants of Great Britain’s 
overseas conquests.429  This delegation or transfer of responsibility did not lessen the 
significance of the proliferation of Anglicanism.  Instead, it added a new agent to correct 
the problematic perception of passing legislation in promotion of religious tolerance while 
simultaneously building an empire buttressed by the promotion of an established church. 
This is a noteworthy distinction between the British Empire’s early and later overseas 
colonial efforts.  Although the pecuniary aims of early and later British colonization were 
undoubtedly the same, the proliferation of Anglicanism was not an ancillary endeavor or a 
delegated responsibility in the North American colonies.  Instead, it functioned as the 
principal imperative of POGG in the establishment of each of the thirteen American 
colonies as well as English- and French-speaking British-Canada.  
Returning to the attempt to establish the colony of Virginia, juxtaposition of the 1584 
Charter and the 1606 Charter illustrates the thematic continuation of grounding 
colonization in the proliferation of Anglicanism: 
…by the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his 
Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, 
as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true 
Knowledge and Worship of God,… 430 
One might be tempted to interpret the vagueness of referring to ‘Christian Religion’ as 
Great Britain’s acceptance of Catholic and other non-Anglican denominations.  If that were 
the case, there would be no need to compete with Spain or France over Catholicism.  
Moreover, the laws on tolerance and/or the necessity of colonial migration to secure 
religious autonomy would have been superfluous.  Strong clarifies that from 1606 onward, 
the Crown’s colonial governors in Virginia “were required to promote the established 
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religion of England in the areas under their jurisdiction. They were to ensure that the ‘true’ 
word, and service of God and Christian faith be preached, planted, and used” according to 
the rights, doctrine, and religion established within the realm of England.431  Therefore, it 
was assumed that the Church of England “would be Virginia’s church and directed settlers 
to follow its practices ‘in all fundamentall pointes’,” although the House of Burgesses did 
not formally establish the Church of England in Virginia until 1619.432   
The references to religion in Virginia’s charter and all other applicable charters—whether 
corporate, proprietary or royal—continuously implicated the Church of England as the 
established church of the American colonies.  This was the case even where religious 
tolerance was purported to either reflect the generousness of the Crown’s royal 
prerogative—i.e., sanctuary colonies—or accept the practical realities of the time—i.e., 
religious tolerance as a political means to an end. The next five case studies analyze 
noteworthy charter variations that demonstrate how Great Britain responded to one or both 
situations.  In each case, the constituting stipulations either directly or indirectly revert to 
setting the religious baseline for the supremacy of Anglicanism and the Church of England.  
3.3.1 The Colony of Massachusetts—A Sign of Divine Consent? 
In 1629, Charles I granted a proprietary charter to the Massachusetts Bay Company, which 
was a Puritan-owned trading enterprise.433 The accompanying settlement of 
Massachusetts Bay was the first to be populated by the afore-referenced disenchanted 
Puritans seeking religious autonomy from the Church of England and the British Crown.434  
They believed that, “God had revealed America at just the right time for them to escape a 
religiously corrupt Europe.”435  Accordingly, they came to the North American continent with 
the primary objective of “establish[ing] their own shining ‘citty…upon a Hill,’ free of the sin 
and corruption of the land and society they were leaving.”436  Much to their chagrin, 
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immigration would not completely free them from the British Government or the Church of 
England.  The 1629 Charter for Massachusetts Bay provides: 
according to the Course of other Corporacons in this our Realme of 
England, and for the directing, ruling, and disposeing of all other 
Matters and Thinges, whereby our said People, Inhabitants there, 
may be soe religiously, peaceablie, and civilly governed, as their good 
Life and orderlie Conversacon, maie wynn and incite the Natives of 
Country, to the KnowIedg and Obedience of the onlie true God and 
Saulor of Mankinde, and the Christian Fayth, which in our Royall 
Intencon, and the Adventurers free Profession, is the principall Ende 
of this Plantacion…437 
As the colony became the most lucrative in New England, Charles I converted it into a royal 
colony, which implied direct rule by the Crown.438 As a result of the rise in status, the 
colonists began taking advantage of their perceived autonomy to self-govern. Conflict 
between the colony and the Crown immediately followed.  According to Virga and Spinella, 
the colonists “moved quickly to establish their political and religious—and eventually, 
geographical—authority, with confidence based on their religious faith and the later 
economic success that they took as a sign of divine consent.”439  One such exercise of 
colonial autonomy included the creation of religious laws that barred the proliferation of 
Anglicanism within the colony.440 Another step taken by the colonists after the 
establishment of the English Commonwealth in 1649 was to declare “Massachusetts a 
commonwealth, although they had no authority to do so.”441  When James II attempted to 
exercise his royal prerogative to exert control over the settlements throughout New 
England, these and other unsanctioned acts resulted in the revocation of the royal charter 
in 1684.442  Brooks highlights that the bases for the charter’s revocation included, 
“repeated violations of the charter’s terms [including] establishing religious laws, 
discriminating against Anglicans and Quakers, and running an illegal mint.”443  It is unclear 
whether the Crown would have taken issue with the religious practices of the colony if they 
had not implicated the Church of England.  However, the Crown’s response to the national 
church being shunned in one of her overseas possessions seemingly cut at the heart of the 
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Crown’s control over not only how the colony was governed, but also the degree of religious 
deference afforded the colonists.  The Empire’s response lends support to the assertion 
that the Church of England was meant to be afforded legal and political exception or 
privilege in each of the American colonies, notwithstanding the degree of religious 
tolerance afforded other denominations.     
3.3.2 Safe Haven Colonies—Maryland & Connecticut 
Maryland and Connecticut were established for the primary purpose of providing religious 
sanctuary to non-Anglican believers.444 The former was established in 1634 by Lord 
Baltimore as a religious haven for those espousing the Catholic faith.445 After the 
Reformation, “monasteries and Catholic hierarchy [in England] lost their real estate and 
legality.”446  It was also unlawful for Catholic priests to be trained or to minister in 
England.447  Therefore, the colony served as a settlement site for Catholics who continued 
to be persecuted because of the schism between the British monarchy and the Roman 
Catholic Church.448  The latter was founded in 1635 by Puritan minister Thomas Hooker 
and was meant to be a religious sanctuary for colonial Puritans who, like English Puritans, 
sought separation from the Church of England.449  
Analogous to the outcomes in Massachusetts, religious or political deference went to the 
Crown and the Church of England above that of the non-Anglican denominations.  The 1632 
Charter establishing the colony of Maryland denoted that if ‘peradventure’—i.e., questions 
or doubts—resulted from the charter language, then: 
… [the] Interpretation to be applied always, and in all Things, and in 
all Courts and Judicatories whatsoever, to obtain which shall be 
judged to be the more beneficial, profitable, and favorable to the 
aforesaid now Baron Baltimore, his Heirs and Assigns: [Provided 
always, that no interpretation thereof be made, whereby God’s holy 
and true Christian Religion, or the Allegiance due to Us, our Heirs and 
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Successors, may in any wise suffer by Change, Prejudice, or 
Diminution;]…450 
Despite the expectation of perpetual deference to ‘queen and country,’ the colony of 
Maryland never received royal status.451  If Catholicism was to flourish in the colony, it 
would be an up-hill battle as clerics could not be trained on the mainland, so they could not 
be readily dispatched to the British-American colonies.  Moreover, the language of the 
charter makes clear that religious deference would not result in the Crown and/or the ‘true 
Christian religion’ being changed, prejudiced or demoted from its place of preeminence in 
the colony.  Therefore, it is not surprising that, despite Maryland being chartered as a 
Catholic haven, the situation only lasted until 1649 when Anglicanism interceded as the 
official religion of Maryland.452  To ensure that Anglicanism continued to suppress non-
Anglican denominations in Maryland, the SPG was given specific direction from 1701 to 
1783 to not only center its efforts to spread Anglicanism in Virginia, but also Maryland.453 
Connecticut’s charter presents differing circumstances brought on by a thirty-year span of 
time and a changing of the monarchial guard.  However, the religious imperative implicated 
by POGG yielded a similar result.  Although the colony was founded in 1635, it did not 
secure constituting documentation until 1662.454  A change to the monarchy—i.e., from 
Charles I to Charles II—had the potential to result in differing views on the political 
expediency of religious tolerance.  The shift compelled the colonial leaders to secure a 
foundational charter to avoid curtailment of the religious autonomy that Puritans had been 
afforded under the royal prerogative of Charles I.455  The terms signified that the 
inhabitants would be, “religiously, peaceably, and civilly governed” and were to encourage 
natives to accept the knowledge of “the only true GOD, and He Saviour of Mankind, and 
the Christian faith.”456  However, the British Empire also required that nothing could be 
done in the colony that was, “contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this Our Realm of 
England.”457  Each sub-section of the charter reiterates this provision.  Although the 
Connecticut charter did not reference a ‘true Christian religion,’ it left no doubt of the fact 
that the continuation of religious tolerance was within the royal prerogative of the Crown 
and the laws of his realm.  This stipulation made any religious practice subject to the same 
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laws that afforded supremacy to the preferential relationship between the Crown and the 
Anglican Church.  
3.3.3 A Charter Notwithstanding!—The Duke of York’s Land Grant  
As the Dutch founded New York as a colony under the name New Netherland, the colony’s 
origin is not as much about establishment as it is about conquest.  New York had been a 
Dutch settled colony for almost a half a century before Charles II seized it to derail the 
Dutch’s trading relationship with the American colonies.458  Charles then bestowed the 
usurped territory upon his brother, the Duke of York in 1664, incorporating it into the British 
Empire.459  Despite New York’s more recent ‘sanctuary state’ mantra, it cannot be taken 
as an indication that the lack of transfer/charter documents gave rise to New York 
becoming a haven for Christians and non-Christians alike.460  Instead, the circumstances 
surrounding the acquisition of the colony offer a more plausible and probable 
interpretation.  The Duke of York was brother to the English monarch, who was the head of 
the Church of England at the time he bestowed the land upon York.461  Although Charles 
was a proponent of religious tolerance, he did not hesitate to support the reinstatement of 
the monarchial/‘defender of the Anglican faith’ paradigm after the British monarchy was 
restored in 1660.462  Charles not only supported Parliament’s reestablishment of the 
monarchy, he accepted the re-entanglement of the monarchy with the Church of England, 
which was dismantled during the reign of his father.463   
Johnson clarifies that except for “Dutch enclaves such as Brooklyn and Flushing, the Long 
Island townships of New York were settled by Connecticut Puritans.”464  Although the same 
Puritans that settled Massachusetts and Connecticut also settled New York, those of New 
York were denied a colonial legislature because the colony had been appropriated 
territory.465  Likewise, after the 1689 Act of Toleration was passed on the mainland, the 
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New York Supreme Court of Judicature reaffirmed New York’s religious trajectory when it 
held that that the Act did not extend to the colony.466  As a result, the colonists of New York 
were subject to all the imperatives of POGG, but lacked the requisite level of autonomy to 
exercise their rights to contribute to the colony’s governance.  These occurrences make the 
notion that the religious imperative of POGG did not extend to New York historically 
inconsistent with the practices of the British Empire.  Implicit in the familial relationship 
between York and the English sovereign is ample support for the assumption that New York 
was meant to be primarily Anglican like the other twelve.  Along the same lines, the 
preclusion of religious tolerance for the colony’s settlers suggests that the establishment 
of ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’ in New York also implicated the proliferation 
of the Church of England so long as the colony fell within the purview of the British Empire.  
 3.3.4 The Last British-American Colony—Georgia’s Latent Religiosity 
   Clause 
By the time the British Empire added the colony of Georgia to its portfolio of overseas 
possessions, it had been perfecting the means to proliferate Anglicanism for almost two 
hundred years—vis-à-vis the two centuries to which Gill refers—during the reigns of 
approximately nine different monarchial personalities.  At the same time, the presence of 
non-Anglican denominations and other non-Christian subgroups continued to expand.  
Despite the political conundrums that emerged from empire building for the proliferation 
of a national church controlled by so many personalities, the imperatives of POGG 
continued to be endorsed. Georgia was the last colony to be constituted before the War of 
Independence.  Both the Spanish and the British claimed rights to it, but it ultimately 
became a British colony in 1732.467  Recall Hakluyt’s contention that the Spanish and 
French introduced the Catholic Church to every territory they planted their imperial flag.  
While under Spanish rule between 1540 and 1732, Catholicism flourished in that area.468  
Historical archives indicate that “prior to English settlement in Georgia, the Spanish 
operated multiple Catholic missions on Georgia’s barrier islands and along the coast.”469  
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As such, it is reasonable to conclude that Catholicism was a predominant or even the 
exclusive religious denomination espoused by the people inhabiting the region.   
Accordingly, it would seem reasonable for the charter to provide for the liberty of 
conscience for the “greater ease and encouragement of [the Empire’s] loving 
subjects….”470  Moreover, Nichols suggests that those who relocated to Georgia expected 
that ‘ease and encouragement’ to be quite liberally granted.471  However, it came with 
stipulations: 
there shall be a liberty of conscience allowed in the worship of God, 
to all persons inhabiting, or which shall inhabit or be resident within 
our said provinces and that all such persons, except papists, shall 
have a free exercise of their religion, so they be contented [with the 
quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the same, not giving offence or 
scandal to the government].472 
The inclusion of a ‘Liberty of Conscience’ clause might suggest that by the middle of the 
18th century the British Empire had come to genuinely support religious plurality, or at least 
discontinue the practice of making Anglicanism an obligatory aspect of colonial 
constitution.  According to Colonial Records for the State of Georgia, many of the colonists 
had similar hopes.473  Pastor Bolzius, a German Lutheran, noted that Georgia was expected 
to be an “[a]sylum for all sorts of Protestants to enjoy full Liberty of Conscience Prefferable 
to any other American Colonies in order to Invite Numbers of Oppressed or persecuted 
People to Strengthen [the] Barrier Colony….”474  However, the practical implications of the 
charter further the religious imperative of the POGG doctrine.  After the issuance of the 
1732 Charter, Catholics were effectively expelled, while non-Anglican colonists wrestled 
with the fact that the Church of England was installed as the official church and Anglicanism 
as the official religion of the colony from 1758 until the American Revolution.475  The last 
monarch to rule the American colonies—i.e., George III—assumed the throne in 1773, and 
colonial discontent reached its climax, so war was an inevitable outcome.476   
                                                          
470 ‘Charter of Georgia: 1732’ <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga01.asp> accessed 18 August 
2018. 
471 Joel A Nichols, ‘Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in Colonial and Early 
National Georgia’ (2005) 80 New York University Law Review 1693, 1695. 
472 ‘Charter of Georgia: 1732’ (n 470). 
473 Nichols (n 471), 1695. 
474 Nichols (n 471), 1695 [1] The statement made by Johann Martin Bolzius, paster of Georgia's Salsburger 
Lutheran Community, was included in The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia and cited by Nichols. 
475 Nichols (n 471), 1695. 
476 Alden (n 237), 45 and 226-27. 
[99]  
 
Similar to the circumstances amongst the kingdoms of the British Isles in 1689, the 
perceived promotion of tolerance during a period of growing discontent was the Empire’s 
politically expedient response.  This is especially the case as circumstances had shown the 
maneuver to be a familiar mode of furthering POGG in the enlargement of the Empire’s 
overseas portfolio.  As will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, it was also employed 
in 1760 with the signing of the Articles of Capitulation of Montreal to secure British-Canada 
as well as the Quebec Act of 1774 to retain the French-Quebecois when American rebellion 
was imminent.477  In Georgia’s case, the charter provision had the practical effect of 
prompting a religious cleansing of Catholics from the British Empire’s last American colony, 
while simultaneously subjugating the non-Anglican adherents after inviting immigration 
based on the promise of religious equanimity.  Thus, the latent effects of the religious 
imperative motivated Georgia’s willingness to rebel against imperial rule.  By February 
1776, the colonists of Georgia had seized control of the government from the royal 
governor, who they held under house arrest until he was ushered out of the colony.478  
Georgia’s trustees fashioned a temporary constitution, which was promulgated on April 15, 
1776.479  According to Nichols, the temporary constitution “made no mention of religion, 
but merely established rules for keeping peace until such time as a fuller form of 
governance could be constructed.”480  It has been suggested that “revolutionary feelings 
took hold only slowly in Georgia.”481  However, it would appear that even the last British-
American colony found that the distinction between the patent and latent implications of 
the charter were enough to compel the colony to become a signatory to the Declaration of 
Independence.482  As a tangential note, Georgia’s historical records reflect that because of 
the ban on papists, Catholicism did not take hold again in Georgia until well after the 
American Revolution.483 
Whether American colonial charters referenced Anglicanism explicitly or indirectly, they all 
reflect religion and governmental entanglement as a facet of POGG.  Moreover, POGG 
achieved legal and political ends by affording a modicum of tolerance to denominations 
(and later-included religious subgroups), whilst also furthering the religious end of 
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safeguarding and sponsoring the proliferation of the Anglican Church as the established 
church. The British Empire retained the same imperial dynamic well after America’s 
colonial period ended, notwithstanding the religious landscape of  later acquisitions.  Recall 
that the British Empire’s later colonization of India prompted Victoria I to make similar 
commitments to respect indigenous belief systems, which included several non-Christian 
dogmas.  Not unlike the dynamic with Anglican and non-Anglican Christian denominations, 
the commitment creates a religious and political irregularity where the Crown—as the 
protector and defender of the ‘Anglican’ faith—endorses a national church but commits to 
the accommodation of rival religious beliefs.  Commitments notwithstanding, there was an 
upsurge in Anglican converts in India during Victoria’s reign.484  As the same approach to 
tolerance is practiced in the United Kingdom today, it also suggests that so long as there 
is a hereditary monarchy, England’s confounding church-state arrangement will endure.  
Likewise, it is to be expected that England will continue to uphold the theory that the 
conundrum can be overcome by unprecedented exceptionalism.  To do otherwise strikes 
at the foundation of more than the extensive history of the British Empire and its overseas 
possessions.  It could also challenge the hegemony of Anglicanism.  Thanks to British 
Imperialism, the Anglican Communion and its associated offspring are as expansive as the 
Empire’s past and present overseas territories.485   
Where it pertains the North American colonies, the history of Great Britain makes clear that 
religious denominationalism was not only reasonably foreseeable—vis-à-vis Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Georgia—but a domestic and overseas reality 
during the entirety of the period the British Empire controlled the American colonies.  As 
Hakluyt’s petition specifically implicated the Church of England, as do American colonial 
charters, the extension of Anglicanism into the North American colonies as the superlative 
denomination was a foregone conclusion.  Where tolerance was afforded, it was to the 
extent that it was politically expedient while at the same time retaining compulsory 
deference to the religious imperatives of POGG.  For this reason, Maryland and 
Connecticut’s charters afforded deference to the Church of England through the Crown by 
incorporating provisions that ensured that colonists’ religious autonomy remained in a 
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perpetual state of revocability at the prerogative of the Crown.  Georgia’s charter reserved 
British control of the proliferation of Anglicanism by completely suspending Catholicism in 
a region that had been catholically-inclined for at least a century. The British Empire 
employed POGG to retain control over Massachusetts by outright revoking the colony’s 
constituting charter when colonists prohibited the spread of Anglicanism, which is 
analogous to the Empire’s objectives in Georgia concerning Catholicism.  These case 
studies evidence the fact that there was no practical way for sovereign nations to exercise 
favoritism by constitutionally articulating or establishing a superior religious denomination 
without the effects of those political choices infringing upon or being involuntarily (and in 
more modern settings, unconstitutionally) imputed to the adherents of all the others. 
 
Figure 3.1: Predominant Religions in Thirteen American Colonies in 1750  
© Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates that by 1750 the Anglican Church came to represent the controlling 
religious denomination in the British-American colonies.  The Church of England literally 
usurped the religious landscape making it impossible to put distance between other 
believers and the effects of the Anglican Church or the Imperial government.  This was not 
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the expectation of the non-Anglican denominations that came to the colonies for a religious 
‘fresh start’.486  Thus, colonial inhabitants eventually took issue with the fact that the 
colonies came to look too much like the situation from which they emigrated.  Moreover, 
the objectives purported by legislatively establishing religious tolerance in 1689 had been 
found wanting.  It appears that the distance between the colonies and the mainland 
prevented the British Empire from noticing the twigs of discontent fostered by POGG…that 
is, until they became bundled into a detailed inventory of religious, political, and legal 
issues and were too deeply rooted to avoid rebellion.487  The British Empire did eventually 
take notice when the issues were outlined in the document that declared American 
independence from colonial rule.  For this reason, it can be inferred that the religious 
imperative of POGG not only advanced the British Empire and its established church 
regime, but it also advanced American independence.  However, the American colonies’ 
collective experience under POGG made it emphatically unacceptable as the manifesto 
upon which to bring the colonies out of colonialism into independence in the establishment 
of the United States.   
3.4 The Political & Legal Imperatives: ‘Civil Order’ and ‘Settled & Quiet 
 Government’  
In addition to the Church of England being installed as the established church in the 
colonies, close adherence to the Empire’s monarchial/parliamentary framework and 
colonial rule of law served as the other imperatives to POGG.  The legislative powers of the 
Royal Council as well as the juridical infrastructure in the colonies, including the Supreme 
Court of Judicature, belonged to the British Empire. They became cooperative instruments 
of the Crown or Parliament imposed on the colonies to institute ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & 
quiet government’.  In his description of colonial antecedents to the American system of 
government, Cane endorses the idea that the monarchial, parliamentary, and juridical 
imperatives were conditions to the establishment of the American colonial infrastructure.  
According to Cane, the colonial government was meant to be a replica of that in England: 
…consisting of an executive governor (who was, in the royal colonies, 
technically the Monarch’s representative but in practice the 
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representative of the British Government), a legislature consisting of 
a representative assembly and an upper chamber, and a system of 
local courts. Moreover, just as in British legislative sovereignty 
resided in the Monarch-in-Parliament, so (the argument ran) in the 
colonies it resided in the Monarch acting in concert with the various 
colonial legislatures.488 
Figure 3.2 attempts to illustrate Cane’s interpretation of the governmental framework in 
the American colonies:489  
 
Although the Colonial Courts were often approved by the Colonial Assembly, there was an 
obvious imbalance within the infrastructure.  The imbalance caused the colonies to 
challenge not only the origin and power of the Empire to establish laws in the colonies, but 
also the ability of the Courts to enforce English law on the colonies.490  In the text, The Rule 
of Law in the Realm and the Province of New York: Prelude to the American Revolution, 
Herbert Johnson explains: 
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of the Colonial Governmental Framework under POGG 
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Constitutionally the origin of the colonial judicial power was but one 
manifestation of other uncertainties in the…colonial constitution.  
This involved the question of whether colonial legislative power was 
based upon the consent of the people or if it was dependent upon 
prerogative powers vested in royal colonial governors by virtue of their 
commissions.491 
 
The British Empire maintained that the colonists were subject to the rule of law itself as 
well as the juridical infrastructure that enforced the law.492  According to Smith, the two 
chief means whereby the Crown kept its finger on the law of the colonies were: (2) review 
of colonial legislation; [and] (2) appeals from colonial courts.”493  Therefore, to say that the 
laws of England extended to the colonies was to acknowledge that the imperial courts 
administering those laws had jurisdiction over the colonies.   
The effects of the varying monarchial personalities’ perspectives on the royal prerogative 
however, often made it difficult to reconcile statutory laws and/or judicial decisions 
throughout the colonies.494  From a practical perspective, POGG made the establishment 
and reconciliation of the laws in Great Britain’s vast empire “cumbersome and 
roundabout.”495  In the text Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation 1813-1865, Swinfen 
points out that, where it concerned law making, British colonial policy after 1783 did not 
change radically despite the forfeiture of the thirteen American colonies.496  Apparently, 
the lessons taken away from the loss of the American colonies only resulted in gradual 
reforms brought about by pressures on the British to adopt “a new attitude towards 
empire.”497  Consequently, the British came to understand “in the half century after 1815, 
that it might be to the mutual benefit of Britain and her overseas possessions if the bonds 
of empire were relaxed.”498  These changes however came only after the loss of the 
American colonies and a second conflict with the American states during the War of 1812. 
It was not the case during the period between the commencement of the American colonial 
experience in 1603 and its conclusion in 1783.   Notwithstanding the type of charter issued 
or how much governmental autonomy was promised, the British Empire used POGG to keep 
a tight reign over British-America.  The Crown, Parliament, and English colonial law 
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functioning in tandem to regulate the colonies.  The constituting documents for the 
establishment of the colonies of Virginia and New Jersey are illustrative of the most 
straight-forward and most complicated nuances of furthering the political and legal 
imperatives of POGG.  They also demonstrate the scope of political and legal flux that 
resulted from the inner workings of the doctrine.  It should be noted that suggesting that 
Virginia’s establishment was the most straight-forward by no means suggests that it was 
ideal in its implementation or maintenance.    
3.4.1 The Colony of Virginia—Colonial America’s Bastion of POGG? 
James I renewed colonial pursuits in North America by granting a corporate charter to a 
London-based merchant company—the Virginia Company—in 1606.  The first of three 
charters to settle the colony of Virginia provided that in addition to, “propagating... [the] 
Christian Religion to such People,” the colonizers “may in time bring the Infidels and 
Savages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet 
Government…”499  Within the first two years of settlement, the colony was on the brink of 
failure due to illness and starvation.500  To continue to foster Virginia’s economic viability, 
a second proprietary charter was issued in 1609, which accompanied additional colonists 
and provisions.  The 1609 charter was issued to Thomas Gates (i.e., the future governor of 
Jamestown) and George Somers (i.e., subsequent founder of Bermuda) specifically.501 The 
charter instructed the men to “divide themselves into two Colonies… [a]nd have yielded 
and granted in any and sundry Privileges and Liberties to each Colony, for their quiet 
settling and good Government therein…”502  The principle aim of the charter was to expand 
the settlement base to increase the colonies chances of survival, which would also further 
the promotion of POGG. 
By the time a third charter was issued in 1611, James I had dissolved the Virginia Company 
and converted Virginia to a royal colony.503  As it relates to the imperatives of POGG, the 
1611 Charter outlined the framework for the implementation of the Royal Governor, 
Council, and rule of law: 
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“…our said Council, or any two of them for the time being, shall, and 
may have full Power and Authority, either here to bind them over with 
good Sureties for their good Behaviour, and further therein, to 
proceed to all Intents and Purposes as it is used in other like Cases, 
within our Realm of England; …. as the Governor, Deputy or Council 
there, for the Time being, shall think meet; Or otherwise, according to 
such Laws and Ordinances, as are and shall be in Use there, for the 
well-ordering and good Government of the said Colony.”504 
Consistent with Figure 3.2 and Cane’s characterization of the colonial infrastructure, the 
provision of the 1611 Charter vested substantial power to govern with the British Crown 
through the Royal Governor and the Royal Council, which also acted as the Supreme 
Court.505  The Colonial Assembly was not granted enumerated or exclusive powers to 
govern, so every law that was made in or applied to Virginia “had to be confirmed in 
England.”506  Where the Assembly could and did enact laws, the Crown (and/or Parliament) 
would retain its control by arbitrarily ‘vetoing’ or ‘disallowing’ the proposed laws.507  The 
British Empire reasoned that the power to disallow benefited the colonies, as “no two 
colonies were at the same stage of political development or economic viability.”508  
Therefore, the colonial government needed imperial oversight to legally protect them from 
themselves.509  In actuality, the British Empire benefitted from the right of disallowance, 
even if the individual colonies did not.   
If there was an enumerated power, it was the Colonial Assembly’s taxing power, making 
the Assembly responsible for taxing the colony to support the Empire.  Even the taxing 
power came under imperial scrutiny when the British Empire attempted to usurp it to 
further the Stamp Act and other pieces of legislation designed to increase colonial taxes 
for the benefit of the mainland.510  In Virginia, it was not until 1619 that the colonists 
sought more autonomy with the establishment of the House of Burgesses.511  The House 
of Burgesses was the representative assembly—elected by popular vote—to guarantee the 
colonists’ ability to take an active role in their colony’s governance.  However, the Laws 
Enacted by the First General Assembly of Virginia illustrates the tenuous nature of colonial 
autonomy: 
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In 1618 the council in London instructed the Virginia governor to 
initiate the first representative assembly in the colonies. It was felt 
that the colonists needed to have some voice in local affairs if order 
and economic prosperity were to be reestablished in the faltering 
colony. The legislature lasted until 1624, when a reorganization 
imposed by the king restored all power to the governor.512 
   
Restoring power to the Governor was an undeniable exercise of the Crown’s royal 
prerogative.513  According to the McIlwaine and Kennedy, “the governor continued to call 
the House of Burgesses for unofficial consultations; however, he was forced to rely 
primarily on the upper house, the Council of State appointed by the king, and he could not 
act without its approval.”514  While under British rule, arbitrary exercises such as this 
stymied the consistency of representative government in Virginia—as well as the other 
colonies—to allow the Crown and/or Parliament to keep the colonies within its locus of 
control.515   
Likewise, Virginia’s colonial legal scheme became the framework closest to Great 
Britain’s.516  Johnson notes, “the law of Virginia was established [in the colonies] as being 
the statutes and case law of England….”517  Although circumstances resulted in pragmatic 
variations, the laws adopted in other colonies were modeled and reconciled with the laws 
of Virginia while Virginia’s law were reconciled with those of the Empire.518  Virginia 
essentially emerged as the archetype upon which all other colonial governmental 
infrastructures attempted to be based. The reasons for this circumstance could be that 
Virginia was the first successful settlement, and it yielded the most aristocratic society of 
proper English men and women.519  According to Lawrence, “the wealth that flowed from 
Virginia [as a result of its tobacco boom] contributed to that of Britain and its power grew 
accordingly.”520  It could also be attributed to the fact that the Crown continuously 
cultivated its survival by establishing it as a royal colony as early as 1611.521  Likewise, it 
could be because the colonies’ founders and settlers were not separatists with lingering 
resentful feelings toward the Crown, Parliament, and/or the Church of England.522  This 
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does not suggest that they did not find issue with all three institutions; however, they 
respected the political framework of Great Britain because they believed it treasonous to 
do otherwise.523  They also still believed that it was possible to reform the Anglican Church, 
so complete separation or the establishment of a new denomination was not their 
objective.524 Accordingly, it can be inferred that the colony of Virginia typified the best-case 
scenario: the imperatives of POGG systematically functioning to afford the mainland control 
for the furtherance of ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’. 
Compounding the problem of imperial rigidity was the fact that the sheer distance between 
the Crown and the colonies prevented expedient responses to many important colonial 
issues.525  The British Empire’s efforts to employ POGG ensured a governmental presence, 
but it failed to provide consistent and trustworthy governance.  Alden observes that Great 
Britain’s “prestige exceeded her power…her men of public affairs were, with some 
exception, ill fitted to govern distant dependencies peopled by Englishmen.”526  Along the 
same lines, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was said to be the inauguration of a 
constitutional monarchy, was supposed to curtail the monarchy’s power to govern in favor 
of Parliament.527  This notwithstanding, disbanding colonial assemblies, taxing the colonies 
arbitrarily, precluding the establishment of legislatures in new colonies, revoking charters, 
requiring colonial conferences to be held in England, and exercising royal prerogatives to 
haphazardly exert supremacy continued well after 1689.528  Moreover, the occurrences 
continued to incite tension between the colonies and the British Empire.   
On a fundamental level, imperial/colonial tension seems to have been caused by a 
misapprehension concerning the dynamics of the game being played.  Like the saying goes, 
it’s like bringing checkers to a chess match.  Notwithstanding the level of equality that the 
American colonies embraced as British transplants, the British Empire did not see them as 
such. Colonialism was not to create a relationship of equals. The fact that the English Bill 
of Rights was passed and celebrated as a ‘powerful statement’ concerning the rights of 
British subjects, but did not extend to the American colonies, was evidence of this reality.  
Moreover, POGG was not only the philosophy guiding colonization, it also established the 
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basis for Great Britain to continue to legislatively and judicially inhibit the establishment of 
equality.  As such, the rights guaranteed to British subjects by the English Bill of Rights 
became “part of the disputes between [the British Government] and American colonists, 
which led to the Revolutionary War and American independence.”529  This then led to the 
American colonies’ establishment of the American Bill of Rights, which was undoubtedly a 
statement to the British Empire about the inflexibility of its colonial rule.  Although Great 
Britain could not appreciate it at the time, these issues facilitated the formation of 
ideological differences between the mainland and the colonies concerning 
interdependence, and more importantly independence.  The irony of Virginia being POGG’s 
centerpiece for the American colonies is that the doctrine’s impact eventually set the 
foundation for Virginians like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison to become leaders in 
conceiving a different means to achieve peace, civil order, and an effective governmental 
infrastructure in the new nation that followed.530   
Eventually, the undesirable effects of POGG were too overly burdensome for even the 
aristocracy of Virginia, as well as the rest of British-America.531  It did not however prevent 
Virginia from offering symbolic deference to its history after becoming an autonomous 
state.532  At the point of statehood, Virginia adopted the ‘commonwealth’ designation in its 
name instead of being designated a state (the other three Commonwealths are 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky, which was originally a part of Virginia).533  The 
U.S. State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual however makes clear, “the term 
‘Commonwealth’ does not describe or provide for any specific political status or 
relationship,…the term broadly describes an area that is self‑governing under a 
constitution of its adoption….”534  Thus, Virginia’s (and the other three states) adoption of 
the nomenclature has been disengaged from any residual deference to the supremacy of 
the British Empire.  The adoption however is undoubtedly an homage to the vestiges of the 
POGG doctrine.  Likewise, the American arm of the Anglican Communion officially divested 
itself from the Church of England during the Founding era to make clear the 
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disestablishment of religion and government in the United States.535  According to 
Podmore, the divestiture or separation of church and state affected the entire scope of the 
relationship between American and British Anglican congregations.536  Not only was 
reliance on Anglican Ecclesiastical law altered, but divergence emerged in every aspect of 
church governance, which included the ability for American Anglican clergy to preach in 
Great Britain and vice versa.537  Consequently, Anglicanism under the designation of 
‘Episcopalian’ has emerged as one of the many denominations in America, instead of the 
one with exceptional deference or superlative distinction.  
3.4.2 The Colony of New Jersey—A Bumper-Crop of Constituting Documents 
The constituting documents for the colony of New Jersey are arguably the most convoluted 
in the way of evidencing the POGG doctrine.  This is because the territory was legally 
usurped, gifted, transferred, repossessed, bifurcated, partially leveraged, partially 
auctioned, and left fluctuating between the imperial governments of two larger colonies 
before finally being surrendered to the British Crown in 1702.538  In the process, at least 
fifteen different transfer documents were recorded, three of which were constituting (or 
reconstituting) documents drafted by three different proprietary establishments.539 These 
are the documents that are germane to this study, as each is drafted with the aim of 
promoting some semblance of POGG.  Whether their aims were in full compliance with the 
British Empire’s ideology is somewhat debatable. Nevertheless, the documents are 
relevant, as they are demonstrative of how perspectives in the American colonies subtly 
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transitioned to the ideology of LLPH when POGG failed to effectively address changing 
colonial attitudes and circumstances. 
The province of New Jersey—like the colony of New York—had been an overseas possession 
of the Dutch as a part of New Netherland until it was usurped by Great Britain in 1664.540  
It was then gifted to the Duke of York, who retained New York but transferred the rights to 
New Jersey.541  As such, it was not granted a founding charter by the British Empire. 
Instead, York simply released the territory to John Berkeley and George Carteret.542  The 
transfer of rights left the responsibility of establishing an effective governmental 
infrastructure to Carteret.  The Concessions and Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the 
Province of New Jersey was his colonial brainchild; however, there are notable aspects of 
POGG therein.  Specifically, the document’s primary objective was to ensure “safety, peace 
and well-government”. 543  To achieve these ends, the document provided for a ‘provincial 
governor’ who possessed the right to “take to him six councellors at least, or twelve at 
most, or any even number between six and twelve,” with whose advice and consent he 
would govern the colony.544  A provincial assembly was established to include members 
elected from the proprietors of the province.545  A chief Secretary was instituted to “do all 
other…things that we by our instructions shall direct, and the Governor, Council, and 
General Assembly shall ordain for [the good and welfare of the said Province].”546  To 
ensure loyalty to the British Empire, provincial office holders were required to swear 
allegiance to “the King of England, his heirs and successors;”…and be “faithful to the 
interests of the Lords Proprietors….”547  Carteret’s document of Concessions yielded a 
bumper-crop of migrants, mostly Puritan transplants from other regions, mainly New York 
and New England.548  They joined the residual Dutch, Swedish and German colonists who 
immigrated to New Netherland.549   
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Where it concerned non-Anglican beliefs, Carteret seemed to appreciate the pecuniary 
benefits that religious liberty provided.  As such, the customary Religiosity clause is absent 
from the Concessions document. Instead, a Liberty of Conscience clause designated: 
[t]hat no person qualified as aforesaid within the said Province, at any 
time shall be any ways molested, punished, disquieted or called in 
question for any difference in opinion or practice in matter of religious 
concernments, who do not actually disturb the civil peace of the said 
Province; …persons may…freely and fully have an' enjoy his and their 
judgments and consciences in' masters of religion…[behaving 
themselves peaceably ant quietly, and not using this liberty to 
licentiousness, nor to the civil injury or outward disturbance of 
others]; any law, statute or clause contained, or to be contained, 
usuage or custom of this realm o England,...550 
Allegiance to the British Crown notwithstanding, the Concessions document is somewhat 
unique in that the Proprietors’ individual commercial interests are unmistakable.  As has 
been previously established, the proliferation of the Anglican Church was part and parcel 
of the gift to the Duke.  However, it appears that Carteret was less concerned about religion 
and more concerned about the colony turning a profit. Therefore, religious tolerance was 
endorsed as long as quit-rents were consistently paid.551 
By 1674, Berkeley’s debts forced him to leverage the West half of the province, which York 
attempted to repossess as an annex of New York, to no avail.552 In 1682, Carteret 
auctioned off the East half of the province.  As a result, two distinct colonies—West New 
Jersey and East New Jersey—were established, and the new proprietors adopted two 
distinct constituting ‘agreements’. West New Jersey’s Charter of Fundamental Laws was 
instituted in 1676, while East New Jersey’s Fundamental Constitutions for the Province of 
East New Jersey in America was instituted in 1683.553  Although there are notable 
references to ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’ in both documents, the two 
agreements do not overtly implicate the Church of England as a fundamental condition to 
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colonial establishment.  Instead, economic viability again made religious ideologies a 
secondary or tertiary consideration. 
Where it pertains the governmental frameworks, Figure 3.2 also illustrates the structure 
outlined in the agreements for both halves of New Jersey.554  However, there are 
noteworthy circumstantial distinctions between the documents.  In the agreement for West 
New Jersey, Chapter 17 demonstrates not only the customary language associated with 
POGG, but also a clause that appears to be an early iteration of the United States’ 
philosophy of LLPH: 
That no Proprietor, freeholder or inhabitant of the said Province of 
West New Jersey, [shall be deprived or condemned of life, limb, 
liberty, estate, property or any ways hurt in his or their privileges, 
freedoms or franchises, upon any account whatsoever,] without a 
due tryal, and Judgment passed by twelve good and lawful men of his 
neighborhood…555 
 
Moreover, the agreement for West New Jersey appears to make slavery illegal in the colony.  
Chapter 23 provides for “all and every person and persons inhabiting the said Province, 
shall, as far as in us lies, be free from oppression and slavery.”556  Although beyond the 
scope of this study, the provision should not be taken as a foregone conclusion that 
Chapter 23 insolated New Jersey from the effects of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. To the 
contrary, Carteret and Berkeley openly promoted using slave labor to address the chronic 
scarcity of free labor in the region.557  Therefore, at least “sixty acres for every slave” was 
afforded any man who imported slaves from 1664 to 1682.558  Once the two halves were 
rejoined when New Jersey became a royal colony, the British Crown “dispatched [New 
Jersey’s Royal Governor] from London with instructions to keep the settlers provided with 
“a constant and sufficient supply of merchantable Negroes at moderate prices.”559 He 
likewise was ordered to assist slave traders and “to take especial care that payment be 
duly made.”560  Despite the inclusion of Chapter 23, the British Crown (i.e., at this point the 
sovereign was Anne) as well as its Colonial Government contributed to the unified state of 
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New Jersey becoming one of the last northern states to abolish slavery, which was done by 
force after the end of the American Civil War.561   
Where it pertains the Religiosity clause, both agreements leave to each colonist his/her, 
“opinion, judgment, faith or worship towards God in matters of religion…[and] the exercises 
of their consciences in matters of religious worship….”562  However, East New Jersey’s 
agreement goes further to suggest that not only should men speak as men without 
“respect-to one's particular persuasion in matters of religion,” but also they should not “be 
compelled to frequent and maintain any religious worship, place or ministry 
whatsoever;…”563  This provision appears to anticipate the varying viewpoints espoused by 
those who were already living in the colony, the first wave of Puritan immigrants, and any 
religious subgroups/denominations that might relocate to East New Jersey with the intent 
to further religion by compulsory measures. Moreover, it appears to attempt to mitigate the 
possibility of church wardens pressuring for compulsory religious worship, which was 
common within the Anglican Church as well as many of the more orthodox denominations 
who immigrated to the region.564  The major caveat to East New Jersey’s Liberty of 
Conscience clause was that holding public office was predicated on being a Christian.565  
The question of whether any denomination of Christianity would meet the condition 
seemingly returns to the laws of the Empire.  As was the case with previously colonial 
holdings, it can be inferred that office holders were Anglican.  If they were of any other 
denomination, they could not be papists. As was the case with Carteret’s original 
Concessions document, the objective was to afford religious tolerance as long as one had 
faith in God and was willing to “live peaceably and quietly in a civil society.”566  As both 
documents evidence the imperatives of POGG to varying degrees, the political and 
economic expediency in religious tolerance prevailed in New Jersey’s collection of 
constituting documents. 
The most noteworthy aspect of New Jersey’s three constituting documents is that they were 
drafted by proprietors attempting to promote the economic sustainability of the colony, 
which entailed affording deference to the “king of England, his heirs and successors” but 
also acknowledging “the true right of liberty and property, as well as the just ballance both 
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of the Proprietors among themselves, and betwixt them and the people:….”567 These 
nuances appear to demonstrate the subtle shift away from the colonial perspective 
occasioned by POGG toward the individual rights of the proprietors and the colonists (or 
future American citizens).  After falling into disrepair due to multiple transfers and shifting 
shareholders, authority over the two colonies sporadically shifted between New York and 
New England until they were surrendered to the Crown in 1702.568  Despite the temporary 
emergence of the philosophy of LLPH, New Jersey ultimately reverted to POGG while under 
the imperial leadership of New York.569  Therefore, it would stand to reason that it was 
subject to many of the same political and legal limits placed upon New York.570   
By the end of the 18th century, the British Empire had issued sufficient charters to 
encompass thirteen independent colonies and secure possession of large swaths of 
Canadian territory.  Figure 3.3 details the language included in the remaining six of the 13 
original American colonies as well as that included in the Constitution of the first post-war 
state, Vermont.  Taken in conjunction with the case studies undertaken herein, it becomes 
evidence that American colonial charters referenced the establishment of ‘good 
government,’ in conjunction with terms like ‘well-ordering,’ ‘quiet settling’, ‘settled’, ‘civilly 
governed’, ‘peaceable’, ‘better managed’, or some derivative thereof. The linguistic 
conjugations are unquestionably indicative of an American iteration of POGG.  As the three 
iterations of Virginia’s charter demonstrate, Great Britain employed what could be termed 
colonial-era ‘boilerplate text’ to dictate how the colonies interacted with each other and 
with the mainland to maintain imperial control.  As the three iterations of New Jersey’s 
colonial agreements demonstrate, POGG also fostered a trickle-down effect as it relates to 
the governance structure, so imperial control was not completely lost. However, the 
proprietary interests of the colonies’ investors seemingly shifted the focus away from the 
fixed aims of POGG to further distinct commercial ends.  In both cases, POGG is evident; 
although in colonial New Jersey, the customary imperatives of POGG appear to have been 
revised to deal with New Jersey’s distinctive set of circumstances. 
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 Figure 3.3: POGG Provisions in Charters for Residual American Colonies571 
Charter Particulars: Reference to the Imperatives of POGG—vis-à-vis ‘Religiosity clause’ and ‘Civil Order’ and ‘Settled & Quiet 
Government’ provision. 
1. New Hampshire572   
Founded: 1623  
(originally part of Mass. Bay 
Colony) 
Royal Charter: 1679 
Sovereign: Charles II  
Commission of John Cutt (1680): “…that by such examples ye infidel may be invited & desire to partake of ye Christian 
Religion, & for ye greater ease & satisfacc'on of or sd loving subjects in matters of Religion We do hereby will, require & 
com'and yt liberty of conscience shall be allowed unto all protestants; & yt such especially as shall be conformable to ye rites 
of ye Church of Engld, shall be particularly countenanced & incouraged.” 
 
And further We do by these prsents, for Its,…give & grant unto ye said Councell & their successors for ye time being, full & 
free liberty, power, and authority, & hear & Determine all emergencies, relating to the care & good Government of Our subjects 
within ye sd Prov: & also to sum'on & convene any person or persons before them & punish contempts;” 
 
2. Rhode Island573  
Founded: 1636 
Royal Charter: N/A 
Sovereign: Charles II 
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663): And wee doe likewise, for vs, oure heires and successours, give 
and graunt vnto the sayd Governour and Company and theire successours by these presents, that, for the more peaceable 
and orderly Government of the sayd Plantations,…”. 
 
 Religious Freedom outlined in Charter: “…Now know bee, that wee beinge willinge to encourage the hopefull undertakeinge 
of oure sayd lovall and loveinge subjects, and to secure them in the free exercise and enjovment of all theire civill and 
religious rights, appertaining to them, as our loveing subjects; and to preserve unto them that libertye, in the true Christian 
ffaith and worshipp of God, which they have sought with soe much travaill, and with peaceable myndes, and lovall 
subjectione to our royall progenitors and ourselves, to enjoye; and because some of the people and inhabitants of the same 
colonie cannot, in theire private opinions, conforms to the publique exercise of religion, according to the litturgy, formes 
and ceremonyes of the Church of England, or take or subscribe the oaths and articles made and established in that behalfe; 
and for that the same, by reason of the remote distances of those places, will (as wee hope) bee noe breach of the unitie 
and unifformitie established in this nation: Have therefore thought ffit, and doe hereby publish, graunt, ordeyne and declare, 
That our royall will and pleasure is, that noe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise 
molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not 
actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd colony; …they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie, and not useing this 
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3. Delaware574  
Founded: 1638 
Royal Charter: N/A 
Sovereign: N/A-land grant from 
Duke of York 
Charter of Delaware (1701): “KNOW YE THEREFORE, That for the further Well-being and good Government of the said 
Province, and Territories; and in Pursuance of the Rights and Powers before-mentioned, I the said William Penn do 
declare, grant and confirm, unto all the Freemen, Planters and Adventurers, and other Inhabitants in this Province and 
Territories, these following Liberties, Franchises and Privileges, so far as in me lieth, to be held, enjoyed and kept, by 
the Freemen, Planters and Adventurers, and other Inhabitants of and in the said Province and Territories "hereunto 
annexed, for ever.” 
 
 Religious Freedom outlined in Charter: “…I do hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons, inhabiting In this 
Province or Territories, who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the 
World; and professes him or themselves obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any Case 
molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, 
nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his or their Mind, or to 
do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to their religious Persuasion.  
 Religious Test (Public Service): ”AND that all Persons who also profess to believe in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the 
World, shall be capable (notwithstanding their other Persuasions and Practices in Point of Conscience and Religion) 
to serve this Government in any Capacity, both legislatively and executively, he or they solemnly promising, when 
lawfully required, Allegiance to the King as Sovereign, ….” 
 
4. North Carolina575  
Founded: 1653 
Royal Charter: 1729 
Sovereign: Charles I & II 
Charter of Carolina (1663): “And because such assemblies of freeholders cannot be so conveniently called, as there 
may be occasion to require the same, we do, therefore, by these presents, give and grant unto the said Edward Earl of 
Clarendon, George Duke of Albemarle, William Lord Craven, John Lord Berkley, Anthony Lord Ashley, Sir George Carteret, 
Sir William Berkley, and Sir John Colleton, their heirs and assigns, by themselves or their magistrates, in that behalf 
lawfully authorized full power and authority from time to time to make and ordain fit and wholesome orders and 
ordinances, within the province aforesaid to be kept and observed as well for the keeping of the peace, as for the better 
government of the people there abiding, and to publish the same to all to whom it may concern; ….so as such 
ordinances be reasonable, and not repugnant or contrary, but as near as may be, agreeable to the laws and statutes 
of this our kingdom of England, ….” 
 
 Religious Freedom outlined in Charter: “And furthermore, the patronage and advowsons of all the churches and 
chappels, which as Christian religion shall increase within the country, isles, islets and limits aforesaid, shall happen 
hereafter to be erected, together with license and power to build and found churches, chappels and oratories, in 
convenient and fit places,.…” 
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5. South Carolina576  
Founded: 1663 
Royal Charter: 1729 
Sovereign: Charles I & II 
Charter of Carolina (1665): “… give and grant unto the said Edward Earl of Clarendon, George Duke of Albemarle, 
William Earl of Craven, John Lord Berkeley, Anthony Lord Ashley, Sir George Carteret, Sir John Colleton, and Sir William 
Berkeley, their heirs and assigns, by themselves, or their magistrates, in that behalf lawfully authorized, full power and 
authority, from time to time, to make and ordain fit and wholesome orders and ordinances within the province or 
territory aforesaid, or any county, baronny, or province, within the same, to be kept and observed, as well for the keeping 
of the peace, as for the better government of the people there abiding, and to publish the same to all to whom it may 
concern; …so as such ordinances be reasonable, and not repugnant or contrary, but as near as may be, agreeable to 
the laws and statutes of this our kingdom of England; ….” 
 
 Religious Freedom outlined in Charter: “And furthermore, the patronage and advowsons of all the churches and 
chapels, which, as Christian religion shall increase within the province, territory, isles, and limits aforesaid, shall 
happen hereafter to be erected; together with licence and power to build and found churches, chapels and oratories, 
in convenient and fit places, within the said bounds and limits; and to cause them to be dedicated and consecrated, 
according to the [ecclesiastical laws] of our kingdom of England; …; saving always the faith, allegiance, and sovereign 
dominion, due to us, our heirs and successors, for the same:…” 
 
6. Pennsylvania577  
Founded: 1682 
Royal Charter: N/A 
Sovereign: Charles II 
Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania (1681): “CHARLES the Second, by the Grace of God, King of England, Scotland, 
France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all whom these presents shall come, Greets. WHEREAS Our Trustie 
and wellbeloved Subject WILLIAM PENN, Esquire, … as also to reduce the savage Natives by gentle and just mamlers 
to the Love of Civil Societie and Christian Religion, hath humbley besought Leave of Us to transport an ample Colonie 
unto a certaine Countrey hereinafter described…in the Partes of America not yet cultivated and planted; And hath 
likewise humbley besought Our Royall Majestie to Give, Grant, and Confirme all the said Countrey, with certaine 
Privileges and Jurisdictions, requisite for the good Government and Safetie of the said Countrey and Colonie, to him 
and his Heires forever.” 
Charter of Privileges Granted by William Penn, esq. to the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania and Territories (October 28, 
1701): “KNOW YE THEREFORE, That for the further Well-being and good Government of the said Province, and 
Territories; ….” 
 Religious Freedom outlined in Charter: “…I do hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons, inhabiting in this 
Province or Territories, who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the 
World; and profess him or themselves obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any Case molested 
or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, nor be 
                                                          
576 ‘Charter of Carolina: June 30, 1665’ <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc04.asp>. 
577 ‘Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania: 1681’ <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa01.asp>;  




compelled to frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his or their Mind, or to do or 
super any other Act or Thing, contrary to their religious Persuasion.  
 Religious Test (Public Service): “AND that all Persons who also profess to believe in Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the 
World, shall be capable (notwithstanding their other Persuasions and Practices in Point of Conscience and Religion) 
to serve this Government in any Capacity, both legislatively and executively, he or they solemnly promising, when 
lawfully required, Allegiance to the King as Sovereign, and Fidelity to the Proprietary and Governor, ….” 
 
7. Vermont578 
Founded: 1777 (after start of War 
of Independence; therefore, it 
was never apart of British-
America). 
Constitution of Vermont (08 July 1777): “And whereas, the inhabitants of this State have (in consideration of protection 
only) heretofore acknowledged allegiance to the King of Great Britain, and the said King has not only withdrawn that 
protection, but commenced, and still continues to carry on, with unabated vengeance, a most cruel and unjust war 
against them; employing therein, not only the troops of Great Britain, but foreign mercenaries, savages and slaves, for 
the avowed purpose of reducing them to a total and abject submission to the despotic domination of the British 
parliament, with many other acts of tyranny, (more fully set forth in the declaration of Congress) whereby all allegiance 
and fealty to the said King and his successors, are dissolved and at an end; and all power and authority derived from 
him, ceased in the American Colonies.” 
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It has been demonstrated that POGG was a systematic means to manage Great Britain’s 
new international paradigm, the imperial/colonial relationship on the North American 
continent.  Recall that Yusuf contends that the effects of the POGG doctrine were dualistic 
in nature.  In addition to facilitating authority over the British Empire’s overseas territories, 
it was also intended to grant powers for colonial governments to self-rule. Where the 
American colonies were concerned, the rigidity of the imperatives repeatedly frustrated the 
latter aim.  Humphreys notes that the colonies were established as “dependent 
communities legally subject to the authority of the English Crown.”579  Consequently, the 
Crown’s royal prerogative was enforced upon the North American colonies notwithstanding 
the degree of autonomy afforded them by the terms of the charters, or how distinctive their 
regional circumstances.580  Leading up to American rebellion, the contentious power 
struggle that developed between the Crown and Parliament concerning the scope and 
ownership of the ‘royal prerogative’ made the latter aim of POGG unduly burdensome if not 
impossible for the American colonies.  Humphreys notes: 
The history of [the American colonies’] constitutional development in 
the first half of the eighteenth century is essentially the history of the 
efforts of the colonial assemblies to establish their supremacy within 
the colonies and over the instruments of the royal prerogative.581   
 
The conflicts specifically occasioned by George III’s approach to his royal prerogative, and 
Parliament’s efforts to constrict his power in its own favor, instead of toward the colonial 
assemblies was at the heart of the colonies’ rebellion.582 Taken collectively, the British 
Empire’s imperatives—the Religiosity clause, the monarchial/parliamentary governmental 
framework, and the British colonial rule of law—demonstrate that POGG was not just a 
constitutional clause associated with the British Commonwealth.  It was in fact also a 
colonial American phenomenon.  But/for the British Empire’s failure to effectively promote 
the second aim of POGG, it might have become so rooted in the psyche of the American 
colonies that the history of the United States might have been a different one.  
3.5 The Rejection of POGG for ‘Life, Liberty & the Pursuit of Happiness’ 
It is well understood that the American colonies informally issued a declaration of 
independence from Great Britain in 1775, which in 1776 was formally memorialized and 
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distributed internationally.  The purpose of the declaration was to recognize the sovereignty 
of thirteen independent states no longer colonially tethered to the British Empire. The 
declaration realized several outcomes relevant to the present constitutional dynamic of 
England, Canada, and the United States.  It “reflected a range of concerns about security, 
defense, commerce, and immigration,” which from the colonists’ perspective, necessitated 
responses beyond the scope of the British Empire’s POGG doctrine.583  It also recognized 
that the established-church regime was unworkable in the American colonies where so 
many denominations had migrated for the distinct purpose of disengaging from the effects 
of the entanglement of the Church of England and the British Government.584 The most 
prejudicial aspect of POGG was that the legal deference afforded Anglicanism infringed on 
the religious liberties of all non-Anglican denominations by frustrating their ability to fully 
flourish.  Alden notes that shortly after the official declaration, the status of the British 
Empire was likened “to that of the Romans in fatal decline.”585  This comparison seemingly 
speaks to the practical realities that plagued both empires when they expanded beyond 
that which was logistically manageable, while attempting to keep too tight a rein on so 
many distinct territories.   
The declaration was also a point of demarcation for the transition of British colonies into 
independent states. Armitage observes that, “the Declaration marked the entry of those 
states into what would now be called international society…and open[ed] American 
commerce to a wider world outside the limits previously set to it by the laws of the British 
Empire.”586  From an ideological perspective, the declaration conveyed a permanent 
deviation from the imperial/colonial relationship that had prevailed.  According to Alden, 
“it is not to be denied that the colonists became less like the English with every passing 
day after the founding of [Virginia]. It could not be otherwise.  Unquestionably a notable 
gap emerged between the Englishman and the American as early as 1763, and that gap 
grew thereafter.”587  Former U.S. President John Adams suggested that the American 
Revolution had actually “[begun] in 1607, when Englishmen and colonists began to pursue 
separate courses.”588  Consequently, the colonies gravitated away from the ideological 
‘difference in degree’ that framed British-Canada’s perspective as a dominion of the British 
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Empire.  No longer colonial British, the American colonies came out on the other side of 
the revolution proclaiming an ideological ‘difference in kind’.   
After the Revolution, each colony was established as an internationally recognized 
autonomous state, allowing each to self-determine and to decide whether to join a united 
collection of states or chart its own course.589  As a condition of linking their fates to one 
another, a new direction was fundamental to their continued unity, which necessitated 
shedding POGG and its associated imperatives. Accordingly, disestablishment replaced 
establishment.  The establishment and proliferation of the Anglican Church gave way to the 
separation of church and state where religion would flourish to meet the needs of the 
people without governmental promotion, preference, and/or entanglement.  The people 
abandoned the British monarchy and Parliament, collectively the backbone of POGG, in 
favor of an executive and legislative branch of government elected by the people and 
removable by the people.  As it pertains to the rule of law, “the colonists saw [English] 
‘common law’ as a set of unchanging principles of public law, principles which [American] 
usage would describe as ‘constitutional’.”590 Thus, the U.S. Constitution serves first as a 
social contract constituting the states of America as no longer colonies of the British 
Empire.  It also constitutes the basis for a national framework, including the rule of law and 
juridical structure, intended to reinforce the parameters of the social contract of the 
American states.  It was meant to be a framework that did not possess the same 
characteristics that “colonial representatives and lawyers perceived as being employed for 
the purpose of ‘imperial exploitation’.”591  Consistent observations made by Sachs 
pertaining to the law of ‘the Founding’, it can be inferred that American Constitutional and 
Common law were established in distinct contravention of the British framework.592  
The American colonies’ resolve concerning the adoption of a different national ideology 
was intensified by French and British responses to their joint declaration and commitment 
to defending their resolution to the point of war. By 1779, France had afforded de facto 
international recognition that was accompanied by offerings of political alliance and trade 
agreements.593  Alden notes that although Parliament fully accepted that the colonies were 
lost to the British Empire as early as 1781, George III refused to admit defeat.594  Even 
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after Parliament voted to “consider as enemies to his Majesty and this country” those who 
continued an offensive campaign “for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to 
obedience by force,” George “would not unequivocally promise to refrain from further 
military action against the Patriots.”595  Leading up to the finalization of the 1783 treaty, 
the British Empire continued to attempt to cajole the colonies back into the fold by offering 
partial recognition.596 Great Britain went so far as to offer the American colonies a similar 
deal to the one Canada would receive; the British Empire would extend qualified 
independence to the thirteen states. This included greater autonomy than that which had 
been afforded them as colonies, but a lesser level of sovereignty within the British Empire 
than unfettered independence granted.597  Needless to say, the states passed on the offer. 
In the same way that the 1763 Treaty of Paris ended a war and brought enlargement to 
the British Empire, the 1783 Treaty of Paris ended a war and brought about territorial 
retrenchment. As for that which it did not cede, representatives for the American states 
attempted to persuade the British Empire to “cede all of Canada to the United States,” 
without the slightest degree of success.598  Alden explains that the United States was 
“forced to abandon the Patriot dream of converting Canada into a fourteenth state.  
[Canada was to remain British…]”599 Independence notwithstanding, it would require 
additional treaties—e.g., Jay’s Treaty, which established territorial boundaries between the 
U.S. and Canada—as well as another war—i.e., the War of 1812—for the British Empire to 
accept that the colonies were gone forever and to finally discontinue its efforts to exert 
control over American territories and citizens.600  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that the ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’ provision 
directly or indirectly occurs in the charters for each of the thirteen colonies. The 
circumstances related to six of the 13 colonies, which are examined herein, rebut the 
presumption that the British Empire’s views on colonialism evolved and relaxed over the 
200 years that the American colonies were subject to British control.  The six focus colonies 
encompass the first British-American colony (1607), the last British-American colony 
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(1774), and each of the colonies that were specifically designated as sanctuary colonies 
for Catholics, non-Anglican Protestants, and other religious subgroups.  The final two 
selected colonies are those which are noteworthy because they are illustrative of colonial 
and/or imperial discontent concerning the nature of the relationship between the colonies 
and the Crown. Focusing on these specific colonies offers substantive support for the 
proposition that POGG was a systematic institutional scheme employed to establish the 
American colonies well before the Empire secured British-Canada from the French.  
Moreover, POGG was never intended to yield an alliance or partnership as the American 
(and later Canadian) colonists perceived; instead, it was designed to establish an 
institutional hierarchy within the British Empire by ensuring dominion and control over 
overseas territories.  This is the case notwithstanding whether the colonists were formerly 
from the British Isles or indigenous to the region usurped by colonization efforts. 
Much scholarly and legal debate has gone into whether the American colonies considered 
themselves revolutionaries when they sought to break from the British Empire.  Evaluation 
of the colonies’ declaration of freedom as a forthright legal petition responding to the 
imperatives of POGG suggests that the colonists did not see themselves as anything more 
than men and women who were tired of being grist in the mill of Imperialism.  The domestic 
and international publication of the document was an indictment; an appeal for post-
colonial unity; and a call for aid by way of international recognition and financial support.  
It is safe to assume that they had no way of knowing the future effects of the choices they 
made, no more than they knew what the future held when or if they secured independence.  
Had the aims of the POGG doctrine been fully successful, the branches of government in 
the United States might look very different, as the drafting and adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution might have never been.  Instead, the POGG doctrine might have become as 






THE BASTION OF POGG: 
CANADA’S APPROACH TO DISESTABLISHMENT 
“Colonialism is a denial of the reality of self in favour of an  
imaginary special position inside the mythology of someone else’s empire.   
That special position can never exist because empires have their own purpose.”601 
This chapter continues the historiographic analyses undertaken in previous chapters to 
demonstrate how the POGG doctrine became the mainstay of Canadian constitutionalism. 
The doctrine initially thwarted the Canadian colonies’ ability to fully self-govern as early as 
1749 and continued until 1982; therefore, Canada’s post-colonial identity is the national 
embodiment of the POGG doctrine. This chapter first evidences how during Canada’s 
colonial era, national autonomy was stagnated by the British Empire’s integration of POGG 
to promote ‘Britishness’ in Canada without adequately reconciling the divergent social, 
religious, and political perspectives of the non-British colonists over whom the Empire took 
dominion.  Moreover, the promotion of Anglican exceptionalism and favoritism toward 
British Loyalists severely frustrated British-Canada’s ability to embrace a cohesive national 
identity and promote religious equilibrium between British Loyalists and non-Anglican 
religious subgroups.  
This chapter then demonstrates how Canada’s decision to remain a British overseas 
possession during the American rebellion resulted in her acquiescence to POGG, which 
consequently became the nation’s mode of constitutional evolution from imperial 
possession to Commonwealth nation.  As modernity has afforded Canada opportunities to 
move toward a national identity divorced from United Kingdom—especially since 
constitutional ‘patriation’—this chapter evidences that the POgG clause functioning in 
tandem with Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms has altered the trajectory of the 
aftereffects of remaining steadfast to a status of perpetual annexation. As such, this 
chapter demonstrates how preservation of POGG in Canada buttresses the national policy 
of one law for all Canadians and appropriately encompasses the concept of 
‘multiculturalism’ in light of the nation’s colonial history and its aspirations toward being ‘a 
free and democratic society’.602  
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4.1 When Freedom Finally Rings: Proclaiming Disestablishment in Canada 
Due to the extended association with the British Empire, Canada’s Constitution both 
resonates and rebuffs the influences of British Imperialism.  Canada’s loyalty to the British 
Empire—and later the British Commonwealth—has been held responsible for the creation 
of a fractured nation of Canadians of predominantly French, British, and Aboriginal 
ancestry.603 The degree of ostracism experienced by French and Aboriginal Canadians from 
Canadian Loyalists continues to reverberate throughout the nation.  It originally led to 
exclusion of the Aboriginal people from the political process.604  It has also led to multiple 
succession attempts by French-Canadians—the most recent in 2014—who have not felt a 
part of the nation since 1763.605  At the epicenter of Canadian dissonance is the legacy of 
the vendetta between the French and English empires over the entanglement of religion 
and government.606 The battle for supremacy between political-Catholicism and political-
Anglicanism has arguably affected or infected every overseas territory controlled by either 
empire.  Akin to the American colonial experience, imperial supremacy came by way of the 
systematic integration of imperatives of the POGG doctrine. 
The implementation of POGG in the Canadian colonies—until the point of national 
adoption—was arguably as systematic and problematic as it was in the Ulster and American 
colonies.  Once Canadians willingly embraced POGG as indicative of their constitutional 
identity, its effects created a life-line to the British Empire.  As will be illustrated herein, it 
was neither the association they coveted nor a relationship that advanced a holistic 
outlook for an independent Canada.607 Comparable to the colonists in the American 
colonies, British-Canadians believed that migration to North America was neither a 
downgrade in British social status nor indicative of a desire to be stripped of rights afforded 
them as British subjects living on the mainland.608 According to Buckner, “[e]ven prior to 
Confederation the British population in [British-Canada] increasingly referred to 
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themselves collectively as British-Americans. They saw themselves as provincial Britons, 
claiming on the basis of ethnic descent the right to self-governing institutions similar to 
those possessed by the metropolitan British….”609 The larger impact of this significant 
misalignment of expectations seemingly resulted in Canada needing to distinguish herself 
apart from the British Empire and establish a post-colonial national identity that balances 
her colonial past with her present cultural demography.   
Seymour Lipset points out that “the American Constitution rejected church establishment; 
the Canadian did not.”610 In actuality, the statement appears to be only partially correct.  
Where it pertains Canada’s definitive stance on disestablishment, Ogilvie observes that, 
“compromise and hypocrisy are ingrained in the Canadian soul.”611 Therefore, the 
boundaries of church and state were undefined in Canada until 1982, because “religion 
as well as all other aspects of life in Canada…is under constant negotiation and 
readjustment.”612  As POGG became fully integrated in British-Canada—and the Dominion 
established in 1867—Canada’s constitutional documents did not broach the subject of 
disestablishment.613 Even after the Statute of Westminster was passed in 1931, affording 
Canada a larger stake in her own independence, Canada’s constitutional documents did 
not stipulate the separation of religion and government.614  Thus, Great Britain’s church-
state arrangement figured vicariously in Canada’s approach to religious plurality.  Since 
Elizabeth II serves as the head of state in Canada, her role as supreme governor of the 
Church of England and the defender of the Anglican faith afforded certain assumptions 
regarding religious establishment in Canada.615  In other words, it was presumed that 
Canada’s national religious ideology was Anglicanism by default, with limited exceptions 
associated with Catholic education.616  A practical benefit of the presumption of an 
established church is that it left Canada with the ability to rebut the presumption after 
1982. Canada is now more clearly defining the limits of its ‘accommodationist’ church-
                                                          
609 Phillip Buckner, ‘Introduction: Canada and the British Empire’ in Phillip Buckner (ed), Canada and the 
British Empire (Oxford Scholarship Online 2011) 5. 
610 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada 
(Routledge 1990) xiii. 
611 Ogilvie (n 606), 124. 
612 Ogilvie (n 606), 124. 
613 Ogilvie (n 606), 124. 
614 Government of Canada, ‘The Statute of Westminster, 1931: Giving Canada Its Own Voice’ (Important 
and Commemorative Days, 2017) <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/important-
commemorative-days/anniversary-statute-westminster.html> accessed 1 June 2019. 
615 Lynch (n 245), 155. 
616 Ogilvie (n 606), 125. 
[128]  
 
state arrangement, even though constituting documents assumed the religious regime of 
her colonizer.617   
Comparable to the situation in the United States, multiculturalism has created unforeseen 
challenges to religious plurality in Canada.  This is especially pronounced where it pertains 
immigrants from Muslim-majority nations that do not espouse democracy and/or nations 
where religion and government are so intertwined that they are essentially one.  For some 
who have emigrated from nations with these conditions, there has been an expectation 
that Canadian democracy demands accommodation of the full breadth of political and 
religious preferences from their countries of origin.  Moreover, the expectation is often 
couched such that a rejoinder in the negative is labelled as disenfranchisement or a failure 
“to foster peaceful co-existence built on the principle of tolerance.”618 These are the 
circumstances that Canada’s present approach to disestablishment has attempted to 
balance.  Specifically, Canada’s adoption of its Charter of Rights and Freedoms was an 
attempt to not only establish coalescence amongst the three foundational ethnic groups, 
but also memorialize a national policy on fundamental freedoms—e.g., speech, religion, 
belief, or expression.619  According to Hogg, the “Charter's natural momentum was towards 
centralization because "where guaranteed rights exist, there must be a single national 
rule.”620   
As the POgG clause is also enshrined in Canada’s constitutional documents, it stands to 
reason that any decisions concerning disestablishment that affect the legislative 
competencies outlined in the Constitution Act of 1867 (‘BNA’) must be evaluated in 
relationship thereto.  Amid these conditions, which are unique to Canada, is where 
requests for faith-based legal exceptionalism arguably find themselves, creating a 
conundrum for both the legislature and the judiciary.  For these reasons, Canada’s decision 
to preclude faith-based legal exceptionalism evidences a commitment to safeguarding her 
church-state arrangement and the national rule of law.  More importantly, the decision 
appears to be a reaction to Canada’s foundational ideals and commitments and is 
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demonstrative of a prudent rejoinder for nations that espouse liberal democracy and 
disestablishment.  
To understand why remaining steadfast in the preclusion of faith-based legal 
exceptionalism is the appropriate constitutional response for Canada, it is necessary to 
consider the years leading up to the British Empire’s conquest of British-Canada in 
conjunction with those surrounding the issuance of the 1982 Charter. In Canada’s 
decades-long renegotiation for devolution of power from Great Britain, the nation has 
adopted an approach to disestablishment that appears to avoid the history of 
confrontation between Catholics and Anglicans.  Specifically, her accommodationist 
approach moves away from the first imperative of POGG, thereby absolving Canada of joint 
liability for the effects of faith-based legal exceptionalism associated with the religious 
practices of the British Empire.  
4.2 British-Canadian Compliance & Embracing the POGG Doctrine 
Where POGG was introduced in the American colonial charters by the specific terms, ‘civil 
order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’, the terms adopted in Canadian constituting 
documents were ‘peace, welfare, and good government’ and subsequently ‘peace, order, 
and good government’.  Akin to the American colonies, the collection of documents 
advanced three specific imperatives: (1) the proliferation of Anglicanism (presumptively); 
(2) the establishment of the British monarchial and parliamentary governance paradigm; 
and (3) the extension of British colonial law as legislative and juridical substrates of each 
province.  If the British Empire determined it expedient to confer independence on its 
overseas territory—which did not occur in the American colonies and was arguably only 
partly achieved in British-Canada until 1982—the far-reaching tentacles of the doctrine 
made it politically and legally impracticable to implement an infrastructure that did not 
include remnants of POGG.  Since 1749, this has been the cause of an ever-continuing 
reevaluation of Canada’s national identity. 
From 1749 onward, the machinations associated with POGG continued to suppress the 
colonial structure of existing inhabitants in New France who, although not all indigenous to 
the region, were forced to depart the colonies or acquiesce to marginalization of the pre-
existing social order.  In its place, POGG came to be associated with British Loyalists or 
Tories who migrated to British-Canada directly before, during, or after the American War of 
Independence.  These British refugees were committed to the Empire and the spirit of 
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POGG.621  Thus, it is an unquestionable reality that because of POGG, British-Canada was 
established with three distinct populations: those who were indigenous to the region; those 
who immigrated as colonists under the French flag; and in due course, those who 
emigrated from the American colonies to remain under the British flag.622  Ethnic and 
religious diversity notwithstanding, the British Empire made little notable effort to promote 
coalescence.  Coates notes that “French Canadians had many reasons to feel ambivalent 
about the British Empire…the French settlements in North America faced almost continual 
threat from the British.”623 Thus, it appears that the British simply built POGG’s 
infrastructure around and in some cases on top of the other two populations. This offers 
context for Bumsted’s contention that, “[f]rom 1763, French Canadians have been in the 
world of the British Empire and Commonwealth, but they have not been ‘of’ the British 
Empire.”624     
Contrary to prevailing perspectives on the definitive link between POGG and Canadian 
constitutionalism, John Ralston Saul has attempted to reconstruct the world view of 
Canada as a nation divorced from POGG.  In the text, A Fair Country: Telling Truths about 
Canada, Saul examines the significance of the Aboriginal people of Canada and affords 
them the recognition not often given by the British Empire for contributing to Canada’s 
national identity.  He suggests that Canada is neither the posterchild for POGG nor a people 
steeped in the legacy of the imperatives associated with establishing POGG.625  Saul claims 
that it is the “empire-besotted elite” who suggest that “POGG is the defining motto of the 
Canadian Constitution.”626  He also contends that instead Canada was founded as ‘a Métis 
civilization,’ which despite contentions to the contrary explains Canada’s evolution.627  With 
all due respect to Saul’s challenge to Canadian history, this study considers not only Saul’s 
compelling analysis but also the weight of documentary support, including colonial 
legislation, the BNA, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, subsequent judicial analyses, 
and associated legal studies.  These documents offer a compelling assessment of 
Canada’s domestic and international identity.  The introductory language of §91 of the BNA 
provides: 
                                                          
621 John J Garcia, ‘“ He Hath Ceased to Be a Citizen ”’ (2017) 52 Early American Literature 591, 591-92. 
622 Bumsted (n 361), 43; Garcia (n 621), 591-92. 
623 Colin M Coates, ‘French Canadians’ Ambivalence to the British Empire’ in Phillip Buckner (ed), Canada 
and the British Empire (Oxford University Press (Online) 2011) 181. 
624 Bumsted (n 361), 58. 
625 Saul (n 104), 112. 
626 Saul (n 104), 112. 
627 Saul (n 104), 4. 
[131]  
 
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, 
Order and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not 
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively 
to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not 
so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, 
it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the 
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends 
to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter 
enumerated;…628 
Noteworthy legal scholars such as Richard, MacDonald, Chapnick, Killey, and even Justice 
Bora Laskin, former Chief Justice of Canada, have contributed comprehensive analyses 
concerning the omniscience of POGG in Canada from a domestic and/or international 
perspective.629  As was established in previous chapters, Yusuf has evaluated relevant 
history and substantive theories to explicate the causal link between the breadth and scope 
of POGG in colonial and post-colonial Canadian constitutionalism.  In aggregate, theirs are 
contributions that explain how POGG has been a part of the Canadian identity since shortly 
after the territory was conquered by the British Empire.  They also explain how the 
purposeful inclusion of the POgG clause in Canadian colonial and constitutional documents 
makes it an essential aspect of Canada’s modern national and international outlook.   
From a domestic law perspective, these scholars focus on the effects of POGG by analyzing 
constitutional cases to explicate the POgG clause.  They demonstrate how POGG remains 
central to delineating between legislative competencies (or enumerated powers) of the 
federal government (i.e., Section 91 of the BNA) and the provincial governments (i.e., 
Section 92 of the BNA).630  To varying degrees, each of the aforementioned theorists have 
analyzed the central legal issue of how the POgG clause distinguishes national and 
provincial legislative competencies.  To illustrate, Yusuf, Laskin, and Killey have evaluated 
cases like Russell v. The Queen, Hodge v. The Queen, and Louis Riel v. The Queen ex parte 
Riel as illustrative of judicial decisions that have sought to balance the aforementioned 
powers.  Moreover, they claim that such balancing is sometimes achieved in a manner that 
invites criticism for pitting preservation of the POGG doctrine against upholding judicial 
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competence.631  The collective position taken by these scholars could mean that upholding 
the POgG clause is the appropriate means of achieving judicial competence by continuing 
to further POGG.  Although extensive analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this 
study, each case considers a constitutional question centered on the clause—vis-à-vis the 
Queen’s or federal government’s—residuary powers that may emanate from national 
emergencies, gaps in the law, and/or aspects of lawmaking that may have both 
Dominion/Federal and provincial facets (i.e., the double aspect doctrine), such as the 
legalization of faith-based legal exceptionalism.632   
Theorists also provide support for the inference that because of Canada’s espousal of 
POGG, her present and future identity on the international stage remains one of a middle-
power.633   For the sake of clarity, middle-power nations are those whose role in the larger 
international sphere—especially since the end of the Second World War—lack dominance 
and assertiveness in relation to super-power nations.634 Although a full analysis of 
Canadian ‘middlepowermanship’ is also beyond the scope of this study, scholars allude to 
the fact that this is Canada’s position because of the enduring resolve to remain committed 
to the myth of the perfect kingdom, even when the kingdom had ceased to exist.635 The 
goal of this analysis is not to pass judgment on the way in which POGG has affected the 
governance scheme in Canada.  However, it is fair to say that without a complete 
divorcement, it was unlikely that a different ideology and/or a distinct infrastructure could 
be introduced into any newly independent nation, let alone Canada’s.  According to Harvey, 
POGG brought with it a “history and constitutional development [that could not] be simply 
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wished away.”636 Like the impracticability of getting rid of England’s hereditary monarchy 
and established church, undoing the effects of POGG after such a protracted relationship, 
with all its implications, is a more challenging proposition than “merely…designing a 
constitution from scratch.”637 This explains the necessity of the divorcement between the 
American colonies and the Empire and why the constitutional philosophy of LLPH is 
unquestionably a premeditated act of shedding the remnants of POGG in order to establish 
a clean slate upon which to construct a new nation.638 Thus, a fundamental truth about 
Canada and POGG is that being ideologically constrained by its legacy was inevitable.  
For Canada, the constraints eventually facilitated the power to self-rule and subsequent 
independence. They also left Canada attempting to determine what self-rule and 
independence would entail. Underhill and Chapnick both contend that POGG was a 
consequence of Canada’s historical need to differentiate itself from the United States.639 
According to Chapnick, “[s]ince America declared itself the land of life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness, Canada had to become something else.”640  POGG expediently 
offered ‘something else’.  Even if the POGG doctrine never wholly represented the Canadian 
populous, as Saul claims, it is unquestionable that it represented those who remained loyal 
to the British Empire after the American War of Independence. Likewise, it came to 
represent the indigenous populous who because of their own internal conflicts found it 
expedient to assist those loyal to the British.  By default, it also came to represent those 
who acquiesced when other alternatives were presented.  To appreciate how this dynamic 
informs Canada’s present approach to disestablishment, it is worth reevaluating the two 
prominent imperial forces at work in colonial Canada and how their animosity made 
embracing POGG conceivable. 
4.3 ‘Le Pays des Canadas’: Substitution of Colonizers & Enforcement of Belief  
After the religious wars in France, the proliferation of Catholicism became an 
accompanying aspect of the settlement of New France and French social ordering.641 
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Through the proliferation of Catholicism, a ‘Frenchified’ social order developed.642 Since a 
principal condition of POGG was the proliferation of Anglicanism (which continued to 
perpetuate the British Empire’s crusade against Catholicism), the subjugation of French 
influences not only suppressed the French approach to ‘monarchial’ supremacy and 
French Civil law, but also the religion that the colonists had come to embrace. This suggests 
that the ‘sectarian bitterness’ between the French and British left little room for colonial 
coalescence, which offers a cogent rationale for Canada’s more recent efforts to promote 
cohesion, especially since 1982.643 
Approximately fifty years before the British approached North American shores with 
intensions to colonize, the French and Spanish vied for territorial rights in North America. 
Dickason explains that French colonization of Canadian territory dates back to 1534, when 
the French began occupying large tranches of land that extended from the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico.644  Although colonial charters were issued by the French 
Crown as early as 1588, one of the first charters of record associated with Canadian 
colonization was the 1603 Charter to settle Acadia (Nova Scotia).645 It was granted by 
Henry IV of France to Pierre du Gast, Sieur de Monts, instructing him to:  
people and inhabit the lands, shores, and countries of Acadia, and 
other surrounding areas, stretching from the fortieth parallel to the 
forty-sixth, and there to establish our authority, and otherwise to there 
settle and maintain himself in such a way that our subjects will 
henceforth be able to be received, to frequent, to dwell there, and to 
trade with the savage inhabitants of the said places…646 
The charter afforded du Gast a monopoly on the fur trade and an appointment to the office 
of lieutenant-general “of the coasts, lands and confines of Acadia, Canada and other places 
in New France.”647 In return, du Gast had to populate the territory with 60 colonists a year 
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and establish business enterprises with indigenous inhabitants.648  He was also expected 
to convert the indigenous people to the Protestant faith.649  Analogous to the first British 
charter to establish an American colony, the charter illustrates that evangelism was an 
imperative to French imperial pursuits in North America. 
History reflects that Roman Catholicism became the primary religion in France by 1627.  
Like the pecuniary aspirations of Henry IV, Louis XIII through his chief minister Cardinal de 
Richelieu, issued a charter to Compagnie des Cent-Associés or ‘the Company of 100 
Associates’ to officially settle New France and promote economic viability in the region.650  
According to the Charter, the Company was contracted to settle Canada based on the 
following:   
... tout le pays de la Nouvelle-France, dite Canada », dont le territoire 
s'étend, d'est en ouest, de l'île de Terre-Neuve « jusqu'au Grand lac 
de la mer douce et au-delà », et du sud au nord, de la Floride jusqu'à 
l'Arctique. Parmi les privilèges octroyés par Sa Majesté figure le 
monopole de la traite des fourrures. La compagnie s'engage à établir 
4 000 colons en quinze ans, dont 300 dès la première année.651 
Although available archives do not include the Religiosity clause, Wallace alludes to its 
existence.652  It appears that Catholics and Protestants—i.e., Huguenots—were initially 
meant to have equal access to colonize and evangelize in French-Canada, as a compromise 
resulting from the Religious Civil War that nearly destroyed the French Empire.653 Thus, the 
clause stipulated that New France would be a Catholic settlement, because of fear that 
Catholics and Huguenots could not peaceably co-exist while concurrently colonizing the 
region.654  Instead, the “danger of religious strife in the colony, such as that which had rent 
the mother country with civil war,” resulted in the inclusion of a stipulation that “no 
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colonists should be sent to New France who were not Roman Catholics.”655  Moreover, “this 
position remained in effect during the whole of the period of French rule,” making New 
France “almost exclusively Roman Catholic.”656  
To proliferate Catholicism, Catholic missionaries were dispatched to the colonies of New 
France.  Of note is Jesuit missionary Paul Le Juene, whose journals and letters detail his 
effort to spread Catholicism to the indigenous population of Canada from 1632 onward.657  
According to Micah True, the efforts to establish a colonial society was modeled after South 
American Catholic missions.658  The indigenous inhabitants “were settled in European-style 
permanent villages where life was rigidly ordered around religion.”659  Moreover, the Jesuit 
missionaries “followed the example of their brethren in South America in envisioning the 
colony as a place that would be perfectly ordered and regulated by pious devotion to 
religion, and in which Amerindians could be ‘Frenchified’ and evangelized.”660  Thus the 
colonies evolved into largely homogenous religiously-centered communities. Despite 
homogeneity, the colonists of New France were not immune to the French Civil War or the 
conflicts between the French and British Empires.  Neither the rivalry for territorial and 
religious supremacy nor colonization to aid in the proliferation of Christendom was 
unfamiliar to those who settled in New France.661  The significant difference for the French-
Canadian colonists is that by the time the British took over the region, they already 
espoused a non-Anglican faith as well as the French approach to social ordering.  The 
competing religiously-political perspectives aligned with competing empires was not 
compelling enough to change their views on spirituality or the Frenchified social 
perspectives. That is until the integration of POGG further politicized religion by stripping 
away the socio-legal infrastructure that existed and making Anglicanism a legal condition 
of being a functioning member of British-Canadian society.  
A subtle nuance that offers a distinction between France’s approach to Catholicism and 
colonialism and the British Empire’s imposition of Anglicanism returns to Henry VIII’s break 
with the Church in Rome.  Although the French overtly patronized the Catholic Church and 
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promoted Catholicism in France to the point of civil war, the French Government and the 
Church were not the same infrastructure as it was with the British Empire.662  As has been 
previously established, it was not until the loss of the American colonies that the British 
Empire adopted new tactics to spread Anglicanism.663  These methods included essentially 
those employed by the French—i.e., delegating evangelism to religious societies.664 Carey 
notes that “the rupture created by the loss of the American colonies, [] led, in due course, 
to the creation of the first Anglican colonial dioceses, beginning with Nova Scotia in 1787 
and expanding very slowly to include new dioceses in India, the West Indies, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Jerusalem.”665  Recall that in conjunction with the creation of Anglican 
dioceses, SPCK and SPG were also licensed in the American and Canadian colonies to 
practice “energetic Imperial Anglicanism.”666  These organizations saw that their imperial 
mission was to continue the “rivalry with Roman Catholic France and Spain.”667  As the 
British Empire continued to expand, these ecclesiastical agents adopted the imperial 
mission of rivaling any non-Anglican faith that it encountered.668  Until the time of Great 
Britain’s new approach, France endorsed the Church in Rome, while the British Empire 
encompassed the Church at home.  Schlenther points out that, “[i]n lieu of a bishop, the 
[British Imperial] Governor acted as the effective head of the [Anglican] church, holding the 
right to license, appoint, and dismiss all clergyman.”669  As the American colonial charters 
demonstrate, the tolerance of other Christian denominations fluctuated at the will of the 
Governor appointed by the Crown or Parliament.  A consequence of this situation is that 
there is strict separation between church and religion in France, while Great Britain still 
wrangles with a national religion and church, and the untidy optics associated therewith.  
4.4 The Canadian Colonial Paradigm: Conquest under the 1763 Treaty of Paris 
Britain’s imperial pursuits in North America began and ended with two conflicts that 
occasioned expansion and retrenchment, respectively. The terms of these were 
memorialized by the signing of two treaties in Paris, with a span of twenty years between 
them.  The first Treaty of Paris of 1763 officially ended the protracted conflict between the 
                                                          
662 Alan S Kahan, ‘Religion in France’, Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for 
Democratic Souls (Oxford University Press 2015) 148. 
663 Hilary M Carey, ‘Gladstone, the Colonial Church, and Imperial State’ in Hilary M Carey and John 
Gascoigne (eds), Church and State in Old and New Worlds (BRILL 2011) 156. 
664 Carey (n 663), 156. 
665 Carey (n 663), 156. 
666 Schlenther (n 404), 131-32; See also, Calhoon and Chopra (n 428), 102-03.  
667 Schlenther (n 404), 132. 
668 Schlenther (n 404), 132. 
669 Schlenther (n 404), 132. 
[138]  
 
British and the French.  As is illustrated by Figure 4.1, the political boundaries of the North 
American continent before the 1763 Treaty reflects that the British Empire’s colonial 
territories were split by French-America.  Rupert’s Land under the Hudson Bay Company—
which would later become Manitoba (1870), Alberta (1905), and Saskatchewan (1905)—
was to the north of New France and Louisiana and the thirteen colonies were to the east.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Imperial Transition before/after the 1763 Treaty of Paris670 
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The Seven Years’ War (European theater) and the French and Indian War (American 
territory) were to a large extent part of the cost of building an empire on the backs of 
competing religious dogmas. According to Ward, the war was the “long-expected 
Armageddon between Catholic and Protestant [i.e., Anglican].”671 Accordingly, France and 
Great Britain—with the aid of supplemental belligerents, including the American colonies—
were at war for the better part of seven years.  On 10 February 1763, France, Spain, and 
Great Britain finalized the first Treaty of Paris, effectively ending both wars.672  As is 
illustrated by Figure 4.1, the political boundaries of the North American continent after 
1763 left the British Empire in possession of a large portion of the French Empire’s North 
American portfolio. Although the 1763 Treaty transferred Canada from one empire to 
another, it was not the defining moment that started Canada on its way to becoming the 
defender of POGG.  There were two crucial instances that substantially contributed to 
Canada’s present constitutional character.  One was initiated by the British Empire, and 
the other was the conscious choice made by Canadian colonists.   
4.4.1 Nova Scotian Expulsion—The First Iteration of POGG in British-Canada 
According to Yusuf, one of the earliest references connecting Canada with the POGG 
doctrine was in 1749, which was in “an instrument appointing Edward Cornwallis Governor 
of Nova Scotia by…George II.”673   The instrument conferred on the governor “full power & 
authority, to make, Constitute or Ordain, Laws Statutes & Ordinances for the [Public peace, 
welfare & good Government] of our said province and of the people and inhabitants 
thereof…”674  After almost two centuries of systematic application in the American colonies, 
POGG was indeed a strategic doctrine that would also be the means to colonize the 
Canadian colonies.  Conferral of the POGG power to Governor Cornwallis was undoubtedly 
a continuation of that doctrine notwithstanding what might have been the views of the 
colonists of New France or those who subsequently immigrated to British-Canada thinking 
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themselves an extension of mainland British society.675  Unfortunately, the loss of the 
American colonies did not facilitate an immediate period of reflection concerning imperial 
bureaucracy in achieving POGG, despite those same imperatives being central to Irish and 
American rebellion.  The British Empire would unquestionably employ POGG again and 
again to colonize and Anglicize other overseas territories—e.g., Australia in 1788, India in 
1858, and Nigeria in 1901.676   
In anticipation of usurpation, the British Empire began advancing the first imperative of 
POGG, notwithstanding the degree of religious tolerance purported to exist in British-
Canada in 1749.  As the Empire prepared to establish the Anglican Church in the Canadian 
colonies, the first order of business was establishing an environment for Anglicanism to 
flourish as the national religion.677 To eliminate the need to actually ‘tolerate’ Catholicism 
in Nova Scotia, the Acadian colonists were collectively expelled.678  Expulsion came in two 
waves, in 1755 and 1758, which deported the colonists mostly to other French territories—
like Louisiana—or returned them to France.679  In their place, the British Empire initially 
immigrated 2,600 European Anglicans, which was followed by “substantial immigration of 
English-speaking colonists, both from Britain and New England.”680  Delâge observes that 
the British conquests in Acadia were originally characterized by outrageous plundering.681 
After the occupation was decisive, “the British strove to shape Acadia on the systematic 
mode of social management. It became a matter of ensuring political loyalty, of securing 
conversion from Catholicism to [Anglicanism], and of modifying the integration model 
between colonists and Indians to one of apartheid.”682  In the process, the last two 
imperatives of POGG could be achieved.  Specifically, Governor Cornwallis’ appointment 
brought with it the British monarchial and parliamentary structure, which is analogous to 
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that which Cane ascribes to the American colonial infrastructure as early as 1607.683  
Despite any initial promises made to the French colonists concerning the retention of 
French property rights and Civil law, British-Canada’s ability to self-rule was restricted in 
the same manner as in the American colonies: “the laws and statutes to be so made were 
not to be repugnant to but ‘as near as may be agreeable’ to the laws of Great Britain.”684 
These noteworthy similarities not only evidence the British Empire’s comprehensive 
imperial doctrine for colonization throughout North America, but are also relevant because 
they demonstrate the similar set of circumstances faced by American and Canadian 
colonies at the point of American rebellion.   
4.4.2 The Treaty of 1763—Not a Game-Changer for the Quebecois 
Despite the British Empire’s proliferation of Anglicanism as a condition of POGG, much ado 
has been made about the extraordinary bandwidth afforded French Catholics when the 
British Empire gained New France.685  However, juxtaposition of the terms and outcomes 
of the 1763 Treaty; the 1689 Act of Toleration; and the colonial charters for Maryland and 
Georgia reveals that there was arguably nothing out of the ordinary course of imperial 
business in the Treaty.  The same degree of subterfuge accompanied them all.  It also 
reinforces the premise that the British Empire never saw any other Christian denomination 
as equal to Anglicanism.  Bulman suggests that the British Empire believed that “Anglican 
Christianity was the ideal civil religion,” …offering “peace and virtue on earth, and salvation 
above.”686  As such, there was an apparent comparative/superlative game afoot 
concerning the view that Anglicanism was superior not only to Catholicism but all other non-
Anglican faiths.    
Prima facially, Article IV of the 1763 Treaty afforded protection of the religion of French-
Canadians.687  The Article provided that, “His Britannick Majesty, on his side, agrees to 
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grant the liberty of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will, in 
consequence, give the most precise and most effectual orders, that his new Roman 
Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the 
Romish church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit.”688  However, it was well 
understood that Catholicism was all but illegal throughout Great Britain.689 Thus, the British 
Empire approached Catholicism in the Canadian colonies the same way it did in Ireland 
and the American colonies of Maryland and Georgia.690 Despite the provisions of Article IV, 
the British Empire limited the training and dispatch of Catholic clergy, which effectively shut 
down access to education in Quebec.691  At the time the Treaty was instituted, every level 
of academia in the region was administered by Catholic missionaries and churches.692 
Where it concerned the monarchial and governmental infrastructure, the practical effect of 
the Treaty was that papists were prevented from holding public office in British-Canada.693 
Therefore, the Canadian legislature and judiciary were essentially Anglican enterprises, 
with the bandwidth to create laws that were ‘as near as may be agreeable’ to the laws of 
mainland Britain.694  The groundswell that ended the way POGG affected the American 
colonies and briefly modified its effect in the Canadian colonies was American rebellion. 
 4.4.3 The Quebec Act of 1774—The Carrot/Stick Stratagem? 
Recall from the previous chapter that the mistrust of the British monarchy and Parliament 
spread through the American colonies.  The fissures in the façade of the relationship 
between the colonies and the Crown were fundamentally unrepairable less than a decade 
after the ratification of the 1763 Treaty.  When George III issued his royal proclamation of 
rebellion in August of 1775, authorizing British officers to use their utmost endeavors to 
resist and quash the rebellion, the American colonies were for all intents and purposes lost 
to the British Empire.695  The colonies officially declared their independence in the summer 
of 1776 with an official indictment of George III that was published for the international 
community to take notice.696  As the POGG doctrine was cast-off in favor of LLPH, the 
colonies had begun functioning as a de facto national presence with a Continental 
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Congress acting on their collective behalf.697  It was at this juncture that the trajectory of 
the Canadian colonists might have changed.  The crucial opportunity that gave rise to 
Canada’s commitment to Great Britain and the stringent adoption of POGG has come to be 
known by some theorists as the ‘Great Refusal’.698 Specifically, the U.S. Continental 
Congress broached the subject of unification with the people of Canada as early as 
1774.699 The motivation for the exchange is evidenced by Congressional communiqués 
sent to the people of Quebec in 1774 and 1775 and to British-Canada in 1776.700 The 
objective of the first two missives was to raise awareness of the rights that French-
Quebecois were denied under the 1774 Quebec Act and to gain support for American and 
Canadian independence.701   
For some who claim that the American colonies were disingenuous in their attempts to aid 
the Quebecois, they often buttress their position by pointing to the American colonies’ aid 
in the expulsion of the French from North America during the 1760s.702  Specific attention 
is afforded the fact that Benjamin Franklin favored the British Empire’s usurpation of 
French territory.703  According to excerpts from Franklin’s correspondence, he believed that 
it was in the British Empire’s best interest to remove France from the American continent 
to suppress the prospect of future territorial confrontations.704  This reality 
notwithstanding, the American colonial rebellion apparently precipitated a change in 
circumstances that altered previous perspectives and alliances. As Franklin aided in 
authoring the American Declaration of Independence, it can be inferred that his was one 
of those perspectives that changed.  It can also be inferred that if Franklin understood the 
benefit of expelling the French, he could also appreciate the doggedness of the British 
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imperial engine.  Therefore, it is plausible that Franklin understood that the American 
colonies’ best interest would be served by removing Great Britain—vis-à-vis British-
Canada—from the American continent for the same strategic reasons that it was beneficial 
to remove the French. 
It is well established that the American colonies were heavily involved in the conflicts with 
the French that brought about the 1763 Treaty. Such intimate involvement supports the 
proposition that the colonies were keenly aware of what Voltaire meant when he spoke 
about French-Canada and the relentlessness of the British Empire: 
Great Britain…having already provided [the American colonies] with a 
much larger population, will not tolerate the presence of another 
European power in that area and will relentlessly attack Canada until 
such presence is ousted. Given the enormous disproportion in 
population and material resources between the French and British 
colonies in North America, [and] the impossibility of modifying that 
imbalance in the foreseeable future…[Britain will inevitably prevail 
sooner or later].705 
It has also been demonstrated that the American colonies had intimate knowledge of the 
inner workings of the imperatives of POGG. As has been demonstrated, the constitutional 
phraseology had been reiterated throughout American colonial charters since 1607.  
Mancini and Alden point out that prior to the 1763 Treaty, the only thing keeping the 
American colonies loyal to the British Crown was the threat of invasion by French-
Canadians.706  This is especially the case as the 1763 Treaty reignited issues concerning 
imperial taxation without colonial representation; the colonies right to self-governance; and 
the British Empire’s reiteration of its power to pass any laws over the colonists that it saw 
fit.707  It is reasonable to conclude that just because the American colonies were for the 
British Empire against French-Canada in 1760 does not mean that the colonies would 
remain for the British Empire against the Quebecois when the prospect of independence 
was up for grabs.  If there was ever a time for priorities to shift, this was it.   
Somewhere between 1763 and 1774, the benefit of liberating Canada from Great Britain 
and gaining it as part of an independent America was undoubtedly in the minds of those in 
power in the American colonies. Canadian independence provided the means of removing 
the British Empire’s influence—vis-à-vis the POGG power—from the entire American 
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continent.  As such, the American colonies attempted to align with Canada and lessen the 
likelihood of repeated territorial confrontations as well as attempts by the British to exert 
control over the newly formed United States.708  Similar to the British Loyalists living in the 
American colonies, French- and English-speaking Canadian colonists refused to side with 
the American colonies, because frankly, they did not believe the colonies would prevail.709 
Some scholars suggest that French-Canadians opted to take the ‘wait and see’ approach 
with the expectation of establishing alliances based on the post-war landscape.710 As the 
Loyalists were those who left the American colonies in favor of the British Empire, their 
mass exodus evidenced their choice. 
Recognizing the possibility of losing parts or the whole of British-Canada to the American 
cause, the British Empire issued the Quebec Act of 1774, in which the imperatives of POGG 
play a conspicuous role.  As the Act was repealed almost immediately after the conclusion 
of the War of Independence, it appears to have been little more than a carrot on a stick.  In 
other words, the timing and assurances made by the Act in the grand scheme of things 
were simply too good to be true.  As such, the Quebec Act was most likely a calculated 
attempt to appease French-Canadians while American colonial relations digressed toward 
war.  Nevertheless, there are those who espouse a different narrative.711  In the text, The 
Problem of Quebec: May–June 1774, Peter Thomas contends that the Quebec Act, “was 
not hastily devised as an expedient to prevent the French Catholic inhabitants of Britain's 
newly conquered colony from joining the older settlement colonies of North America in 
rebellion.”712 Attributing the timing to an unusually busy legislative term and a series of 
shifts in Parliamentary leadership and responsibilities related to British North America, 
Thomas opines: 
Before the Boston Tea Party the North ministry had made the decision 
to introduce legislation on Quebec in the Parliamentary session of 
1774. There is no clear evidence that the timing of the measure—its 
introduction at the end of an unexpectedly busy session—was in any 
way motivated by the desire then to retain the loyalty and support of 
Canada in any impending clash with the colonies further south.713 
Instead of being contrivance on the part of the British Empire, Thomas proposes that the 
concessions of the Quebec Act were “statesmanlike provisions” that were “enlightened in 
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the context of contemporary prejudices.”714  In other words, the British turned away from 
its deeply held intolerance of Catholicism and hatred of the French, which prevailed 
throughout the British Empire, to embrace the French-Quebecois.  As it relates to Thomas’ 
contentions, this altruistic gesture represented a new way of thinking in the empire.715  This 
was the case notwithstanding the fact that the British did not pursue a similar course during 
the virtually concurrent settlement of the American colony of Georgia, where religious 
demographics were comparable.716  Accepting Thomas’ perspective as accurate, the 
Quebec Act could be perceived as an excessively magnanimous overture by British 
Parliament and its monarch, George III.   
With all due respect to Thomas’ contentions, the Act undoubtedly represented shrewd 
stratagem instead of a late add to ‘an unexpectedly busy session’.717  This becomes evident 
when the Act is appropriately evaluated in light of the imperatives of POGG and George III’s 
views on his royal prerogative.718 There can be no doubt that the two circumstances—i.e., 
the prospect of Quebecois rebellion and the certainty of American rebellion—contributed to 
Britain’s newly-adopted broadmindedness. The Act came just in time to counter the 
American colonies planned exodus that included encouraging Canadians to consider a joint 
endeavor. Why not tolerate a degree of political inconvenience to mitigate a rebellion that 
would be a short-lived colonial catastrophe? 
Moreover, the British were well aware of the statistics in Quebec.  Article IV of the 1774 Act 
acknowledges that “the Inhabitants whereof amounted, at the Conquest, to above sixty-
five thousand Persons professing the Religion of the Church of Rome.”719  Thomas offers 
a higher estimate, with Catholics in Quebec numbering as high as 150,000, with “only 
about 500 British settlers.”720  The imperial government could not simply treat Quebec as 
it had Nova Scotia; it was unfeasible and would have been a palpable motive for a ‘joinder 
of claims’ in favor of rebellion.  Hence, Articles V and VI expediently gave the French-
Quebecois that which they sought: 
That his Majesty's Subjects, professing the Religion of the Church of 
Rome of and in the said Province of Quebec, may have, hold, and 
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enjoy, the [free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of Rome, 
subject to the King's Supremacy,…]721 
[Provided nevertheless:] That it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his 
Heirs or Successors, to make such Provision out of the rest of the 
said accustomed Dues and Rights, for the Encouragement of the 
Protestant Religion, and for the Maintenance and Support of a 
Protestant Clergy within the said Province.722 
The provisions are analogous in terminology and effect as those employed in relation to 
Ireland as well as those integrated to varying degrees in the thirteen American colonial 
charters.723  They afford a modicum of short-lived autonomy while ensuring not to diminish 
the supremacy of the Church of England, which would be enforced as the national church 
once the full breadth of British control was restored.  Or in this case, the risk of loss had 
passed. 
Like the provisional preservation of denominationalism, the British Empire also agreed to 
preserve the French colonial governmental and legal infrastructure.  Article XII of the Act 
conferred on Quebec a governor and council for colonial administration under French Civil 
law.724  The governor and council were endowed with “Power and Authority to make 
Ordinances for the Peace, Welfare, and good Government, of the said Province, with the 
Consent of his Majesty's Governor, or, in his Absence, of the Lieutenant-governor, or 
Commander in Chief.…”725  However, the most telling bit of the provision is the last four 
words thereof, “for the Time being.”726  Notwithstanding what French colonists understood 
about the British Empire’s laws related to ‘settlement, conquest, or cession’, the Empire 
never intended to honor those commitments beyond a convenient period of time.727  Saul 
observes that colonialism creates an “imaginary special position inside the mythology of 
someone else’s empire.”728  Moreover, he cautions that ‘the special position’ is illusory 
because empires have their own agenda.729  This was arguably the case here. The British 
returned to the business of empire at its earliest opportunity, which conveniently turned 
out to be less than a decade after the 1783 Treaty recognized American independence and 
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gained the United States much of the territory that the French had ceded to the British 
under the 1763 Treaty.730  More importantly, it occurred when the window of opportunity 
for Canadian liberation and independence had sufficiently closed. 
4.4.4 The Prospect of Canadian Independence & the Practicality of Aid 
In evaluating the connection between the 1763 Treaty and the 1774 Quebec Act, there are 
scholars who contend that the religious terms of the Act actually caused American 
rebellion.731  As if Catholic intolerance was a creature of colonial America’s making, 
Metzger submits that, “the toleration granted to Canadian Catholics by the Quebec Act so 
offended religious prejudices in the Protestant colonies and so aroused the colonists 
against the authors of the measure that the act may be classed as a primary cause of the 
[American] Revolution.”732  The issue with this line of reasoning is that it continues to 
advance the distorted perception that American colonists saw Anglicanism as a fellow 
beleaguered denomination of Protestantism.  This misconception allows for an inaccurate 
shift of responsibility for authoring colonial anti-Catholic propaganda from the British 
Empire to the American colonies.  Further, this line of reasoning discounts the aims of 
American independence, which above all else was ‘Liberty’.733   
Anglicanism has often been designated as a sister to or extension of Catholicism because 
the Henrician split from the Catholic Church did little more than fully entangle the British 
monarchy with the Church of England.734  As has been illustrated, the Church of England 
continues to declare historical lineage to the Catholic Church. Moreover, the propagation 
of the Church of England as the established church—and Anglicanism as the established 
religion—in the American colonies was the first imperative of POGG when it was instituted 
there. This was the case notwithstanding the desires of the non-Anglican denominations 
who immigrated to the American continent to put some distance between themselves and 
the British monarchy and the Anglican/Catholic religious vendettas.  In the American 
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colonies, Anglicanism was seen as the ‘ecclesiastical arm of Imperialism,’ and those who 
aided in the imperial mandate were given labels like ‘Anglican Jesuits’ and ‘storm-
troopers’.735  Schlenther highlights the yoke created by Anglicanism, when he implies that 
the British Empire spent decades attempting every means fair and unfair to push 
Anglicanism on American colonies as well as “draw back into the fold those sheep 
whose…forebears had escaped the Church of England in order to seek their own New World 
ecclesiastical pastures.”736  He also contends that from “the non-Anglican perspective, it 
must have seemed as if what their forefathers had fled now threatened them in their 
American haven.”737   
It is convenient to identify Anglicanism as an outgrowth of Protestantism because of the 
timing of Henry’s infamous dissociation with the Church in Rome.  Scholars also appear to 
do so in a lazy attempt to cluster all those who espouse Christianity in one collective belief-
bucket for the purpose of comparison, contrast, and/or scrutiny.  However, it is well-
established that the motives driving the Protestant and Henrician Reformations were not 
synonymous. Catholicism and Anglicanism were often mutually linked as religious 
substructures of the empires that sponsored them—as they continue to be linked today.  As 
such, Protestant dissenters in the American colonies had no more trust in Anglicanism and 
the Church of England than they did in Catholicism and the Church in Rome.   
The former’s reputation predates the American colonial experience, as it was a 
consequence of the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century. Therefore, the pejorative 
perspective of Catholicism is undeniably of British establishment and propagation. The 
latter’s reputation undoubtedly emanates from British Imperialism. It was arguably a 
consequence of the empire’s efforts to utilize the imperatives of POGG as a system of 
colonization.  As has been demonstrated herein, the mutual disdain displayed by the major 
empires that espoused the two faiths—vis-à-vis the French and British Empires—were the 
means of obstructing the development of many of the religious subgroups and 
denominations that established colonies in America.738  At the core of these circumstances 
is the misconception that the American colonies were responsible for authoring anti-
Catholic sentiment in British North America. According to Alden, the American colonies’ 
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condemnation of the religious freedom granted to French-Canadians, which included 
“permit[ing] the Roman Catholic Church to collect tithes,” was demonstrably attributable 
to the fact that it resulted in “discrimination against them…in favor of the inhabitants of 
French-Canada.”739 In other words, the sentiment resulted from the effects of encouraging 
faith-based legal exceptionalism. 
Recall from the previous chapter, the English Crown supported Anglicanism against all 
other denominations represented in the colonies.  It effectively gave societal and legal 
exception to those who espoused Anglicanism. Taken in tandem with the other ‘intolerable’ 
acts that were a part of the Quebec Act, the American colonies took issue with religious 
exceptionalism, which was common to imperial infrastructures and has become a common 
modern response to the promotion of multiculturalism.  Myriad historians suggest that 
there was no love lost between Protestant colonists and the Catholic Church in colonial 
America.740  However, blame shifting has promoted the suggestion that notwithstanding 
the remarkable prospect of liberty and independence, the American colonies so hated 
Catholics that they would go to war with their mother country.  Moreover, the disdain was 
so strong that it made the colonies unwilling to aid or be aided by those who espoused the 
faith.  
The content and context of correspondence to the Canadian people from 1774 to 1776 
offer compelling contradiction to the theory of ‘America’s war on Catholicism’.  Despite 
Great Britain's efforts to mandate colonial communication through imperial channels, the 
Continental Congress sent communiqués directly to the Quebecois after the British Empire 
adopted the Quebec Act in October 1774.741  Moreover, the objectives thereof were known 
to British Parliament, which was well aware that the American colonies hoped to add (at a 
minimum) Quebec as an American state.742  Not only did the 1774 correspondence outline 
the restrictions to colonial rights imposed on the Quebecois under the Quebec Act, but it 
also invited them to join the cause of independence, “not on the small influence of [their] 
single province, but on the consolidated powers of North-America….”743 This initial letter 
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also invited the colonists of Quebec to send delegates “to represent [the] province in the 
continental Congress to be held at Philadelphia on the tenth day of May, 1775.”744   
The 1775 correspondence extended a second petition to unite “in the defence of [their] 
common liberty…”745  As Ferguson observes, “liberty in the eighteenth century was…the 
most cherished right that a people could possess….” “The very definition of liberty,” 
Humphreys notes, “was freedom from arbitrary rule.”746  This was central to the actions 
and reactions of the American colonists.747  As will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter, the American colonies did not believe that Canadian and American common liberty 
was synonymous with common religion.  It was instead synonymous with an idea of 
democracy in a republican form of government and a legal system that was common to 
all.748  This is not dissimilar to the rationale buttressing the need for Common law in 
England instead of the laws arising out of Anglican Ecclesiastical courts.  This idea of one 
law for all—which would also buttress the creation of American Common law—in turn would 
allow for the “most potent voice in religious expression.”749 
Recognizing their similar plight, and fully able to foretell Quebec’s future course, the 
Continental Congress reaffirmed their common political and legal subservience as cause 
for friendship, instead of reduc[ing] [Americans] to the disagreeable necessity of treating 
[Canadians] as enemies.”750  The longstanding colonial condition of the two British 
territories left no doubt of the religious proclivities of the Quebecois.  However, American 
colonists had arguably come to find the pitfalls of colonialism a bit more abhorrent than 
the comparative/superlative trappings of imperial-Catholicism versus imperial-
Anglicanism. Unlike the French and British Empires, the American colonies were not 
seeking to colonize or usurp Canada.  The Congressional missives evidence that—despite 
military tactics that included invading British-Canada as an act against the British Empire—
the American colonies were looking to establish an alliance with their similarly-situated 
sibling.751 Their objective was liberty against Imperialism, which America believed was to 
their mutual benefit.752   
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From a purely pragmatic perspective, there was no practical wisdom in making Catholicism 
a deal-breaker.  If it were, then it is unlikely that the American colonies would have 
attempted to form an alliance with the French of Canada from 1774 to 1776; accept aid 
from France in 1775; or agree to a French-American alliance in 1778.753  It is well 
established that many American colonists were non-Anglican subgroups and 
denominations; however, the correspondence with French-Canadians and the treaty with 
France demonstrate early attempts in the American states to separate religion from 
domestic and foreign policy.  As will be explored more fully in the next chapter, this was 
also the stance of the U.S. Government during its war with the Barbary States (i.e., Morocco, 
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli) from 1786 to 1816.754  Despite efforts by the North African 
states to behave like other empires predicating government action on the recognition of 
national denominational supremacy—in that instance, a denomination of Islam—the United 
States approached the 1796 Treaty of Tripoli as international foreign policy.755  As such, 
the U.S. did not attempt to proliferate or elevate a national belief system or church.   
In the furtherance of colonial liberation, the French and American governments signed the 
Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on February 6, 1778, making 
France the first international realm to recognize the colonies as independent states.756  It 
is well understood that, “the single most important diplomatic success of the [American] 
colonists during the War for Independence was the critical link they forged with France.”757  
Instead of independence, the Canadian colonies opted to remain provincial Britons in 
whatever capacity that could be achieved. However, French-Canadian ambivalence 
subsequently shifted, as American colonial concerns transitioned into Upper and Lower 
Canadian provincial concerns, when the ‘statesmanlike provisions’ that conveyed a 
modicum of autonomy and religious deference were repealed in 1791.758 
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4.5 POGG versus LLPH: The Importance of Remaining British 
France’s constitutional motto was and is styled, ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ or ‘liberty, 
equality, and fraternity’.759 Although not formally adopted as France’s national philosophy 
until after the French Revolution, the ideology was a facet of the rise of the first and second 
French colonial empires as a means of transforming Revolutionary France into a ‘Republic 
of Virtue’.760  As such, the British Canadian colonies effectively proceeded from one colonial 
ideology to another. The transition resulted in the new philosophy of POGG marginalizing 
French influences and people in Canada.  Bourrie suggests that the transition is one from 
which “Quebec is still trying to adapt…[f]or most of their history, the descendants of the 
settlers of New France have fought against the political, cultural and social impact of the 
‘conquest’.”761 After the war for American independence, the Loyalists who charted British-
Canada’s constitutional direction became the most strident supporters of POGG in the 
British Empire, as well as the Commonwealth that was established thereafter. Chapnick 
points out that “[Canadians] chose to stay loyal to Great Britain, and grew proud of that 
loyalty.”762  Therefore, it is evident that despite the transfer of imperial power occasioned 
by the 1763 Treaty of Paris, it was actually the Quebec Act of 1774 that afforded the 
Canadian colonies a choice concerning their constitutional trajectory.  Whether designated 
a colony, dominion, or province, the continuation of the British/Canadian ‘overseas’ 
paradigm, which set Canada on its way to becoming the bastion of POGG, stopped being 
British imperial encroachment and became a preference after 1776.  
Within two years after the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, it is estimated that 35,000 
to 40,000 British Loyalists migrated to British-Canada to retain their place as British 
subjects, identifying strongly with their British heritage.763  This estimate does not account 
for the thousands of Loyalists who initiated their departure as early as 1774, after opting 
to await the war’s end on the mainland or in uncontested territory.764  It also excludes those 
who switched sides mid-stream and joined the British militia encamped throughout the 
region.  Lastly, it discounts ‘late Loyalists,’ who “abandoned the early Republic in response 
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to offers of Canadian land made after 1791.”765  Among other things, the Act included, 
“generous provisions to encourage migration…cheap land, low taxes, and little oversight in 
the way of state authority.”766  Garcia suggests that at least fifteen thousand more 
American citizens defected in the late Loyalist wave between 1791 and 1800.767 
Of those who left before and during the war, there were many whose residence in Canadian 
territory was not meant to be permanent.  They expected to simply return to their homes 
and property in the colonies when the rebellious Patriots were quashed.768  Once they 
realized that they were on the wrong side of history, countless Loyalists were denied reentry 
to the United States.769  Even before affording Loyalists preferential treatment in British-
Canada, the British Empire sought to retain control in the newly-formed American states by 
lobbying post-war exceptionalism for the Loyalists.770  The Empire advocated to restore 
them to their previous status before the war, which included granting them American 
citizenship.771  Just as the negotiations to secure Canada as the fourteenth state were 
futile, so too were appeals for the indemnification of Loyalists.772 The newly formed nation 
was quite aware that accepting the returning Loyalists would result in a repopulation of 
those who remained loyal to the British Empire.773  Moreover, it would have been a means 
to allow the British a foothold in controlling the destiny of her former colonies.  According 
to the text of the preliminary articles of peace for the Treaty of Paris, the British Empire 
requested Congress’ commitment to ‘earnestly recommend’ to American states that they 
hold returning Loyalists harmless for desertion.774 However, the only state that did so in 
earnest was Massachusetts.775 Other states “would not comply immediately, fully, or 
unanimously.”776  Alden notes that “[i]if the Revolution contained an element of Genesis 
for the Patriots, it was Exodus for many of the Loyalists, including both men and women 
who could not safely return to their homes and Tories who preferred to begin life anew 
outside the United States and under the British flag.”777  The mass exoduses and lost rights 
of reentry arguably assisted in establishing Canada as different by degree while the 
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American states moved toward becoming a nation that was different in kind following the 
war.   
Several scholars allude to the fact that British, British-Canadians, and Americans all upheld 
stories about the caliber of men and women who were lost or gained by pre- and post-war 
migration.778  Each nation was guilty of debasing the other in order to promote their own 
national image and elevating their subjects/citizens.  Like references to the myth of 
Britain’s perfect kingdom, the ‘myth’ of superiority of stock was just that, a myth.  Alden 
notes: 
[a]ll the disparate elements in the American colonial population were 
to be found among [the Loyalists], and in much the same proportions, 
with two exceptions. There were Negros among them, but only a few; 
there were Scots [from North Britain] among them, relatively many.... 
[t]he Jews supplied devout Loyalists as well as devout Patriots.779 
Like those original migrants from the British Isles, the Canadian and American colonists 
were also from the same nucleus of common demography. These were overlapping 
societies whose lineage includes a national rebellion against the Roman Empire; consistent 
efforts to retain collective control of the British Isles against outside invaders; as well as 
episodic conflicts between and amongst one another for countrywide recognition and 
equality. The difference was one of perspective on being a part of the British Empire versus 
the perspective of being a free agent able to chart a different course.  One might liken the 
perspective to that which the Irish felt when it separated from Great Britain, or even Great 
Britain’s predecessors felt when Roman-Britain was finally free from the Roman Empire. It 
may even become the perspective that sweeps the United Kingdom when her secession 
from the European Union is finally complete.  Notwithstanding the impediments that may 
transpire moving forward, the ‘possibility of purpose’ was (and is) the thing.   
For those who chose British-Canada, they were assured that as long as the British Empire 
existed, their commitment to it meant that their wagons would be hitched to that imperial 
horse.780  At the time, it was headed toward greatness, while the future of the American 
states was, ‘yet to be determined’.  Loyalists were afforded employment, real property, and 
new homes to build a new life in British-Canada to live as provincial Britons, even though 
there were not seen as such by those on the mainland.781 Christianity—in the general 
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sense—remained the connective tissue between the British Empire and British North 
America. However, it has been established herein that the difficulties inherent in Great 
Britain’s strategies to achieve POGG shifted religious, political, and legal ideologies in both 
the American and Canadian colonial regions.  As has been demonstrated, POGG resulted 
in a shift away from the Empire’s collectivist hierarchical view of social ordering toward a 
more individualist perspective in the American colonies.  Instead of attempting to “preserve 
a historical source of legitimacy [where] government[s] derive[] its title-to-rule from a 
monarchy linked to church establishment,” America sought to “overthrow an oppressive 
state…and create a type of government never seen before.”782  For the Canadian colonies, 
POGG had the opposite effect.  Whether embraced or imposed, POGG became the cement 
for Canadian social ordering under British authority.   
Once Canadians declined the opportunity for independence, the British Empire took the 
necessary legislative steps to memorialize the provinces’ role as subordinate to the British 
Empire.  The Constitutional Act of 1791 repealed the 1774 Quebec Act, instituted the POgG 
clause, and relegated Upper and Lower Canada by adapting each colony’s constitution to 
that of the British Empire.783  According to Hatter, the 1791 Act continued to further the 
imperatives of POGG by shaping the Canadian Government in Great Britain’s image:  
A lieutenant-governor represented the monarchical element of 
government. The Legislative Council, representing the aristocratic 
element, consisted of members appointed by the Crown for life. 
Indeed, in a nod towards the hereditary British House of Lords, the 
Act reserved the right for the Crown to confer hereditary titles on 
members of the Legislative Council. Finally, an elected Legislative 
Assembly, representing the democratic element and mirroring the 
British House of Commons, completed the legislative structure of 
government.784  
The 1791 Act also ensured that English property rights replaced French-Canadian 
‘seigneurial tenure’.785  Likewise, Acts of Parliament established English law, rather than 
French Civil law in all criminal, civil, and property disputes in both English- and French-
speaking regions of Canada.786  ‘For the time being’ effectively elapsed with the integration 
of the legislative and juridical imperatives of POGG.  Hence, Canada was to be “a model 
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British colony—a replica of the mother country—...a Superior, more happy, and more 
polished form of Government than [the republican form] found in the United States….which 
was too flimsy a fabric out of which to fashion a nation.”787 As such, British-Canada was 
well on her way to embracing POGG as the cornerstone of her continued connection to 
retaining Britishness.   
4.6 The Antithesis to The King’s Peace: Canada’s Welfare under POGG 
From 1791 to 1867, the imperatives of POGG continued to be more indicative of the 
direction of British-Canada’s national character.  Along the way, the phrase itself 
transitioned, as the British Empire seemed to have the foresight to distinguish the 
imperial/colonial dynamic between it and the Canadian provinces. Similar to the terms 
used with the American colonies—i.e., civil order—the constitutional phraseology of British-
Canada transitioned from ‘peace, welfare, and good government’ to ‘peace, order, and 
good government’. Numerous Canadian scholars have analyzed the significance of this 
linguistic variation, especially since the term ‘order’ has been used far fewer times than 
‘welfare’ in Canada’s constitutional documents.788 Analyses diverge concerning whether 
the terminologies convey the same meaning.  Considering the strategic nature of the British 
Empire’s application of POGG, it seems highly unlikely that the change was arbitrary or 
meant to yield the same connotations. A noteworthy perspective concerning the dichotomy 
associated with the shift in terminology is addressed in Saul’s text, A Fair Country.  As it 
relates to the one-word substitution, Saul opines: 
[w]hat a difference one word can make.  Peace, Order, and Good 
Government. What could such a phrase possibly mean? This, we are 
told, is our liberté, égalité, fraternité, our life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness.  And if it is boring by comparison, well, so be it.  We are 
a careful, boring lot.  In any case, this is the lot we must struggle 
against while, of course, remaining careful…. 
…the real meaning of welfare over the preceding half-millennium was 
perfectly clear: faring well, well-being, bien-être, being well, fare ye 
well, good fortune, happiness, Bonheur, felicity.  Used by a 
government, this was clear reference to the public good. The public 
weal. The welfare of the people.  The welfare of the state. The welfare 
of the subject, who later became the individual.789  
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Moreover, “the wellbeing of the individual within society” was central to the kingdom when 
kings actually ruled.790 His description appears to be indicative of the concept of the King’s 
Peace.791  For Saul “[t]his was the just King, who wishes his subjects [above all else] to be 
treated justly, who [was] concerned with their welfare.”792   
Saul’s description of the concept of the King’s Peace evokes images of Geoffrey of 
Monmouth’s Arthur Pendragon—the once and future king of Albion—and his idealistic realm 
of Camelot.793  As has been noted in previous chapters, the imposition of POGG is 
seemingly where the King’s Peace or the Peaceable Kingdom and the archetype for empire 
parted ways.  The one-word substitution is arguable illustrative of the imposition of the 
three precise imperatives under a dozen monarchial personalities to achieve that objective. 
Therefore, it is not too far afield to suggest that the change established an imperial/colonial 
dichotomy similar to the one attempted in the American colonies from 1607 to 1776.  As 
has been previously established, a notable similarity between Canadian and American 
colonists is that both believed their wellbeing should be paramount.  However, the 
establishment of ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’ and ‘peace, order, and good 
government’ demonstrate the Empire’s effort to impress upon their colonies a condition of 
an imperial mother country and a collection of colonial daughters.794 However, the Empire 
failed to consider that, “for the colonial power…one day the ‘daughter[s]’ would grow up 
and acquire full independence.”795 Therefore, Great Britain’s plan undoubtedly signifies 
the establishment of colonial order for the benefit of imperial welfare, not necessarily the 
other way around.   
The passage of the BNA in July 1867 and the replacement of welfare with order seemingly 
changed the way Canadians saw themselves.  Saul notes that with the inclusion of order, 
“[their] legal, public description of [themselves], the concept of welfare…had been 
erased.”796  It was at this point—the point of full ideological submission—that the British 
conferred on Canada the limited right of self-rule.  By recognizing the Dominion of Canada—
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i.e., the confederation of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the colonies of Ontario and 
Quebec—Great Britain conceded to an incremental move toward the second aim of 
POGG.797  According to Canadian historians, the move toward Canadian autonomy 
emanated from a number of national concerns, such as “the need for a common defense, 
the desire for a national railroad system, and [the necessity of finding a solution to the 
problem of French and British conflict].”798  One of the most significant reasons for the 
provinces need for autonomy was the havoc that Great Britain’s entangling religion and 
government wreaked on English- and French-Canadian relations.  The contentious political 
environment that continued from the British Empire’s promotion of Anglican social and 
legal exceptionalism is arguably one that has been felt by every British colony, 
notwithstanding the presence of other Christian denominations or non-Christian religious 
subgroups. This is a circumstance that the Canadian people—now fully independent and 
looking to refine their national persona—are left to repair in order to espouse a national 
identity inclusive of the original three ethnicities as well as the rest of its diverse population.  
The effects of Great Britain’s confounding church-state arrangement taken in light of 
Canada’s move out from under its umbrella illustrates the common misconception that 
affording exceptionalism is the proper course for achieving cohesion in multicultural 
landscapes.  As will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters, recent requests for 
Islamic law exceptionalism, and/or suggestions that Islam is the answer to the ills of the 
West, emanate from the same fallacy. Moreover, the legacy of conflict between two 
‘imperialized’ denominations of Christianity in Canada was also the situation in the 
American colonies. The issues associated therewith are what the American Constitutional 
Framers understood about religiosity when they drafted the 1st Amendment.799  The 
conflicts also make clear the inaccuracy of suggestions concerning the innocuous nature 
of faith-based legal platforms, especially those associated with religions that remain 
tethered to present or former empires. These religious infrastructures and those who 
espouse them seem to demand allowances that almost never result in bi-lateral 
acceptance of the beliefs of others.  Therefore, exceptionalism has seemingly become the 
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short-sighted response to ethnic migration in post-colonial settings.  Moreover, it seems to 
discount the possibility that it is discriminatory to the larger populous.  As has been 
demonstrated, exceptionalism has not been proven to be anything more than overtly 
discriminatory.  As will be demonstrated in the final two substantive chapters of this study, 
faith-based legal exceptionalism as a facet of multiculturalism neither promotes equity or 
equality nor achieves cohesion on any level.   
4.7 Even in the Borderlands: The Enduring Effect of the POGG Doctrine 
Despite a persistent connection to Great Britain’s legacy of tethering Anglicanism to the 
functioning of her national government, Canada’s accommodationist church-state 
arrangement has seemingly evolved into sound constitutional policy. It is a policy that has 
yielded a constitutionally prudent response to requests for faith-based legal 
exceptionalism. Moreover, it is a policy that can be effectively replicated while retaining 
constitutional integrity.  In Canada’s case, it “insist[s] on separation of church and state, 
yet retain[s] a posture of benevolent neutrality toward religion.”800 In practice, this policy 
has come to represent a more “secular and privatized” approach to religion, which 
attempts “to treat religion as…[an] individual belief system” whether “grounded in religion 
or in a secular morality [i.e., secularism as religion].”801 In comparison with the United 
States’ separationist church-state arrangement, legal scholars suggest that the differences 
between their underlying perspectives are de minimis.802 This and other similarities have 
continued to fuel considerable debate concerning whether disestablishment as it has been 
approached in the United States influenced Canada’s post-1982 perspective.803 This 
inquiry is especially germane in light of Canada’s recent decision to ban faith-based legal 
exceptionalism, while the United States continues to ruminate over the issue as if her 
foundational history lacks prudent direction.  
When making assessments about Canadian or American approaches to law and politics, 
there is a natural inclination toward comparison. According to Nick Baxter-Moore et al., 
there has been a longstanding debate concerning the distinctness of the two nations 
whose essential cultural attributes and political customs emanate from their common 
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British colonial heritage.804  In their 2018 study focused on Explaining Canada-US 
Difference in Attitudes toward the Role of Government, Baxter-Moore et al. join the ‘lively 
debate’ by evaluating current contrasting hypotheses.  These are centered on the work of 
Seymour Martin Lipset and those who refute his conclusions.805  These studies concern 
the degree to which Canadians and Americans have diverged since the War of American 
Independence.806  Lipset’s text Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the 
United States and Canada starts with the basic proposition: 
Americans do not know but Canadians cannot forget that two 
nations, not one, came out of the American Revolution.  The United 
States is the country of the revolution, Canada of the 
counterrevolution.  These very different formative events set indelible 
marks on the two nations.807   
As a country established as a refuge for counter-revolutionaries, Lipset claims that 
Canada’s values stem from “the nation’s founding constitutional principles of Peace, Order 
and Good Government, while American values are based on the aspirational goals of Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”808 Moreover, he suggests that these constitutional 
principles inform Canadian and American perspectives concerning the impact of religion 
on political perspectives; the manner that law functions in society; and the normalization 
of social stratification, which led to exceptionalism amongst specific subsets of society.809   
Amongst Lipset’s detractors are Edward Grabb et al., who challenge his findings in Defining 
Moments and Recurring Myths: Comparing Canadians and Americans after the American 
Revolution (2000) and Regions Apart: The Four Societies of Canada and the United States 
(2005).  According to Grabb et al., the socio-political value differences in Canada and the 
United States are wholly attributable to the respective cultural outliers—vis-à-vis the 
American South and Francophone Quebec.810  Grabb et al. also suggest that “close 
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examination of the values and attitudes of Americans who do not reside in the South and 
of Canadians outside Quebec fail to turn up significant differences across the Canada-US 
border.”811  In the text Border Culture, the Boundary Between Canada and the United 
States of America, and the Advancement of Borderlands Theory, Victor Konrad and 
Heather Nicol expound on the work of Grabb et al. by assessing whether the ideologies do 
more than have cross-national influence but instead combine to establish an amalgamated 
ideology.812  Konrad and Nicol assert that where it pertains to POGG and LLPH, there is 
actually a convergence of values among citizens of both nations who live closer to the 
Canada-U.S. border and regularly interact.813 
At this theoretical juncture, Baxter-Moore et al. attempt to fine-tune the debate by testing 
the validity of the distinctiveness of Canadian and American socio-political value systems 
concerning both constitutional ideologies.  Sampling Canadian- and American-born 
university students, Baxter-Moore et al. evaluate those living within a 30-mile radius of 
each other in what is considered part of the hinterland of both nations (i.e., universities in 
New York and Ontario closest to the Canada-U.S. border).814  The 771 student-sample (i.e., 
431 Canadian- and 340 American-born students) offers insight into whether living in such 
close proximity and having frequent interaction results in Lipset’s perceived, divergent 
values closing in on each other.815  This question is especially significant where socio-
political perspectives might be shaped less by the legacy of constitutional ideologies, and 
more by the effects of interacting with students in higher education on the other side of the 
border.816  The survey produced by Baxter-Moore et al. covers a broad range of topics 
related to governmental responsibilities, such as hiring minorities and women, 
guaranteeing access to abortion, alleviating homelessness, regulating fire-arms, and 
accommodating customs associated with religious difference.817  The findings concerning 
accommodation of religious difference—and the proper limits thereof—will be taken up in 
the next chapter.  As it relates to Canada’s POGG doctrine, the survey poses five questions 
that are useful in making inferences about the degree to which POGG continues to impact 
the socio-political landscape of modern Canada.  Students were asked the following: 
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 Figure 4.2: Excerpt of International Survey of Attitudes  
on the Role of Government818 
 (1= strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree) 
Q1 It is the responsibility of government to provide for the well-being of all of its 
citizens. 
Q2 It is the responsibility of individuals to take care of themselves and their families. 
Q11 Most of the time, I trust the government of Ottawa/Washington to do what is right. 
Q12 Peace and order are more important than freedom of speech. 
Q13 It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that 
they become disruptive. 
The outcomes of the study demonstrate consistency with a number of Lipset’s contentions. 
Specifically, responses to questions 1 and 2 reveal that “Canadians are more likely than 
Americans to see the role for government in providing for family well-being and less likely 
to see this as an individual responsibility.”819  Where it pertains questions 11 through 13, 
responses allude to the fact that “Canadians in general are much more trustful of their 
federal government than Americans, but they are also more likely than Americans to value 
peace and order more than freedom of speech [a fundamental freedom], and to express a 
preference for living in an orderly society than one that prizes freedom more heavily.”820   
Based on these findings, it can be inferred that notwithstanding Saul’s contentions that 
POGG is the preference of the ‘empire-besotted elite’, the doctrine’s effects are still central 
to Canadian socio-political perspectives.  This is the case notwithstanding whether 
Canadians live and educate themselves in close proximity to Americans.   It would appear 
that the outlooks that came from British loyalty continue to impute to the Canadian 
Government an expectation to provide for the well-being of the Canadian family structure 
in exchange for steadfast loyalty to queen and country.  This also seems to be reminiscent 
of what Saul’s suggests about Canadians’ expectations of POGG before welfare was 
replaced by order.  As the POgG clause of the BNA implies, the Crown and later Parliament 
remains the residual guarantor of peace and civil order throughout the provinces.821  These 
findings also suggest that preservation of the essence of POGG continues to rank higher 
than certain fundamental freedoms in Canada.  The study specifically addresses freedom 
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of speech.822  However, does it also follow that if speech were exchanged with religious 
expression (i.e., not freedom of conscious but acting of those beliefs) a similar outcome 
would result?   
As it relates to Canada’s decision to ban faith-based legal exceptionalism, it appears that 
there is a basis for concluding that achieving the aims of POGG was likely of implicit or 
explicit importance.  Moreover, Canada’s national trajectory is arguably consistent with 
furthering a legislative and juridical framework that promotes values that are ‘common’ to 
all Canadians.  As has been demonstrated in this and the previous chapter, Canada and 
the United States have in common a colonial relationship with the imperatives of POGG as 
well as post-colonial adoption of disestablishment, despite the imperial enforcement of 
Anglicanism.  However, ideological influence by proximity in this instance is not supported.  
In other words, Canada’s decision not to sanction faith-based legal exceptionalism appears 
to have been by Canadians for the benefit of Canadians, which is as it should be when the 
inquiry is one of constitutional significance.  As Canada has returned to her foundational 
roots to assess the question of faith-based legal exceptionalism, a relevant question is 
whether the United States will do the same?  That is, will the United States return to her 
foundational ideals and commitments to address the question of Islamic law 
exceptionalism? 
4.8 Post-Patriation Reconciliation: Bijuralism & the Charter 
It has now been established that Canada’s position on faith-based legal exceptionalism 
was not a restatement of the British Empire’s established church-state arrangement or an 
espousal of the ideology of those living below the Canadian border.  Therefore, it can be 
deduced that Canada’s national policy appropriately endeavors to reconcile the following: 
 The British Empire’s colonial establishment of a religiously, linguistically, and 
ethnically disjointed populous; 
 Relevant legislative competencies enshrined in §§ 91 and 92 of the BNA, which 
would likely necessitate selective augmentation or abrogation to accommodate 
religious law.  This is especially case where certain provisions—e.g., assessing 
interest, marriage and divorce, solemnization of marriage, and property rights—fall 
clearly within the legislative competencies of Federal or provincial governments.823 
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 Relevant provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which afford not only 
freedom of conscience and religion but also gender equality and equal protection 
under the law.824 
As it concerns these aspects of pre-constitutional (i.e., colonial law) and constitutional law, 
there is arguably no occurrence more suitable for consideration than the transfer of full 
sovereignty that brought about Canada’s current legislative and juridical framework.  
Canada’s ‘patriation’ of its constitutional documents from Great Britain in 1982 is the most 
significant achievement in fully relinquishing the last vestiges of the colonial-era POGG 
doctrine.  This is the case even though the POgG clause remains part of Canada’s 
constitution as a means to clarify Canadian federalism—similar to the Tenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, which clarifies “the relationship between Federal and state 
governments.”825  Canada’s history—which has been discussed at length herein—also 
offers explanation for the importance of establishing a central legal framework for all 
Canadians, instead of going down a potentially unconstitutional road of affording exception 
to a subset of her citizenry based on religious proclivities.   
It is well established that Canadian constitutional supremacy was not distinct from that of 
Great Britain until 1982; therefore, Canadian perspectives on democracy, responses to 
religious plurality, and/or judicial interpretations of the separation of religion and 
government were originally inherited from English law.826  Laskin acknowledges that, as 
new provinces were added to British-Canada, “the British Monarch, the British Cabinet, the 
British Parliament and such British courts as the House of Lords and the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council…played major roles in the establishment of Canadian legal 
institutions and in the direction taken by Canadian law.”827  According to Girard, it was not 
until after World War II that the Canadian legislature and judiciary sought to exist beyond 
the shadows of ‘British justice’.828  Laskin further notes that after the war, it was finally 
“possible for the first time to contemplate deviation of Canadian law from British law in all 
its branches.”829  Before patriation, any major changes to Canada’s constitutional law 
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could only be made by British Parliament.830  This made Canadian national sovereignty and 
constitutional supremacy illusory at best.  Moving past the illusion apparently occasioned 
a paradigm shift for Canadian views on law and politics.  This shift was influenced by 
Canadian lawyers and politicians who advocated in favor of distinguishing Canada’s 
political and legal structures from the British model.831  This meant embracing the 
supremacy of Canada’s Constitution as comprehensive indication of Canadian law.832  
Recall that in the process Canada transitioned from Great Britain’s political 
constitutionalist approach of lawmaking toward legal constitutionalism. 
Due to the nature of Canada’s establishment, the shift also necessitated the institution of 
‘bijuralism,’ which is a juridical arrangement exclusive to Canada.  Specifically, there are 
“two legal systems coexist[ing] in Canada, each having their own unique terminology, [civil 
law] in the province of Quebec and [common law] in the other provinces and territories.”833 
According to the Justice Department, Canadian bijuralism is a measure of reconciliation 
from the Quebec Act of 1774: 
[a]s a legacy left by the colonisation of North America by France and 
Great Britain, Canadian bijuralism is an expression of the coexistence 
of the civil law and common law legal traditions in Canada. This 
coexistence found its first formal expression in the [Quebec Act, 
1774].834  
Consequently, Canadian “federal legislation, acts and regulations, must speak to four 
audiences when its provisions deal with private law matters: common law Anglophones, 
civil law Anglophones, common law Francophones, and civil law Francophones."835  As is 
evidenced, the bijural status is neither occasioned by religious preferences, promoting 
religious determinants, nor steeped in Ecclesiastical law.836  Instead, it is a reflection of the 
societal fragmentation that resulted from the British Empire’s implementation of the 
legislative and juridical imperatives of POGG, while assuming that the degree of 
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incompatibility would eventually repair itself in favor of the British imperial way of life.837 
Likewise, Canada’s accommodationist approach to disestablishment in conjunction with 
the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms remain overriding conditions 
of federal law under its bijural framework.838 The practical effect of bijural status is that 
Canada’s constitutional documents endeavor toward “equal treatment before and under 
the law, and equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination…which is 
equally guaranteed to both men and women.”839 All of which are fundamental under 
Canadian federalism and can be limited only as is “justified in a free and democratic 
society.”840  
4.9 The Islamic Inquiry in Canada: POGG in the Post-Colonial Context  
As the United States sought inspiration from other nations and developed a uniquely 
American approach to constitutionalism, so too did Canada. Girard explains that when 
Canada began moving toward legislative and legal autonomy, there was greater interest in 
governmental models of nations other than Great Britain, most notably Scandinavia.841 
One might be inclined to suggest that Canada’s location in the West would result in 
undervaluing the governmental models in Muslim-majority nations, as there is nothing to 
suggest that, when Canada sought to fully devolve from the British Empire, she looked to 
the Middle or Far East for constitutional guidance.  For this reason, it is worth noting that 
there are and were no similarly situated Muslim-majority democratic nations. For the sake 
of clarity, the 2016 iteration of The Economist's Democracy Index identifies Indonesia and 
Turkey as best and worst in the top five Muslim-majority nations espousing democratic 
ideals.842  Neither of these nations were in this position leading up to 1982.843  In 2016 
however, the two nations ranked 48th and 97th, respectively, with 88.1% and 98.6% of the 
population espousing Islam.844  Moreover, both nations were (and continue to be) plagued 
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by sectarian bitterness between Sunni and Shia Muslims, reminiscent of Canada’s 
tumultuous history with Catholicism and Anglicanism.845  This reality is also supported by 
the breadth of scholarly and political discourse focused on whether Western democracy 
and Islam might co-exist at any point.846  By contrast, Canada ranked 6th in terms of a 
stable, liberal democratic government, which advocates disestablishment and equal 
treatment for men and women.847  Therefore, it is reasonable for Canada to look not to 
nations that advocate religion/government entanglement or a return to problematic 
colonial practices.  As such, the proper models were those that are either on par or 
surpassing Canadian performance.  
There are some scholars who advocate for reassessments of Western democracy to 
account for the cultural practices of the nations from which immigrants may hail.848  In 
Canada’s case, this includes Arab, South Asian, and/or West Indian nations.849  In 
response to those who espouse this viewpoint, it is easy enough to contend that the 
statistics speak for themselves.  Instead, this appears to be one of the few instances where 
it is wholly appropriate to respond that Canada is not an Arab, South Asian, and West Indian 
nation.  It is a nation formed by confederation of a collection of provinces established as a 
result of the British Empire’s colonial pursuits on the continent of North America.  It has a 
distinct history that encompasses—and therefore must evaluate—more than post-
nineteenth century migration from Arab, South Asian, and/or West Indian nations.  As 
Canada does not carry the weight of Imperialism that buttresses England’s policies 
concerning faith-based legal exceptionalism, it can be inferred that the decision not to 
sanction a platform for the practice of Islamic law is neither discriminatory nor exclusionary.  
Of course, there may be pockets within Canada’s Islamic community whose responses and 
protests have had the effect of taking issue with the reality that Canadian law affords a 
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broader array of rights than does Islamic law.  Those same pockets may find it appropriate 
to punish those within the community for seeking protection or taking advantage of 
Canadian law, as an affront to the Islamic faith.  However, hyper-magnification of those 
instances is not indicative of an error in Canada’s decision not to sanction Islamic law 
exceptionalism.  Instead, it is a testament to the need for Islamic law reform for Muslims 
living in Muslim-minority nations, which appears to be consistent with the scholarly 
discourse of theorists like An-Na’im and Manea. Likewise, it is instructive in why 
foundational perspectives are integral to constitutional decisions.  Considering these 
factors, Canada’s policy sends a clear message that it is not the role of Government to act 
as gatekeeper or policing agent against the interests of those who aspire to live under the 
tenets of liberal democracy.  Notwithstanding views to the contrary, Canada’s decision is 
recognition of the larger continuum of national progression in the promotion of “a posture 
of benevolent neutrality toward [all] religion.”850   
It is also important to understand that the aforementioned statistics on Turkey and 
Indonesia do not consider the denominations existing within religious subgroups—e.g., 
Sunnis and Shias.  If tribunals were sanctioned, the sectarian bitterness inherent between 
the two largest denominations of Islam might occasion the need for Canada’s government 
to become embroiled in petitions to bifurcate Islamic law tribunals, as each might find their 
religious views worthy of separate adjudicators.  Thereafter, Anglicans and Catholics may 
reassert their desire for government-sponsored Ecclesiastical courts, claiming a pre-
existing constitutional right.  In light of the full breadth of religious plurality, requests for 
extraordinary treatment based on distinctions could continue ad nauseam.  This begs the 
question: Where does it end?   
4.9.1  Legal Exceptionalism Does Not Multiculturalism Make 
Recall that Durham, Ryskamp, and Hirschl collectively distinguish Canada’s church-state 
arrangement as one where there is strict separation of church and state with an emphasis 
on multi-cultural accommodation. As many Muslim-majority nations promote the idea that 
religion and government are indistinguishable, analyses concerning the issues associated 
with Western nations espousing or returning to a similar perspective for the sake of 
inclusion seemingly turn on the possibility of only two outcomes: exceptionalism or 
disenfranchisement. As has been the case with Muslim migration, this dichotomy 
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seemingly prevails notwithstanding how many religious subgroups—including the non-
religious—are required to stand-down so Muslims can achieve exceptionalism.    
Where it pertains multicultural accommodation, Canada’s commitment to POGG has 
seemingly resulted in a line of demarcation that stops exceptionalism at the point of 
embracing non-democratic political ideologies and yielding to the domestic rule of law. 
Specifically, Canada’s rule of law is imputed to not only those ethnicities present at the 
point of establishment but also later ethnic transplants.851  This includes those who 
espouse the Islamic faith.  This reality notwithstanding, the migration of Muslims created 
a recent need to evaluate the constitutionality of Islamic law tribunals functioning in a 
sphere beyond or within the Canadian legislature and judiciary.  The accommodationist 
church-state arrangement that has emerged in Canada since it discontinued relying on the 
constitutional standards of the British set the backdrop for the question of accommodating 
Islamic law exceptionalism.852 Questions concerning Islamic law tribunals initially emerged 
in Ontario.  In 2003, “the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice proposed that Muslims have their 
own tribunals and a parallel legal system–Sharia law–in Ontario.”853   
Gender Equality Advocacy groups backed by Muslim women living in Ontario “argued that 
Sharia tribunals would undermine women’s rights and ‘push back Canadian law by 1,400 
years’.”854  Specifically, Homa Arjomand of the International Campaign Against Sharia 
Court in Canada was quoted in an interview stating that, “…studying the decision of several 
arbitration cases…expose[s] how women are victimised by male-dominated legal decisions 
based on 6th century religion and traditions.”855 Much of the debates—which spread 
throughout the provinces—focused on the repressive circumstances created by application 
of Islamic law in Canada’s democratic landscape.856  The debates centered on the 
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imbalance of power and/or lack of agency that certain members of Islamic communities 
lose under these legal schemes.857  In other words, equality under the law essentially yields 
to patriarchal dominance.  Thus, gender equality becomes essentially non-existent, making 
the voluntary nature of the tribunals illusory.  Several interviews with Muslim women 
affirmed that they would feel unsafe living in Canada if Islamic law were sanctioned.858 
Beyond the concerns specifically focused on women, statistical data on the life choices of 
Muslims lean toward the need for a centralized rule of law.  Recent reports by the Sound 
Vision Foundation suggest that there are approximately 750,000 Muslims living in 
Canada.859  Of those, 32% are single, 59% are legally married, while 3.5% are divorced.860  
Another 2.9% are separated, while 7,540 Muslims are cohabitating or living in domestic 
partnerships (i.e., whether these are hetero- or homo-sexual living arrangements is 
unclear), and 21,145 are single parents.861  If these statistics are to be believed, then the 
subtleties of Muslim life appear to be proportionate with the larger Canadian populous.   
In response to heightened public concern expressed in the media and through groups and 
individuals about the use of Islamic law in arbitrations, former Attorney General Marion 
Boyd was tasked to investigate the prevalence of Islamic law tribunals throughout 
Ontario.862  Boyd’s report recommended that Islamic law tribunals be allowed for the sake 
of judicial expediency.863  The report suggested that there were legal benefits to Canadian 
Muslims being afforded the option to voluntarily submit civil disputes to these religious 
tribunals under the Ontario Arbitration Act.864  However, the report failed to address how 
the body of law that emerged from tribunal decisions would filter into Federal or provincial 
court systems in Canada.865  In line with the custom of following the U.K.’s lead, Canada 
initially moved in the direction of allowing Islamic law tribunals.  Similar to the outcomes in 
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the U.K. discussed in Chapter 2, the report and the decision triggered huge controversy 
concerning equality, judicial oversight, and the separation of government and religion. 
Ontario’s government rejected the recommendation, and Ontario banned all faith-based 
arbitration tribunals in the province.866  Likewise, Quebec’s National Assembly supported 
blocking the use of sharia principles in Quebec courts.867  Other provinces with fewer 
Muslim inhabitants followed Ontario and Quebec’s lead.  Presently, the national legislature 
has effectively rejected the use of Islamic law—or any other religious law—at any 
adjudicatory level, including arbitration.868 
In evaluating the rationale for making Islamic law tribunals illegal, Saul offers insight into 
the 2004 sharia debate in Ontario specifically, but Canada generally.  He notes that the 
debate was over “whether shari’a courts could be created to permit Islamic family 
arbitration in the province.”869  A question, which Saul notes, even divided the Islamic 
community.870  Apparently, not every Muslim resident of Canada was in favor of integrating 
faith-based legal exceptionalism, especially when the practical effect was fewer rights for 
some Muslims without any oversight to correct the discriminatory imbalance.  As a result, 
the tribunals were not perceived as a benefit to multiculturalism; instead, many saw the 
move as “the failure of multiculturalism” in Canada.871  According to Saul: 
[e]ventually, the Ontario government decided that the problem was 
not Sharia courts of arbitration.  Rather, the error lay in the broad 
decision some years before to permit any sort of religious family 
arbitration.  The intention had been good…[b]ut the fall out was worse 
than the advantage gained.  So these arbitration courts were banned 
for all religions.  It had been a decade-long experiment that was 
finally put aside.872  
Saul further notes that after the decision, the provincial government responsible for the 
choice in Ontario was re-elected, “with no signs…of cultural communities or ethnic 
minorities punishing the government for its decision.”873  Moreover, Muslim immigration to 
Canada has increased since Canada’s decision.874  This increase may have ‘everything’ to 
do with the fact that Islamic law exceptionalism is not legally sanctioned. 
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This chapter demonstrates the detrimental toll that sectarian bitterness and Anglican 
exceptionalism took on social interaction during the foundation of Canada. Canadian 
colonial- and post-colonial history appears to be a testament to the interplay between 
exceptionalism and disenfranchisement.  If Canada desires to continue to promote a “free 
and democratic society,” the national government can never forget that its infrastructure 
is not impervious to problems that emanate from being too cavalier toward foundational 
issues in an effort to appease later immigrants to the provinces. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, the United States has been legislatively and judicially slack in this regard.  
This has been to her detriment, and the people who felt overlooked have used the ballot 
box to demonstrate their dissatisfaction.  
As such, Canada appears to be taking the opportunity post-patriation to make clear her 
approach to constitutionalism. In the process, Canada must be cognizant of the fact that 
to again resort to religious exceptionalism as even the most well-meaning answer to 
multiculturalism would undoubtedly be tantamount to democratic regression.  A primary 
question posed during the Islamic law debates focused on: How accommodating Islamic 
law promotes multiculturalism?875  For Western nations that have disentangled religion 
and government, this question is of the utmost significance.  In Canada’s case, the answer 
was (and is): It does not.876  As a nation with colonial ties to Canada, the question must 
also be addressed by her southern sibling.  In light of the pitfalls of colonialism that led to 
rebellion, this question should remain central to any analyses concerning legalizing faith-
based legal exceptionalism in the United States of America.  
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OBSERVATIONS ON HEEDING FOUNDATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE U.S. 
 “[This Constitution], and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ….”877 
***** 
“I’m Irish and you’re German. But what makes us both Americans? Just one 
thing. One. Only one. The rule book. We call it the Constitution, and we agree to 
the rules, and that’s what makes us Americans.”878 
This chapter returns to the Islamic law inquiry in the United States to continue investigating 
the effects of the POGG doctrine to clarify foundational perspectives and to assess the 
prudence of sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism.   Previous chapters establish 
that POGG was instrumental in framing perspectives on faith-based exceptionalism in 
England and Canada.  Specifically, England extended legal exception to Islamic law, which 
is consistent with her colonial-era practices under POGG.  In light of England’s established 
church-state arrangement, the legacy of POGG has been carried forward to reinstitute faith-
based legal exceptionalism notwithstanding how the decision affects the nation’s shared 
values.  Alternatively, Canada prohibited all forms of faith-based legal exceptionalism, 
which appears to be consistent with the nation’s constitutional adoption of POGG as an 
aspect of federalism.  Specifically, Canada’s accommodationist church-state arrangement 
entails heeding her foundation history and continuing to foster a uniform rule of law for all 
of Canada, especially where Charter rights are concerned.  The outcomes in England and 
Canada not only demonstrate the value of grounding such significant constitutional 
decisions in foundational principles, but they also offer justification for the divergent 
outcomes in other Western nations that may or may not find it prudent to sanction Islamic 
law exceptionalism.   
Unlike England and Canada, the United States continues to ruminate over taking a 
definitive stance on Islamic law exceptionalism.  Now that it has been established that 
POGG was also an American colonial phenomenon, this chapter analyzes the present 
situation in the U.S. to highlight how ambivalence has left unresolved certain foundational 
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issues that affect the perspective on religious law being indiscriminately entangled with 
American Common law.  The first issue relates to an undervaluation of what the Framers’ 
understood about Islam when drafting the U.S. Constitution.  The next issue relates to the 
overemphasis on the amalgamative nature of Judeo-Christian denominations when 
evaluating the Framers’ perspectives on disestablishment. These misconceptions are 
arguably consequences of disconnecting the causal link between POGG as a stipulation in 
constituting charters and the establishment of the original American nation-states. By 
attempting to correct the aforementioned misconceptions, this chapter will demonstrate 
how properly framing American colonial perspectives affords the proper basis for legislative 
and judicial consensus concerning faith-based legal exceptionalism in the United States.  
5.1 Consequences of America’s Vacillation on Islamic Law in U.S. Courts 
The U.S. Congress and Supreme Court have had decades to respectively create legislation 
and binding legal precedent that endeavors to maintain the wall of separation between 
religion and government enshrined in the 1st Amendment.  This indicates that they have 
also had decades to rebut any claim that the American legal system is a conduit for 
proliferating Christianity, which also negates the contention that non-Christian immigrants 
should be able to circumvent U.S. law on religious grounds.  It is well understood that both 
branches of government have consistently endeavored toward a uniform rule of law that 
remains distinctly American—vis-à-vis creating legislation and legal precedent that is 
consistent with the U.S. Constitution and not a means to further the political ideologies, 
laws and/or religious objectives of other nations.  Despite these realities and the 
intractable language of the Supremacy Clause and the separationist church-state 
arrangement buttressed by the 1st Amendment, the United States seems to be stymied by 
requests for faith-based legal exceptionalism.879   
This is especially the case for those requests posed by Muslim advocacy groups in favor of 
holding Muslims to different legal standards than the rest of American citizenry.  This 
specific request is based on a claim that Muslims are denied religious liberty in Western 
nations if the Quran and Sunnah are not the primary sources of law in their adjudicative 
matters.880  Central to this claim is the fact that Common law often separates religion and 
                                                          
879 First Amendment to U.S. Constitution. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 





state, where they are considered an inextricable entity in the Muslim context.881 As such, 
the aforementioned branches of government have avoided addressing what Professor Fish 
highlights as the “vexing question of how a liberal state can accommodate citizens whose 
religious commitments require them to be illiberal.”882  Branches of government appear to 
be treating this seminal constitutional question concerning the constancy and supremacy 
of the national rule of law as if its significance is solely attributable to accommodating 
multiculturalism and those negative perceptions of Islam that were exacerbated by 9/11.  
In this instance however, understating the issue’s significance by cloaking it in ‘political 
correctness’ will not make the assessment any less essential to the future of the 
supremacy of the U.S. Constitution or juridical infrastructure.883   
Since 9/11, approximately 32 of 50 U.S. states have put forth legislation with language to 
preclude foreign, international, and/or religious law.884  It appears that the remaining third 
have opted to do nothing, or they have linked Islamic law exceptionalism with forms of 
religious accommodation, such as religious cloaks (abayas), face veils (nicabs), or head-
coverings (hijabs).  As a result of the timing of the requests, some state legislatures’ 
responses to the Islamic law inquiry have been chalked up to conservative radical reactions 
to imaginary threats.885  This is likely attributable to the fact that some state legislatures 
have acted with such singularity of focus on Islam that the judiciousness of furthering 
legitimate aims gets lost in the socio-political squabbling about the legislation’s patent or 
latent promotion of Islamophobia.  This notwithstanding, it seems unlikely that over two-
thirds of U.S. states are over-dramatizing the prospect of integrating bodies of law where 
                                                          
881 Brougher (n 306), 5. 
882 Stanley Fish, ‘Book Review: Dust Jacket’ in Nicholas Adhar, Rex Aroney (ed), Shari’a in the West (Oxford 
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883 George Carlin, When Will Jesus Bring the Pork Chops? (Hyperion 2004) <https://www.goodreads.com/ 
work/quotes/833245-when-will-jesus-bring-the-pork-chops>. Carlin makes a relevant observation 
concerning the way political correctness has become a gag order when questioning the limits of tolerance, 
which has seemingly resulted in the suppression of free speech for the sake of tolerance.  He notes: 
“[p]olitical correctness is America's newest form of intolerance, and it is especially pernicious because it 
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language with strict codes and rigid rules. I'm not sure that's the way to fight discrimination. I'm not sure 
silencing people or forcing them to alter their speech is the best method for solving problems that go much 
deeper than speech.” 
884 Jeremy Grunert, ‘How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Awad v. Ziriax and the Question of Sharia 
Law in America’ (2013) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 695, 695-696. 
885 See e.g., Sarah Topy, ‘Sharia Law in the Sooner State and Beyond: How the First Amendment Impacts 
the Future of Anti-Sharia Statutes’ (2011) 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 617; Uri Friedman, ‘The 
Coming War on “Radical Islam”’ [2016] The Atlantic <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2016/11/ trump-radical-islam/508331/>. Topy brands the concerned caused by Islamic law in 
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the source materials are interpretations of religious texts from divergent belief systems.  
This is particularly significant as the move creates issues with sustaining the supremacy of 
the national rule of law in a nation that, since her international recognition of sovereignty, 
has built a codified body of law attempting to respect the constitutional separation of 
‘church and state’.  
Where it pertains state legislatures’ evaluation of Islamic law, the challenging 
consequences of integrating legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam is a subject that 
has been taken up by political scientists and legal scholars alike.886  Besides the obvious 
issue concerning disestablishment, there is also the fact that the inextricable nature of 
religion and government that describes Islamic law is derived mostly from authoritarian 
regimes.887  As such, it is not too far afield to suggest that any attempts to integrate 
interpretations of Islamic law will not only result in entangling church and state, but it may 
also result in attempts to balance tenets of American democracy with tenets of 
authoritarianism.888 This is evidenced by the Democracy Fund’s recent survey, which 
clarifies that although support for democracy is widespread in the U.S., “notable minorities 
display…fondness for authoritarian approaches.”889  
Moreover, labeling these consequences as an extension of multiculturalism appears to 
foster an imprecise understanding of what is actually occurring. This is demonstrated by 
the perplexing contradiction in making what appears to be unprecedented expansion to 
the limits of the Free Exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution to encompass social 
interactions that are customarily understood as civic in nature.  The aims are manifested 
by attempts to read into the Constitution a basis for circumventing the national rule of law 
                                                          
886 See e.g., Mara Revkin, ‘The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law Deprivatizing Islamic Law : An 
Argument for Judicial Interpretation of Shari ’ a in American Courts’ (2015) 47 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2015.1008840>; Turner and 
Arslan (n 322); Shirish P Chotalia, ‘Arbitration Using Sharia Law in Canada: A Constitutional and Human 
Rights Perspective’ (2006) 15 Constitutional Forum constitutionnel 63; Kimberly Karseboom, ‘Sharia Law 
and America: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts’ 
(2012) 10 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 663; Grunert (n 884); Yaser Ali, ‘Shariah and 
Citizenship - How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America’ [2012] California Law 
Review. Similar to the discussion concerning public veiling, the discussion of Islamic law and sharia, 
constitutionality, and liberal democracy is long on discussion, but short on solutions due to the very 
subjective nature of religious belief.  For this reason, this study attempts to consider the constitutional and 
foundational basis for assessing Islamic law exceptionalism. 
887 Richard Wike and Janell Fetterolf, ‘Liberal Democracy’s Crisis of Confidence’ (2018) 29 Journal of 
Democracy 136, 137 <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/705724>. 
888 Wike and Fetterolf (n 887), 137. 
889 Wike and Fetterolf (n 887), 137; Lee Drutman, Larry Diamond and Joe Goldman, ‘Follow the Leader: 




for certain immigrants to achieve multicultural authenticity.890  As was established at the 
beginning of this study, these ends are beyond what is generally understood as 
multicultural inclusion.  They are also beyond what is understood as conscientious/ 
religious exemptions.  Therefore, they give rise to a valid question of whether this is a move 
toward ‘constitutional amendment by stealth’.891  That is, where certain “political actors 
consciously establish a new democratic practice whose repetition [or normalization] is 
intended to compel their successors [or constituents] into compliance.”892  This is 
especially the case since this kind of exceptionalism associated with voluntary immigration 
appears to be unprecedented in the history of England, Canada, or the United States, 
except under imperialistic mandates associated with conquest or cession.  When 
considered from this perspective, there is legitimate cause for more detailed analysis. 
As it pertains America’s juridical infrastructure, there does not appear to be consensus or 
uniformity concerning Islamic law or the possibility of Islamic law platforms becoming an 
aspect of ADR.  Since the U.S. federal judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from issuing 
advisory opinions, and most state courts avoid them as well, actual cases or controversies 
generally set the floor and ceiling for determining the prudence of engaging with Islamic 
law or sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism.893  Recently, the American Bar Association’s 
(‘ABA’) House of Delegates adopted a resolution opposing “federal and state laws that 
impose blanket prohibitions on consideration or use by courts or arbitration tribunals of 
the entire body of law or doctrine of a particular religion.”894 This is the case 
notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated that it is not averse 
to upholding the supremacy of American law by prohibiting entire bodies of law from any of 
                                                          
890 Scott Milligan, Robert Andersen and Robert Brym, ‘Assessing Variation in Tolerance in 23 Muslim-
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891 Kymlicka (n 34), 97; Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber, Scopes of Religious Exemption (2018) 138 
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the particular nations where this particular religion or—any other religion—is the majority 
belief system.895  Maintaining that the rights enshrined in the U.S. Bill of Rights are beyond 
the vote, the ABA appears to have equated competing religious law platforms or the U.S. 
judiciary’s engagement with religious law with the right of free exercise of religion enshrined 
in the 1st Amendment.896 However, the national debate over the question of 
‘exceptionalism’ suggests that there may be a misalignment between the rights enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights—as are equally applicable—and the exceptions that are claimed by 
some, which appear to be contrary to the Bill of Rights.  
As if to address this national conundrum by installing American lawyers as the backstop for 
policing Islamic law within the U.S. judiciary, the resolution also declares that “American 
courts will not apply Sharia or other rules (real or perceived) that are contrary to our public 
policy, including, for instance, rules that are incompatible with our notions of gender 
equality.”897 The ABA’s resolution notwithstanding, sidestepping this inquiry leaves 
unanswered questions about both branches of government tacitly approving the practice 
of Islamic law via unauthorized Ecclesiastical courts and/or national courts relying on 
religious texts for adjudicative purposes.  As such, both branches have seemingly failed to 
fully scrutinize the national and international implications of America’s vacillation on the 
Islamic law issue.  
The void created by indecision appears to continue to encourage insularity concerning 
Islam instead of ranking it as one of the many U.S. religious subgroups with ideological 
variances.  As has been previously established, an increasing number of legal scholars and 
political scientists are moving toward a consensus that there can be nothing enigmatic 
about Islam as a belief system that makes it fitting, or most importantly, constitutional to 
allow some Muslims—or other religiously conservative citizens—to circumvent the national 
rule of law because of a fondness for authoritarian principles or partiality for certain 
adjudicative outcomes that religious law affords.   In reality, the question regarding faith-
based legal exceptionalism has been answered in whole or in part by the occurrences that 
buttressed the War of Independence and America’s Founding Fathers’ constitutional 
responses thereto.   By returning to that history, a foundational analysis allows for a proper 
                                                          
895 C-SPAN, ‘Scalia & Breyer: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions’ <https://www.c-
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896 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The ABA Resolution cites to Justice 
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reference point when the Constitutional Framers consciously decided to forgo adopting the 
laws of the British Empire, which included denominational and religious law exceptionalism 
as an imperative of the POGG doctrine.   
As was evidenced in previous chapters, POGG “has a long legislative pedigree.”898  When 
first conceived, the associated imperatives were a means to extend the King’s Peace 
throughout English lands.   Recall that by the time it became a British imperial doctrine, 
there were different iterations of the doctrine—vis-à-vis ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet 
government’; ‘peace, welfare & good government’; or ‘peace, order & good government’—
but the imperatives for furthering POGG remained unchanged. Therefore, Yusuf’s 
conception of POGG as a conduit to control and later confer independence on Britain’s 
colonial holdings affected both the American and Canadian colonies but to differing 
degrees.899 The most notable consequence was American colonial rebellion/war, which 
stymied POGG’s application in the American colonies and subsequent states.  It also 
resulted in a redistribution of the colonial migration profile based on allegiances and 
religious proclivities.  Canada became the bastion of POGG, while the United States 
became a champion for religious denominationalism.900   
Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the Constitutional Framers’ commitment to 
disestablishment was not just a response to colonial frustration with British imperial 
control. It was also grounded in setting the historical baseline for religious equilibrium 
amongst the many denominations already co-existing in the United States.  The fact is that 
American rebellion made some form of religious tolerance a foregone conclusion, 
especially since it already existed in the form of the imperial establishment of Anglicanism. 
However, achieving equilibrium was the overriding objective, since it demanded that early 
Americans grasp the importance of not returning to the practice of comparative/superlative 
religious politics by installing another denomination as the national replacement to 
Anglicanism.  This seems to be an under-evaluated aspect of American foundational 
                                                          
898 Yusuf (n 103), 28. 
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900 Steven Waldman, Founding Faith: How Our Founding Fathers Forged a Radical New Approach to 
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history.  As it relates to Islamic law exceptionalism, the practical effects of affording such 
exceptionalism yield comparable outcomes to those that were present at the point of 
colonial rebellion. Put another way, the practical effect is the reestablishment of the 
comparative/superlative dynamic between religious denominations and/or subgroups.  
This is especially the case since requests for exceptionalism are buttressed in part by the 
theory that Islam is in some way exceptional.  This is the case notwithstanding how well-
meaning the theory of affording exception might appear when viewed through the lens of 
multiculturalism.   
5.2 The Guise of Multiculturalism: Legislative & Judicial Interaction with 
 Islamic Law 
In the United States, only about one-third of U.S. states have actually passed legislation in 
response to requests for Islamic law exceptionalism.901 For those that have attempted yet 
failed, noteworthy politically-charged cases such as those involving Muneer Awad, then 
executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations and Paul Ziriax, acting on 
behalf of the Oklahoma State Board of Elections, exemplify specific reasons for failure.  
Where it pertains the juridical aspect of the debate, recent decisions concerning the nature 
of arbitration seemingly tie the hands of national courts to avoid religious agreements that 
are contrary to the national rule of law.902 Despite the ABA’s national declaration 
concerning Islamic law, there is no evidence that U.S. judiciaries have established clear 
guidelines for addressing claims that require judges to refer to or contextualize religious 
texts, while at the same time perpetually upholding the wall of separation between church 
and state.  In other words, there is no consensus of state and federal legislation and no 
clarity on how U.S. judges would or could adjudicate claims while not only preserving the 
doctrine of stare decisis, but also preventing interpretations of the Quran and/or the 
Sunnah from binding the 99% of America’s multicultural population that does not espouse 
Islam.903  
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In the few noteworthy instances where Islamic-centric cases have come before the U.S. 
judiciaries, interpretations of the Quran were relied upon to support the cause of action 
and/or to uphold affirmative defenses and/or substantiate mitigating circumstances.904 In 
addition to illustrating the issues inherent in engaging with Islamic law, these cases also 
demonstrate that faith-based legal exceptionalism affords opportunities for substantiating 
certain petitions that are not equally available to Muslims and non-Muslims.  As will be 
assessed more fully in the next chapter, the imbalance created by legal exceptionalism 
establishes a ‘dormant’ or negative effect on other claimants because of their beliefs, 
whether based in religion or moral secularism. This begs the uncomfortable question of 
how far beyond the scope of foundational perspectives and/or Constitutional principles is 
the United States willing to go under the guise of multiculturalism to ingratiate more insular 
religious proclivities? 
 5.2.1 Islamic Law Incongruity—From the Legislature to the Judiciary  
Although they were dubbed cases about religious discrimination, the Awad cases just as 
easily deserve attention because they demonstrate how post-9/11 trepidation frustrated 
a suitable opportunity to better shape the manner in which state legislatures safeguard 
disestablishment and uphold the supremacy of the rule of law when it is being 
challenged.905  Specifically, the Oklahoma House of Representatives and Senate proposed 
Joint Resolution 1056, which sought to amend the Oklahoma state Constitution.906 
Dubbed the ‘Save our State Amendment,’ the resolution was to be voted on by the citizens 
of Oklahoma in the fall of 2010.  In relevant part, the Amendment provides the following: 
[W]hen exercising their judicial authority [the courts] shall uphold and 
adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the 
Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the 
Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if 
necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the 
                                                          
precedent. “According to the U.S. Supreme Court, stare decisis ‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, 
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to 
the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’…Moreover, proponents argue that the 
predictability afforded by the doctrine helps clarify constitutional rights for the public. Other commentators 
point out that courts and society only realize these benefits when decisions are published and made 
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904 See generally, Center for Security Policy, ‘Shariah in American Courts: The Expanding Incursion of 
Islamic Law in the U.S. Legal System’ (2014). 
905 The Court also left unanswered the question of Equal Protection; however, for the sake of considering 
Original ism, the supremacy of the laws of the United States addresses the issue without need for further 
inquiry. 
906 Save Our State Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), Invalidated by 
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 P.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial 
decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider 
international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection 
shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not 
limited to, cases of first impression.907  
Once the Resolution cleared the House and Senate, the Secretary of State forwarded it to 
the Attorney General for legal review. The Attorney General raised issue with the proposed 
language due to lack of specificity concerning “the definition of either Sharia Law or 
International law.”908  The Attorney General’s revised referendum provides in relevant part:  
This measure amends the State Constitution…It makes courts rely on 
federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from 
considering or using international law. It forbids courts from 
considering or using Sharia Law. International law is also known as 
the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of international 
organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states 
and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also 
deals with some of their relationships with persons. The law of 
nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources 
of international law also include international agreements, as well as 
treaties. Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal 
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.  
SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED?  
FOR THE PROPOSAL — YES___ AGAINST THE PROPOSAL — NO ___909 
The revised referendum was balloted as Oklahoma State Question 755 (‘SQ755’).910  
Approximately 71% of the voting population decisively approved SQ755, which passed on 
November 2, 2010.911  Once the Oklahoma Board of Elections certified the election results, 
SQ755 would become a part of Oklahoma’s state Constitution. The American Civil Liberties 
Union (‘ACLU’) then commenced a civil action on behalf of Awad in the U.S. District Court 
in Oklahoma.912 Awad’s complaint challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment and 
sought to temporarily enjoin the certification of the election results for SQ755.913  
Moreover, Awad alleged that the Amendment violated the Establishment and Free Exercise 
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909 Save Our State Amendment (n 906). 
910 Save Our State Amendment (n 906). 
911 Awad v. Ziriax, et al., 754 Fed. Supp. 2d, 1298 (2010) < https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/awad-v-
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Clauses of the 1st Amendment.914  The Court granted the request for temporary injunction, 
“finding plaintiff Awad had standing [and] the alleged violation of plaintiff Awad's 1st 
Amendment rights constituted irreparable injury….”915  
The Board of Elections appealed the judgment, and the Appellate Court affirmed the District 
Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.  The ACLU amended its original complaint and 
refiled with the District Court in Oklahoma in order to seek a permanent injunction.916  The 
amended complaint added additional claimants—most if not all of whom were Islamic law 
activists.  The complaint also included additional claims. Not only were the Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses implicated, but also the Equal Protection and Supremacy 
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  The enlargement of claims and claimants appears to have 
been a litigatory maneuver to avoid a dismissal based on procedural grounds, particularly 
Awad’s lack of judicial standing.  The maneuver also may have been attempted to set up a 
basis for a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the limits on the free 
exercise of religion in the United States. 
The District Court again determined that the language of the ‘Save Our State Amendment’ 
was facially discriminatory since it was evident that banning Islamic law was the primary 
purpose thereof.  Despite Oklahoma’s claims to the contrary, the Court reasoned that 
Oklahoma legislators added a Sharia law provision allowing courts to consider the law of 
another state of the U.S., only if the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law.917  
By contrast, no similar restriction was added limiting the use of other states’ law where it 
includes international law or the legal guidelines of other nations or cultures.918  As such, 
the Court found it appropriate to permanently enjoin the Election’s Board from certifying 
the results for SQ755, as it was in the interest of upholding an individual’s rights.919 
Consequently, the state of Oklahoma was precluded from modifying its state Constitution 
for the sole purpose of singling out Islamic law.    
Since the commencement of Awad, analyses of the Islamic law inquiry produced legislation 
that can be characterized as: (1) Islamic law specific; (2) the supremacy of American law 
over foreign law and customary practices; and (3) the supremacy of American law over 
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916 754 Fed. Supp. 2d, 1298 (2010) (n 911). 
917 Grunert (n 884), 702-05. 
918 Grunert (n 884), 702-05. 
919 Grunert (n 884), 702-05. 
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international law.920  As it relates to variations in nomenclature, the terms ‘foreign’ and 
‘international’ were used interchangeably in some states.921  However, states also drafted 
legislation that referenced both terms to make distinction between international law and 
foreign law.  Specifically, international law encompasses the ‘law of nations’ as is defined 
by the international legal community.922  Foreign law on the other hand encompassed the 
laws of ‘other’ countries as well as social and religious customs or practices (i.e., customary 
practices).923  It appears that these customs or practices may not rise to the definition of 
law as a codified legal lexicon—like Tort law or the law of Contract—but are steeped in 
tradition and may be loosely designated as ‘law’ so as to elicit a noteworthy place within 
that community of believers—e.g., Mosaic law or Sharia.  To fully appreciate the analytical 
distinction, it is important to understand that the holdings in Awad address category (1) 
only.  
It might seem as if the Awad cases lend support to individual, faith-based choices of law or 
faith-based forum shopping in place of U.S. law—whether through ADR or before a U.S. 
judiciary.  In reality, they appear to do no more than reinforce a long-held legal premise that 
facially discriminatory legislation is an unconstitutional means to target the proclivities of 
any religious subgroup or denomination that may be democratically challenging, yet have 
not been deemed illegal or against public policy.924  However, they do not address whether 
reinforcing the supremacy of state law is problematic if done so in a religiously neutral way, 
vis-à-vis the inclusion of what is tantamount to a neutral ‘state law supremacy clause’. This 
question is particularly relevant when evaluated in light of the fact that the national 
Supremacy Clause achieves similar results at the national and international levels.  As 
there are at least fifteen U.S. states that to some degree succeeded under categories (2) 
and/or (3), the Awad cases do not appear to offer an affirmative response to the question 
of whether Islamic law is a natural extension of free exercise in the U.S. or whether religious 
choice of law in general is a natural extension of the universal right of conscience.  
Although a lesser evaluated but no less significant perspective, the series of cases also 
seem to reinforce what the Framers understood about legally ‘favoring one religion over 
another’, which will undoubtedly have certain effects that are imposed upon all non-
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Muslims.  As will be borne out in the remaining chapters, the collective work of scholars 
like Kymlicka and Wright et al. illustrates that these effects are beyond the general 
understanding of accommodation of multicultural difference.925  Specifically, allowing 
interpretations of the Quran and/or the Sunnah, while disallowing other religious texts to 
act as the source material in ADR and/or adjudication establishes a recognizable 
imbalance that appears to be illustrative of the issue that early Americans raised about 
affording Anglicanism social and legal exception above other denominations.   
This imbalance appears to be exacerbated by the reality that in the same way that Sunnis 
and Shias have established multiple interpretive perspectives on the Quran and Sunnah, 
so too have other faiths, hence the various denominations.926  Therefore, it is essential to 
understand that the Awad cases do not deal with the practical substantive and/or 
procedural circumstances that undoubtedly instigate larger socio-political and socio-legal 
issues.  These issues would likely emanate from America’s long history of legislating and 
litigating toward the separation of church and state only to renege on this foundational 
principle to afford exception to Islamic law (or any other religious law).  This reality may 
explain why the Court declined to address the merits of the claims involving the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Supremacy 
Clause, despite the fact that petitioner’s writ of certiorari addressed each of them.927 
Depending on the religious beliefs and legal claims of subsequent petitioners, these are 
the claims that could prompt a national acknowledgement that Islamic law is inconsistent 
with the Framers’ view of religious liberty or freedom of conscience as well as 
constitutionally impermissible because it encroaches upon the United States’ separationist 
church-state arrangement and by extension the religious liberties of non-Muslims.   
5.2.2   Religious Claims & Defenses from Arbitration to the National Judiciary 
Beyond the constitutional implications emphasized by the Awad cases, allowing 
interpretations of religious texts to buttress judicial decisions or to be incorporated by 
reference in state or federal judiciaries is generally acknowledged to be fraught with issues 
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in light of America’s separationist church-state arrangement.928  Thus, engagement by the 
national judiciary with the Quran and/or the Sunnah as a result of claims originating in 
national courts also appears to give rise to challenging questions of excessive 
entanglement between religion and government.  Although England’s legalization of faith-
based legal platforms as an aspect of the country’s ADR scheme might send a different 
message, it is important to fully distinguish the motivation behind England’s national policy.  
Therefore, the issues concerning excessive entanglement in the United States are 
substantial and are arguably no less challenging when brought about by arbitration instead 
of litigation.  Legal scholars who attempt to explain the legal logistics of Islamic law 
exceptionalism indicate that arbitration statutes would serve as the means by which the 
tribunals are sanctioned. Specifically, tribunals would rely on ‘voluntary’ arbitration, which 
implicates procedural aspects of Contract law as the conduit for affording the parties the 
ability to rely on interpretations of the Quran and/or Sunnah for the substantive legal 
precepts that undergird legal decisions.   
Islamic law skeptics raise issue with the fact that by employing binding arbitration for the 
purpose of reinforcing religious texts, the U.S. Court system is effectively acting as a conduit 
for the violation of rights beyond those that are perceived to emanate from the 1st 
Amendment.929  This is especially the case because this adjudicative method ties the 
hands of the Court to ensure that the decision was fair for all the parties involved.  In the 
Supreme Court’s 2019 holding in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., [17-
1272], Justice Kavanaugh speaking on behalf of a unanimous court made clear that 
arbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce arbitration contracts according 
to their terms.930  Although Schein involves the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) and was not 
specific to religious tribunals, the proposed use of pre-existing state arbitration legislation 
to sanction faith-based legal platforms—which will be more fully addressed in the next 
chapter—makes the Court’s general statements apt for the analysis herein.  Thus, it can be 
inferred that when parties agree to delegate their claims to religious arbitrators, the Court 
may not override the agreement, notwithstanding how steeped in religious ideology the 
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agreement or how vulnerable or lacking in free-will one party may be in comparison to the 
other(s).  This establishes a basis for questioning whether the U.S. Government, by 
sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism, is also sanctioning the promotion of laws that 
are “at odds with the values of modern [American] democracy.”931  
Another issue is that despite the fact that arbitration is meant to be in lieu of litigation, 
arbitrated cases have the propensity to bleed into the national rule of law as a matter of 
course, especially if one of the parties attempts to overturn the decision or when the Court 
attempts to enforce the judgment.932  This circumstance is amplified when considered in 
light of the previous discussion concerning England’s decision to sanction Islamic law 
tribunals (including issues with jurisdictional creep).  The substantive and jurisdictional 
issues faced by Parliament and England’s national judiciary when parties attempt to appeal 
decisions from Islamic law tribunals to the national courts are ongoing, even though parties 
are keenly aware of limitations placed on their claims when they pursue binding religious 
arbitration in lieu of litigation. England’s issues offer a pragmatic foretaste of 
circumstances in the United States, if she followed in England’s footsteps.933  There is every 
probability that claimants in the United States would follow the lead of claimants in England 
with analogous legal suppositions. Thus, religion-centric cases would undoubted find 
themselves knocking at the doors of U.S. courthouses expecting affirmation and/or 
validation of the religion to which they are attached.  This is the case despite the fact that 
England and the United States have notably dissimilar church-state arrangements 
(established-church versus separationist) as well as approaches to constitutionalism 
(political versus legal). Moreover, these foundational differences offer disparate 
constitutional motivators for the rationale and extent to which faith-based legal platforms 
have been appraised. 
Where it pertains U.S. state courts more recent attempts to engage with Islamic law outside 
the constitutional law context, the outcomes have seemingly legitimized the concerns of 
those who see sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism as creating an unfounded right 
of certain religious adherents to avoid adhering to and upholding the law of the land.934 
The 2010 case, S.D. v. M.J.R. illustrates one of the more egregious efforts to rely on Islamic 
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law to circumvent the national rule of law.935  According to the legal transcript, “plaintiff, 
S.D., and defendant, M.J.R., [were] citizens of Morocco and adherents to the Muslim faith. 
They were wed in Morocco in an arranged marriage in 2008, when plaintiff was seventeen 
years old.”936  After relocating to New Jersey for M.J.R.’s employment, he physically abused 
S.D. on three different occasions, which left bruises and also resulted in him having 
nonconsensual sex with her on several occasions.”937  S.D. sought a restraining order 
(‘TRO’) under the state’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to prevent further physical 
abuse.938 
The New Jersey Superior Court found that M.J.R. had violated the statute by physically and 
sexually abusing S.D.; nevertheless, he invoked principles of Islamic law and claimed a 
right to the free exercise of religion to excuse his conduct.939  M.J.R. claimed that ‘his desire 
to have sex when and whether he wanted to, was something that was consistent with his 
[religious] practices and…was something that was not prohibited.”940 Consequently, the 
Court found in favor of M.J.R. citing that, “he believed his conduct was permitted by his 
religion.”941 This case gives rise to a number of pertinent questions. The first is 
substantively comparative: whether the holding would be the same if the claim were 
brought before an Islamic law tribunal?  The second is socio-political: if the holding were 
the same under Islamic law, under what conditions could the U.S. Government rationalize 
the outcome as a valid use of America’s ADR framework or a constitutionally appropriate 
means to promote multiculturalism?  
Although the judgment was ultimately reversed on appeal, the case demonstrates the kinds 
of incongruent claims that have been furthered in the name of religious law as a purported 
indispensable extension of free exercise.  In this specific instance, it creates legal 
precedent that treats the actualization of the sexual desires of Muslim men differently than 
the actualization of the sexual desires of other husbands, domestic partners, or significant 
others in the U.S.  The practical effect is affording a man who espouses Islam a pass for 
the same behavior that would undoubtedly end punitively for a non-Muslim who could not 
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941 ‘S.D. v. M.J.R.’ (n 937). 
[190]  
 
rely on interpretations of Islamic law to mitigate what is tantamount to criminal conduct.942  
Cases such as this also open the door for insular religious subgroups/denominations to 
justify certain behavior by pointing to sections of their religious texts or imported 
interpretations of those texts to justify behavior that would otherwise be objectionable in 
America’s democratic environment.  Accommodating or affording exception to these 
outcomes is a recipe for establishing absurdities within the American rule of law by yielding 
incongruent outcomes as it relates to the rights of those who are non-Muslim in 
establishing legal claims and defenses as well as possible judgments and/or penalties. 
Notwithstanding how many Muslim litigants are willing to subjugate their rights to the will 
of Islamic law, the same cannot be presumed for non-Muslims whose cases might fare 
worse than certain Muslims under the same set of circumstances.   
This case gives rise to the question of whether sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism 
is the proper American constitutional conundrum to establish a basis for not only legislative 
involvement in certain ‘privileges’ secured by the Bill of Rights but also for determining the 
goal of nationally sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism. This is particularly relevant 
since this case demonstrates that there is a disconcertingly unpredictable nature to certain 
religious claims and/or defenses, which creates legitimate concerns about whether 
religious laws are compatible with the aims of American democracy and/or the national 
rule of law.  Since the outcome will affect the scope of all Americans’ equal protection under 
the law and not just those who advocate for adding Islamic law to the American juridical 
framework, it may be disingenuous to haphazardly include Islamic law exceptionalism in 
the category of multiculturalism.  As will be analyzed in more detail herein, multiculturalism 
has encouraged an understatement of certain issues inherent in what Silverman refers to 
as “the U.S. legal system pay[ing] the price of…interacting with faith-based tribunals.”943  
In other words, such engagement risks the destabilization of the supremacy of the national 
rule of law.944  Once that authority is gone, no amount of national hubris or international 
self-aggrandizement will undo the damage.  
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5.3  The Principal Consequence of POGG: The Road to Religious 
 Disestablishment 
There appears to be no evidence that, since the effectuation of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of faith-based legal exceptionalism or 
any other legal platforms operating in contravention of the state and/or federal judiciary. 
This is presumptively because Article VI Section 2 taken in conjunction with the 1st 
Amendment covers the legal landscape concerning the possibility of using the U.S. judiciary 
as a conduit for the dispensation of the laws of other nations and/or cultures, whether 
based in religious denominationalism or secularism.  This is not to say that the United 
States legislature and judiciary have not been confronted with the prospect of considering 
foreign law as a result of national cases involving foreign litigants.945  Examples of these 
circumstances include cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’)—also the 
Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’).946  The ATCA grants U.S. federal courts original jurisdiction over 
civil actions by a foreign national for violations of a U.S. treaty or international law 
notwithstanding where in the world the act was committed.947 The ATCA was originally 
employed to bring claims against individuals for human rights infractions, but it has also 
become the means to bring claims against national or international corporations for 
complicity in environmental crimes.948   
Likewise, the U.S. executive and judiciary have been confronted with the possibility of 
considering international law where it involves commitments that might “delegate 
legislative or adjudicative powers to international bodies created by treaties.”949  In the 
text, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities, Justice Stephen 
Breyer acknowledges that, “American law promises to a significant extent to take content 
from, or to be bound by, certain decisions of foreign or international tribunals.”950  The 
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practical reality is that although U.S. Courts have been alluding to foreign/international 
authority since the nation’s founding, “[the] citations are rare, and [the] effect on the 
outcome [of American cases is] rarer still.”951   According to Frank Easterbrook, citations to 
foreign authority “are just filler, added by law clerks or by the Justices themselves when 
engaged in belt-and-suspenders reasoning.  They do not imply that the cited sources have 
any legal effect.”952  Promises notwithstanding, it is well understood domestically and 
internationally that throughout history all three branches of the U.S. Government have been 
loath to make any promises that have the practical effect of ‘bastardizing’ the Supremacy 
Clause or impeding the American rule of law.   
Where it pertains America’s policy of not citing to foreign or international authorities when 
interpreting the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, it is worth recalling Calabresi’s definition 
of Originalism and Sachs’s discussion of ‘constitutional continuity’ and era of the Founding 
included in Chapter 1.  Specifically, Constitutional supremacy extends from the 
compromise that resolved the power struggle between the central government and 
independent states during the founding era.953  Many of the newly-formed states had 
enacted statutes during the founding that “forbade such citations…to sever ties to the 
colonial power.”954  Thus, America’s prudently-adopted perspective on the importance of 
safeguarding Constitutional supremacy most likely has its genesis in the collective 
compromise necessitated by colonial disdain for Great Britain’s royal prerogative, which 
included the imperial policy of ‘disallowance’.  As was previously demonstrated, the British 
Empire’s royal prerogative encompassed what was essentially an arbitrary claw back 
provision to restrict colonial autonomy.955  It had the practical effect of making the laws 
formed by American colonial governments voidable if they failed to uphold the imperatives 
of POGG.  The American colonists, who represented various religious denominations, 
condemned the application of the prerogative because a primary aspect thereof was 
affording religious and legal exception to Anglicanism.  Moreover, the policy of disallowance 
came to frustrate the reliability and uniformity of rulemaking in the colonies.  Considering 
the Awad cases as well as domestic engagement with Islamic law, a worthwhile question 
is what makes the more recent attempts toward legal exceptionalism under the guise of 
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‘multiculturalism’ any less injurious than was legal exceptionalism under the doctrine of 
‘civil order’ and ‘settled & quiet government’? 
5.3.1 U.S. Constitutional Framers’ Rejection of Faith-Based Legal 
 Exceptionalism  
Despite the tendency to arbitrarily amalgamate and label ‘Christians’ in modern America, 
the fact is that religious diversity is remarkably robust. The same can also be said about 
the religious subgroups and denominations co-existing in the American colonies.  
Therefore, demands for legal exception based on religious proclivities is not a new 
phenomenon; similar expectations were evident as the principle imperative of the POGG 
doctrine.  In the colonial American context however, the issues were brought about by 
imperial force.  Modern America has seemingly rebranded this issue so as to invite it in as 
an expansive view of promoting multicultural inclusion.  As was established in Chapter 2, 
foundational circumstances reflect that this approach to plurality was disruptive to the 
establishment of democratic values and denominational inclusion in colonial America.  The 
disruption created is no less prevalent in America’s modern multicultural climate.   
Many American historians who focus on the events leading up to the American 
Revolutionary War take care in haphazardly supposing that one Christian denomination 
can be interchanged with another, as if the definition of denominationalism is the opposite 
of what it actually is.956  As was also the case in colonial America, hundreds of subgroups 
and denominations in modern America have adherents who are subject to the national rule 
of law notwithstanding how tenuous their connection to Christianity.957  This is especially 
important since religious diversity in America—as well as other Western nations—is based 
on independent, voluntary associations that exist on a sizeable continuum, which moves 
from extreme conservativism to extreme liberalism.  For example, the beliefs of the ‘Plain 
People’ preclude them from partaking of electricity from the national grid or owning 
technological devices, while the United Methodist Church has recently undergone a schism, 
resulting in two denominations, as a result of modern attempts to read into Biblical 
scriptures the practice of ordaining gay/lesbian clergy and performing same-sex 
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weddings.958  The sizeable continuum also demonstrates that Muslims are not the only 
religious devotees who worship in communities that identify with ethnic and/or geographic 
origins—e.g., Dutch Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, or Roman Catholic.  Therefore, American 
colonial history and modern demographics illustrate that it is wholly inappropriate to chuck 
the many Judeo-Christian denominations into one enormous ‘belief-bucket’ for the 
purposes of defending the idea of sanctioning competing extra-constitutional legal 
platforms for certain insular religious subgroups/denominations who see their religious 
views as exceptional. 
Recall that Calabresi points out that advocating in favor of an Originalist evaluation on any 
current constitutional issue means determining whether the Constitutional Framers have 
spoken before current branches of government take steps that might eviscerate aspects 
of the U.S. Constitution.959  To make such an evaluation however, it is often necessary for 
Originalist analyses to include not just the paper-trail but also historical circumstances and 
conditions that led to rebellion and the declaration of independence in 1776.960  Based on 
the totality of those circumstances, it becomes evident that, in regards to religious plurality 
in the U.S., the further away from 1776 America moves, the less it seems to heed the 
disadvantages inherent in faith-based legal exceptionalism versus the inherent benefits of 
disestablishment.  This is especially noteworthy when disestablishment is viewed not 
through America’s current politically distorted lens, but instead through her rear-view 
mirror. From that perspective, it is easier to discern why the Framers concluded that 
disestablishment was the foundation upon which all religious liberty in America should be 
built (and continues to be sustained).  Furthermore, deviation from this constitutional pillar 
is not likely to achieve multicultural inclusion.  Instead, it will likely lead to further individual 
and national polarity as well as possibly renewed threats of state secession.961   
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As to the question of Islamic law tribunals, certain occurrences in America’s foundational 
experience demonstrate that the United States—vis-à-vis the American colonies and early 
states—had already counted the costs of legal exceptionalism.  More importantly, they 
found that the cost was too high as exceptionalism has historically shown to be overtly 
discriminatory and detrimental to efforts to foster religious equilibrium as well as individual 
choice in religiously plural societies.  Moreover, it can be inferred that the Framers’ original 
decisions were aimed at avoiding the risk of future generations taking similar steps, which 
would return the United States to the same problematic position that was experienced by 
the American colonies.  John Ragosta has examined the problems inherent in Anglican-
centric legal exceptionalism during the period leading up to and directly after the American 
Revolutionary War. His work focuses on Virginia and other Anglican strongholds; however, 
the previous analysis of British-America’s colonial charters reveals that many of his 
assertions are generally applicable to the other colonies.   
Ragosta observes that notwithstanding the continued growth of religious denominations in 
the American colonies, “the legal and social dominance of the Church of England was 
unmistakable.”962  The British Empire held firm to imperial-Anglicanism, which had been 
“formed from her cradle under the nursing care of regular government.”963  As British 
imperial hubris made it almost impossible to fathom a win for the American colonies, the 
British imperial strategy in 1776 included “win[ning] the war and establish[ing] the Anglican 
Church even more fully in America, preventing any serious effort to use British protection 
of religious dissent to encourage loyalty.”964  Recall that the religious landscape of the 
American colonies 25 years prior to the war indicated that Anglicanism had been so primed 
and propagated that it was considered the de facto national faith with the Church of 
England as the de facto national church.965  To suggest that Anglicanism would become 
‘more fully established’ can only suggest that it would relinquish de facto status to take on 
de jure status.  Those who remained loyal to the British Empire during the colonial period 
of rebellion and the Revolutionary War were emboldened by the prospect of permanently 
cementing the American iteration of POGG in the newly independent states.966  From the 
Tories and/or Loyalists’ vantage point, they had been in a position to make Anglicanism 
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the established religion in the colonies.967  They also expected to be in the advantageous 
position of fortifying Anglicanism throughout the states after the war.968  Likewise, they 
would be in the position to revoke any war-time rights negotiated between the British 
Empire and the factions of non-Anglican religious dissenters, while at the same time 
vigorously punishing those dissenting rebels for treason.969  
Therefore, to properly understand the legacy and continued significance of America’s 
separationist church-state arrangement, one must understand that it was the many 
denominations of non-Anglican dissenters who recognized how detrimental establishment 
and faith-based legal exceptionalism were to American democracy.  In a letter to James 
Madison, Judge Caleb Wallace—a Scottish-American of the Wallace clan—posed the 
apropos question, “[i]f this [Anglican establishment] is continued, what great advantage 
[was gained] from being independent from Great Britain?”970  In other words, 
establishment and/or exceptionalism were detrimental to the preservation of the 
independence of denominational choice, which is arguably the true epitome of religious 
liberty.971  The dissenters became acutely aware of the fact that the only way to establish 
a common bond of freedom was to avoid trading in one form of exceptionalism for 
another.972   In fact, the formation of that common bond was arguably a direct consequence 
of religious dissenters not falling into the identical comparative/superlative trappings of 
extending legal exception to one denomination over the others.  As such, it can be inferred 
that American perspectives on faith-based legal exceptionalism were not only integral when 
foundational decisions were made, but they also drove Canadian/American disbursement 
of colonial and post-colonial migration patterns.973  In essence, some of those who wanted 
to uphold the imperatives of POGG went north, and some of those who did not became 
Americans.  
As was established in the previous two chapters, the promise of religious equilibrium was 
often an illusory bargaining chip employed by the British Empire to secure loyalty and/or 
evade the possibility of colonial alliances against Imperialism.974  Moreover, the ‘Great 
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Refusal’ was a direct result of the British Empire’s strategic issuance of the Quebec Act of 
1774 to prevent French-Canadians from siding with the American colonies.975 From the 
French-Canadian perspective, the Act afforded religious and legal ‘concessions’ as a 
consequence of the French having possessed Canadian territory from the late 1500s until 
1763.976  From the British imperial perspective, it proved to be little more than a ‘carrot’ to 
ensure that French-Canadians rebuffed American invitations to join the cause of 
independence.  As with the French-Canadians, the hope of religious and legal equilibrium 
was also employed as a bargaining chip in the American colonies.  Specifically, it was used 
as motivation for conscription of the non-Anglican denominations in support of the British 
cause.977  Their numbers came to represent a strategic advantage where it concerned the 
possibility of turning the tides of war.  To put the imperial Anglican/dissenter dichotomy in 
its proper perspective, religious dissenters had been sailing across the Atlantic Ocean since 
1607 seeking religious freedom from imperial-Anglicanism and imperial-Catholicism.  By 
the time the colonies collectively declared independence in 1776—i.e., almost 200 years 
later—the British Empire was still leveraging the ‘prospect’ of religious and legal equilibrium 
amongst the denominations.  Even after the tides of war were turning toward the colonies 
(with the aid of the French), Ragosta and Alden note that imperial representatives 
expended considerable time and energy endeavoring to maintain dissenters’ support for 
post-war British Imperialism, while at the same time, attempting to retain Anglican 
supremacy and preeminence for the Church of England.978 This explains why countless 
religious dissenters embraced the Baptists’ declaration: “[t]hese things granted, we will 
gladly unite with our Brethren of other denominations, and to the utmost of our ability, 
promote the common cause of Freedom.”979  
During the period between the “revolution through the ratification and amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution (1775-1791), the protection of religious liberty, and the proper 
relationship of religion to politics, were of great concern to the Founders.”980  As the United 
States presently engages in moderately antagonistic political debates over sanctioning 
Islamic law exceptionalism, proponents continue to make claims that the infusion of 
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Islamic law into the U.S. juridical framework would be harmless.981  When the Framers’ 
intent is raised as a rebuttal, the Framers’ concerns for the inherent issues with mingling 
religion and government are sometimes downplayed as unwarranted fears.982  This is 
especially evident when some scholars criticize the Framers’ approach to 
disestablishment—vis-à-vis the wall of separation—and their zeal for protecting the 
supremacy of the national rule of law.983  
On the contrary, it seems more plausible that the Framers were guided by the momentous 
impact of charting the direction of America’s future after two hundred years under the 
American iteration of POGG.984  The first paragraph of the first essay of the collection that 
has come to be known as The Federalist Papers illustrates this reality. The Federalist No. 
1 proclaims:  
After a full experience of the insufficiency of the existing federal 
government, you are invited to deliberate upon a new Constitution of 
the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; 
comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence 
of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is 
composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most 
interesting in the world.  It has been frequently remarked, that it 
seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their 
conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good 
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever 
destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and 
force.985 
Although not one of the 85 essays/articles of The Federalist Papers focuses exclusively on 
the centuries of Anglican exceptionalism under the doctrine of ‘civil order’ and ‘settled & 
quiet government’, there can be little doubt that the Framers grasped one overarching fact, 
as they were responding to the pressure of Imperialism.  There was no possible way toward 
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denominational liberty in an environment where one religious denomination is afforded 
exception because it purports to be the answer to the ills of the others.986  
5.3.2 Historical Nexuses & Efforts to Revise the Framers’ Intent  
Broadly defining Multiculturalism also appears to be the basis for reinterpreting certain 
aspects of America’s foundational history to suggest that integrating Islamic law into the 
U.S. legal framework was ‘theoretically’ within the realm of possibilities for early Americans 
and the Constitutional Framers. Relying on interpretations of Thomas Jefferson’s state 
papers, Denise Spellberg’s text, Thomas Jefferson’s Qur’an: Islam and the Founding 
Fathers, invites such an inference while analyzing the Constitutional Framers’ and early 
Americans’ support for Muslims becoming future citizens of the United States.987 In fact, 
one could argue that she establishes a circumstantial thread that might support such a 
conclusion without explicitly defending it. To further the study attempted herein however, 
it is necessary to go beyond mere allusion.  
The survival of Thomas Jefferson’s copy of the Quran, which includes notes in his own 
handwriting, makes his ownership of the text irrefutable. However, Spellberg puts forth 
several other important claims that when evaluated in tandem with the legacy of POGG 
assist in extrapolating whether the Framers would have supported legal exceptionalism in 
the name of Islam.  Most notably, Spellberg indicates that Thomas Jefferson purchased the 
text in 1765, and it “informed his ideas about plurality and religious freedom in the 
founding of America.”988 Jefferson’s ownership of the text also supports Spellberg’s 
assertion that there were noteworthy early Americans who “moved beyond European ideas 
about the toleration of Muslims” and willingly learned about and understood the tenets of 
Islam.989  Moreover, it establishes a basis and timeline for the contention that the Founding 
Fathers were knowledgeable about Islam at the time the Constitution was drafted, debated, 
and ratified.  Jefferson’s investigation of Islam’s religious text creates not only the impetus 
but also the occasion for the Framers to fully debate the likelihood of the United States 
hosting immigrants of various religious dogmas, including Islam. Therefore, they possessed 
requisite knowledge to discern whether the tenets of Islam and/or Islamic law furthered 
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the democratic ideals that they sought to promote in the newly-formed United States.  This 
includes the provisions of the Bill of Rights.990  
Based on the weight of the documentary support however, Jefferson’s ownership of the 
text cannot be construed to mean that the Constitutional Framers would have sanctioned 
integrating Islamic law into the U.S. legal framework.  It seems to suggest quite the 
opposite. In fact, Jefferson’s possession and meticulous study of the text makes it 
reasonable to question whether the Framers saw the imperatives of Islam as too closely 
resembling the imperatives of POGG.  This is especially relevant since POGG was rejected 
by the Framers and early Americans in favor of the foundational ideology of LLPH.  Thomas 
Jefferson’s state papers evidence that a similar question was likely in the forefront of his 
thoughts as he deliberated the future of the United States.991  Specifically, Jefferson had 
occasion to juxtapose Anglicanism and Islam while defending a proposed piece of 
legislation to disestablish the Church of England from the Government of Virginia in 
1776.992  In front of the Virginia House of Delegates, he likened Anglicanism to Islam as 
notably similar religious ideologies that bind religion and government so tightly that they 
frustrate freedom of religious choice, and by extension religious equilibrium.993  
Where it pertains evaluating Jefferson’s perspectives on Islam by today’s politically-correct 
standards, it is too convenient to dismiss them as ill-informed or prejudicial toward those 
who espouse Islam.  However, the fact that the Quran is the source material for Islamic law 
makes it oxymoronic to suggest that Jefferson’s analyses were both ill-informed about 
Islamic law and well-informed about the content of the Quran. Jefferson had more than 
marginal awareness of the fact that many European nations tended toward religious 
regimes, as the American states were barely on the other side of being a part of one.  As a 
consequence of more than a decade of access to his own copy of the Quran, it appears 
that he understood that ‘Mehomitan nations’ tended toward religious regimes as well.  
Therefore, the juxtaposition of the two belief systems demonstrates not only Jefferson’s 
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substantive understanding of the Quran, but also his recognition of how the tenets of Islam 
have a propensity to connote inflexible religious, political, and legal conformity.  
Another point of note is that the aims of Jefferson’s comparison were not to validate or 
discredit the veracity of Islam, thus he was not making a value judgment.994  Instead, he 
was establishing a foundational basis for religious liberty in the newly-established American 
states, after decades of ‘religious toleration’ under British Imperialism.995  This affords an 
explanation for Jefferson’s predication of religious equilibrium on discontinuing the “bloody 
European history of church/state entanglement” as the basis for adopting the Virginia 
statute instead of disparaging Islam or Islamic law.996  According to Spellberg, Jefferson’s 
objective for the comparison was to ensure that non-Anglican denominations never again 
engaged in religious politics associated with religious regimes, which led from legal 
exceptionalism to rebellion to war.997  This was an integral aspect of the Framers’ collective 
rationale for embracing disestablishment, which then came to encompass the possibility 
of citizenry who adhered to Islam or other religious dogmas co-existing in the U.S.998  
According to Spellberg, “[for Jefferson] to include Muslims meant to include every[] one of 
every faith: Jews, Catholics and all others. And to exclude Muslims meant that there would 
be no universal principle…for all believers in America.”999  
It is also important to recognize that not only Jefferson, but all of the 55 delegates who 
took part in the Constitutional Convention were dedicated to addressing the particular 
challenges facing the United States during and beyond their lifetimes.1000  As most of them 
were also involved in British-American colonial rebellion, they understood the importance 
of establishing foundational principles that would endure and direct the new nation into an 
indeterminate future.1001  In preparation for the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Framers reviewed hundreds of publications, treaties, and official papers focused on socio-
legal, socio-political, and philosophical theories of effective governance throughout the 
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known world.1002  Spellberg’s claims concerning the extent to which these early Americans 
considered Islam endorses the plausibility that one such document was Muhammad’s 
Medina Charter. This theory is particularly plausible since the Charter was essentially a 
social contract between Muslims and ‘People of the Book.’1003  The Charter “established 
governing rules for the people of…Medina…and addressed specific social issues of the 
community in an attempt to end the chaos and conflict that had been plaguing the region 
for generations.”1004  To put another way, the charter was essentially a treaty that 
endeavored to address generations of political and legal turmoil caused by Muslims 
commandeering the territory of Medina in the name of Islam and needing to determine the 
treatment of non-Muslims (i.e., Jews and possibly early Christians) who possessed the 
territory first. 
Although there is no evidence of a residual copy labeled Jefferson’s ‘Charter’ in the same 
way that Jefferson’s Quran has survived, nothing about the Framers’ commitment to 
drafting the Constitution suggests that Jefferson would own and study the text in a vacuum, 
while discounting the political ideologies and/or the laws of those who adhered to the 
religion.  The time dedicated and meticulous degree to which he made notes in the margins 
do not support a cursory review.  Spellberg makes clear, “…Jefferson was curious about 
the religion and law of Muslims, and that's…why he bought the Quran.”1005  She and other 
scholars generally agree that Jefferson’s interaction with persons who definitively 
espoused Islam was not until the Barbary conflicts.1006 Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that his evaluation of Islam and Islamic law was purely academic, and it was one 
of the many resources that aided in parsing out the proper direction for the newly-formed 
United States.  This is particularly significant since Spellberg makes clear that [Jefferson] 
had no interest in personally espousing the faith but “was able to separate his principles 
about Muslim religious liberty …from [those] inherited European prejudices about 
Islam.”1007  Therefore, the likelihood that the Framers evaluated the content and context 
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of the Medina Charter prior to drafting the U.S. Constitution has merit.  Moreover, the mere 
possibility of Jefferson accessing the Charter taken in tandem with his definitive evaluation 
of the Quran supports the supposition that the Framers were aware of any aspects of 
Islamic law that may or may not have furthered their aims for religious liberty in the United 
States.   
It is also worth noting that any interaction that the Framers had with the legal precepts of 
the Quran and/or the Medina Charter would have been in a context that seemingly negates 
the need to revisit the topic after every new wave of Muslim migration and every new 
request for faith-based legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam (or any other religious 
dogma). This is also applicable to any former slaves who may have espoused Islam when 
they were naturalized after the Civil War.  Specifically, Jefferson purchased his copy of the 
Quran approximately 20 years prior to the Barbary conflicts.1008 Based on the timing 
between Jefferson’s purchase and the first Maghreb Treaty between the U.S. and Morocco 
in 1786, it stands to reason that any Charter assessment he may have performed occurred 
in a historical context before Muhammad died, which by definition means in its most 
pristine form—i.e., before the politically-motivated schism between Sunnism and Shi’ism.   
Likewise, his evaluation of the Quran would have been in a context before the Framers had 
reason to be inundated with competing posthumous cultural and/or political interpretative 
variations of Islamic jurisprudence that emerged after the Sunni/Shia schism.  It was also 
before the full extent of the war might have skewed or soured the Framers’ 
perspectives.1009  Therefore, it can be surmised that the Framers were cognizant of 
available constitutional alternatives concerning disestablishment. One such alternative 
undoubtedly included taking an overly-expansive approach to scoping free exercise (i.e., by 
continuing to bind religion and government) for the sake of the future hypothetical Muslim 
citizens that they envisioned as well the real Anglicans/Episcopalians who remained within 
their purview.  This alternative notwithstanding, the Framers took up the task of drafting a 
social contract for the United States that included three distinct branches of government 
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and the deliberate disentanglement of religion from each. Considering these factors, it 
would appear that the Framers’ decision concerning faith-based legal exceptionalism for 
disparate religious dogmas was a well-reasoned one. Therefore, faith-based legal 
exceptionalism, whether as the consequence of POGG or a facet of post-colonial 
immigration, does not appear to be in keeping with the Framers’ perspectives on American 
constitutionalism.  
Some of the first treaty commitments that the United States negotiated as a sovereign 
nation afforded the Framers the opportunity to personally interact with representatives of 
the Maghreb nations. As such, early American foreign policy practices also demonstrate 
that the Framers remained resolute in setting a trajectory for the United States that 
attempted to avoid problematic religious politics that are part and parcel of inextricably 
linking religion and government.  Juxtaposition of the peace treaties and/or the ratification 
notes from the Barbary conflicts illustrates the distinction between the Framers’ collective 
view on the future of the church-state arrangement in the U.S. versus that of both England 
(previously discussed) and the Muslim-majority nations.  The treaty between the United 
States and Morocco, dated 1786, is illustrative of the relationship between religion and 
government that defined U.S. negotiations with the Maghreb nations, whose governments 
were indivisible facets of a denomination or sect of Islam.  These negotiations also appear 
to have further shaped the Framers’ commitment to disestablishment.  The Treaty’s seal 
and introductory remarks were distinguished as follows: 
The inner circle of the seal contains the name “Muhammad, son of 
Abdallah, son of Isma'il, God is his protector and his Lord.” The border 
of the seal contains the verse taken from the well-known poem in 
praise of the Prophet, called the Burdah, which verse occurs in 
several other seals of these North African documents: “He who takes 
the Apostle of God for his helper, if the lions encounter him in their 
jungles, they will withdraw.”1010 
Likewise, Hunter Miller’s negotiation notes demonstrate that although the Muslim nations 
were willing to establish treaties with ‘infidels’, asserting the supremacy of the Islamic 
belief system was a palpable aspect of those negotiations.1011  According to Miller’s notes, 
the seal read, “To the Great One of the American States…the President…Peace be on those 
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who follow the right guidance [i.e., the Mohammedan religion]!...”1012 Likewise, “The Great 
One of…is the title by which infidel rulers are addressed in letters from the Prophet. The 
greeting formula, ‘Peace be on those who follow the right guide,’ is the classical one to 
unbelievers, implying that they are not worth greeting.”1013  When this provision as well as 
the interpretative notes are evaluated in light of the myriad colonial charters issued on 
behalf of the British Empire, a common thread emerges.  Furthermore, juxtaposition of 
earlier charters and the treaties of the Muslim-majority nations with Article XI of the 1796 
Treaty with Tripoli, the Framers’ adoption of a different perspective on establishing the 
United States as a religious regime becomes unmistakable:   
[a]s the [government] of the United States of America is not in any 
sense founded on the Christian Religion,-as it has in itself no 
character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of 
Musselmen,-and as the said States never have entered into any war 
or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the 
parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever 
produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two 
countries.1014 
It is worth clarifying that this provision is not meant to suggest that Christianity in the 
holistic sense was not an important aspect of the lives of early Americans.  It is well 
understood that it was. However, one is not predicated on the other.  If it were, then the 
Framers’ attempt to promote religious equilibrium would have been for naught.  It is well 
understood that there is a remarkable distinction between nations that endeavor toward 
disestablishment while recognizing the significance of individual belief or dedication to 
one’s faith, and those that allocate a constitutional role for their preferred religious 
denomination by declaring that the nation—e.g., every Islamic state—or the national 
government—e.g., Great Britain—is an establishment in furtherance or proliferation of that 
particular religious dogma. Herein however, it is evident that the U.S. Government 
recognized that it was not a conduit for the proliferation of any religious denomination to 
uphold the sacrosanctity of the countless denominations that were already co-existing in 
America.   
At this point in history, the American colonies had recently been an extension of an empire 
that was an instrument of Anglicanism; therefore, making remarkable legal and linguistic 
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distinctions had the effect of setting precedent for religious equilibrium amongst the many 
discrete religious denominations in the newly established states.  It also repudiated the 
practice of basing international foreign policy on the proliferation of a particular 
denominational perspective, as had been the practice of the British Empire and the 
Barbary states.  Distinctions such as this appear to have achieved their desired result, as 
the U.S. Government does not and has not ever upheld a national church or religious 
denomination.  Moreover, the question of affording exceptional treatment to one 
denomination over the others seems to have been settled once the Anglicans 
reestablished themselves as Episcopalians to separate the religion from the government 
that fashioned it.1015  Returning to Jefferson’s 1776 comparison of Anglicanism and Islam, 
it appears that it was ripe for that time and under those circumstances, without being 
unduly critical of the rigid alignment of religion and government that is often identified with 
Islamic law and the national governments that espouse it.1016  As is demonstrated by the 
current continuation of academic and legal discourse focused on the same aspects of 
Islam that the Framers originally questioned, the comparison seemingly remains ripe 
during this time and under these circumstances.  A reasonable follow-up question is why 
would the Framers be in support of the modern U.S. Government—notwithstanding whether 
there’s a Democratic or Republican majority—affording legal exceptionalism to Islamic law 
now? 
5.3.3  The Scope of ‘Free Exercise’—The Early American Interpretation 
Recall that the degree to which the question of faith-based legal exceptionalism has been 
addressed in England has included both the British Empire asserting a right to 
exceptionalism, which in turn has created an obligation to cut non-Anglican faiths a wide 
berth as it relates to their requests for exceptionalism.  Where it pertains Canada and the 
United States, there is a scarcity of scholarly research on post-colonial faith-based legal 
exceptionalism. This appears to be attributable to the fact that both nations are 
constitutionally bound to disestablishment. As Canada has already established a 
prohibitive policy concerning all forms of faith-based legal exceptionalism, the United 
States’ similar commitment to disestablishment creates a reasonable question concerning 
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why she continues to wrangle with whether to take unprecedented steps to further expand 
the Free Exercise clause for this purpose.  America’s vacillation also makes germane the 
question of how the Framers and early Americans construed ‘free exercise’ of religion.  
Most of the pertinent scholarly research concerning the Constitutional Framers’ outlook on 
the Free Exercise clause of the 1st Amendment appears to fall within two distinctive 
categories.  The first focuses on whether the Framers intended that the Free Exercise and 
Establishment clauses should define a constitutional right upon which individuals could 
rely to seek redress, or whether it was intended to set up the procedural limits for religious 
regulation amongst the states.  Although a full exegesis of the first category is beyond the 
scope of this study, a general overview will aid in framing the second category. 
Constitutional theorist Steven D. Smith was the first to “raise and frame the question of 
whether the religious clauses were originally meant to express a principled position on the 
proper relationship between government and religion.”1017 Labelling his opposing 
perspectives as ‘substantive’ (a principle or theory of religious liberty) and ‘jurisdictional’ 
(a designation of jurisdiction to the states), Smith contends that the “religion clauses were 
not originally intended to approve any principle or right of religious freedom…[instead, 
they]…were purely jurisdictional in nature; they were intended to do nothing more than 
confirm that authority over questions of religion remained with the states.”1018  In other 
words, the clauses were “not a guarantee of religious freedom but a jurisdictional 
prohibition against the federal government enacting laws regarding religion, reserving to 
the states the right to legislate as they please.”1019  
There are undoubtedly academics who embrace Smith’s theory; however, Professor Ellis 
West offers another point of view that he labels the ‘normative perspective’.1020  In 
actuality, the theory reconceptualizes Smith’s use of the term ‘substantive’ to distinguish 
between the perception of religious liberty as a fundamental versus constitutional right.1021 
In the text, The Religious Clauses of the First Amendment: Guarantee of States’ Rights?, 
West explains: 
[m]any Americans believe that religious liberty is a natural right that 
all humans possess and that should not be violated by any 
government.  Therefore, it can logically be argued that the crucial 
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issue raised by…Smith…is [not whether the clause is a principle or 
theory of religious liberty, but] whether the religion clauses were 
intended to protect natural rights of individuals or the rights of states 
to legislate on the subject of religion.1022 
Likewise, West substitutes Smith’s term ‘jurisdictional’ with ‘federalist’, arguing that 
federalism is the theory that creates the division “between the central government and 
…[the] states.”1023 Essentially, federalism and states’ rights are synonymous for the 
purpose of West’s analysis.  As far as free exercise is concerned, what is relevant is that 
West concludes that the constitutional clause has normative instead of federalist 
aspects.1024 He reasons that since the Framers denied “the national government 
jurisdiction over only laws prohibiting the free exercise and not laws protecting the free 
exercise of religion,” the clause was not simply an allocation of jurisdiction between the 
states and federal government”1025 Taking the Free Exercise clause as a normative 
constitutional provision leads to the second category, which is germane to the investigation 
attempted herein. 
Specifically, the normative reading of the Free Exercise clause provides an analytical basis 
for determining to what extent, if any, the Constitutional Framers and early Americans 
understood the Free Exercise clause to sanction legal exceptionalism.  It appears that the 
closest the United States has come to seriously contemplating a return to faith-based legal 
exceptionalism is where the Supreme Court has read religion-based exemptions into the 
meaning of free exercise.  In West’s article, The Case against a Right to Religion-Based 
Exemptions, he asks, “[w]hen, if ever, does the free exercise clause of the first amendment 
give an individual or organization the right to disobey with impunity a valid law of the 
state?”1026  He further spells out that, “[a]lmost all the individuals and some of the groups 
who claim such a right do so because the laws to which they object require them to do or 
no to do something that is contrary to what their religion, [as they understand it,] requires 
them to do or not to do.”1027  As is the robust nature of religious diversity in America, West 
provides a plethora of example cases that implicate all of the Abrahamic faiths as well as 
the beliefs of the Native Americans and certain religious organizations.1028  
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None of the illustrations however include comprehensive circumvention of an entire area 
of law or an entire juridical framework in favor of competing platforms that result in 
transferring foreign laws for an insular religious subgroup or denomination.1029  The fact 
that much of the academic discourse focuses on religion-based exemptions is very telling 
when evaluated in light of the legacy of POGG and the Framers’ overt attempts to establish 
religious equilibrium in the newly-formed American states. As such, there is support for 
distinguishing the meaning and extent of religion-based exemptions and faith-based legal 
exceptionalism.  Put another way, Smith and West’s analyses demonstrate that they are 
not mutually-inclusive concepts.  Specifically, religion-based exemptions appear to be 
uniformly available to all believers based on their subjective, individual understanding of 
the precepts of the religious dogmas to which they adhere—e.g., conscientious objection. 
While legal exceptionalism is afforded to specific religious subgroups/denominations 
based on claims that a particular sect “should reap superior advantages”—e.g., religious 
law tribunals and/or religion-centric choices of law.1030  As the latter is the basis for the 
expectation of both Anglican exceptionalism and Islamic law exceptionalism, a case for the 
return to foundational ideals makes relevant the question of whether the Framers’ 
perceived religious exemptions differently than legal exceptionalism.  
Ragosta explains that from the inception of the United States, early Americans and the 
Constitutional Framers embraced the ubiquity of the freedom of conscience.1031  However, 
the ubiquitous nature of that freedom did not include a right to violate or circumvent the 
rule of law based on a determination that it was not fit for purpose in furthering one’s 
preferred method of worship or continuing the religiously political or legal options before 
immigration.1032  According to West: 
[t]he historical data makes it abundantly clear that the ‘free exercise 
of religion’ mentioned in the first amendment was not originally 
understood to include a right to violate legitimate laws with impunity. 
Rather, ‘free exercise of religion’ meant the absence of laws whose 
primary purpose or effect was either to support or harm religion in 
general, any particular religion, or any persons or groups because of 
their religion, and it meant nothing more than that.1033  
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In other words, the “government could not directly regulate worship or a religion’s internal 
affairs…[that is,] the time and place of worship or who could participate.”1034  As free 
exercise also included the freedom to opine the merits and/or shortcomings of different 
faiths, it was not understood to mean that the Government could reprimand citizens for the 
vocalization of mere religious opinions.1035  Beyond belief, worship, internal affairs, and 
debate—which were deemed unequivocal aspects of free exercise—there is a bit of a 
variance concerning how the Framers perceived aspects of religion that might warrant 
more expansive exemptions from the rule of law.   
In the article, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: Evidence from the First 
Congress, Vincent Muñoz evidences that members of the First Congress “did not 
understand religious exemptions to be included in the 1st Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.”1036  As a matter of fact, the only religious exemption considered was a 
conscientious objector exemption—vis-à-vis “a religious exemption from militia service”—
but it was in the context of the 2nd Amendment not the 1st.1037  This proposed addition to 
the 2nd Amendment was a compromise in keeping with that which was already included in 
state constitutions.1038 However, the provision did not survive Congressional deliberation, 
thus it is absent from the ratified version of the 2nd Amendment.  According to Muñoz: 
The presence of “free exercise” protections, combined with the 
recognition of religious exemptions from militia service in state 
constitutions of the time,… supports the conclusion that the right of 
religious free exercise was not understood to include exemptions. 
Both provisions would have been unnecessary if the former was 
understood to include the latter.1039  
Along the same lines, Ragosta argues that although early American perspectives on ‘free 
exercise’ were “fueled by a deep devotion to religion,” it was not so exhaustive as to afford 
the circumvention of valid, laws that “mandat[ed] or prohibit[ed] action that [are] facially 
neutral to religion.”1040  Ragosta’s analysis substantiates the general assertion that, 
although early Americans and the Framers would “support exceptions to general laws,” 
neither group would construe ‘free exercise’ to encompass sanctioning a legal platform for 
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a distinct choice of law.1041  Where it pertains activities that might give rise to exemption, 
these included activities such as, “oath taking, military service, medical procedures, [and 
possibly] work schedules...”1042  Under these circumstances, “the government [might] 
restrain[] its hand, in favor of those who take action or oppose taking action for religious 
reasons.”1043   
West takes both analyses further in two significant ways.  First, he demonstrates that 
government legislation may be the more appropriate means of addressing religion-based 
exemptions in America’s religiously robust landscape, even though he did not espouse 
Smith’s supposition that the 1st Amendment was merely an allocation of power between 
the state governments and the Federal Government.  He also appears to reaffirm the 
voluntary, subjective nature of religious choice, which arguably upholds the 
reasonableness of religion-based exemptions that are fair and neutral while advocating 
against faith-based legal exceptionalism.  In so doing, West endorses Muñoz’s claim that 
religion-based exemptions were not understood by the First Congress (or Constitutional 
Framers) to be included in the 1st Amendment.1044  
According to West, not only is the Constitutional guarantee of religious liberty not violated 
when the federal or state government “interferes with the practice of religion by an 
individual or a church,” but the Constitutional Framers never intended to create an 
interference-proof provision in the first place.1045  If this were the Framers’ intent, “there is 
almost no government action that could not at some time or another be considered a 
violation of religious freedom.”1046  As it appears that the current momentum in some U.S. 
states bends toward moving beyond religion-based exemptions to faith-based legal 
exceptionalism, it is important to understand that although some exemptions came to be 
commonplace—as Ragosta observes—sanctioning faith-based legal exceptionalism was 
not one of them.1047   
5.3.4  Free Exercise & Legislatively Granted Religion-Based Exemptions 
For the sake of clarification, the aim of this study is not to advocate against all religion-
based exemptions.  Like West’s position in the previous section, the aim is adding support 
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to the supposition that the preferred method is for legislatures to grant exemptions as 
privileges.  Such a practice would certainly distinguish exemptions that are available to all 
faiths from exceptionalism that is attempted by certain religious groups based on their 
perception that their faith is incomparable to others for the purpose of circumventing the 
national rule of law.  More to the point, it will prevent the trappings of setting Islam as an 
insular belief system with hypersensitive adherents demanding treatment not afforded 
adherents of other faiths.  Returning to the exemption that has come to be known as 
conscientious objection, the First Congress opted to exclude the provision covering those 
who are “religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”1048  Although not a constitutional 
provision, the Congress stated that it would be permissible to grant such exemptions as a 
legislative privilege.1049  Therefore, it can be inferred that if any exemption (or ‘exception’) 
has the effect of weakening or changing the dynamic of the constitutional framework, then 
proposing legislation for state constitutional and/or statutory privilege might conceivably 
afford American citizenry the right to vote thereon and would be the proper means to 
address this exceptional change of Constitutional circumstances.   
An ancillary benefit of legislatively-granted exemptions is that it affords Americans the full 
breadth of knowledge to understand how the legalization of faith-based legal platforms—
for one religious subgroup or all of them—will affect the whole of society. This appears to 
be more prudent than relying on an expansive interpretation of multiculturalism to shield 
exceptionalism to the extent that members of other religious subgroups/denominations 
remain unaware of how they are actually impacted. This furthers West’s other contention 
that “religion-based exemptions [should be] granted by legislatures… [to avoid] hardship 
and to [promote] neutrality.”1050 Specifically, if legislatures can extend secular exemptions 
to persons, groups, or businesses based on undue hardship and/or fairness, then the same 
can be achieved for exemptions based on religious grounds.   
As it relates to religious fairness and neutrality, it is well understood that some exemptions 
or exceptions “have the effect of significantly influencing some persons’ choice of 
religion.”1051  This can include influencing adherents to stay in a specific religious 
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community or penalizing the ones who leave.  If a central facet of religious liberty in the 
United States is the freedom of voluntary religious choice, then where in that does affording 
exception to religious subgroups that have as an objective stifling religious choice? To 
illustrate this point, recall that religious wardens and denominational persecution were 
commonplace within the British Empire.  As the possibility of indirectly sanctioning a return 
to similar policies appears to be tangentially connected to Islamic law exceptionalism, it is 
worth exploring this possibility further.   
There are some Islamic law scholars who liken Islam with other religions for the sake of 
supporting Islamic law exceptionalism in Western nations.1052  Many of those rely on the 
Quranic verse, “[t]here is no compulsion in religion. Wisdom has been clearly distinguished 
from falsehood.”1053  However, there is often an inability to adequately distinguish the 
Quranic verse from “centuries of Muslim jurists [who have] all affirmed…ruling[s] 
that…clash so clearly with the Qur’an’s repeated statements on the freedom of religious 
choice.”1054  In the text, The Issue of Apostasy in Islam, Jonathan Brown notes that the 
criminal element of apostasy has its historical association in “its public dimension and the 
threat it posed to a public order built on confessional identity.”1055  Therefore, harsh 
punishments like stoning or death for apostasy were deemed necessary to prevent the 
need to police individuals’ public and private behavior.1056   
Remedying inconsistent approaches to the public dimension of private belief appears to 
be precisely the aim of legislatively-granted exemptions. Therefore, a relevant question is 
not whether it’s the U.S. Government’s role to grant equally accessible religious 
exemptions.  Instead, it is whether it is appropriate for the U.S. Government to legalize faith-
based legal exceptionalism to further the policing of public and private religious behavior—
whether blatantly or indirectly—in a nation where policing religiosity is counter to its 
constitutional aims?  If espousing the tenets of Islam is as inherently astute as is suggested 
by some Quranic or Islamic law scholars, then legislatively-granted exemptions instead of 
exceptionalism has a ring of uniformity and fairness that is lacking in the various 
interpretations of Quranic meaning that give the impression of compulsion without choice.  
According to West, exemptions “must be made available to all religions that would 
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experience the relevant hardship,” [that results from affording the 
preference]….[o]therwise, even the moderate principle of neutrality toward religion would 
be violated.”1057   
Returning to the American iteration of POGG, the decisions made by the Constitutional 
Framers demonstrate that one of the most compelling lessons learned from approximately 
two hundred years of colonialism was not to equate free exercise with a “multiformity of 
[denominationally subjective] religious claims” that resulted in recreating the 
comparative/superlative religious dynamic that existed under British Imperialism.1058  By 
the end of the Revolutionary War, this was undoubtedly a pillar of American 
constitutionalism.  As such, there is historically sound evidence for the conclusion that the 
Constitutional Framers and early Americans would have made a sharp distinction between 
‘free exercise’, religious exemptions, and legal exceptionalism for one belief system. 
Moreover, those distinctions would have undoubtedly been predicated on heeding the 
issues created by the religious imperative of POGG as it applied to the colonies up to the 
point of American independence.  Said another way, considering the effects of POGG in the 
American colonies, it is highly unlikely that the Constitutional Framers would have 
supported faith-based legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam. This is especially the case 
as they did not support it in the name of Anglicanism.  Therefore, a fair question is if it was 
‘unconstitutional’ for those who actually drafted the Constitution, then how can it become 
constitutional without the U.S. Government disregarding America’s foundational history 
and the Constitutional document it produced? 
5.3.5 The Framers & Exceptionalism as a Foundational Concession 
At this point, it is worth evaluating whether there were circumstances under which the 
Constitutional Framers might have thought it not only prudent but also justified to offer 
‘legal exceptions’ akin to those requested by Muslim advocacy groups. This analysis is 
relevant to assess whether there are certain cultural subgroups co-existing within the U.S. 
that could be considered distinct, especially where legal tribunals and the circumvention 
of the U.S. juridical infrastructure are concerned. It is a universal truth that there were 
Aboriginal peoples co-existing on the land that presently houses the United States and 
Canada. Moreover, imperial and other types of expansion have been catalysts for changes 
to not only the topography but also cultural and religious ideologies. Recent estimates 
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suggest that there were hundreds even thousands of distinct tribes throughout the North 
American continent, and their “systems of belief and ritual were as legion as the tribes 
[themselves].”1059  
Therefore, differences in cultures, beliefs, and the colonial/imperial dynamic between 
Native Americans and the British Empire, the French Empire, and the Spanish Empire 
resulted in corresponding issues at different points in North American history. The 
difficulties in question are arguably inherent in imperial attempts to colonize territories that 
are already inhabited by others.  As was previously discussed, long before the conflict 
between the British and the French Empires, the French and Spanish Empires vied for 
North American territory.  Brecher points out that after England captured Canada in 1760, 
the French and Indian War brought about a century and a half of conflict between the 
British and French Empires for control of the North American continent.1060 By the time the 
American colonies transitioned into independent states, there was also a transition in the 
way in which those newly formed states interacted with Native Americans.1061 
To fully understand why the legal and religious ‘concessions’ extended to Native Americans 
are unparalleled to the religion-centric ‘exemptions’ and/or ‘exceptions’ associated with 
any subsequent immigrants—notwithstanding religion or country of origin—it is necessary 
to distinguish instances of colonial and post-colonial engagement.  Specifically, there is an 
important distinction between engagements that occurred between the British Empire (or 
British-America) and Native Americans as indigenous peoples, and the United States and 
Native Americans as tribal nations. Confusing these points in history fosters the 
misapprehension that there were not historical points of demarcation involving different 
imperial forces and different motivating factors. It also obscures the fact that the 
involvement between the U.S. and Native Americans is not the same relationship that 
existed between the Spanish, French, or British Empires and Native Americans.  
Analogous to the interaction between the American colonies and the British Empire under 
POGG and the Canadian colonies and the French and British Empires (also under POGG), 
the imperial/tribal relationships were focused on proliferating Catholicism and 
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Anglicanism, respectively.1062 Recall that the conversion of ‘savages’ was integral to the 
aims of the British Empire.1063 Peter d’Errico explains the relationship between the Empire 
and Native Americans, which predates the existence of the United States:  
[f]rom their earliest contacts with the ‘new world,’ colonizing powers 
asserted sovereignty over indigenous peoples, based on a 
theological-legal theory built on ‘divine right.’ Spain, Portugal, France, 
England, and other colonial regimes explicitly based their sovereignty 
claims on religious doctrines decreed by the Pope, who was regarded 
as having power to grant titles to portions of the earth for purposes 
of Christian civilization. The result of colonial assertions of 
sovereignty was that indigenous nations were legally stripped of their 
independent status. Their existence was in some instances not 
recognized at all[,] and their lands treated as legally ‘vacant’ (terra 
nullius). In other instances, indigenous peoples were declared to 
have a ‘right of occupancy’ but not ownership of their lands. In either 
instance, the fundamental principle was that supreme legal authority 
lay outside the indigenous nations.1064 
By contrast, there were ancillary religious and cultural elements to the dynamic between 
Native Americans and the United States; however, intra-continental engagement was and 
remains predicated not on claims of religious exceptionalism, but on claims of ‘tribal 
sovereignty’.1065 Similar to the constitutional circumstances that buttress Canada’s 
engagements with the First Nations and to some degree the French-Quebecois (e.g., 
ethnicity, language, and territory), the colonial terms associated with the British Empire 
were amended or voided, and new terms with the United States were memorialized.1066  
However, the changes did not occur until both sovereign entities were no longer under 
British Imperial control.  At the point of American independence, the Framers took certain 
steps to make distinction between U.S. interaction with Native Americans and the 
interaction between natives and the British Empire. Most notably, the Framers ratified 
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official bi-lateral treaties between the U.S. Government and Native American tribes, which 
are demonstrative of the fact that North American lands were not considered ‘legally 
vacant’. Moreover, they evidence that the U.S. Government understood that Native 
Americans possessed more than a ‘right of occupancy’.   
The first official bi-lateral treaty between the U.S. and a Native American tribe—i.e., the 
Lenape Nation—was designated, Treaty with the Delawares, 1778.1067  As a matter of legal 
distinction, it is generally understood that treaties are “compact[s] between independent 
nations.”1068 Thus, the ratification of one or a series of treaties between the U.S. 
Government and tribal nations evidences the understanding of a shift in the rules of 
engagement.  Compare the designation of ‘Treaty’ with the ‘Royal Proclamation of 1763’ 
and the ‘Quebec Act of 1774’ issued by the British Empire. The former established the 
relationship between the Crown and Canadian Aboriginals and the latter outlined the 
freedoms afforded the French-Quebecois.  By the nature of their titles, they afford no 
independent designation to the Aboriginals and/or French-Quebecois, even though their 
existence predated British occupation.1069  The aims of the Delawares Treaty were to 
secure food, supplies and safe passage for American troops across Lenape lands during 
the “United States’ war against the king of England.”1070  Securing a means of ingress and 
egress in itself suggests that the territory is neither legally vacant nor physically 
unoccupied. For the sake of further exemplification, the United States entered into bi-
lateral treaties with the “tribes of the Upper, Middle and Lower Creeks and Semanolies 
composing the Creek nation of Indians,” in 1790 under the Treaty with the Creeks as well 
as in 1794 with the Six Nations, which “occupied the border between the United States 
and British Canada.”1071 Consistent themes were the acknowledgment of territorial 
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sovereignty as well as the recognition of legal and physical occupancy by the tribal 
nations.1072   
Along the same lines, there are three relevant provisions of the U.S. Constitution—which 
were ratified between 1789 and 1868—that demonstrate the acknowledgement of the 
sovereign rights of Native Americans. Specifically, Art. 1, § 2, Cl. 3 provides that, 
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers… excluding 
Indians not taxed…”1073  In the text Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 
Justice Story notes, “[the] arrangement adopted by [this section of] the constitution was a 
matter of compromise and concession.”1074  Where it concerned apportioning state 
representation and taxes, Justice Story explains that: 
[t]here were Indians, also, in several, and probably in most, of the 
states at that period,…who did not form a part of independent 
communities or tribes, [exercising general sovereignty and powers of 
government within the boundaries of the states]. It was necessary, 
therefore, to provide for these cases,…[t]here seems not to have 
been any objection in including, in the ratio of representation, 
persons bound to service for a term of years, and in excluding Indians 
not taxed.1075 
Likewise, Article 1, Section 8 provides: “Congress shall have the power to regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes,…”.1076 This too recognizes tribal sovereignty; but in this case, it applies to 
commercial activities between the U.S. Government and the tribal nations. Lastly, the 14th 
Amendment provides: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
state, excluding Indians not taxed.”1077  Admittedly, the 1868 ratification of the 14th 
Amendment created a problematic dichotomy concerning the definition of tribal 
sovereignty and the attainment of American citizenship for the purpose of equal protection 
under U.S. law (i.e., one sovereign entity seeking protection from another sovereign 
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entity).1078  Although worthy of detailed explication, full analysis of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this study.  Suffice it to say that the three constitutional provisions have been 
interpreted to mean that, “Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”1079  Native American duality as 
sovereign tribes with members who are also American citizens has resulted in certain 
limitations to the nature of their claims of sovereignty.1080  However, where tribal 
sovereignty exists, it predates the United States and exists notwithstanding the state in 
which the lands are situated.1081  As is demonstrated herein, these constitutional 
provisions underpin the United States’ acknowledgement of Native American tribes as 
sovereign and distinguishable from not only state and federal governments but also foreign 
nations.1082  This suggests that tribal sovereignty cannot be equated with other claims for 
exceptionalism associated with subsequent immigration, whether voluntary or involuntary. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of a constitutional equivalent to the rights and privileges 
associated with being first.  
These concessions (i.e., not exemptions or exceptions) also underpin the establishment of 
distinct legal infrastructures and bodies of law—vis-à-vis Tribal law and Indian law.  As it 
relates to the division between Indian law and Tribal law, Cohen et al. explain: 
[p]rior to the creation of the United States, the entire land mass it now 
occupies was owned and governed by hundreds of Indian tribes. 
These tribes, sovereign nations under international law, were brought 
into [British-America] through a colonial process that was partly 
negotiated and partly imposed.1083  
After the establishment of the United States, the provisions of the U.S. Constitution taken 
in conjunction with relevant Supreme Court decisions set the principles of “[f]ederal Indian 
law, [which] is the primary mechanism for mediating the resulting intergovernmental 
relationships among the Indian nations, the United States, and the states of the Union.”1084 
In regards to Tribal law, Fletcher explains that, “[e]ach Indian nation has the authority, 
                                                          
1078 See e.g., Scott Bomboy, ‘The 14th Amendment’s Tortuous Relationship with American Indians’ [2014] 
Constitution Daily <https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-14th-amendments-tortuous-relationship-with-
american-indians1>. Bomboy provides a short overview of the circumstances created by the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution and Native American’s claims to tribal sovereignty but also U.S. citizenship. 
1079 ‘Commerce With Indians Tribes’ (n 1065). 
1080 ‘Commerce With Indians Tribes’ (n 1065). 
1081 ‘Commerce With Indians Tribes’ (n 1065). 
1082 Judge Joseph J. Wiseman, ‘An Overview of Key Federal Indian Law Cases’ <https://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/Key-Federal-Indian-Law-Cases.pdf>. 
1083 Felix S Cohen and Executive Board of Authors and Editors, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
(LexisNexis 2012) [1.01]. 
1084 Mathew LM Fletcher, American Indian Tribal Law (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2011) xxi-xxii. 
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often expressed in an organic document such as a tribal constitution or a treaty with the 
United States, to legislate for the general welfare of the tribe, its people, and its land…”.1085 
As a result, the Native American judicial system (i.e., Tribal courts) is beyond the regulatory 
oversight of the U.S. judiciary.  The partition continues to be memorialized by the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. Under the Act, “tribes were encouraged to exercise their 
inherent sovereignty to establish their own justice codes and operate court systems 
enforcing those laws.”1086   
However, the Tribal Law & Policy Institute acknowledges that “tribal justice systems are 
diverse in concept and character.”1087  Although many tribes have expansive bodies of 
codified law, many do not.  Thus, they are at different levels of development in the creation 
of comprehensive and cohesive laws that have intertribal applicability.1088  This reality has 
been the catalyst for tribal court decisions remaining outside the American juridical 
framework. Based on the Framers’ acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty, enforcement of 
tribal court judgments outside tribal lands remains the subject of ongoing legal analysis 
and scholarly debate.1089  The debated issues are not however religion-centric, so they fall 
beyond the scope of the Free Exercise/1st Amendment analyses linked to requests for 
Islamic law exceptionalism.  Instead, analyses concerning the enforcement of tribal 
decisions fall within the purview of the Article IV, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution—i.e., 
the Full, Faith & Credit clause—or as a Conflict of Laws inquiry—i.e., the principle of 
Comity.1090  
                                                          
1085 Fletcher (n 1084), xxi-xxii. 
1086 Tribal Law and Policy Institute, ‘Tribal Courts’ (Tribal Court Clearinghouse, 2018) <https://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/justice.htm>; See also, 25 U.S.C. § 461, et seq. 
1087 Tribal Law and Policy Institute (n 1086). 
1088 Tribal Law and Policy Institute (n 1086). 
1089 See e.g., PS Deloria and Robert Laurence, ‘Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreement: 
The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question’ (1994) 28 Georgia Law Review 365. 
Deloria and Laurence focus on the procedural hurdles of enforcement of tribal judgments off-reservation 
and of state judgments on-reservation in light of the grand Indian law concept of tribal sovereignty. 
Specifically, both the entry of judgment against non-consenting defendants and the determination to 
enforce, or not, another government's judgment are acts which only sovereigns do.; William V Vetter, ‘Of 
Tribal Courts and " Territories " Is Full Faith and Credit Required ?’ (1987) 23 California Western Law 
Review 219. Vetter focuses one the fact that Indian tribal governments have become increasingly active, 
expanding both the nature and amount of their concerns and efforts. The number and variety of cases 
being heard in tribal courts are also increasing. However, unless tribal court judgments can be enforced 
outside of the reservation, judgments against non- members may be useless.; Craig Smith, ‘Full Faith and 
Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions Revisited’ (2010) 98 California Law 
Review. Smith postulates that federally recognized Indian tribes are America's third sovereigns; however, 
exactly what demands the existence of tribal sovereignty places on our constitutional system is a seemingly 
inexorable question. 
1090 See also, William L Reynolds, ‘The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit’ (1994) 53 Maryland Law Review 
412. Reynolds points out that the Framers intent was to ensure unity of the new nation while also 
preserving states' autonomy.; ‘Comity’, Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School 2019) 
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Despite the fact that past and present questions of co-existence implicate subgroups that 
have come to be distinct ethnic minorities, the foundational documents referenced herein 
evidence that there is no connective thread between the distinctions made related to tribal 
sovereignty and the Constitutional Framers’ analysis concerning religious equilibrium, the 
right of free exercise, and/or legislatively-granted religious privileges.  In fact, the subject 
of religion is noticeably absent from the bi-lateral treaties between the United States and 
Tribal Nations from U.S. inception to 1868.1091  Even after 1868, religion did not assume 
a role in treaties between the U.S. Government and Native Americans. Recall that 1868 is 
a historical landmark for the United States because Native Americans were designated 
U.S. citizens for the sake of equal protection under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  Thus, Indian law turned into the legal channel between the Government and 
the now semi-autonomous tribes.   
Unless Muslim migrants are endeavoring to collectively claim sovereign territorial rights in 
the name of Islam—vis-à-vis an Islamic state or caliphate—within the sovereign borders of 
the United States, their voluntary immigration to the United States is not akin to the 
circumstances of Native Americans.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Framers would not have established a common thread between constitutional analyses 
related to Native American tribal sovereignty and faith-based legal exceptionalism as is 
attempted by Muslim advocacy groups. This also demonstrates the complexity and 
imprudence of pointing to multiculturalism as the connective thread between culture, 
political ideologies, and faith-based legal exceptionalism in modern America.  Specifically, 
linking the two ethnic groups as similarly-situated fosters an incongruent commonality that 
diminishes the legacy and history of the former and frustrates the ability to discern a 
constitutional resolution for the latter.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The research outcomes included herein suggest that the Constitutional Framers would find 
it prudent to legally accommodate religion-centric legal platforms in light of the lessons 
learned under the POGG doctrine. Moreover, they would have distinguished faith-based 
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1091 See also, ‘Treaty with the Delawares, 1778’ (n 1067); ‘Muscogee Treaty, 1790’ (n 1071); ‘Treaty of 
Canandaigua, 1794’ (n 1071); ‘Treaty of Fort Wayne, 1809’ 




legal exceptionalism from religious exemptions and/or constitutional concessions.  
Therefore, it can be inferred that neither the Framers nor early Americans would have 
construed the right of conscience, religious liberty, or free exercise to encompass faith-
based legal exceptionalism, entitling adherents of Islam to carve out a separate legal 
infrastructure.  The enduring legacy of POGG in the American colonial experience ensured 
that early Americans understood exceptionalism to be exactly what it is—a privilege 
afforded one or a few religious subgroups to the detriment of the others.  It is likely that the 
Framers’ rejoinder would have been akin to Canada’s most recent national response. 
In light of this reality, it is imprecise for faith-based legal exceptionalism to be construed as 
a natural extension of religious liberty in the U.S.  Unless or until this kind of 
exceptionalism—and all of its known repercussions—are acknowledged as definitive 
extensions of one’s constitutional right of free exercise or universal right of conscience or 
belief, it would be imprudent to use the Free Exercise clause as its conduit.  To do so would 
implicate the 1st Amendment in achieving what is the equivalent of a religion-centric choice 
of law provision when the proper course of action is affording a religion-based exemption. 
If religious law tribunals are to be construed as religion-based exemptions, it has been 
established herein that the proper course is to make such a privilege uniformly available 
to all religious denominations or allowing U.S. citizens the option to vote on the measure, 
instead of returning to the practice of faith-based legal exceptionalism.  To do so would 
respect the subjective, voluntary circumstance that is religious choice while also respecting 
the sanctity of the social contract that is the U.S. Constitution.  This is an option preferable 
to continuing to instigate a degree of religious division in the United States that has not 







OBSERVATIONS ON DISREGARDING FOUNDATIONAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE U.S. 
 “That [fairly stable constitutional system of government] has allowed a large 
multiracial, multiethnic, and multireligious population to govern itself democratically 
while protecting basic human rights and resolving disputes under the rule of law.”1092 
This chapter concludes the investigation into the POGG doctrine’s effect on U.S. 
constitutional history by focusing on some of the possible outcomes of disregarding the 
Framers’ perspectives on POGG at the time the U.S. Constitution was drafted.  Assessing 
the present Islamic law inquiry in the U.S., this chapter attempts to illustrate how 
multiculturalism is not the proper focal point from which to gauge legislative and judicial 
consensus concerning faith-based legal exceptionalism. As such, perspectives on 
multiculturalism are evaluated in the context of Muslim immigration to highlight how over-
extended the concept has become. Likewise, this chapter illustrates how pitting 
multiculturalism against assimilation has resulted in a discernible ‘power-grab’ in 
determining how political and legal inquiries, which are undoubtedly constitutional in 
nature, are being assessed as questions of multicultural inclusion.  This chapter also 
evidences the practicality of the United States following in England and Canada’s footsteps 
by returning to foundational ideals and commitments to address such a consequential 
amendment to American constitutionalism.  In light of the absolute necessity of religious 
equilibrium at the point of America’s foundation, this chapter also demonstrates the 
continued necessity of avoiding comparative/superlative politics surrounding religious 
liberty by examining some of the not so obvious—or ‘dormant’—effects of sanctioning faith-
based legal exceptionalism for one religious subgroup (i.e., Islamic law).  Finally, this 
chapter puts forth a constitutional rationale for ensuring that multiculturalism does not 
become America’s newest suicide pact. 
6.1 Incongruity in Multiculturalism & the Expediency of Foundational Principles 
Recall from the first chapter that the concept of multiculturalism was originally identified 
as a celebration of cuisine, music, customs, and traditions associated with different 
cultures co-existing in one nation.1093  However, the malapportionment of more recent 
accommodation requests focused on political ideologies and foreign and/or religious legal 
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infrastructures associated with Muslim migration has placed a spotlight on the overreliance 
on the concept of multicultural inclusion as the response to every condition and/or issue—
whether good, bad, or very bad—associated with ethnic migration.  As was established at 
the beginning of this study, the situation was exacerbated by the promotion of 
multiculturalism as the antithesis to societal assimilation instead of encouraging 
interdependence for the sake of cultural inclusion and individual accountability.1094   As 
such, national promotion of multiculturalism in the U.S.—and in other Western nations—has 
arguably waned or even dissipated.  Recall that Barry suggests that attitudes concerning 
multiculturalism can be attributed to the fact that any belief or practice, even remotely 
linked as an element in the culture of the group who practices it, is preserved as an 
extension of multiculturalism.1095  Moreover, it appears that efforts to question the issues 
that emanate from this kitchen-sink approach have resulted in political correctness 
stepping in as the proverbial ‘gag order’ for the purpose of quashing certain speech that 
might be challenging but no less necessary to properly address socio-political occurrences 
that raise questions concerning perceived violations to the U.S. state and federal law.1096   
To illustrate Barry’s contention in the post-9/11 American context, a recent exhibition on 
Religion in Early America was sponsored by Smithsonian’s National Museum of American 
History and was on display from 2017 to 2018.  The exhibition seemingly attempted to 
afford later immigrated Muslims a personal stake in the early American experience as an 
apparent boost to their ‘cultural well-being’.1097  Its effort to include Islam in the scope of 
religious diversity in early America was slightly overshadowed by its capitalization on the 
insidious institution of slavery to create an inherited religious legacy between more recent 
Muslim immigrants and Muslims whose religion was ‘suppressed’ or ‘exploited’ because 
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has resulted in multiculturalism failing to yield social inclusion or national unification in Western nations. 
1095 Barry (n 56), 252. 
1096 See e.g., Anne Reynolds, ‘Political Correctness’, The First Amendment Encyclopedia (Middle Tennessee 
State University: The John Seigenthaler Chair of Excellence in First Amendment Studies 2019) 
<https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1138/political-correctness>; Jay Bowen, ‘The First 
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speech in further of multicultural inclusion.  




of their status as ‘black chattel’.1098  The establishment of this link seems to promote the 
theory that later Muslim immigrants have the same religious stake in America’s history as 
is possessed by those who were ‘involuntarily’ immigrated.   
Consistent with Barry’s contention about the behavior of ‘intellectual magpies’, there does 
not appear to have been an assessment of whether using slavery as a historical nexus 
serves to benefit America’s ethnically and politically fragmented landscape, or whether it 
even establishes a legacy that later immigrated Muslims would find appropriate.  As Islam 
is the religious center for multiple ethnicities, can it be assumed that any of them would 
find something appropriate in having a history of enslavement in the United States or any 
other nation?  This notwithstanding, the aims of multiculturalism appear to be furthered by 
virtue of the fact that establishing this notable connection attempts to place Islam on equal 
footing with Christianity in the early American experience, even if in fact it was not.  Ill-
contrived attempts at multicultural inclusion, such as this one, also seem to glaze over 
continued claims that the United States has failed to sufficiently promote multicultural 
inclusion for those non-Muslim involuntary immigrants or their posterity.  This failure is 
evidenced by the fact that the topic of ‘African-American or Slavery reparations’ remains a 
‘thing’ in the United States.  As such, it has reemerged as an agenda item for at least two 
of the candidates running on the Democratic ticket for the 2020 presidential election.1099  
This is the case despite the fact that slavery was legally prohibited after the Emancipation 
Proclamation on 01 January in 1863.  
Along the same lines, the exhibit focused on the religious beliefs of those in the business 
of purchasing black chattel without representing the religious beliefs or history of those in 
the business of selling.  Therefore, the exhibit’s showpieces illustrating that there were 
slaves who were brought to the United States from the African continent, spoke Arabic, and 
                                                          
1098 National Museum of American History (n 1097); National Museum of African American History & 
Culture, ‘African Muslims in Early America’ <https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/collection/african-
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1099 Laura Stampler, ‘What Exactly Are Slavery Reparations? 2020 Democrats Are Trying to Figure That Out’ 
[2019] Fortune Magazine <http://fortune.com/2019/02/27/slavery-reparations-democrats-2020/>; 
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espoused Islam suggests that those human beings were not sold into slavery by Jews or 
Christians.  There are some scholars who have debated not only whether Islamic slavery 
was more humane than imperial slavery but also the notable differences between slavery 
based on ethnicity versus enslavement based on religion.1100  Despite the hair-splitting 
over the degrees of insidiousness associated with the practice of enslaving human beings, 
this area of discourse has demonstrated that the institution of slavery was an Islamic 
practice—including a connection to the Transatlantic Slave Trade—before it became an 
economic staple in many Western nations.1101  Omissions such as this appear to contribute 
to the perception that it is appropriate to promote multiculturalism at all costs, even if it 
means the suppression or augmentation of applicable history to avoid casting a pejorative 
light on those who espouse Islam. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that circumstances such 
as this are demonstrative of Barry’s contention, thereby highlighting a problematic facet of 
the all-inclusive approach to multiculturalism.  
To further demonstrate the problematic implications of an expansive interpretation of 
multiculturalism, it is worth returning to the political ideologies that were referenced in 
previous chapters. Specifically, the ideals that buttress authoritarianism have been 
traditionally viewed as existing on the opposite end of the political spectrum of those that 
buttress democracy.1102  Moreover, there is little to no evidence that any Western nation 
has or would willingly trade in democracy for authoritarianism.  This is the case despite 
recent reports suggesting that authoritarian regimes attempt to migrate imams and other 
religious scholars as a ‘soft-power strategy’ to promote authoritarianism in Western 
nations.1103  Along the same lines, statistical data suggests that there are far fewer citizens 
                                                          
1100 Burkett and Leiner (n 754), 33-36; See also, Robert Allison, The Crescent Obscured: The United States 
and the Muslim World 1776-1815 (Oxford University Press 1995). Leiner notes that “Islamic slavery was 
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1101 See generally, Ronald Segal, ‘America’s Black Muslim Blacklash’, Islam’s Black Slaves: The History of 
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of democratic nations purposely seeking to take up residence in nations with known 
authoritarian regimes than there are citizens under authoritarianism seeking relocation to 
nations espousing democracy.1104 Yet, even the suggestion that authoritarianism is 
politically and/or legally incompatible with American values appears to be an affront to 
multiculturalism because it might send an unwelcoming message to newer immigrants who 
hail from nations where the socio-political backbone is authoritarianism.  Occurrences such 
as these allow for the inference that multiculturalism has become a catch-all expression 
devoid of real merit in determining how to address incongruences that accompany certain 
facets of plurality.  Likewise, over-reliance on multiculturalism gives the impression that 
the United States has reached a problematic precipice that might culminate in bastardizing 
the supremacy of the national rule of law if political ideologies and religion-centric legal 
precepts continue to be defined as an aspect of multiculturalism to condone certain 
political and legal exceptionalism. 
6.2 A Prudent Legal Inquiry: From Where Does Islamic Law Originate? 
As has been previously demonstrated, a good deal of the assessment of Islamic law 
exceptionalism in the U.S. has been focused on multiculturalism and the 1% of the 
population that espouses Islam as well as far less than 1% that desires separate Islamic 
law platforms.1105  However, it would appear that any assessment of Islamic law 
exceptionalism is better served by focusing on foundational aspirations of the Framers as 
well as the Constitution as a social contract, which implicates not just the 1% but also the 
other 99%.  With this in mind, it is necessary to first understand that Islamic law and the 
concept of ‘sharia’ have been portrayed by some as both an inflexible and indivisible pillar 
of the Islamic belief system and the mainstay of legislative/juridical infrastructures for 
certain Muslim-majority nations.1106  Depending on whether the objective is to conflate or 
bifurcate, the belief system could be labeled religion, law, religious law, or legalistic religion.  
Consequently, there have been myriad debates concerning whether Islamic law (also 
designated ‘sharia law’) is compatible with the tenets of liberal democracy upheld in the 
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United States, Canada, and/or England.1107  As has been established, relevant scholarly 
discourse and political debate, which is applicable to all three nations, appear to advocate 
for a degree of caution and/or suggest that the question remains uncertain.  However, the 
analysis put forth in previous chapters demonstrates a misalignment of the question of 
democratic integration in nations that espouse disestablishment.  Where it pertains the 
policies adopted in England and Canada, the misalignment is circumstantially connected 
to the divergent outcomes associated with the effects of POGG.  As the United States has 
seemingly failed to adopt a national stance or appreciate the causal link between POGG 
and the nation’s perspective on disestablishment, the degree to which the U.S. has fully 
scrutinized England and Canada’s national rejoinders as an aspect of their common 
colonial heritage is a work in progress.  
What is clear is that recent Congressional reports evidence that the U.S. legislature is fully 
cognizant of the fact that religious law is exclusively imputable to those who become 
members of the religious subgroups/denominations to which the law is applicable. 
Specifically, Brougher notes that those outside a specific religious community are not 
bound by social and/or legal precepts of the religious dogmas espoused by those inside 
the community.1108  Therefore, debating the issue of the appropriateness of U.S. 
legislatures—whether state or federal—statutorily excluding a collection of religious 
guidelines that have “no legally binding authority [on any American citizen] in the United 
States,” demonstrates the degree to which reliance on an expansive definition of 
multiculturalism has seemingly distorted the 1st Amendment Free Exercise 
assessment.1109  
Akin to the circumstances in England that resulted in the curtailment of jurisdiction for 
Anglican Ecclesiastical courts, religious plurality precludes ignoring the prospect of Islamic 
law exceptionalism encroaching on the religious liberty and/or other rights of non-Muslims.  
Engaging with sharia guidelines or Islamic law via ADR or litigation in a vacuum is 
reminiscent of the problematic predicament that existed for religious dissenters under the 
POGG doctrine at the point of American colonial rebellion.  As such, it offers a plausible 
alternate theory of why many American citizens find something disconcerting about the 
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idea of integrating Islamic law in to the American legal framework.  Although it could be 
attributed to racism or Islamophobia, it might as easily be attributed to the fact that 
exceptionalism still retains the fundamental characteristics of encroaching on the personal 
and legal rights of others, whether religious or secular.1110  As the United States does not 
have a national church in the way that England does, the Government cannot employ it to 
appease concerns by suggesting that Islamic law exceptionalism is the proper ‘Christian’ 
response or even in line with the values that all Americans share.  Instead, previous 
chapters demonstrate that the proper ‘Constitutional’ response is to return to the 
objectives and outlooks of the nation’s Founders.  From that vantage point, it becomes 
reasonable to question under what circumstances would Islamic law exceptionalism—or 
faith-based legal exceptionalism generally—not be prohibitive in the United States of 
America? To address this question in the Islamic law context, it is essential to make a 
distinction between religious guidelines and the religion-centric laws of Islamic states. 
 6.2.1 Distinguishing Religion, Religious Guidelines & Religious Law 
As it pertains to disestablishment in an Islamic state or ummah, Islamic scholars suggest 
that the founder of Islam made no separation between religion and government.1111  
Specifically, Muhammad made no discernible distinction in his community “that was at 
once political and religious, [of which he was] the head of state.”1112  Likewise, “he never 
showed his companions any sign of separation of church and state.”1113  Thus, it can be 
inferred that Islam has been reared on a steady diet of religion/governmental 
entanglement that never deviated from seeking to discern what the Quran requires and/or 
what Muhammad would do or say about social ordering.  Even where the Medina Charter 
has been highlighted as illustrative of an early Islamic treaty—as is the case in this study—
scholars like Bernard Lewis have qualified the assertion by noting that the agreement was 
“a unilateral proclamation” by Muhammad concerning the coexistence of Meccans, 
Medinese, and the People of the Book.1114 Lewis also contends that the Charter “marked 
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the first step toward the later Islamic autocracy.”1115  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the 
autocratic community that Muhammad founded is the proper reference point for 
determining how to address Muslim immigration to Muslim-minority nations like those that 
are the subject of this study.1116  
It does however aid in understanding Brougher’s assessment that many Muslim-majority 
nations that attempt to establish secular states or detach religion from government often 
opt for secular legal codes to replace established sharia practices and principles.1117  To 
illustrate, recall that the 2016 Democracy Index identifies Indonesia and Turkey as Muslim-
majority nations that were ranked the highest and lowest in terms of espousing 
democracy.1118  Although their rankings speak to the degree to which democracy is 
flourishing—which includes the impartiality of their legal infrastructures—the point here is 
that democracy has resulted in the adoption of Civil law systems instead of the retention 
of Islamic law.1119  This suggests that that there is some level of awareness that although 
sharia and Islamic law are distinguishable, the primary and secondary source material 
affects its neutrality.  It is however beneficial to understand how religious guidelines and 
the laws of Islamic nations have been distinguished since schisms occurred within the 
founder’s ummah.  This is especially germane to the clarification of statutory and judicial 
engagement as well as 1st Amendment analysis concerning Islamic law exceptionalism.   
Where it pertains sharia, Kamali explains that it represents a set of religious guidelines that 
are distinguishable from Islamic law.1120  In Understanding Islamic Law in Theory & 
Practice, Mashood Baderin also acknowledges that Islam is not sharia, and sharia is not 
Islamic law.1121  Although sharia is typically translated as Islamic law, the connotation is 
incorrect because it is inconsistent with its original meaning.1122  Specifically, sharia, 
                                                          
1115 Lewis (n 1114), 40. 
1116 For the sake of clarity, the evaluation of the Medina Charter as a means for the original Framers to 
assess Islamic law in the context of the ummah and the evaluation of Islamic law for the sake of 
accommodation outside the ummah yields the same outcomes.  Specifically, entanglement of church and 
state was not the objective for the founding of the United States; and now that it separation of church and 
state is a constitutional pillar, religiously law becoming entangled with national law frustrates the 
separation and forces the laws of the ummah on those who do not espouse the beliefs or practices of the 
ummah.   
1117 Brougher (n 306), 5. 
1118 The Economist Intelligence Unit (n 842). 
1119 See generally, The Economist Intelligence Unit (n 842); United States Central Intelligence Agency, 
‘Introduction to Indonesia’ (n 843); United States Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Introduction to Turkey’ (n 
843). 
1120 Kamali (n 151), 2. 
1121 Mashood Baderin, ‘Understanding Islamic Law in Theory and Practice’ (2009) 9 Legal Information 
Management 186, 186-87. 
1122 Raj Bhala, Understanding Islamic Law (Shari’a) (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc 2011) xix. 
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“originally meant the path or track by which camels were taken to water, and so by transfer 
the path ordained of God by which men achieve salvation.”1123  In other words, “shari’ah 
literally means a way to the watering-place or a path apparently to seek felicity and 
salvation.”1124  Since sharia is “a path to religion…[it] is primarily concerned with a set of 
values that are essential to Islam.”1125  An-Na’im’s observations further this idea: “[t]he 
term Sharia does not occur in the Qur'an at all in the meaning that we use it today.  In fact, 
the term Sharia does not exist in Muslim sources for the first 300 years of Islam.  In other 
words, Sharia is not a term or concept that is interchangeable with Islam that you find from 
the beginning.”1126  
Even more telling is the distinction Ali makes between sharia and Islamic law. She 
acknowledges that the scholarship on sharia varies significantly on the development and 
influences of sharia; therefore, it is a bit difficult to establish accuracy concerning how to 
conceptualize it.1127  Fluidity notwithstanding, Ali distinguishes between sharia and Islamic 
law in a way that is germane to the analysis attempted herein.  Specifically, she contends 
that references to the concept of sharia law are misleading because “[a]dding ‘law’ to 
sharia implies that sharia constitutes law in the sense of legally enforceable rules akin to 
black-letter law,… .”1128  Her assertion is consistent with An-Na’im and others who make 
clear that principles of sharia by their nature and function cannot and therefore should not 
be implemented by Muslim or secular states, as they are left to the personal choices of 
those who espouse Islam.1129    
Therefore, it can be inferred that sharia is a collection of guiding principles not dissimilar 
to moral recommendations linked with other faiths.  Like all other subjective guidelines, 
there is nothing legally binding about them, although they are unquestionably persuasive 
in directing one’s moral compass.  As such, it is imprecise to suggest that sharia is a legal 
codex that possesses the elements of a body of law that demands integration of legal 
tribunals for the practice thereof. If this is the case, then where the U.S. Government 
attempts to integrate or afford exception to ‘sharia law’, it would seem to be complicit in 
legally compelling the personal and individual religious choices of those who espouse 
                                                          
1123 Bhala (n 1122), xix. 
1124 Kamali (n 151), 2. 
1125 Kamali (n 151), 2. 
1126 An-Na’im (n 305), 10. 
1127 Ali, Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (n 65), 21. 
1128 Ali, Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (n 65), 4. 
1129 Ali, Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (n 65), 21; An-Na’im (n 305), 1-3. 
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Islam.1130 Thus, a relevant question is whether it is prudent for U.S. state and/or federal 
governments to afford deference to distinct legal platforms that have the practical effect 
of policing religious choices and the degree to which people follow religious ‘guidelines’. 
This is especially pertinent since the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear “that courts 
should refrain from trolling through a person’s or institutions’ religious beliefs.”1131  Then 
it would appear that sanctioning Islamic law exceptionalism sets the U.S. judiciary up to 
become the conduit for ‘trolling’…or worse…a conduit for returning to the colonial-era 
practice of promoting religious wardens. 
Where it pertains Islamic law on the other hand, Brougher also clarifies that like sharia, the 
two primary sources are the Quran and the Sunnah, which signifies the words and actions 
of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.1132  Similar to sharia, Islamic law returns to 
interpretations of the Quran but from a jurisprudential perspective. Kamali contends that 
Islamic law came into existence long after the first reference to sharia in the Quran.1133 
Likewise, Baderin evaluates how legal rights associated with Islamic law are comparable 
or compatible with Common or Civil law by distinguishing not only the source material but 
also the way in which that material is reinforced.  Specifically, he clarifies that Islamic law 
is tied to legal or interpretive schools reinforcing (by reinterpretation) the Quran and/or the 
Sunnah.  For clarity, “a legal [or interpretive] school implies a body of doctrine taught by a 
leader, or imam, and followed by the members of that school.”1134  The following diagram 




                                                          
1130 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press: Islamic 
Text Society 2003) xix. 
1131 Karseboom (n 886), 699. Karseboom is citing the holding in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Mitchell et 
al. v. Helms et al., 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
1132 Brougher (n 306), 5. 
1133 Kamali (n 1130), xix. 
1134 Kamali (n 151), 68. 
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As is illustrated herein, interpretive schools determine how and to what extent secondary 
sources—ijma (consensus amongst Muslim jurists) and qiyas or aql (i.e., analogy (Sunnis) 
or reason (Shi’ites) taken from previously accepted decisions)—are relied upon.1135  From 
an analytical or jurisprudential perspective, the aforementioned sources establish a 
cyclical deductive practice by: (1) extracting injunctions and principles based on 
interpretations of the Quran; (2) applying principles reflected through the teachings of 
Prophet Muhammad; (3) opining and coming to a consensus from among the confidants 
of Muhammad or juridical ijma; and (4) deducing analogies or qiyas.1136  This appears to 
be consistent with the distinctions between sharia and Islamic law that Baderin makes, 
especially since any question concerning secondary sources returns to the Quran and 
Sunnah.1137  
Recall that American Common law does not rely on religious texts for its formation, 
expansion, or contraction.1138  This also means that Courts do not look to the views of 
                                                          
1135 Brougher (n 306), 5. 
1136 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements’ (2002) 7 Journal of Islamic 
Law & Culture 36-7; See also, Brougher (n 306), 5. 
1137 Baderin (n 1121), 188-89. 
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prophetic figures or church liturgy to pronounce impartial judgments. Instead, Common law 
in the United States has a built-in system, the principle of stare decisis, which requires 
Courts to adhere to the rules established by decisions in earlier cases.1139  The effect is 
that Common law builds on and corrects itself as judges continue to revisit prior legal cases 
to ensure stability and consistency of the rule of law as a whole.  This also allows citizens 
to generally respect the rule of law as neutral and uniformly applicable.  As a result, 
American legal scholars and judges—as do certain Islamic law scholars—signify that Islamic 
law (i.e., sharia law) lacks the precision and uniformity associated with black letter law 
derived from Common or Civil law systems.  Turner and Karrar-Lewsley observe that, “the 
amorphous nature of [Islamic] law can be difficult to appreciate…[i]n fact, the term [Islamic 
law] no more denotes a cohesive, codified law than the term ‘natural law’ does.”1140  Along 
the same lines, a Delaware Court judge in a 2003 dispute focused on Delaware’s 
‘Borrowing Statute’ noted that “[i]t is not possible to open up law books and read cases to 
discern [Islamic] law.”1141  These perspectives (and myriad others) are consistent with Ali’s 
contention that Islamic law “is not and cannot be uniform, as [it] does not have a static, 
fixed content, extrapolated as it is from a range of sources by different juristic schools.”1142  
To put another way, all roads lead back to the Quran and Muhammad, the head of the 
Islamic ummah.  
Considering the distinctions highlighted herein, there appears to be an essential 
contradiction in the comparisons between sharia, Islamic law, and Common law.  By 
disregarding or understating the contradiction, much scholarly discourse focuses on the 
somewhat oxymoronic inquiry into whether the religious source material that buttresses 
Islamic law can be divorced from its religious content.   This would aid in determining 
whether Islamic law is compatible with Western democracy or whether the primary sources 
are malleable enough to adapt to changing times.  However, this study approaches the 
subject from the perspective that the source material renders it lacking in the neutrality 
necessary to be applied uniformly without curtailing or violating the religious freedoms and 
legal rights of those who do not espouse the religion.  To put another way, Islamic law 
scholars demonstrate that the application of Islamic law results in repeatedly answering 
                                                          
1139 Oyen (n 203). 
1140 Paul Turner and Robert Karrar-Lewsley, ‘Finding Your Path: Arbitration, Sharia, and the Modern Middle 
East’ (2011) 6 Global Arbitration Review 3 <https://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/finding-your-
path-arbitration-sharia-and-the-modern-middle-east/>. 
1141 Dylan Consla and Brandon Mordue, ‘Stop Borrowing Trouble: Clarifying the Saudi Basic Exception to 
Delaware’s Borrowing Statute’ (2016) 41 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 29, 29. 
1142 Ali, Modern Challenges to Islamic Law (n 65), 5. 
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two questions, which are what does the Quran dictate and what would Muhammad do?  
Are these questions not analogous to asking what does the Torah dictate and what would 
Moses do? Or what does the Holy Bible dictate and what would Jesus Christ do?  Or what 
are the dictates of any one of the dozen or so religious texts (and the actions/thoughts of 
their prophetic figures) that were relied upon during the swearing in of members of the 
116th U.S. Congress in January 2019?1143 
Although the questions in themselves are arguably the most relevant and necessary 
questions that people of faith should ask on a consistent basis, how are these the 
appropriate questions for establishing legal precedent and/or dispensing judgments in a 
religiously plural society that espouses disestablishment?  To take this point further, it 
might appear comparable to suggest that at one point in the histories of Western nations, 
religious law was the only law there was; or at some point in history, medieval kings and 
queens entangled religion and law (e.g., Alfred the Great).  However, the history of Anglican 
Ecclesiastical courts makes the lack of neutrality easily discernible, while at the same time 
invalidating the effectiveness of such a comparison.   Wooding notes that the jurisdictional 
conflict between the law of the state (i.e., Common law) and the law of the Church (i.e., 
Canon law) continued for centuries even before Henry VIII’s schism from the Church in 
Rome.1144   After the split, one of the most significant factors in the religious law of Anglican 
Ecclesiastical courts finally giving way to English Common law and a national juridical 
infrastructure was the acknowledgment that it was legally unacceptable for the laws of the 
whole of society to be determined by the religious texts and/or canon of one denomination 
or subgroup.  From that perspective, the encroachment on the religious liberties of non-
Anglicans is unmistakable. 
                                                          
1143 Amanda Jackson, ‘Muslim and Jewish Holy Books Among Many Used to Swear-In Congress’ CNN World 
News: International Edition (Washington DC, 4 January 2019) 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/03/us/congress-swear-in-religious-books-trnd/index.html>; See also, 
Aleksandra Sandstrom, ‘Faith on the Hill’ (2019) <https://www.pewforum.org/2019/01/03/faith-on-the-
hill-116/>. The Pew Research Center highlights religious denominationalism as it relates to the 116th 
Congress for the express purpose of illustrating overrepresentation of Christians in Congress, while the 
religious schisms that exist within all other religious subgroups are noticeably left unclassified.  For 
example, how many of the Muslims are Sunni, which represents 99% of the Muslim population worldwide, 
and therefore suggests a present and future expectation of overrepresentation of Sunnism in the United 
States.  Likewise, how many of the Jews are Hasidic versus non-Hasidic or even Jews for Jesus?  Along the 
same lines, there are certain denominations listed that may not believe in using electricity let alone running 
for public office. The inclusion of those on the list however aids in exaggerating the overrepresentation 
argument.  In reality, the outcomes do not suggest that there is an overrepresentation of Christians in 
Congress; instead, it highlights that there is an overrepresentation of certain denominations of Christianity 
in Congress. It also allows for the inference that religious law exceptionalism (religious law tribunals) in light 
of so much denominationalism creates a problematic outcome in the United States. 
1144 Wooding (n 255), 157. 
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Evaluation of the same set of circumstances as a means of rationalizing Islamization as a 
facet of multiculturalism still results in both Anglican Ecclesiastical courts and Islamic law 
tribunals making demands for privilege or exceptionalism and imposing the religious laws 
of the few on the whole of society.  The exchange of terms from Anglicanism to Islamization 
seemingly shifts the means by which encroachment of the rights of those outside either 
religious community is perceived and evaluated.  Specifically, Anglican Ecclesiastical law 
seemingly connotes Imperialism, while Islamic law has apparently come to connote 
migration of a diaspora and/or multiculturalism, which necessitates the accommodation 
of ‘difference’.  In this case however, both yield the same result for those who do not 
believe in either perspective on religiosity.  Exchanging denotations for connotations 
results in jurisdictional retrenchment of Anglican Ecclesiastical law/courts being deemed 
acceptable because it demanded expansive exceptionalism.  Yet, preventing jurisdictional 
encroachment of Islamic law, which also demands expansive exceptionalism, is an affront 
to multiculturalism.  This is the case despite the fact that the juxtaposition is between one 
of the largest religious denominations in the world (i.e., Anglicanism) and the second 
largest and fastest growing religious belief system in the world (i.e., Islam).1145  This reality 
notwithstanding, the different connotations seemingly result in a failure to even question 
the means by which affording faith-based legal exceptionalism will affect religious liberty 
and equal access to justice of non-Muslims in one context, even though it created a 
justifiable basis for rebellion and war for the sake of religious liberty in the other context. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that Islamization of American Common law represents the 
inverse of the circumstances that instigated assessments of the appropriateness of 
continuing to afford exceptional treatment to the Ecclesiastical courts of England.  That is, 
it has the same constitutionally insupportable aspects that result in ascribing the religious 
guidelines or legal precepts of Muslims to the whole of society.  Furthermore, any reliance 
on sharia or Islamic law that results in invoking what is religious primary and secondary 
source material brings about this outcome.  As religion is a voluntary association in 
England, Canada, and the United States, it can also be deduced that, notwithstanding 
whether the religious guidelines and laws are bifurcated or conflated, there is no real way 
to get around this practical reality.  This is also the case where methods of interpretation 
and dispensation bind national judiciaries to step into the shoes of Islamic jurists.  Whether 
encroachment comes by primary or ancillary means, it is no less problematic where the 
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legal rights and religious liberties of the non-Muslims implicated by Islamic law 
exceptionalism are concerned.    
The aforementioned analyses provided by American and Islamic law scholars and jurists 
establish a basis for conceptually distinguishing between sharia and Islamic law, which 
also negates the theory that Islamic law is an indivisible extension of Islam or sharia. 
Specifically, the term sharia encompasses discrete religious guidelines linked with the 
‘voluntary’ associations preferred by those who espouse Islam.  Alternatively, Islamic law 
includes interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah that have become legally binding in 
nations where that law prevails.  The apparent distinction between the concepts suggests 
that it is imprecise to equate sharia with Islamic law when attempting to make 
determinations about sanctioning either as a legal resource for ADR or adjudication in the 
U.S.  Hence, the effects of the POGG doctrine and what those effects taught the Framers 
about faith-based legal exceptionalism remains extremely relevant today.  In other words, 
the nation’s comprehensive assessment of not only Anglican exceptionalism, but also of 
the Quran and the religious laws of Islamic ummahs, afforded the American colonies the 
requisite foundational understanding to recognize the imprudence of faith-based legal 
exceptionalism in 1776 remains prevalent today.   
 6.2.2 The Nature of Islamic Regimes—Schisms & Geography  
If the United States were to discount America’s connection to POGG and the Framers’ 
perspectives, then the comparative/superlative nature of denominationalism within Islam 
offers a relevant prediction of the effects of entangling the American legislature or judiciary 
with the religiously political feud of two denominations.  Recall from previous chapters that 
North America has already been an arena for one religious Armageddon.  Not unlike the 
history of competitive proliferation of imperial-Catholicism and imperial-Anglicanism, the 
historical and geographical proliferation of Islam has similar characteristics.  Specifically, 
the spread of Islam possesses the same schismatic attributes of denominationalism that 
are inherent in other religious belief systems.  The most notable schism within the Islamic 
faith is between Sunnism and Shi’ism.1146  Recall that Anglicanism emerged because of 
England’s split with the Church of Rome over Henry VIII’s marital circumstances.  Along 
similar lines, the Sunni/Shia split emerged over the question of who would be 
Muhammad’s rightful successor.1147  According to Ahmed and Kerston: 
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Muslims who wanted to select [Muhammad’s] successor, or Caliph, 
by following the Prophet had designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali 
as his legitimate heir. This group was called Shia Ali, or ‘Party of Ali’, 
from which comes the word Shia.1148  
Like the religiously-political tensions between Catholicism and Anglicanism, engagements 
between Sunnis and Shias have resulted in “occasional instances where religious 
intolerances on both sides led to [national and international] conflict.”1149  Returning to 
Figure 5, denominationalism has resulted in comparable and in some instances competing 
schools assessing the Quran and Muhammad’s thoughts and actions, while establishing 
Islamic law as the legal substrate for approximately 45 nations throughout the Middle East 
and Africa.1150  Notwithstanding the fact that one can distinguish between sharia (non-
legally binding religious guidelines) and Islamic law (legally binding law of certain Islamic 
nations), the distinction does not negate the religious nature of either, as they are both 
recitations of the Quran and Sunnah.  Based on the relative steadiness of migration from 
Muslim-majority countries to the U.S., especially since the 1960s, it is safe to say that the 
United States plays host nation to immigrants from every nation listed in the diagram.  
Brougher and others contend that, for the U.S. judiciary to engage with Islamic law, it entails 
affording a platform for the dispensation of interpretations of religious law imported from 
Islamic law nations based on any of the aforementioned perspectives on the proper 
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah.1151  Thus, a relevant socio-legal inquiry is, does 
Islamic law possess the requisite neutrality to be applied in a nation that espouses 
disestablishment or whether any interpretation of it should be afforded deference in the 
U.S.?  Moreover, how does the particular selection affect everyone else? 
6.3 The ‘Dormant’ Effects of Marketing Exceptionalism as Multiculturalism 
In light of American foundational experiences under POGG and the lessons of the Framers 
pertaining to faith-based legal exceptionalism, it is necessary to demonstrate the 
problematic implications of espousing any one of the aforementioned interpretations.  This 
entails determining whether there are discernable ‘dormant effects’ on those who are 
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outside the zone of exception.  In other words, how might the legal rights of non-Muslims 
be affected by affording faith-based legal exceptionalism to Muslims?  This question is 
relevant because it why is it essential to reject the notion that assessments concerning 
exceptionalism and/or Islamization of U.S. law should be understood as appropriate within 
an expansive view on multiculturalism.    
The phrase ‘dormant effects’ is a nod toward the concept of the ‘dormant or negative 
commerce clause,’ which is a legal principle that stems from Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution.1152  The principle is employed to prohibit protectionist state legislation that 
discriminates against interstate or international commerce.1153  It suggests that affording 
exclusive power to Congress implies an inverse consequence, which is a restriction on state 
legislation that improperly discriminates against interstate commerce.  One can generally 
understand the constitutional analysis as an evaluation of how individual states’ subjective 
commercial activities (i.e., intrastate activities) have a cumulative effect on the larger 
commercial community (i.e., interstate activities).  The vantage-point from which these 
activities are evaluated is not from one state’s efforts to benefit itself or its individual 
residents. Instead, the activities are evaluated from the vantage point of the larger 
commercial community.  
The 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, offers an uncomplicated illustration of 
the underlying principle.  Filburn was a small Ohio farmer who grew wheat to use on his 
farm.1154  When the U.S. Government set production limits on wheat under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938, the aim was to stabilize not only wheat supply but also associated 
prices.1155  Filburn exceeded the limit permitted by nearly 12 acres and was fined as a 
                                                          
1152 ‘Commerce Clause’, Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School) <https://www.law.cornell.edu 
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1153 ‘Commerce Clause’ (n 1152); Martin H Redish and Shane V. Nugent, ‘The Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism’ (1986) 1987 Duke Law Journal 589 
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IIB1 addressing the Intent of the Framers, arguing that certain legal scholars contend that the Framers 
were clearly aware of the dangers of interstate economic friction, and chose to deal with the problem solely 
by the vesting of a power in Congress, rather than by imposition of a direct constitutional provision.  This is 
not dissimilar to the religious argument made by Ellis concerning the proper means to address religious 
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1154 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)., Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School) 
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result.1156  When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Filburn argued, “the extra 
wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been…for his own use and thus had 
no effect on interstate commerce,…this meant that he had not violated the law because 
the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.”1157  The 
Court disagreed with Filburn.  In a unanimous decision, the Court reasoned that, “even if 
each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate 
activity viewed in aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” it is 
within the purview of Congress’s regulatory power.1158 Therefore, Filburn’s subjective 
activities taken in aggregate with the production of all other farmers had a negative or 
dormant effect on interstate commerce.  Put another way, if every farmer attempted to 
exceed the regulatory limits for their own self-interest, it would frustrate the stability of not 
only wheat supply but also the national cost of wheat.    
Although the terminology is customarily associated with the constitutional legalities 
surrounding commercial activities, the employment of the laws of commercial contract to 
make reasonable the concept of faith-based legal exceptionalism, or the contracting away 
of one’s Free Exercise liberties, also makes reasonable the use of the Commerce Clause 
to provide theoretical application herein.  Based on the meaning of faith-based legal 
exceptionalism ascribed to this study, it can be inferred that affording exception based on 
the subjectivity of one’s religious beliefs may produce effects that are ‘dormant’ for citizens 
who belong to other religious subgroups/denominations.  It may also be inferred that these 
effects could frustrate the preservation of the national rule of law and equal access thereto, 
especially if the effects promote ‘forum shopping’ or create a wider range or different set 
of legal standards amongst the adherents of different religious dogmas.  For the sake of 
illustration, it is worth analyzing the circumstantial implications of Muslim Family Law 
(‘MFL’) and Muslim Banking Law (‘MBL’), when balanced against the rights of the 
adherents of other faiths or the plurality inherent in religious denominationalism as a 
whole.  
6.3.1 Evaluating the Dormant Effects of Muslim Family Law 
Returning to S.D. v. M.J.R., the defendant’s claim at its core was centered in family law that 
had morphed into domestic abuse charges and a petition for spousal protection under a 
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TRO.1159  The defendant’s reliance on the assertion that the actualization of his sexual 
desires is not problematic in his understanding of Islam suggests that his legal counsel 
thought it a valid defense.   Put another way, his attorney thought it acceptable to respond 
to the plaintiff’s petition for a TRO by relying on an interpretation of the Quran or Sunnah 
that aided in mitigating his client’s behavior.  As inherently problematic as such defenses 
may appear, the right to make them is not predicated on how repugnant society finds them.  
Instead, they appear to be predicated on the degree to which the U.S. is willing to expand 
the margins of the Free Exercise clause to allow interpretations of religious texts to 
refashion certain legal standards, defenses, and/or mitigating factors for some religious 
subgroups.  
Likewise, custodial rights under MFL offer another relevant illustration of the dormant 
effects.  The legal implications for parental rights of non-Muslim fathers demonstrate the 
dormant effect, especially where fathers might benefit from America’s incidental adoption 
of the traditional patriarchal perspectives of Islamic law.  In accordance with Islamic law, 
there are certain rights afforded Muslim men in relation to the best interest of their 
children.  Where it pertains divorce proceedings and custodial arrangements, “it is 
presumed that the best interests of the child are met by the dictates of a female having 
custody during younger years and a male having custody during later years.”1160  When 
male children in particular reach a certain age, husbands are traditionally afforded custody 
of those children in divorce because fathers are presumed to be in their best interest.1161  
Notwithstanding the disparate treatment of male and female children under Islamic law, 
the implications relevant to this study stem from expanding the margins of the Free 
Exercise clause for MFL to circumvent national law.  Specifically, adherents to other 
denominations are subject to U.S. law under a system that looks at the best interests of 
the child(ren) by establishing a rebuttable presumption that the mother is the custodial 
parent, whether in or out of wedlock, from birth to the age of majority.1162  The burden is 
often on the father to rebut the presumption and establish that awarding him full custody 
is in the best interest of his child(ren).  This outcome forces both parents to make a case 
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for full custody or work to achieve a compromise such that the child(ren)’s best interests 
are always paramount.1163  According to Monica Henderson: 
Under Islamic law, long-standing presumptions regarding parental 
fitness direct custody decisions[,] and the law assumes such 
presumptions automatically protect a child's best interests. Such 
presumptions and their enforcement run contrary to custody law in 
the United States.1164 
In other words, depending on the age and gender of a Muslim child at the point of divorce, 
the question of fitness to parent under Islamic law is a secondary or tertiary inquiry after 
the question of whether the parent is male and a Muslim. The latter requirement is 
consistent with interpretations of Islamic law that preclude Muslim children from being 
raised by non-Muslim family members.1165  Tangentially, this suggests that any freedom or 
right to leave Islam is in effect denied the mother if she wants to retain the right to raise 
her children.  For these reasons, Henderson opines that “[t]he court should ensure an 
Islamic decree actually serves the child instead of subjecting the child and possibly fit 
parent to the dictates of traditional [Islamic law] presumptions.”1166   
As a side note however, the patriarchal lens from which Islamic custody decisions are made 
could be a boon for divorced and single fathers who have attempted to gain custody of 
their child(ren) without any measurable degree of success.  To put another way, the 
practical implications appear to encompass Muslim fathers’ religion and gender creating a 
presumptive custodial right, while all other non-Muslim fathers are required to make a valid 
legal case for the same access to their children.  Moreover, the disparity is created for no 
other reason than they fall outside the zone of Islamic law exceptionalism.  To date, there 
have been a small number of cases where U.S. Courts have precluded an automatic 
presumption of custodial rights.  In some of those instances, the Muslim father opts to 
circumvent the U.S. Court’s jurisdiction by returning to his nation of origin and securing a 
judgment under Islamic law, to which the U.S. Court affords deference.1167  According to 
Henderson’s analysis, the same outcome is achieved—the Muslim father gains custody.1168  
However, the outcome is not achieved by using the American judicial system—including 
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state arbitration regulations—as the conduit for expanding the Free Exercise clause to 
foster disparate legal standards for custodial arrangements or other legal decisions for the 
sake of Islamic law exceptionalism.  To put another way, the U.S. judiciary as a conduit 
affects the religious freedoms and legal rights of all Americans, while the other 
circumstance can be distinguished as a consequence of an expansive view on 
multiculturalism that encompasses political ideologies and faith-based legal systems of 
non-democratic nations.  
For those who may be in favor of sanctioning Islamic law tribunals in the U.S. as a means 
to address issues such as the one highlighted above, it is convenient to claim that the 
wife/mother’s religious commitment prevails when she freely agrees to divorce under the 
terms set by a religious tribunal.  Taking this supposition at face value without addressing 
any claims concerning the perceived imbalance of power between men and women under 
Islam, the dormant effects on non-Muslims are implicated not just by disparate legal 
standards and substantive outcomes associated with adjudication, but they are even 
evident in the procedural disparities in the preliminary requirements of arbitration.  It is 
well understood that arbitration in the U.S. is regulated substantively and procedurally by 
state and federal law.  As was previously established, the FAA provides statutory coverage 
for federal arbitration “to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
any ‘maritime transaction or…contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce[.]’.”1169  At the state level, the Uniform Arbitration Act (‘UAA’) or the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act (‘RUAA’) provides statutory coverage for at least 35 states, while 
also providing a statutory template for the regulatory schemes adopted in the remaining 
states.1170   In relation to MFL specifically, the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act (‘UFLAA’) 
has more recently been proposed to regulate all family law disputes where “the parties, 
usually spouses, agree to submit one or more issues arising from the dissolution of their 
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relationship to an arbitrator, who is a neutral third party for resolution [i.e., a licensed 
attorney in good standing trained in identifying domestic violence and child abuse].”1171   
Despite Muslim advocacy groups’ promotion of MFL as a facet of ADR in the U.S., they 
seem to draw the line at having MFL arbitration agreements and procedures regulated like 
all other arbitration under the UAA, the RUAA, or the UFLAA in accordance with its adoption 
by each state.1172  Similar to the situation in England, there is instead an expectation for 
Islamic law tribunals to be accommodated beyond the limits of the national rule of law, 
while at the same time providing an added privilege for Muslim claimants who 
subsequently seek redress from the national judiciary when religion-based arbitration 
yields unwelcomed outcomes.  Although such a preference may seem innocuous to those 
who support and benefit from this exceptional option, the dormant effect on non-Muslims 
is created by the dispensation of unregulated arbitration decisions by lawyers, non-lawyers, 
or even imams using the Quran and/or Sunnah as primary and/or secondary source 
material.  Notwithstanding how innocuous those who benefit from the situation might find 
this outcome, the practical effect is that any integration or commingling of arbitrated or 
litigated decisions made under the Quran and/or Sunnah have an impact on the rights of 
non-Muslims.  Specifically, the decisions affect non-Muslims’ right to not have Islam 
imposed upon them in contravention of their own beliefs as well as the right to have access 
to a national judiciary that does not integrate or commingle the edicts of Islamic religious 
texts as part of the law to be applied in their legal proceedings.  As was established in 
Chapter 2, the high probability of this outcome appears to sit at the heart of legislative 
attempts to erect a jurisdictional fence around Islamic law tribunals in England.   
Returning to the aforementioned MFL example, the ‘price of admission’ to state (and 
federal) arbitration in the U.S. implicates the laws of contract, as Justice Kavanaugh 
recently opined.  This includes equal bargaining power between the contracting parties, or 
in the case of UFLAA, a neutral third party trained to detect and mitigate some of the 
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potential factors that might contribute to the imbalance.  How can it be said then that equal 
bargaining power (or at a minimum a lack of pressure or coercion) is a prerequisite for all 
those who pursue arbitration, except those who espouse Islam?1173  If the aim of this 
prerequisite is to prevent “the manifestly unfair use by a stronger party of its advantage,” 
then it appears that the preliminary determination of equal bargaining power is a moving 
target for faith-based legal tribunals—e.g., subject to familial, cultural, or religious 
pressures—while remaining a constant for non-religious arbitration.  This is especially 
noteworthy if the chief implication of this requirement is that any non-religious contractual 
imbalance might be modified or set aside to restore equity between the parties.1174  This 
leads to the question of whether a religious free-will argument preempts any delimiting 
attempts based on inequity?  From a practical perspective, the dormant effect created by 
Islamic law exceptionalism appears to afford Muslims the ability to avoid preliminary 
arbitration requirements as well as nullify public policy arguments that are applicable to 
any other claimants who pursue traditional (non-religious) arbitration. 
6.3.2 Evaluating the Dormant Effects of Muslim Banking Laws 
As it relates to non-familial rights, the manner in which MBLs are applied is also illustrative 
of instances where the rights of adherents of other religious denominations may be 
curtailed by faith-based legal exceptionalism in the name of Islam.  In the article, The Real 
Shariah Risk: Why the United States Cannot Afford to Miss the Islamic Finance Moment, 
Todd Schmid advocates for the U.S. Government’s reevaluation of present banking and 
investment principles to establish laws that are sharia compliant or that ensure “Islamic 
windows” by incorporating the underlying principles of Islamic finance,…[which include]: 
(1) the prohibition of riba; (2) the prohibition of gharar; and (3) the core emphasis of ethical 
notions of social justice, communal unity, fairness, and transparency.”1175  In relevant part, 
these principles prohibit the giving or requiring of interest.1176  They also require that 
investment choices are made “according to ethical criteria.”1177  The definition of ethical 
criteria presumptively stems from the interpretations of the Quran and/or Sunnah based 
on the previously highlighted religious interpretative schools.  Although a complete analysis 
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of Muslim investment practices is beyond the scope of this study, what is germane is that 
the aforementioned principles result in financial institutions becoming compliant with 
primary and secondary Islamic religious sources.  Does that not result in the U.S. 
Government seeking Quranic interpretations on the banking laws that affect Muslims and 
non-Muslims equally?  
Schmid also notes that “[m]odern Muslim scholars advance a range of rationales for these 
prohibitions…because…the Quran and Sunnah[]…do not provide any detailed 
rationale…beyond asserting, axiomatically, that charging interest is an act of injustice.”1178 
Notwithstanding whether there is anything inherently just or unjust about the 
aforementioned principles, “the feasibility of implementing Islamic banking in the United 
States [is tied to] understanding the core substantive meaning of [these] prohibition[s]”… 
as well as the general structure of the Islamic banking system.1179  To put this in its proper 
context, MBLs implicate not only U.S. banks but also state and federal regulatory bodies. 
The real-world implications seemingly obligate these governmental agencies to become 
engrossed in Islamic religious principles to fully understand the way they are to be applied 
in place of or in conjunction with U.S. law.  Where it relates to the Free Exercise clause, the 
result seems to mandate expanding the margins to make exception for the way in which 
certain interest-bearing accounts are treated in monetary transactions involving those who 
espouse Islam.  This outcome first demonstrates the dormant effect on non-Muslims who 
have no recourse but to be subject to interest rates based on their credit scores and/or 
debt-to-income ratios.  As was demonstrated in the previous section, it is also illustrative 
of the manner in which Islamic law would be imposed upon non-Muslims as MBLs are 
commingled with federal law via litigation and/or when federal arbitration proceedings 
brought under the FAA become subject to judicial review.  If banking regulatory agencies, 
adjudicators, arbitrators, and legal counselors are implicated by the integration of MBLs, 
then how can it be said that the rights of non-Muslims will be spared? Put another way, 
how can the federal judiciary look to the Quran and/or Sunnah to supplement U.S. banking 
laws without affecting the financial circumstances—and religious rights—of non-Muslims?   
At this point, it is worth linking this analysis back to the furtherance of an expansive view 
of multiculturalism. Recall that this assessment is one that has already been undertaken 
by America’s northerly neighbor. Also recall that Durham defines Canada’s approach to 
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disestablishment as an accommodationist church-state arrangement, which means strict 
separation of church and state with the ancillary goal of promoting multiculturalism.1180  
Central to Canada’s debates concerning legalizing Islamic law tribunals was answering the 
question: how does faith-based legal exceptionalism promote multicultural inclusion?1181   
The Canadian legislature found no tangible nexus between the means and desired 
ends.1182  In fact, Canada found that faith-based legal exceptionalism frustrates 
multicultural inclusion because it relies on infringements of Canadian Constitutional Law 
to achieve its desired ends.1183   
As a means of distinguishing subjective preferences from the rule of law, it is worth 
evaluating some of the criticisms.  Specifically, some proponents of Islamic law tribunals 
have claimed that men and women are free to choose whether they want to be treated 
equally based on their religious views.1184 This makes decisions like Canada’s seem 
prejudicial against certain Muslims.  By that logic however, one could argue that every effort 
to further gender equality in nations that espouse democracy should be reevaluated 
because of religious proclivities.  If that is the case, should efforts to ensure equal pay for 
equal work be discontinued because there may be women who have moral or religious 
ambivalence about receiving salaries that match or exceed their husbands?  In reality, 
Canada’s decision does not appear to preclude individuals from treating one another as 
unequally as they are willing to bear.  It simply prevents the Canadian legislature and/or 
judiciary from becoming the conduit for said treatment in violation of Canadian 
Constitutional law.  This finding apparently led Canada to prohibit all faith-based legal 
platforms to avoid frustrating the national rule of law.1185   According to Saul, the Canadian 
Government decided that “[t]he intention had been good—[b]ut the fallout was worse than 
the advantage gained…[s]o…arbitration courts were banned for all religions.”1186   
Recall that Durham and others contend that the U.S. separationist church-state 
arrangement is more pronounced than that of Canada’s accommodationist perspective 
(i.e., separation by a wall instead of a thick curtain).  Evaluating Islamic law tribunals from 
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the perspective most favorable to the spirit of multiculturalism, Canada found that faith-
based legal exceptionalism does nothing to actually promote or demonstrate 
multiculturalism.  This is in keeping with Manea’s assessment of the integration of Islamic 
law exceptionalism in England.  She points out that “for decades, they had argued that 
everyone should be equal despite their racial, ethnic, religious or cultural differences.  Now 
they pushed the idea that different people should be treated differently precisely because 
of such differences.”1187  Thus, the Canadian legislature determined that, “religious laws 
apply to a believer’s spiritual life…[therefore]…they don’t trump Canadian law,” whether 
civil, criminal or otherwise.1188  This position appears to treat all Canadians equally.   
Despite these realities being equally applicable to the U.S. under its wall of separation, the 
U.S. seems to avoid a national proclamation where it pertains the scope of the 1st 
Amendment and returning to the practice of faith-based legal exceptionalism.  For the sake 
of further illustration, the U.S. iteration of the same question posed in Canada (based on 
the aforementioned banking context) might be presented as: What does Representative 
Omar’s ability to wear her headscarf and prayer beads on the Congressional floor have to 
do with the amount of interest calculated on her home in relation to other members of 
Congress?1189  To avoid this type of arbitrary incongruence, it would seem that if MBLs are 
demonstrative of best industry practices, then they would be available to all American 
citizens without needing to label them ‘for Muslims only’.  In the aforementioned example, 
there is an obvious discriminatory element to banking practices with disparate outcomes 
because U.S. banking laws and Muslim banking laws yield dissimilar interest calculations 
for no other reason than the fact that one applicant believes in the divinity of Jesus Christ 
and the other believes that Jesus Christ was one in a long line of important human beings?  
Along the same lines, what if one applicant does not believe in any of the prophets in the 
Abrahamic pantheon?  Notwithstanding the collective holding in the Awad cases or the 
proclamation by the ABA, which were examined in the previous chapter, it appears that the 
problematic outcomes in the original S.D. v. M.J.R. trial more accurately illustrate the 
practical effects of the U.S. Government discounting the Framers’ perspective and 
vacillating too long on nationally prohibiting Islamic law exceptionalism.  
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6.3.3 Evaluating the Effects of Exceptionalism in Free Exercise Challenges 
Another question that is relevant to this study is to what degree will the application of 
Islamic law frustrate those constitutional writs that actually fit the customary definition of 
free exercise claims?  It appears that Muslim migration and the application of Islamic law 
are gauged somewhat superficially, ignoring from where the law originates.  This seems to 
have resulted in Islamic law engagement being evaluated as if it is analogous to other 
religious claims under the 1st Amendment, or synonymous with looking to the impartial 
legal systems of other nations for guidance concerning certain constitutional matters. 
However, this appears to be a mistake.  Although there is much debate over whether it is 
necessary or even appropriate for the national judiciary to look to other nations for 
guidance in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, what is relevant is that any international or 
foreign law consideration is neither binding on U.S. courts or imputable to American 
claimants.1190 
Where it pertains the distinction between relying on Islamic law as primary source material 
and constitutional claims brought under the Free Exercise clause, the adoption of one 
appears to have the potential to render the other obsolete.  Specifically, cases brought 
under the Free Exercise clause are characteristically associated with government action. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has established a tri-part test to determine whether a specific 
government action “encroaches too far on the free exercise of religion.”1191  The 
preliminary jurisdictional inquiry addresses the following questions: (1) whether the court 
has jurisdiction over the matter?; (2) whether the claim is justiciable?; and (3) whether 
there was harm by the Government’s action?1192 Although the nuances involved in 
determining how jurisdiction is resolved are beyond the scope of this study, what is relevant 
is the substantive question that follows.  It determines applicability on the merits of the 
claim.  Specifically, the Court asks whether the Government substantially burdened the 
claimant “for believing or doing something prohibited by claimant’s religion or for refraining 
from believing or doing something compelled by claimant’s religion?”1193  
This question promotes an assessment concerning the veracity of the claimant’s religious 
belief.  The question of whether the Government has “disadvantage[d] [a] claimant 
because of some religiously motivated belief or action on the part of [the] claimant,” is 
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balanced against the veracity of that belief.1194  Galloway notes that “the Supreme Court 
has never formulated an explicit definition of ‘religion’.”1195  Instead, “the core concept is 
that religion concerns…‘belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to 
those arising from any human relation’.”1196  As was previously discussed, the nature of 
religion suggests that the general definition is applicable to those who believe in God as 
well as “non-theistic beliefs [provided that] they are the functional equivalent of belief in 
God.”1197  The test of religious veracity “is whether a given belief that is sincere and 
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox 
belief in God.”1198  
It appears that faith-based legal exceptionalism would establish disproportionate 
constitutional inquiries for Muslims and non-Muslims on procedural or substantive 
grounds.  Thus, it is conceivable that government harm becomes a foregone conclusion as 
it relates to the expansive list of claims for accommodation associated with the voluntary 
religious choices of Muslims.  Based on the test outlined above, affording faith-based legal 
exceptionalism to Islamic law also appears to have the propensity to shift the burden from 
the claimant (to prove veracity of belief) to the Government to disprove religious devotion.  
This occurs because of not only the expansive degree of societal accommodation but also 
because the entire religious subgroup has been afforded faith-based legal exception.  Put 
another way, how does the veracity of belief not immediately attach when every petitioner 
who espouses Islam is shielded by the theory buttressing America’s all-inclusive approach 
to multiculturalism? This question is particularly valid since, notwithstanding whether 
donning religious garb (e.g., abayas or dish-dashas) denotes suppression or empowerment, 
it is an unmistakable personification of religious attachment to a denomination of Islam 
and the unparalleled exception afforded by Western nations because of it.  How does the 
accumulation of exceptions not have an effect on the question of veracity of belief? 
It thus appears that establishing the veracity of belief becomes cluttered by 
multiculturalism in America because inclusion demands the acceptance that the sum total 
of Middle Eastern or North African culture is encapsulated in the tenets of Islam.  Inquiries 
and outcomes such as these are substantively and procedurally relevant when the analysis 
of Islamic law integration is viewed, not through the foundational terms of the U.S. 
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Constitution, but through the undiscerning lens of multiculturalism.  For this reason, 
foundational perspectives seem to provide much needed clarity concerning the 
problematic legal implications of integrating religious law, whether domestic or foreign, into 
a juridical infrastructure founded on a separationist church-state arrangement. 
6.4 The Constitutionality of Broadly Defining Multiculturalism: A New Suicide 
 Pact? 
The final aspect of assessing the implications of not heeding the effects of POGG is 
addressing the question of whether not espousing the political ideologies or religious laws 
of Islamic-law nations has resulted in a failure to reasonably accommodate the religious 
sensitivities of Muslims.  To further this end, it is necessary to return to Barry’s juxtaposition 
between cultural incommensurability and cultural equality in the introductory chapter of 
this study.  Recall that Barry contends that there is an inconsistency that exists when efforts 
are made to treat individual cultures as both unique and incomparable while also claiming 
a level of equivalence between all cultures co-existing in one nation.  Although it is fair to 
say that cultural attributes that accompany new waves of immigrants are both unique and 
worthy of equal treatment, it does not then follow that acknowledgment of their value 
means that it is acceptable to infringe or curtail the rights and freedoms of citizens and 
residents who predate them.   
Where it relates to cultural equality, it is well understood that a nation’s political ideology 
and rule of law are foundational attributes that speak to the unique identity and sovereignty 
of that nation.1199  They also contribute to the identities of the citizens of that nation.1200  
For the three nations that are the subjects of this study, both democracy and respect for 
the rule of law are included in the national standards that are upheld as non-negotiable 
culturally equalizing principles.  Moreover, they are attributes that have arguably made 
migration to these nations more appealing for the million or so new arrivals who in 
aggregate legally relocate to these three nations each year.1201 . However, the expansion 
of the definition of multiculturalism, to encourage host nations to embrace and even afford 
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deference to the political ideologies and laws of the nations from which certain immigrants 
hail, has resulted in and may continue to result in “legal and political accommodation of 
ethnic diversity…[remaining]…in a state of flux….”1202  
The inconsistency surrounding legal and political accommodation seemingly explains why 
the appearance of U.S. ambivalence to a national prohibition of Islamic law is so 
controversial.  The idea of a nation that espouses liberal democracy relying on said 
democracy to circuitously further authoritarian ideals and faith-based legal exceptionalism 
under the guise of multiculturalism seems inherently illogical.  Where it pertains the Islamic 
law inquiry, the political ideologies and legal precepts both lead back to interpretations of 
the Quran and the Sunnah, notwithstanding how many jurists evaluate them.  If one looks 
beyond multiculturalism to determine how the parts fit together, the political ideologies and 
religious source materials seemingly result in the question of compatibility circling back on 
itself and creating a questionable dichotomy between what the U.S. claims to espouse and 
what is actually unfolding. Therefore, it is necessary to assess whether reasonable 
accommodation is discernible in the United States. 
In a 2017 study on ‘political multiculturalism’, Wright et al. take up the under-analyzed 
question of how members of host nations are affected by the expansive degree of social 
interaction that Muslims link to religious claims for accommodation.  In so doing, they 
conclude that, where it specifically pertains to Canada and the United States, it is not 
actually accommodation.  The more precise label for the breadth of claims made by 
Muslims is ‘Muslim exceptionalism’.1203   Akin to the position taken herein concerning faith-
based legal exceptionalism, Wright et al. conclude that exceptionalism extends beyond 
‘customs, traditions, music and cuisine’—vis-à-vis aspects that demonstrate cultural 
incommensurability—to encompass an expectation to incorporate the political ideologies—
or choice of law preferences—of newer immigrants in the name of religion.1204  This appears 
to be the case notwithstanding how compatible or incompatible the ideologies and/or 
preferences are with the non-negotiable culturally equalizing principles of both nations.  
Measuring the effects of Muslim exceptionalism on Canadian and American native-born 
members, Wright et al. observe that exceptionalism is “convincingly demonstrate[d]” in 
                                                          
1202 Kymlicka (n 34), 97. 
1203 Wright and others (n 5), 102. 
1204 Wright and others (n 5), 102. 
[253]  
 
both nations although to differing degrees.1205  Thematically adjacent to faith-based legal 
exceptionalism, the study focuses on three noteworthy areas that are politically imposed 
upon native-born citizens and extend beyond the general understanding of religious 
accommodation: (1) legally upholding multicultural policies; (2) wearing religious garb; and 
(3) accommodating certain religious perspectives and practices.1206  Beyond the more 
obvious request for exception concerning the wearing of religious garb, activities such as 
expecting non-Muslims to extend a degree of reverence for Muhammad consistent with 
that of Muslims; teaching Muslim history in schools; accommodating prayer rooms; 
compelling establishments to accommodate gender specific outlets like swimming pools 
and hair salons all fold into the three categories.1207  
As the list highlights, the claims continue to become more expansive and continue to be 
shielded by the compulsions of multiculturalism. As a result, Wright et al. note that the 
requests and the ideology that shields them have also become an “increasingly salient 
problem.”1208  This is attributable to the fact that they represent the conflict between 
multiculturalists’ compulsion “to accommodate Muslim sensitivities and…practices 
embedded in religion[,] and [the remainder of society’s commitment to] liberal values 
founded on individual freedom and equality.”1209  Therefore, the claims have resulted in 
tolerance becoming “in shorter supply for Muslims than for other religious groups,” which 
is an outcome that Wright et al. ascribe to the effects of secularism.1210  If one does not 
readily assume that secularism is the primary motivating factor however, the findings can 
also be ascribed to the effects of the often-overlooked adherents of the multitude of lesser 
considered denominations and subgroups whose freedoms include the right not to have 
the religious guidelines and/or laws of Islam legally imposed upon them via the national 
courts’ engagement therewith.  This is especially significant as many if not all of them likely 
already have their own deeply held religious guidelines that are not equally forced upon the 
rest of society by way of national courts’ integration via exceptionalism.  
                                                          
1205 Wright and others (n 5), 103. Generally speaking, Wright and others make distinction between religious 
accommodation in general and accommodating Muslim claims in particular, which isolates what is defined 
as Muslim exceptionalism. That is, Muslim claims apparently extend beyond general claims of religious 
accommodation as well as religion-based exemptions. 
1206 Wright and others (n 5), 114-23. 
1207 Wright and others (n 5), 114-23. 
1208 Wright and others (n 5), 105. 
1209 Wright and others (n 5), 104. 
1210 Wright and others (n 5), 125. 
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Kymlicka suggests that these outcomes are more likely attributable to the fact that “we 
are…in a post-multicultural era.”1211  If this is the case, now might be the prudent time to 
revisit the Framers’ perspectives on faith-based legal exceptionalism as well as religion-
based exemptions to make discernible distinctions between proper constitutional inquiries 
on the one hand and the machinations of multicultural theorists who seek to add to 
promote an overly-broad definition of multiculturalism on the other.  In the 1949 Supreme 
Court case Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, Justice Jackson, restating President 
Abraham Lincoln, in his dissent observed, “there is danger that, if the Court does not 
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional 
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”1212  A relevant question is whether the same can be said 
about being so wedded to the rationale behind the concept of multiculturalism that there 
is a failure to recognize when the concept becomes more of a hindrance than a help—vis-
à-vis when its adoption results in  embracing the political ideologies and religion-central 
legal systems of non-democratic nations from which some late-stage American immigrants 
hail.    
To assess the plausibility of an arbitrarily expansive definition of multiculturalism becoming 
America’s newest suicide pact, one need only ask what multiculturalism is attempting to 
achieve and how it is endeavoring to achieve it.  In this study, the question might be framed:  
If American citizens endorse multiculturalism, has it become a 
nationally galvanizing ideology that condones its normalization at all 
costs?  Moreover, does it mean disregarding the law of the Founding 
in order to effectively amend the 1st Amendment for more insular 
religious subgroups and denominations while simultaneously 
infringing on the of rights others?    
In the 1943 case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, the 
Supreme Court addressed a similar question when it overruled Minersville School District 
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, which upheld the pledge of allegiance as necessary to the State's 
interest in ‘national cohesion’.1213  The Court’s response appears to have some relevance 
                                                          
1211 Kymlicka (n 34), 98. 
1212 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)., Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School) 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/337/1>. 
1213 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)., Legal Information Institute 
(Cornell Law School) <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/319/624>; West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-




in assessing the employment of multiculturalism to justify overstepping the foundational 
perspectives on religious freedom in the United States.  
The West Virginia Board of Education—like many others—required public schools to include 
a daily salute to the U.S. flag as a mandatory part of school activities.1214  The salute was 
accompanied by the following declaration: “[I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United 
States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with 
liberty and justice for all.]”1215  Parents of certain students were Jehovah's Witnesses, so 
they rejected the requirement, and their children were expelled for non-compliance.1216  As 
the family’s refusal was based on religious grounds, some legal scholars cling to this 
holding to suggest that every conceivable facet of free exercise under the 1st Amendment 
is an individual right that is beyond any degree of national or state-wide question, 
regulation, or vote.1217  This position is often supported by Justice Jackson’s now famous 
declaration: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy,…to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, 
and property,…freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.1218 
To recollect however, it has been established in previous chapters that—as a consequence 
of POGG—faith-based legal exceptionalism is beyond the scope of what early Americans or 
the Constitutional Framers envisioned by liberty; the freedom to worship; or the concept of 
free exercise included in the Bill of Rights.  Likewise, it has been demonstrated that faith-
based legal exceptionalism does not fit within the category of religious exemptions, as was 
understood by the Framers and/or is understood by Constitutional scholars today.  It has 
also been demonstrated that faith-based legal exceptionalism is not akin to the 
constitutional concessions afforded those who possessed the North American continent 
before the United States was established.  Returning to the Framers’ perspective, it 
appears safe to suppose that unless or until faith-based forum shopping for all religious 
subgroups is acknowledged as an affirmative right that definitively extends from one’s 
constitutional right of Free Exercise; universal human right of conscience or belief; or an 
                                                          
1214 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1215 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1216 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1217 American Bar Association (n 894). 
1218 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
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equally applicable religion-based exemption, then this aspect of Justice Jackson’s holding 
is not germane.  
It is important to comprehend that in this case the pledge of allegiance was devoid of any 
religious content.  Its evaluation is for the primary purpose of determining whether the 
State had a compelling interest in legislative compulsion as an appropriate means to 
promote national cohesion.1219  Specifically, the lesser appreciated aspects of Justice 
Jackson’s opinion appear to speak to the heart of the implications of predicating faith-
based legal exceptionalism on multiculturalism, or treating it as a natural extension of free 
exercise for some denominations when there is no constitutional or foundational support 
for it.  Justice Jackson opines: 
National unity, as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and 
example, is not in question. The problem is whether, under our 
Constitution, compulsion as here employed is a permissible means 
for its achievement. Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in 
support of some end thought essential to their time and country have 
been waged by many good, as well as by evil, men. Nationalism is a 
relatively recent phenomenon [in the U.S.], but, at other times and 
places, the ends have been racial or territorial security, support of a 
dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As first and 
moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its 
accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity.1220 
In other words, “the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any 
topic.”1221 The same appears to be no less true if you replace ‘national unity’ with 
‘multiculturalism’.  By falling back on an expansive definition of multiculturalism to buttress 
this exceptional choice of law provision for Muslims, has not the same result been achieved 
as imposing the national pledge of allegiance upon public school students and their 
families? That is, it “prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in…religion, or other matters of 
opinion, [by indirectly] forcing citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”1222  If 
compulsion is not a permissible means of achieving ‘national unity’, how can it be a 
permissible means of achieving multiculturalism?    
If the United States is intent on setting aside the separation of church and state for the 
sake of Islam, then the United States appears to be intent on setting aside those 
foundational aspects that the Founders employed to define the direction of the nation.  
                                                          
1219 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1220 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1221 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
1222 319 U.S. 624 (1943). (n 1213). 
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Such a consequential move arguably deserves the voice of adherents of every 
denomination that is affected by this change in the nation’s constitutional trajectory.  The 
question of whether to sanction faith-based legal platforms for one religious subgroup or 
all of them demands a bit more than a defense centered in an overly-broad interpretation 
of multiculturalism.  As the Islamic law inquiry demonstrates, the consequences have the 
propensity to affect all citizens’ rights as Islamic law becomes involuntarily imposed upon 
them by juridical engagement, affirmation, or appeal.  In other words, Islamic law 
exceptionalism could come to affect the constitutional foundation upon which the United 
States is built.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Disregarding what the Framers understood about faith-based legal exceptionalism at the 
point of colonial rebellion seems to be propelling the United States toward setting aside 
one of her most sacred constitutional pillars—vis-à-vis her separationist church-state 
arrangement.  Such a consequential move suggests that faith-based legal exceptionalism 
is not an individual right that belongs to any one person or insular religious subgroup or 
denomination.  As the Islamic law inquiry undertaken herein has demonstrated, it will be 
far more than the 1% of the U.S. population that espouses Islam who are subject to the 
dormant effects of nationally sanctioning interpretations of Islamic law or any other 
religious guidelines whose primary sources are religious texts.1223  If America is not willing 
to heed and learn from what the Framers understood after 200 years of negotiating for 
religious equilibrium, then the nation may come to repeat the circumstances brought about 
by the first imperative of the POGG doctrine.   Unlike the American Civil War and the morally 
debasing institution of slavery, the fight for retaining the freedom to co-exist free of faith-
based legal exceptionalism, which has always emanated from the separation of church and 
state, may enlarge the rift in an already polarized nation.  
Therefore, the question of faith-based legal exceptionalism appears to be the 
quintessential American conundrum that should fall within the purview of the federal or 
state legislatures to be put to a vote by the American people.   Moreover, it should be a 
vote that affords the same rights to all religious denominations and encompasses as many 
religious texts and guidelines—i.e., primary sources—as are akin to the Quran and Sunnah. 
To do otherwise is to suggest that there is something about Islam that makes its religious 
perspectives worthy of being imposed upon the whole of society without their consent.  It 
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has also been demonstrated that it is imprudent to allow faith-based legal exceptionalism 
or religion-based exemptions to be shielded under the umbrella of multiculturalism.  Based 
on the present trajectory of national views on practices in furtherance of multiculturalism, 
the misalignment might do more harm to analyses concerning the political ideologies and 
choice of law preferences than it does good.  As has been exemplified herein, there is no 
evidence that suggests promotion of the political ideologies or legal infrastructures of 
newer immigrants is a celebration of their culture, despite multiculturalists’ suggestion to 
the contrary.  Instead, this approach appears to buttress turning the U.S. judiciary into a 
smorgasbord of subjective legal platforms that will have the effect of destabilization the 





CONCLUSION & PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
“[W]hat has been will be again, what has been done will be done again;  
there is nothing new under the sun.”1224     
 
This study has endeavored to expand the scope and application of the POGG doctrine by 
demonstrating that it was and is more than ‘an unexplained constitutional clause’ that 
suffers from a ‘coherence deficit’.1225  By focusing on the international conundrum created 
by requests for Islamic law exceptionalism, this study demonstrates that POGG was the 
catalyst for the establishment of three disparate church-state arrangements.  Thus, it has 
become the basis for England’s perception of a modern-day obligation to sanction faith-
based legal exceptionalism, which is steeped in the legacy of Imperialism.  For Canada, 
POGG was a lifeline for the retention of ‘Britishness’ during its colonial-era, which was 
transitioned into a constitutional basis for sound post-colonial decision-making concerning 
all faith-based legal exceptionalism.   For the United States, POGG was the catalyst for 
rebellion and war as a response to Imperialism, which included faith-based legal 
exceptionalism in the promotion of Anglicanism supremacy.  Likewise, it facilitated the 
establishment of legal constitutionalism, which set a post-colonial trajectory toward life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  However, it remains to be seen whether the 
cautionary tale associated with the foundational connection between POGG and the U.S. 
Constitution will be heeded.  This is especially the case where it pertains responding to new 
expectations for Islamic law exceptionalism, which have been promoted under the guise of 
multiculturalism.   
7.1 The Future Implications of England’s Commitment to the Legacy of POGG 
Although there have been recent assertions that the disestablishment of the Anglican 
Church from the rest of the English Government “would not be the end of the world,” there 
appears to be little evidence that disestablishment has been contemplated in her soon-to-
be post-EU existence.1226 The unwillingness to consider disentangling the Church of 
England from the Government of England appears to be grounded in the fact that England 
is not actually post-Christianity or post-religion in general, despite claims to the contrary.  
Instead, it is more plausible that England has undergone a redistribution of religious 
                                                          
1224 Ecclesiastes 1:9 (New International Version), (n 3). 
1225 Yusuf (n 103), 28. 




subgroups and denominations with the redistribution of colonial inhabitants as a 
consequence of POGG.  As migration to the British Isles from former colonies accounts for 
the lion’s share of her post-war migration profile, imperial commitments concerning 
toleration made to colonial subjects while they remained on foreign soil have seemingly 
been transferred to the mainland.  As a result of that transfer, obligations to ‘tolerate’ have 
now become obligations to ‘accommodate’.  Modernity has also brought about not-so 
flattering reassessments of Imperialism, which seems to be forcing England to make more 
overt attempts at accommodation, even if it results in condoning practices that neither 
further democracy nor promote equality.  This is the case notwithstanding the fact that the 
approaches being adopted have previously been tested and failed in protecting the 
religious liberties and adjudicative rights of those not being afforded exceptional 
deference.   
How these decisions will affect the future promotion of the nation’s FSVs appears to be the 
essential question.  As was evidenced in Chapter 2, the repeated introduction of 
parliamentary legislation to better regulate the substantive and procedural practices of 
Islamic law tribunals evidences that uniformity concerning the aims of sanctioning faith-
based legal exceptionalism whilst also precluding the judgments from encroaching on the 
rights of non-Muslims is clearly lacking. Therefore, the practical implications of sanctioning 
faith-based legal exceptionalism in England appears to encourage three possible 
outcomes: (1) the establishment of incongruent, competing bodies of religious law that 
may foster greater division within British society; (2) the justification for the return to the 
more expansive role of ecclesiastical courts to attempt to balance the disparate 
adjudicative options for the surplus of religious preferences co-existing throughout Britain; 
or (3) the commingling of decisions applying religious law with England’s national rule of 
law, notwithstanding the fact that it may result in imposing religion-specific legal precepts 
upon the whole of British society. 
7.2 The Future Implications of Canada Remaining the Bastion of POGG 
Canada’s protracted relationship with the United Kingdom established a rebuttable 
presumption that the nation would not only comingle religion and government (analogous 
to that of England), but also establish Anglicanism as the national church throughout the 
provinces.  However, Canada’s extrication of religion from government and vice versa was 
fully evident after 1982.  A benefit of full sovereignty coming late to Canada is that the 
breadth of her constitutional history under POGG embraces not only the commitments 
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made by her Founding Fathers but also the more recent Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
The research undertaken herein suggests that Canada relied on that foundational history 
to draw distinction between two constitutional circumstances, which both have religious 
undertones. On the one hand, there is honoring foundational commitments made to the 
French-Quebecois and the First Nations by treaty and royal proclamation. On the other, 
there is enacting legislation or sanctioning competing legal platforms for various insular 
religious subgroups/denominations.  The latter has the practical effect of potentially 
weakening the supremacy of Canada’s legislative and juridical infrastructures, while the 
former  has been a means of addressing the residual foundational issues that British 
Imperialism left unresolved.  As a result of the marriage between POGG and federalism in 
Canada, faith-based legal exceptionalism has been deemed legally impermissible for all 
religious dogmas, as it runs afoul of several aspects of the BNA and Charter.  
How this decision will affect future Muslim immigration to Canada from Islamic law nations 
is unclear.  Future immigration notwithstanding, Canada’s policy concerning faith-based 
legal exceptionalism sends a clear message that upholding the values of her national 
Constitution is the price of admission to Canada regardless of one’s country of origin.  If 
analyses of Canada’s rankings on recent democracy indices are any indication of the 
significance of that message, the decision to retain one law for all Canadians has not 
affected her movement toward being one of the most democratically-inclined nations in 
the world.  As was previously established, the same indices suggest that the United States’ 
ranking continues to drop to the unfortunate status of being labelled democratically-flawed.  
Considering the two nations similar approaches to disestablishment, one could question 
whether the perception of the U.S.’s ambivalence toward certain fundamental 
constitutional determinations—e.g., acquiescence to the accommodation of non-
democratic political ideologies as well as a failure to reach national consensus concerning 
faith-based legal exceptionalism—might contribute to this outcome.  Thus, Canada appears 
to have made the most constitutionally prudent decision since national patriation.  
Specifically, Canada opted to safeguard the national rule of law, which is available to all 
Canadians, thereby preserving the nation’s accommodationist church-state arrangement.  
7.3 The Future Implications of Heeding the Lessons of POGG in the U.S. 
References to the American iteration of POGG are so far removed from the United States’ 
collective memory that to suggest that America was once subject to POGG seems 
inconceivable. Instead, U.S. history is overly pregnant with references to LLPH. This is 
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largely attributable to the fact that by the time the U.S. Constitution came into effect on the 
4th of March in 1789, POGG had been fundamentally disregarded as a mode of effective 
governance in the newly formed nation.  As the research undertaken herein suggests 
however, POGG was not only an aspect of the American colonial experience, but the effects 
thereof led the U.S. toward her separationist church-state arrangement.   
Therefore, the future implications of the U.S. not heeding her constitutional history can be 
found in the possible repetition of her past.  Specifically, America’s claim to religiosity is 
vested in the individual autonomy to espouse any one of the religious denominational parts 
that make up the whole.  Thus, she should not become a nation that sanctions faith-based 
legal exceptionalism for the sake of favoring and bolstering certain religion-centric precepts 
to promote multiculturalism.  This is the case notwithstanding whether exceptionalism is 
achieved directly, or by branches of the U.S. Government becoming conduits for religious 
states or communities to bring about such an outcome.  As religious equilibrium—and by 
extension religious liberty—was utilized as a commodity to be negotiated to secure colonial 
obedience for two centuries during America’s colonial period, there is no basis to the theory 
that separation of church and state was meant to designate that religion was unimportant 
to or absent from establishing the nation.  The key distinction is that the nation was 
predicated on the U.S. Government’s commitment to ‘make no laws’ that utilize the social 
contract between it and the multitude of denominations to again commoditize religious 
liberty or promote denominational exceptionalism by making extra-constitutional 
accommodations for one denomination over others.   
A valid question is whether the U.S. has lost sight of that compact by allowing the concept 
of multiculturalism to be extended to encompass the political ideologies and religion-
centric legal systems of migrants who hail from non-democratic nations, or nations that 
have not disentangled religion from government.  Even before 9/11 created more religious 
division in America, there were endeavors to analyze the sustaining presence of America’s 
religiosity phenomenon.  Specifically, generalizations included first herding Christian 
denominations together like cattle, notwithstanding their ethnicity.  Those making the 
generalization then attach the prefix ‘Judeo’ to the term ‘Christian’ to ensure to implicate 
not just the multitude of those who have made a subjective choice to espouse one faith 
over another, but also an entire ethnic group by historical association, notwithstanding the 
various denominations associated with that group.  To make multiculturalism appear the 
proper response, this religious generalization has seemingly come to be pitted against 
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descriptors like diaspora, marginal, or the other, which are then attached to later arrived 
immigrants to ensure that even beneficial degrees of assimilation are an affront to the 
concept of multiculturalism. This is the case despite the fact that Islam as a world-wide 
subjective religious movement cannot be accurately included under any of the descriptors 
without fostering incongruity.  The uncomplimentary connotations associated with these 
terms then aid in making constitutional questions appear socio-political so as to justify 
sidestepping constitutional history when seeking solutions. 
To avoid repeating history in an effort to secure exceptional treatment for sharia guidelines 
or Islamic law, it is important to recall that the U.S. Constitution establishes the means for 
the expansion and/or contraction of religious denominationalism without individual 
compulsion or the national advancement of one sect over any other.  As a result, there are 
no less than 236 religious subgroups and denominations that populate no less than 
350,000 congregations in the United States.1227  This includes Christian and non-Christian 
believers. As American citizenry, the national rule of law is applicable to them all.  It is 
unlikely that this outcome would have been possible if the Framers had not made a 
concerted effort to remove the effects of the POGG doctrine to ensure that future 
generations did not repeat the same error that aided in losing the British Empire the 
American colonies—vis-à-vis compelling faith-based legal exceptionalism thereby playing 
comparative/superlative politics with religious liberty.   
As later-stage immigration brings with it guidelines and laws that purport to be 
indistinguishable from the religious denominations to which they are attached, the 
individuals who espouse these dogmas make up discrete communities of believers to 
which those legal precepts apply.  However, attempts to integrate those religious guidelines 
and laws with the national rule of law is arguably tantamount to forcing the religious 
precepts of those immigrants on the remainder of society in violation of their religious 
liberties and equal access to an impartial judiciary.  When evaluated in light of those 
discrete denominations of colonial American non-Anglican dissenters, the effects of 
encroaching on religious liberties as a consequence of imperial-Anglicanism appear to be 
quite transparent.  Thus, returning to America’s founding era is integral to heeding the 
pitfalls associated with present requests for Islamic law legal exceptionalism specifically, 
and faith-based legal exceptionalism generally.  Moreover, it will undoubtedly promote the 
future preservation of the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment; national and 
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